Unconsciously Triggered Emotional Conflict by Emotional Facial Expressions

The present study investigated whether emotional conflict and emotional conflict adaptation could be triggered by unconscious emotional information as assessed in a backward-masked affective priming task. Participants were instructed to identify the valence of a face (e.g., happy or sad) preceded by a masked happy or sad face. The results of two experiments revealed the emotional conflict effect but no emotional conflict adaptation effect. This demonstrates that emotional conflict can be triggered by unconsciously presented emotional information, but participants may not adjust their subsequent performance trial-by trial to reduce this conflict.     

The flexible nature of unconscious cognition

The cognitive signature of unconscious processes is hotly debated recently. Generally, consciousness is thought to mediate flexible, adaptive and goal-directed behavior, but in the last decade unconscious processing has rapidly gained ground on traditional conscious territory. In this study we demonstrate that the scope and impact of unconscious information on behavior and brain activity can be modulated dynamically on a trial-by-trial basis. Participants performed a Go/No-Go experiment in which an unconscious (masked) stimulus preceding a conscious target could be associated with either a Go or No-Go response. Importantly, the mapping of stimuli onto these actions varied on a trial-by-trial basis, preventing the formation of stable associations and hence the possibility that unconscious stimuli automatically activate these control actions. By eliminating stimulus-response associations established through practice we demonstrate that unconscious information can be processed in a flexible and adaptive manner. In this experiment we show that the same unconscious stimulus can have a substantially different effect on behavior and (prefrontal) brain activity depending on the rapidly changing task context in which it is presented. This work suggests that unconscious information processing shares many sophisticated characteristics (including flexibility and context-specificity) with its conscious counterpart.     

The flexibility of nonconsciously deployed cognitive processes: evidence from masked congruence priming

Background

It is well accepted in the subliminal priming literature that task-level properties modulate nonconscious processes. For example, in tasks with a limited number of targets, subliminal priming effects are limited to primes that are physically similar to the targets. In contrast, when a large number of targets are used, subliminal priming effects are observed for primes that share a semantic (but not necessarily physical) relationship with the target. Findings such as these have led researchers to conclude that task-level properties can direct nonconscious processes to be deployed exclusively over central (semantic) or peripheral (physically specified) representations.

Principal Findings

We find distinct patterns of masked priming for “novel” and “repeated” primes within a single task context. Novel primes never appear as targets and thus are not seen consciously in the experiment. Repeated primes do appear as targets, thereby lending themselves to the establishment of peripheral stimulus-response mappings. If the source of the masked priming effect were exclusively central or peripheral, then both novel and repeated primes should yield similar patterns of priming. In contrast, we find that both novel and repeated primes produce robust, yet distinct, patterns of priming.

Conclusions

Our findings indicate that nonconsciously elicited cognitive processes can be flexibly deployed over both central and peripheral representations within a single task context. While we agree that task-level properties can influence nonconscious processes, our findings sharply constrain the extent of this influence. Specifically, our findings are inconsistent with extant accounts which hold that the influence of task-level properties is strong enough to restrict the deployment of nonconsciously elicited cognitive processes to a single type of representation (i.e. central or peripheral).     

Interference between Conscious and Unconscious Facial Expression Information

There is ample evidence to show that many types of visual information, including emotional information, could be processed in the absence of visual awareness. For example, it has been shown that masked subliminal facial expressions can induce priming and adaptation effects. However, stimulus made invisible in different ways could be processed to different extent and have differential effects. In this study, we adopted a flanker type behavioral method to investigate whether a flanker rendered invisible through Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS) could induce a congruency effect on the discrimination of a visible target. Specifically, during the experiment, participants judged the expression (either happy or fearful) of a visible face in the presence of a nearby invisible face (with happy or fearful expression). Results show that participants were slower and less accurate in discriminating the expression of the visible face when the expression of the invisible flanker face was incongruent. Thus, facial expression information rendered invisible with CFS and presented a different spatial location could enhance or interfere with consciously processed facial expression information.     

Influence of Supraliminal Reward Information on Unconsciously Triggered Response Inhibition

Although executive functions (e.g., response inhibition) are often thought to interact consciously with reward, recent studies have demonstrated that they can also be triggered by unconscious stimuli. Further research has suggested a close relationship between consciously and unconsciously triggered response inhibition. To date, however, the effect of reward on unconsciously triggered response inhibition has not been explored. To address this issue, participants in this study performed runs of a modified Go/No-Go task during which they were exposed to both high and low value monetary rewards presented both supraliminally and subliminally. Participants were informed that they would earn the reward displayed if they responded correctly to each trial of the run. According to the results, when rewards were presented supraliminally, a greater unconsciously triggered response inhibition was observed for high-value rewards than for low-value rewards. In contrast, when rewards were presented subliminally, no enhanced unconsciously triggered response inhibition was observed. Results revealed that supraliminal and subliminal rewards have distinct effects on unconsciously triggered response inhibition. These findings have important implications for extending our understanding of the relationship between reward and response inhibition.     

Action without awareness: reaching to an object you do not remember seeing

Background

Previous work by our group has shown that the scaling of reach trajectories to target size is independent of obligatory awareness of that target property and that “action without awareness” can persist for up to 2000 ms of visual delay. In the present investigation we sought to determine if the ability to scale reaching trajectories to target size following a delay is related to the pre-computing of movement parameters during initial stimulus presentation or the maintenance of a sensory (i.e., visual) representation for on-demand response parameterization.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Participants completed immediate or delayed (i.e., 2000 ms) perceptual reports and reaching responses to different sized targets under non-masked and masked target conditions. For the reaching task, the limb associated with a trial (i.e., left or right) was not specified until the time of response cuing: a manipulation that prevented participants from pre-computing the effector-related parameters of their response. In terms of the immediate and delayed perceptual tasks, target size was accurately reported during non-masked trials; however, for masked trials only a chance level of accuracy was observed. For the immediate and delayed reaching tasks, movement time as well as other temporal kinematic measures (e.g., times to peak acceleration, velocity and deceleration) increased in relation to decreasing target size across non-masked and masked trials.

Conclusions/Significance

Our results demonstrate that speed-accuracy relations were observed regardless of whether participants were aware (i.e., non-masked trials) or unaware (i.e., masked trials) of target size. Moreover, the equivalent scaling of immediate and delayed reaches during masked trials indicates that a persistent sensory-based representation supports the unconscious and metrical scaling of memory-guided reaching.     

Orientation sensitivity at different stages of object processing: evidence from repetition priming and naming

Background

An ongoing debate in the object recognition literature centers on whether the shape representations used in recognition are coded in an orientation-dependent or orientation-invariant manner. In this study, we asked whether the nature of the object representation (orientation-dependent vs orientation-invariant) depends on the information-processing stages tapped by the task.

Methodology/ Findings

We employed a repetition priming paradigm in which briefly presented masked objects (primes) were followed by an upright target object which had to be named as rapidly as possible. The primes were presented for variable durations (ranging from 16 to 350 ms) and in various image-plane orientations (from 0° to 180°, in 30° steps). Significant priming was obtained for prime durations above 70 ms, but not for prime durations of 16 ms and 47 ms, and did not vary as a function of prime orientation. In contrast, naming the same objects that served as primes resulted in orientation-dependent reaction time costs.

Conclusions/Significance

These results suggest that initial processing of object identity is mediated by orientation-independent information and that orientation costs in performance arise when objects are consolidated in visual short-term memory in order to be reported.     

Effects of unconscious processing on implicit memory for fearful faces

Emotional stimuli can be processed even when participants perceive them without conscious awareness, but the extent to which unconsciously processed emotional stimuli influence implicit memory after short and long delays is not fully understood. We addressed this issue by measuring a subliminal affective priming effect in Experiment 1 and a long-term priming effect in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, a flashed fearful or neutral face masked by a scrambled face was presented three times, then a target face (either fearful or neutral) was presented and participants were asked to make a fearful/neutral judgment. We found that, relative to a neutral prime face (neutral-fear face), a fearful prime face speeded up participants' reaction to a fearful target (fear-fear face), when they were not aware of the masked prime face. But this response pattern did not apply to the neutral target. In Experiment 2, participants were first presented with a masked faces six times during encoding. Three minutes later, they were asked to make a fearful/neutral judgment for the same face with congruent expression, the same face with incongruent expression or a new face. Participants showed a significant priming effect for the fearful faces but not for the neutral faces, regardless of their awareness of the masked faces during encoding. These results provided evidence that unconsciously processed stimuli could enhance emotional memory after both short and long delays. It indicates that emotion can enhance memory processing whether the stimuli are encoded consciously or unconsciously.     

Subliminal instrumental conditioning demonstrated in the human brain

How the brain uses success and failure to optimize future decisions is a long-standing question in neuroscience. One computational solution involves updating the values of context-action associations in proportion to a reward prediction error. Previous evidence suggests that such computations are expressed in the striatum and, as they are cognitively impenetrable, represent an unconscious learning mechanism. Here, we formally test this by studying instrumental conditioning in a situation where we masked contextual cues, such that they were not consciously perceived. Behavioral data showed that subjects nonetheless developed a significant propensity to choose cues associated with monetary rewards relative to punishments. Functional neuroimaging revealed that during conditioning cue values and prediction errors, generated from a computational model, both correlated with activity in ventral striatum. We conclude that, even without conscious processing of contextual cues, our brain can learn their reward value and use them to provide a bias on decision making.     

Role of the Frontal Cortical Areas in the Analysis of Visual Stimuli at Conscious and Unconscious Levels

Event-related potentials (ERP) in response to complex target stimuli, which consisted of a central recognizable picture and a lateral masked image (analyzed at the unconscious level) were recorded in adult subjects and seven-year-old children. ERP components N200, N300, and P400/N400 had different topography and were differently pronounced in adults and children. In adult subjects, the N200 component that reflects the processing of a sensory stimulus was recorded in the temporo-parieto-occipital and occipital areas. In children, N200 was recorded in the caudal regions and the frontal areas of the cortex. Analysis of different waveforms obtained by subtraction of the ERP to the central stimulus from the ERP to the complex stimulus showed that unconscious stimulus processing in adult subjects is not reflected in the ERP structure. In children, an unconsciously processed image incorporated into a complex stimulus evokes processing negativity in the occipital and frontal cortical areas. Comparison of ERP in groups of children divided by their reflectivity/impulsivity showed that, predominantly, the left frontal area is involved in image analysis at the unconscious level in reflective children and, predominantly, the right frontal area participates in unconscious image analysis in impulsive children. It is suggested that the perfection of the visual recognition of a target stimulus, which contains additional unconsciously processed information, consists in growth of the involvement of the left-hemispheric mechanisms (with respective growth of significance of the left-hemispheric mechanisms) and in a decrease in the role of the frontal areas in analysis of sensory information.     

Can the meaning of multiple words be integrated unconsciously?

What are the limits of unconscious language processing? Can language circuits process simple grammatical constructions unconsciously and integrate the meaning of several unseen words? Using behavioural priming and electroencephalography (EEG), we studied a specific rule-based linguistic operation traditionally thought to require conscious cognitive control: the negation of valence. In a masked priming paradigm, two masked words were successively (Experiment 1) or simultaneously presented (Experiment 2), a modifier (‘not’/‘very’) and an adjective (e.g. ‘good’/‘bad’), followed by a visible target noun (e.g. ‘peace’/‘murder’). Subjects indicated whether the target noun had a positive or negative valence. The combination of these three words could either be contextually consistent (e.g. ‘very bad - murder’) or inconsistent (e.g. ‘not bad - murder’). EEG recordings revealed that grammatical negations could unfold partly unconsciously, as reflected in similar occipito-parietal N400 effects for conscious and unconscious three-word sequences forming inconsistent combinations. However, only conscious word sequences elicited P600 effects, later in time. Overall, these results suggest that multiple unconscious words can be rapidly integrated and that an unconscious negation can automatically ‘flip the sign’ of an unconscious adjective. These findings not only extend the limits of subliminal combinatorial language processes, but also highlight how consciousness modulates the grammatical integration of multiple words.     

Functional Difference between Sustained and Transient Modulations of Cognitive Control in the Simon Task: Evidence from False Alarm Responses on No-Go Trials

Cognitive control in response compatibility tasks is modulated by the task context. Two types of contextual modulations have been demonstrated; sustained (block-wise) and transient (trial-by-trial). Recent research suggests that these modulations have different underlying mechanisms. This study presents new evidence supporting this claim by comparing false alarm (FA) responses on no-go trials of the Simon task between the sustained and transient contexts. In Experiment 1, the sustained context was manipulated so that a block included a larger number of incongruent trials. Results showed that participants made more FA responses by the hand opposite to the stimulus location. This suggests a generation of response bias in which the task-irrelevant location information is utilized in a reversed manner (i.e., to respond with the right hand to a stimulus presented on the left side and vice versa). Next, Experiment 2 examined the effect of the transient context and found that overall FA rate was lower when a no-go trial was preceded by an incongruent trial than by a congruent trial, whereas such response bias as that shown in Experiment 1 was not demonstrated. This suggests that the transient conflict context enhances inhibition of the task-irrelevant process but does not make the task-irrelevant information actively usable. Based on these results, we propound two types of cognitive control modulations as adaptive behaviors: response biasing based on utilization of the task-irrelevant information under the sustained conflict context and transient enhancement of inhibition of the task-irrelevant process based on the online conflict monitoring.     

Non-Attended Representations are Perceptual Rather than Unconscious in Nature

Introspectively we experience a phenomenally rich world. In stark contrast, many studies show that we can only report on the few items that we happen to attend to. So what happens to the unattended objects? Are these consciously processed as our first person perspective would have us believe, or are they – in fact – entirely unconscious? Here, we attempt to resolve this question by investigating the perceptual characteristics of visual sensory memory. Sensory memory is a fleeting, high-capacity form of memory that precedes attentional selection and working memory. We found that memory capacity benefits from figural information induced by the Kanizsa illusion. Importantly, this benefit was larger for sensory memory than for working memory and depended critically on the illusion, not on the stimulus configuration. This shows that pre-attentive sensory memory contains representations that have a genuinely perceptual nature, suggesting that non-attended representations are phenomenally experienced rather than unconscious.     

The scope and limits of top-down attention in unconscious visual processing

Attentional selection plays a critical role in conscious perception. When attention is diverted, even salient stimuli fail to reach visual awareness. Attention can be voluntarily directed to a spatial location or a visual feature for facilitating the processing of information relevant to current goals. In everyday situations, attention and awareness are tightly coupled. This has led some to suggest that attention and awareness might be based on a common neural foundation, whereas others argue that they are mediated by distinct mechanisms. A body of evidence shows that visual stimuli can be processed at multiple stages of the visual-processing streams without evoking visual awareness. To illuminate the relationship between visual attention and conscious perception, we investigated whether top-down attention can target and modulate the neural representations of unconsciously processed visual stimuli. Our experiments show that spatial attention can target only consciously perceived stimuli, whereas feature-based attention can modulate the processing of invisible stimuli. The attentional modulation of unconscious signals implies that attention and awareness can be dissociated, challenging a simplistic view of the boundary between conscious and unconscious visual processing.     

树鼩模型:抑郁症的社会竞争失败与学习和记忆的被捕获条件反射

最近基因组研究表明树鼩属于灵长类或是与灵长类亲缘关系最密切的姐妹种.因此,树鼩可能是应用于建立人类疾病动物模型的最佳动物之一.该文报道一种抑郁症的社会竞争失败病因学树鼩(Tupaia belangerichinensis)模型.一对雄性树鼩被饲养在一个双笼中,用网格把双笼隔开,网格上有一小门.适应1周后,把小门打开,这一对树鼩产生短暂的争斗,每天一次,连续21天.其中争斗失败者被称为服从者.这个过程可导致每天1 h的直接社交冲突和23 h的间接相互影响(比如通过气味、视觉等).与正常对照相比,失败者在第三周也就是社交冲突的最后一周显示了体重、自主活动、躲避行为、尿液皮质醇水平等的变化,并且这种改变可持续至少2周以上.此外,还报道全新的记忆模型,一种被捕获条件反射树鼩模型.在一个封闭的小房间中放置捕获笼,其中挂有一片苹果,小房间中有一只自由活动的树鼩.训练的前4次树鼩进入捕获笼吃苹果并不触发捕获笼关闭,但在第5次时触发捕获笼关闭,并持续一小时才释放树鼩.第1-5次树鼩进入捕获笼的延迟时时间作为适心性指标,其中第5次才是作为被捕获的一次学习训练.24 h后,测试树鼩进入捕获笼的延迟时间作为被捕获记忆能力指标.树鼩经过第5次被捕获训练,能形成很好的被捕获记忆,因为24 h后的延迟时间极人地增加.在训练前腹腔注射已知能阻断记忆形成的NMDA受体拮抗剂MK-801(0.2 mg/kg,腹腔注射),对适应指标没有显著影响,但足极大地缩短了24 h后测试的延迟时间,即阻断了被捕获记忆.这些结果表明了一种抑郁症的慢性社会竞争失败与学习和记忆的一次被捕获条件反射树鼩模型.这两种树趵模型对抑郁症与学习和记忆的机理研究、抗抑郁症新药的临床前药效学评价具有潜在的重要意义.

Abstract：

Recent genome studies indicate that tree shrew is in the order or a closest sister of primates, and thus may be one of the best animals to model human diseases. In this paper, we report on a social defeat model of depression in tree shrew (Tupaia belangeri chinensis). Two male tree shrews were housed in a pair-cage consisting of two independent cages separated by a wire mesh partition with a door connecting the two cages. After one week adaptation, the connecting door was opened and a brief fighting occurs between the two male tree shrews and this social conflict session consisted of 1 h direct conflict (fighting) and 23 h indirect influence (e.g. smell, visual cues) per day for 21 days. The defeated tree shrew was considered the subordinate. Compared with naive animals, subordinate tree shrews at the final week of social conflict session showed alterations in body weight, locomotion, avoidance behavior and urinary cortisol levels.Remarkably, these alterations persisted for over two weeks. We also report on a novel captive conditioning model of learning and memory in tree shrew. An automatic trapping cage was placed in a small closed room with a freely-moving tree shrew. For the first four trials, the tree shrew was not trapped when it entered the cage and ate the bait apple, but it was trapped and kept in the cage for 1 h on the fifth trial. Latency was defined as the time between release of the tree shrew and when it entered the captive cage. Latencies during the five trials indicated adaptation. A test trial 24 h later was used to measure whether the one-trial trapping during the fifth trial could form captive memory. Tree shrews showed much longer trapping latencies in the test trial than the adaptation trials. The N-methyl-d-aspartate (NMDA) receptor antagonist MK-801 (0.2 mg/kg, i.p.), known to prevent the formation of memory, did not affect latencies in the adaptation trails, but did block captive memory as it led to much shorter trapping latencies compared to saline treatment in the test trial. These results demonstrate a chronic social defeat model of depression and a novel one-trial captive conditioning model for learning and memory in tree shrews, which are important for mechanism studies of depression, learning,memory, and preclinical evaluation for new antidepressants.     

Attentional Tuning Resets after Failures of Perceptual Awareness

Key to successfully negotiating our environment is our ability to adapt to current settings based on recent experiences and behaviour. Response conflict paradigms (e.g., the Stroop task) have provided evidence for increases in executive control after errors, leading to slowed responses that are more likely to be correct, and less susceptible to response congruency effects. Here we investigate whether failures of perceptual awareness, rather than failures at decisional or response stages of information processing, lead to similar adjustments in visual attention. We employed an attentional blink task in which subjects often fail to consciously register the second of two targets embedded in a rapid serial visual presentation stream of distractors, and examined how target errors influence performance on subsequent trials. Performance was inferior after Target 2 errors and these inter-trial effects were independent of the temporal lag between the targets and were not due to more global changes in attention across runs of trials. These results shed light on the nature of attentional calibration in response to failures of perceptual consciousness.     

The Neural Dynamics of Conflict Adaptation within a Look-to-Do Transition

Background

For optimal performance in conflict situations, conflict adaptation (conflict detection and adjustment) is necessary. However, the neural dynamics of conflict adaptation is still unclear.

Methods

In the present study, behavioral and electroencephalography (EEG) data were recorded from seventeen healthy participants during performance of a color-word Stroop task with a novel look-to-do transition. Within this transition, participants looked at the Stroop stimuli but no responses were required in the ‘look’ trials; or made manual responses to the Stroop stimuli in the ‘do’ trials.

Results

In the ‘look’ trials, the amplitude modulation of N450 occurred exclusively in the right-frontal region. Subsequently, the amplitude modulation of sustained potential (SP) emerged in the posterior parietal and right-frontal regions. A significantly positive correlation between the modulation of reconfiguration in the ‘look’ trials and the behavioral conflict adaptation in the ‘do’ trials was observed. Specially, a stronger information flow from right-frontal region to posterior parietal region in the beta band was observed for incongruent condition than for congruent condition. In the ‘do’ trials, the conflict of ‘look’ trials enhanced the amplitude modulations of N450 in the right-frontal and posterior parietal regions, but decreased the amplitude modulations of SP in these regions. Uniquely, a stronger information flow from centro-parietal region to right-frontal region in the theta band was observed for iI condition than for cI condition.

Conclusion

All these findings showed that top-down conflict adaptation is implemented by: (1) enhancing the sensitivity to conflict detection and the adaptation to conflict resolution; (2) modulating the effective connectivity between parietal region and right-frontal region.     

Unconscious letter discrimination is enhanced by association with conscious color perception in visual form agnosia

Adaptive behavior guided by unconscious visual cues occurs in patients with various kinds of brain damage as well as in normal observers, all of whom can process visual information of which they are fully unaware [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]. Little is known on the possibility that unconscious vision is influenced by visual cues that have access to consciousness [9]. Here we report a 'blind' letter discrimination induced through a semantic interaction with conscious color processing in a patient who is agnosic for visual shapes, but has normal color vision and visual imagery. In seeing the initial letters of color names printed in different colors, it is normally easier to name the print color when it is congruent with the initial letter of the color name than when it is not [10]. The patient could discriminate the initial letters of the words 'red' and 'green' printed in the corresponding colors significantly above chance but without any conscious accompaniment, whereas he performed at chance with the reverse color-letter mapping as well as in standard tests of letter reading. We suggest that the consciously perceived colors activated a representation of the corresponding word names and their component letters, which in turn brought out a partially successful, unconscious processing of visual inputs corresponding to the activated letter representations.     

Task Uncertainty Can Account for Mixing and Switch Costs in Task-Switching

Cognitive control is required in situations that involve uncertainty or change, such as when resolving conflict, selecting responses and switching tasks. Recently, it has been suggested that cognitive control can be conceptualised as a mechanism which prioritises goal-relevant information to deal with uncertainty. This hypothesis has been supported using a paradigm that requires conflict resolution. In this study, we examine whether cognitive control during task switching is also consistent with this notion. We used information theory to quantify the level of uncertainty in different trial types during a cued task-switching paradigm. We test the hypothesis that differences in uncertainty between task repeat and task switch trials can account for typical behavioural effects in task-switching. Increasing uncertainty was associated with less efficient performance (i.e., slower and less accurate), particularly on switch trials and trials that afford little opportunity for advance preparation. Interestingly, both mixing and switch costs were associated with a common episodic control process. These results support the notion that cognitive control may be conceptualised as an information processor that serves to resolve uncertainty in the environment.     

What you may not see might slow you down anyway: masked images and driving

Many theories of driver behaviour suggest that unconscious or implicit emotions play a functional role in the shaping and control of behaviour. This has not been experimentally tested however. Therefore, in this study the effects of emotive masked images on driver behaviour were examined. While driving a simulator, participants were repeatedly exposed to negative or neutral emotionally laden target images that were sandwich masked by emotionally neutral images. These images were encountered across two different trials each of which consisted of 3-4 minutes of driving on a rural road. The results indicate an effect of the negative target images primarily in reducing the extent of familiarisation occurring between the first and second experimental drives. This is evident in a reduced decrease in heart rate and a reduced increase in high band heart rate variability and actual travelling speed from the first to second drives if the negative target image was presented in the second drive. In addition to these findings there was no clear effect of the target image on subjective ratings of effort or feelings of risk. There was however an effect of gender, with the majority of the effects found in the study being limited to the larger female dataset. These findings suggest that unconscious or implicit emotional stimuli may well influence driver behaviour without explicit awareness.