Virulence Determinants of Avian H5N1 Influenza A Virus in Mammalian and Avian Hosts: Role of the C-Terminal ESEV Motif in the Viral NS1 Protein

We assessed the prediction that access of the viral NS1 protein to cellular PDZ domain protein networks enhances the virulence of highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses. The NS1 proteins of most avian influenza viruses bear the C-terminal ligand sequence Glu-Ser-Glu-Val (ESEV) for PDZ domains present in multiple host proteins, whereas no such motif is found in the NS1 homologues of seasonal human virus strains. Previous analysis showed that a C-terminal ESEV motif increases viral virulence when introduced into the NS1 protein of mouse-adapted H1N1 influenza virus. To examine the role of the PDZ domain ligand motif in avian influenza virus virulence, we generated three recombinants, derived from the prototypic H5N1 influenza A/Vietnam/1203/04 virus, expressing NS1 proteins that either have the C-terminal ESEV motif or the human influenza virus RSKV consensus or bear a natural truncation of this motif, respectively. Cell biological analyses showed strong control of NS1 nuclear migration in infected mammalian and avian cells, with only minor differences between the three variants. The ESEV sequence attenuated viral replication on cultured human, murine, and duck cells but not on chicken fibroblasts. However, all three viruses caused highly lethal infections in mice and chickens, with little difference in viral titers in organs, mean lethal dose, or intravenous pathogenicity index. These findings demonstrate that a PDZ domain ligand sequence in NS1 contributes little to the virulence of H5N1 viruses in these hosts, and they indicate that this motif modulates viral replication in a strain- and host-dependent manner.The transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses (HPAIV) of the H5N1 subtype to humans since the year 1997 has caused a high mortality rate of almost 60% (62). Patients infected with H5N1 influenza virus developed mainly severe respiratory disease, characterized by fever, cough, shortness of breath, and pneumonia, that frequently progressed to acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and multiorgan failure (28, 68, 69). In fatal cases, the median time from onset to death was 9 to 10 days (1). Systemic spread (18) and hypercytokinemia (11) have been described as possible disease-aggravating factors of HPAIV-H5N1 viruses, but the reasons for their high virulence in humans are incompletely understood.Due to the potential pandemic threat presented by H5N1 viruses, there is great interest in the identification of viral virulence determinants and their mode of action. This is critical not only for a better understanding of the pathogenic mechanisms induced by these viruses but also for the development of new drugs to treat the infections. The high virulence of HPAIV-H5N1 isolates in the avian host correlates with the presence of a polybasic cleavage site in the hemagglutinin (HA), facilitating its intracellular cleavage by furin-like proteases (27, 50). Further, amino acid substitutions in the PA protein (T515A) (30) and in the NS1 protein (V149A) (40) have been reported to regulate the virulence of corresponding HPAIV-H5N1 isolates in ducks and chickens. The known molecular determinants of virulence in mammalian hosts also include the polybasic cleavage site in the HA (23) and several polymorphisms in the PB2 polymerase subunit and the proapoptotic PB1-F2 protein. Thus, a serine residue at position 66 in the PB1-F2 protein increased viral replication and decreased survival in the mouse model (9). Also, specific amino acid polymorphisms within PB2 (E627K or D701N) can increase virulence in mice (23, 39) and viral replication in mammalian cells (7, 57, 58). Furthermore, the nonstructural NS1 protein, which has a major function in the inhibition of type I interferon (IFN) (17, 19) and in the limitation of the antiviral effects of IFN-induced proteins, including PKR (4, 22), OAS/RNase L (45), and RIG-I (16, 48, 63, 64), contributes to virulence in mammals (34, 55).The domain structure of the NS1 protein is well characterized; it includes an N-terminal RNA binding and dimerization domain and a nuclear localization signal (NLS) at positions 34 to 38 (summarized in reference 19). The NS1 proteins of most human strains circulating between 1950 and 1986 also contain a second NLS at positions 219 to 227 (NLS-2), which includes four conserved basic amino acids (K219, R220, R224, R227) (44). A large-scale sequence analysis showed that the NS1 proteins of avian and human influenza viruses differ in their C-terminal sequences, indicating possible differences in the associated activity (46). Among most high- and low-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses, the last four NS1 amino acids consist of the conserved sequence ESEV (3,007 of 3,692 isolates described in the NCBI database [3]), while for the majority of seasonal human influenza viruses, the motif RSKV is typical (1,911 of 2,713 isolates). Significantly, only the NS1 protein carrying the “avian” ESEV motif interacted in vitro with 24 cellular factors carrying a PDZ (postsynaptic density protein 95, Drosophila disc large tumor suppressor, and zonula occludens 1 protein) domain. The human genome encodes at least 214 proteins containing one or more of these protein interaction modules that recognize short peptide motifs, which are most often present at the C termini of their targets (36, 38). Many PDZ domain proteins have been shown to mediate the formation and localization of higher-order complexes and to participate in various cellular signaling events regulating, for instance, cell polarity and neuronal function (31). Therefore, it was hypothesized that the abundant expression of “avian” NS1 protein capable of interacting with human PDZ domains could possibly disturb their function and aggravate disease severity in H5N1 infections (46). However, there is only limited experimental support for the universal validity of this hypothesis. The grafting of the “avian” ESEV sequence into the C terminus of NS1 protein expressed by mouse-adapted influenza A/WSN/33 virus (H1N1) decreased the mean lethal dose by about 1 order of magnitude (32). Still, it is not clear to what extent this motif contributes to the virulence of HPAIV-H5N1 and other natural influenza A viruses in avian and mammalian hosts.The goal of the present study was to elucidate the role of the C-terminal NS1 motif in viral replication and disease caused by the prototypic influenza A/Vietnam/1203/04 (VN/1203) virus, isolated in a fatal human case (60). This virus expresses an NS1 protein that is very similar or identical at positions 1 to 215 to homologues expressed by other HPAIV-H5N1 strains but naturally lacks the 10 C-terminal amino acids (aa), including the terminal ESEV motif, due to a premature stop codon (Fig. ​(Fig.1).1). We used reverse genetics to produce a recombinant VN/1203 wild-type (WT) virus and two variants with reconstituted NS1 C termini ending either with the “avian” ESEV or with the “human” RSKV sequence. Experimental infections of mice and chickens revealed that all three viruses caused highly lethal infections in both species, with only moderate differences in viral titers in the organs of the mice. Thus, we show that the C-terminal ESEV motif of the NS1 protein contributes little to the virulence of H5N1 viruses in mice and chickens, and we suggest that this motif modulates viral virulence in a strain- and host-dependent manner.Open in a separate windowFIG. 1.Growth kinetics of recombinant VN/1203 viruses expressing WT or elongated NS1 proteins in human, murine, and avian cells. (A) Scheme of the viral VN/1203-NS1 protein with the RNA binding domain and the nuclear localization signals (NLS) at positions 34 to 38 and 214 to 225 indicated. Amino acids involved in NLS2 function are underlined. The C-terminal sequences of the WT and elongated mutant NS1 proteins are given, and the PL motif is shown in boldface. (B to E) Human A549 alveolar cells, murine NIH 3T3 fibroblasts, chicken embryo fibroblasts (CEFs), or EFB-R1 duck embryo fibroblasts (DEFs) were infected with recombinant VN/1203-WT, -ESEV, or -RSKV viruses at an MOI of 0.001. Aliquots of supernatants were harvested at the indicated time points, and samples were titrated by plaque assays in MDCK cells. (F) Human A549 cells were infected at an MOI of 2, and virus titers in supernatants taken at the indicated time points were determined by plaque assays. Results are averages for at least two independent experiments with biological duplicates. Error bars indicate standard deviations.     

Evaluation of Replication and Cross-Reactive Antibody Responses of H2 Subtype Influenza Viruses in Mice and Ferrets

H2 influenza viruses have not circulated in humans since 1968, and therefore a large segment of the population would likely be susceptible to infection should H2 influenza viruses reemerge. The development of an H2 pandemic influenza virus vaccine candidate should therefore be considered a priority in pandemic influenza preparedness planning. We selected a group of geographically and temporally diverse wild-type H2 influenza viruses and evaluated the kinetics of replication and compared the ability of these viruses to induce a broadly cross-reactive antibody response in mice and ferrets. In both mice and ferrets, A/Japan/305/1957 (H2N2), A/mallard/NY/1978 (H2N2), and A/swine/MO/2006 (H2N3) elicited the broadest cross-reactive antibody responses against heterologous H2 influenza viruses as measured by hemagglutination inhibition and microneutralization assays. These data suggested that these three viruses may be suitable candidates for development as live attenuated H2 pandemic influenza virus vaccines.Influenza pandemics occur when a novel influenza virus enters a population with little preexisting immunity (36). During the pandemics of the last century, novel influenza viruses were introduced either directly from an avian reservoir (34) or were the result of reassortment between contemporaneously circulating human, avian, and swine influenza viruses (5, 29, 36). Due to the lack of preexisting immunity to the novel virus, morbidity and mortality rates are typically higher than in epidemics caused by seasonal influenza viruses (4).Although pandemic preparedness planning has largely focused on the highly pathogenic H5 and H7 avian influenza virus subtypes, the recent emergence of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 viruses underscores the need to consider other influenza virus subtypes as well. Of the 16 hemagglutinin (HA) influenza A virus subtypes that have been identified to date, H1, H2, and H3 have been known to cause influenza pandemics (7, 27), suggesting that these viruses are capable of sustained transmission and can cause disease in humans. While the H1 and H3 subtypes have cocirculated in humans since 1977, H2 influenza viruses have not circulated in humans since 1968 (36) and therefore a large segment of the population would likely be susceptible to infection should H2 influenza viruses reemerge. The 1957 H2 pandemic virus was a reassortant that derived the HA, neuraminidase (NA), and PB1 genes from an avian virus and the remaining gene segments from the circulating H1N1 virus (15, 30). As H2 subtype viruses continue to circulate in avian reservoirs worldwide (12, 17, 18, 22, 33), they remain a potential pandemic threat. The development of an H2 influenza virus vaccine candidate should therefore be considered a priority in future pandemic influenza preparedness planning.Given the low likelihood that a previously selected vaccine virus will exactly match the pandemic virus, the ability to elicit a broadly cross-reactive antibody response to antigenically distinct viruses within a subtype is an important consideration in the selection of a pandemic influenza vaccine candidate. Previous studies have examined the ability of inactivated H2 influenza viruses to provide cross-protection against mouse-adapted variants of reassortant human viruses and an avian H2 influenza virus from 1978 (9, 14). Given the potential for live attenuated influenza virus vaccines to confer a great breadth of heterologous cross-protection (1, 2, 6, 35), we recently conducted a study evaluating cold-adapted A/Ann Arbor/6/1960 (AA CA), an H2 influenza virus used as the backbone of the seasonal live attenuated influenza A virus vaccine currently licensed in the United States (3). However, as H2 influenza virus continues to circulate widely and appear in migratory birds (10, 24, 26), in poultry markets (20), and in swine (21), with evidence of interregional gene transmission (19, 22), a more extensive evaluation of recent isolates may be warranted in the selection of a potential H2 pandemic vaccine candidate.H2 influenza viruses fall into three main lineages: a human lineage, a North American avian lineage, and a Eurasian avian lineage (29). In addition to viruses whose replicative ability in mammals has previously been established (11, 21, 23, 25), we selected a group of geographically and temporally diverse H2 influenza viruses from each lineage. We evaluated the kinetics of replication of each of these viruses in mice and ferrets and compared the abilities of these viruses to induce a broadly cross-reactive antibody response to determine which of these viruses would be suitable for further development as an H2 pandemic influenza vaccine candidate.     

Ocular Infection of Mice with Influenza A (H7) Viruses: a Site of Primary Replication and Spread to the Respiratory Tract

Avian H7 influenza viruses have been responsible for poultry outbreaks worldwide and have resulted in numerous cases of human infection in recent years. The high rate of conjunctivitis associated with avian H7 subtype virus infections may represent a portal of entry for avian influenza viruses and highlights the need to better understand the apparent ocular tropism observed in humans. To study this, mice were inoculated by the ocular route with viruses of multiple subtypes and degrees of virulence. We found that in contrast to human (H3N2 and H1N1) viruses, H7N7 viruses isolated from The Netherlands in 2003 and H7N3 viruses isolated from British Columbia, Canada, in 2004, two subtypes that were highly virulent for poultry, replicated to a significant titer in the mouse eye. Remarkably, an H7N7 virus, as well as some avian H5N1 viruses, spread systemically following ocular inoculation, including to the brain, resulting in morbidity and mortality of mice. This correlated with efficient replication of highly pathogenic H7 and H5 subtypes in murine corneal epithelial sheets (ex vivo) and primary human corneal epithelial cells (in vitro). Influenza viruses were labeled to identify the virus attachment site in the mouse cornea. Although we found abundant H7 virus attachment to corneal epithelial tissue, this did not account for the differences in virus replication as multiple subtypes were able to attach to these cells. These findings demonstrate that avian influenza viruses within H7 and H5 subtypes are capable of using the eye as a portal of entry.Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses, which have resulted in over 420 documented cases of human infection to date, have generally caused acute, often severe and fatal, respiratory illness (1, 50). While conjunctivitis following infection with H5N1 or human influenza viruses has been rare, most human infections associated with H7 subtype viruses have resulted in ocular and not respiratory disease (1, 9, 37, 38). Infrequent reports of human conjunctivitis infection following exposure to H7 influenza viruses date from 1977, predominantly resulting from laboratory or occupational exposure (21, 40, 48). However, in The Netherlands in 2003, more than 80 human infections with H7N7 influenza virus occurred among poultry farmers and cullers amid widespread outbreaks of HPAI in domestic poultry; the majority of these human infections resulted in conjunctivitis (14, 20). Additionally, conjunctivitis was documented in the two human infections resulting from an H7N3 outbreak in British Columbia, Canada, in 2004, as well as in H7N3- and H7N2-infected individuals in the United Kingdom in 2006 and 2007, respectively (13, 18, 29, 46, 51). The properties that contribute to an apparent ocular tropism of some influenza viruses are currently not well understood (30).Host cell glycoproteins bearing sialic acids (SAs) are the cellular receptors for influenza viruses and can be found on epithelial cells within both the human respiratory tract and ocular tissue (26, 31, 41). Both respiratory and ocular tissues additionally secrete sialylated mucins that function in pathogen defense and protection of the epithelial surface (5, 11, 22). Within the upper respiratory tract, α2-6-linked SAs (the preferred receptor for human influenza viruses) predominate on epithelial cells (26). While α2-3-linked SAs are also present to a lesser degree on respiratory epithelial cells, this linkage is more abundantly expressed on secreted mucins (2). In contrast, α2-3-linked SAs (the preferred receptor for avian influenza viruses) are found on corneal and conjunctival epithelial cells of the human eye (31, 41), while secreted ocular mucins are abundantly composed of α2-6 SAs (5). It has been suggested that avian influenza viruses are more suited to infect the ocular surface due to their general α2-3-linked SA binding preference, but this has not been demonstrated experimentally (30).The mouse model has been used previously to study the role of ocular exposure to respiratory viruses (6, 39). In mice, ocular inoculation with an H3N2 influenza virus resulted in virus replication in nasal turbinates and lung (39), whereas ocular infection with respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) resulted in detectable virus titers in the eye and lung (6). These studies have revealed that respiratory viruses are not limited to the ocular area following inoculation at this site. However, the ability of influenza viruses to replicate specifically within ocular tissue has not been examined.Despite repeated instances of conjunctivitis associated with H7 subtype infections in humans, the reasons for this apparent ocular tropism have not been studied extensively. Here, we present a murine model to study the ability of human and avian influenza viruses to cause disease by the ocular route. We found that highly pathogenic H7 and H5 influenza viruses were capable of causing a systemic and lethal infection in mice following ocular inoculation. These highly pathogenic viruses, unlike human H3N2 and H1N1 viruses, replicated to significant titers in the mouse corneal epithelium and primary human corneal epithelial cells (HCEpiCs). Identification of viruses well suited to infecting the ocular surface is the first step in better understanding the ability of influenza viruses of multiple subtypes to use this tissue as a portal of entry.     

Characterization of the H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Derived from Wild Pikas in China

The highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus emerged from China in 1996 and has spread across Eurasia and Africa, with a continuous stream of new cases of human infection appearing since the first large-scale outbreak among migratory birds at Qinghai Lake. The role of wild birds, which are the natural reservoirs for the virus, in the epidemiology of the H5N1 virus has raised great public health concern, but their role in the spread of the virus within the natural ecosystem of free-ranging terrestrial wild mammals remains unclear. In this study, we investigated H5N1 virus infection in wild pikas in an attempt to trace the circulation of the virus. Seroepidemiological surveys confirmed a natural H5N1 virus infection of wild pikas in their native environment. The hemagglutination gene of the H5N1 virus isolated from pikas reveals two distinct evolutionary clades, a mixed/Vietnam H5N1 virus sublineage (MV-like pika virus) and a wild bird Qinghai (QH)-like H5N1 virus sublineage (QH-like pika virus). The amino acid residue (glutamic acid) at position 627 encoded by the PB2 gene of the MV-like pika virus was different from that of the QH-like pika virus; the residue of the MV-like pika virus was the same as that of the goose H5N1 virus (A/GS/Guangdong [GD]/1/96). Further, we discovered that in contrast to the MV-like pika virus, which is nonpathogenic to mice, the QH-like pika virus is highly pathogenic. To mimic the virus infection of pikas, we intranasally inoculated rabbits, a species closely related to pikas, with the H5N1 virus of pika origin. Our findings first demonstrate that wild pikas are mammalian hosts exposed to H5N1 subtype avian influenza viruses in the natural ecosystem and also imply a potential transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus from wild mammals into domestic mammalian hosts and humans.Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is an extremely infectious, systemic viral disease that causes a high rate of mortality in birds. HPAI H5N1 viruses are now endemic in avian populations in Southeast Asia and have repeatedly been transmitted to humans (9, 14, 27). Since 2003, the H5N1 subtype has been reported in 391 human cases of influenza and has caused 247 human deaths in 15 countries, leading to greater than 60% mortality among infected individuals (38). Although currently incapable of sustained human-to-human transmission, H5N1 viruses undoubtedly pose a serious threat to public health, as well as to the global economy. Hence, preparedness for such a threat is a global priority (36).Wild birds are considered to be natural reservoirs for influenza A viruses (6, 18, 21, 35, 37). Of the 144 type A influenza virus hemagglutinin-neuraminidase (HA-NA) combinations, 103 have been found in wild birds (5, 7, 17, 37). Since the first HPAI outbreak among migratory wild birds appeared at Qinghai Lake in western China in May 2005 (3, 16, 25, 34, 41), HPAI viruses of the H5N1 subtype have been isolated from poultry throughout Eurasia and Africa. The continued occurrence of human cases has created a situation that could facilitate a pandemic emergence. There is heightened concern that wild birds are a reservoir for influenza A viruses that switch hosts and stably adapt to mammals, including horses, swine, and humans (11, 19, 22, 37).Despite the recent expansion of avian influenza virus (AIV) surveillance and genomic data (5, 17, 20, 21, 33, 40), fundamental questions remain concerning the ecology and evolution of these viruses. Little is known about how terrestrial wild mammals within their natural ecological systems affect HPAI H5N1 epidemiology or about the virus''s effects on public health, though there are many reports of natural and experimental H5N1 virus infection in animals belonging to the taxonomic orders Carnivora (12, 13, 15, 28, 29) and Artiodactyla (15). Herein, we provide the results of our investigation into H5N1 virus infection in wild pikas (Ochotona curzoniae of the order Lagomorpha) within their natural ecological setting. We describe our attempt to trace the circulation of H5N1 viruses and to characterize pika H5N1 influenza virus (PK virus).     

A Novel Genotype H9N2 Influenza Virus Possessing Human H5N1 Internal Genomes Has Been Circulating in Poultry in Eastern China since 1998

Many novel reassortant influenza viruses of the H9N2 genotype have emerged in aquatic birds in southern China since their initial isolation in this region in 1994. However, the genesis and evolution of H9N2 viruses in poultry in eastern China have not been investigated systematically. In the current study, H9N2 influenza viruses isolated from poultry in eastern China during the past 10 years were characterized genetically and antigenically. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that these H9N2 viruses have undergone extensive reassortment to generate multiple novel genotypes, including four genotypes (J, F, K, and L) that have never been recognized before. The major H9N2 influenza viruses represented by A/Chicken/Beijing/1/1994 (Ck/BJ/1/94)-like viruses circulating in poultry in eastern China before 1998 have been gradually replaced by A/Chicken/Shanghai/F/1998 (Ck/SH/F/98)-like viruses, which have a genotype different from that of viruses isolated in southern China. The similarity of the internal genes of these H9N2 viruses to those of the H5N1 influenza viruses isolated from 2001 onwards suggests that the Ck/SH/F/98-like virus may have been the donor of internal genes of human and poultry H5N1 influenza viruses circulating in Eurasia. Experimental studies showed that some of these H9N2 viruses could be efficiently transmitted by the respiratory tract in chicken flocks. Our study provides new insight into the genesis and evolution of H9N2 influenza viruses and supports the notion that some of these viruses may have been the donors of internal genes found in H5N1 viruses.Wild birds, including wild waterfowls, gulls, and shorebirds, are the natural reservoirs for influenza A viruses, in which they are thought to be in evolutionary stasis (2, 33). However, when avian influenza viruses are transmitted to new hosts such as terrestrial poultry or mammals, they evolve rapidly and may cause occasional severe systemic infection with high morbidity (20, 29). Despite the fact that avian influenza virus infection occurs commonly in chickens, it is unable to persist for a long period of time due to control efforts and/or a failure of the virus to adapt to new hosts (29). In the past 20 years, greater numbers of outbreaks in poultry have occurred, suggesting that the avian influenza virus can infect and spread in aberrant hosts for an extended period of time (5, 14-16, 18, 32).During the past 10 years, H9N2 influenza viruses have become panzootic in Eurasia and have been isolated from outbreaks in poultry worldwide (3, 5, 11, 14-16, 18, 24). A great deal of previous studies demonstrated that H9N2 influenza viruses have become established in terrestrial poultry in different Asian countries (5, 11, 13, 14, 18, 21, 24, 35). In 1994, H9N2 viruses were isolated from diseased chickens in Guangdong province, China, for the first time (4), and later in domestic poultry in other provinces in China (11, 16, 18, 35). Two distinct H9N2 virus lineages represented by A/Chicken/Beijing/1/94 (H9N2) and A/Quail/Hong Kong/G1/98 (H9N2), respectively, have been circulating in terrestrial poultry of southern China (9). Occasionally these viruses expand their host range to other mammals, including pigs and humans (6, 17, 22, 34). Increasing epidemiological and laboratory findings suggest that chickens may play an important role in expanding the host range for avian influenza virus. Our systematic surveillance of influenza viruses in chickens in China showed that H9N2 subtype influenza viruses continued to be prevalent in chickens in mainland China from 1994 to 2008 (18, 19, 36).Eastern China contains one metropolitan city (Shanghai) and five provinces (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Shandong, and Jiangxi), where domestic poultry account for approximately 50% of the total poultry population in China. Since 1996, H9N2 influenza viruses have been isolated regularly from both chickens and other minor poultry species in our surveillance program in the eastern China region, but their genetic diversity and the interrelationships between H9N2 influenza viruses and different types of poultry have not been determined. Therefore, it is imperative to explore the evolution and properties of these viruses. The current report provides insight into the genesis and evolution of H9N2 influenza viruses in eastern China and presents new evidence for the potential crossover between H9N2 and H5N1 influenza viruses in this region.     

The Polymerase Acidic Protein Gene of Influenza A Virus Contributes to Pathogenicity in a Mouse Model

Adaptation of influenza A viruses to a new host species usually involves the mutation of one or more of the eight viral gene segments, and the molecular basis for host range restriction is still poorly understood. To investigate the molecular changes that occur during adaptation of a low-pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype commonly isolated from migratory birds to a mammalian host, we serially passaged the avirulent wild-bird H5N2 strain A/Aquatic bird/Korea/W81/05 (W81) in the lungs of mice. The resulting mouse-adapted strain (ma81) was highly virulent (50% mouse lethal dose = 2.6 log₁₀ 50% tissue culture infective dose) and highly lethal. Nonconserved mutations were observed in six viral genes (those for PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NA, and M). Reverse genetic experiments substituting viral genes and mutations demonstrated that the PA gene was a determinant of the enhanced virulence in mice and that a Thr-to-Iso substitution at position 97 of PA played a key role. In growth kinetics studies, ma81 showed enhanced replication in mammalian but not avian cell lines; the PA_97I mutation in strain W81 increased its replicative fitness in mice but not in chickens. The high virulence associated with the PA_97I mutation in mice corresponded to considerably enhanced polymerase activity in mammalian cells. Furthermore, this characteristic mutation is not conserved among avian influenza viruses but is prevalent among mouse-adapted strains, indicating a host-dependent mutation. To our knowledge, this is the first study that the isoleucine residue at position 97 in PA plays a key role in enhanced virulence in mice and is implicated in the adaptation of avian influenza viruses to mammalian hosts.Migratory waterfowl are the natural reservoir of influenza A viruses (11, 53). The viruses replicate efficiently in their natural hosts but replicate poorly if at all in other species (53). However, these viruses can undergo adaptation or genetic reassortment to infect other hosts (43, 44, 53), including humans. Since 1997, the World Health Organization has documented more than 400 laboratory-confirmed cases of human infection with H5N1 avian influenza virus (54).The molecular basis of influenza virus host range restriction and adaptation to a new host species is poorly understood. Mutations associated with cross-species adaptation are thought to be associated with increased virulence (30). Therefore, studies in animal models have attempted to identify the viral molecular determinants of virulence in specific hosts. Reverse genetics (Rg) methods have also identified genetic differences that affect virus virulence and host range, including changes in the viral internal proteins. Experimental infection of mouse lungs is an effective approach for understanding influenza virus virulence and adaptation (reviewed by A. C. Ward [51]). To acquire virulence in mice, influenza A viruses usually must adapt to these hosts over several consecutive generations (serial passages) in the lungs or brain (1, 25, 30). Previous studies have found that the acquisition of virulence during adaptation in the mouse model is associated with mutations in the HA, NP, NA, M, and NS genes and one or more polymerase genes (2, 3, 18, 36, 42, 51). The polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2) gene is a particularly well-characterized polymerase subunit (7, 23, 40, 46). The PB1 and polymerase acidic protein (PA) genes have been implicated in mouse lung virulence (5, 18, 36, 39, 49) but have shown no evidence of having acquired mutations during adaptation (52). However, the many studies conducted to date have focused mainly on highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses such as the H1N1, H5N1, and H7N7 subtypes (7, 23, 48, 50).Various low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses are considered to be potential genetic contributors to the next pandemic strain. Lee et al. (2009) recently reported the presence of avian-like LPAI H5N2 viruses in a number of Korean swine and proposed that the efficient transmissibility of the swine-adapted H5N2 virus could facilitate spread of the virus. They suggested that this adapted virus could potentially serve as a model for pandemic outbreaks of HPAI (e.g., H5N1 and H7N7) virus or could become a pandemic strain itself (21). These findings prompted our interest in the adaptation of an LPAI virus often harbored by wild migratory birds of South Korea. In our ongoing surveillance from 2004 to 2008, approximately 27% of the viruses isolated were of the H5N2 subtype (unpublished data). Studies show that influenza viruses with different genetic backgrounds can acquire different mutations during adaptation in mice. Therefore, we sought to determine whether this common H5N2 virus (nonlethal in mice) would undergo changes different from those observed in highly virulent viruses during adaptation in mice. Wild-bird influenza virus strain A/Aquatic bird/Korea/W81/05 (W81) was adapted in mice over 11 passages and became highly virulent. To identify molecular determinants of this adaptation and altered virulence, we used Rg-generated recombinant viruses to compare the parental and mouse-adapted strains. Here we show that the PA subunit of the polymerase complex, independently of PB2, contributed to adaptation and increased virulence in our mammalian model.     

Reassortment between Avian H5N1 and Human H3N2 Influenza Viruses in Ferrets: a Public Health Risk Assessment

This study investigated whether transmissible H5 subtype human-avian reassortant viruses could be generated in vivo. To this end, ferrets were coinfected with recent avian H5N1 (A/Thailand/16/04) and human H3N2 (A/Wyoming/3/03) viruses. Genotype analyses of plaque-purified viruses from nasal secretions of coinfected ferrets revealed that approximately 9% of recovered viruses contained genes from both progenitor viruses. H5 and H3 subtype viruses, including reassortants, were found in airways extending toward and in the upper respiratory tract of ferrets. However, only parental H5N1 genotype viruses were found in lung tissue. Approximately 34% of the recovered reassortant viruses possessed the H5 hemagglutinin (HA) gene, with five unique H5 subtypes recovered. These H5 reassortants were selected for further studies to examine their growth and transmissibility characteristics. Five H5 viruses with representative reassortant genotypes showed reduced titers in nasal secretions of infected ferrets compared to the parental H5N1 virus. No transmission by direct contact between infected and naïve ferrets was observed. These studies indicate that reassortment between H5N1 avian influenza and H3N2 human viruses occurred readily in vivo and furthermore that reassortment between these two viral subtypes is likely to occur in ferret upper airways. Given the relatively high incidence of reassortant viruses from tissues of the ferret upper airway, it is reasonable to conclude that continued exposure of humans and animals to H5N1 alongside seasonal influenza viruses increases the risk of generating H5 subtype reassortant viruses that may be shed from upper airway secretions.Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5N1 subtype have caused devastating outbreaks in avian species during the past decade. After emerging in the Guangdong province of China in 1996, H5N1 viruses have extended their geographic distribution from Asia into Europe and Africa (45, 51). Sporadic transmission of H5N1 viruses from infected birds to humans has resulted in over 380 laboratory-confirmed infections and a case fatality rate of ∼60% since 2003 (48). Currently circulating H5N1 viruses lack the ability to undergo efficient and sustained transmission among humans although instances of limited human-to-human transmission have been reported (13, 41). If H5N1 viruses were to acquire genetic changes that confer efficient transmissibility among humans, then another pandemic would likely occur.The pandemics of 1957 and 1968 highlight the importance of genetic reassortment between avian and human influenza viruses as a mechanism for the generation of human pandemic strains (15, 46, 47). The structural separation of the influenza virus genome into eight independent genes allows formation of hybrid progeny viruses during coinfections. The 1957 H2N2 and 1968 H3N2 pandemic viruses acquired the hemagglutinin (HA) and PB1 genes, with or without the neuraminidase (NA) gene, respectively, from an avian virus progenitor (14, 33). The remaining genes of these pandemic reassortants were derived from a contemporary human virus (14, 33). The host species in which such human pandemic strains were generated by reassortment between human and avian viruses is not known. However, coinfection of the same cell with both human and avian viruses must have occurred, even though human and avian influenza viruses have preferences for different sialic acid receptor structures present on cell surface glycoproteins and glycolipids (20, 30). The HA of human viruses preferentially binds α(2,6)-linked sialic acids while that of avian viruses preferentially bind α(2,3)-linked sialic acids (3, 12). Cells possessing both of these receptors could support coinfection of avian and human viruses, leading to reassortment.Human respiratory tract epithelial cells can possess surface glycans with α(2,3)- and α(2,6)-linked sialic acids and as such represent a potential host for the generation of avian-human reassortant viruses (24, 35). The general distribution of surface α(2,3)- and α(2,6)-linked sialic acids varies among cells of the human upper and lower respiratory tracts, which are anatomically separated by the larynx. Recent studies have shown that α(2,3)-linked sialic acids are present in tissues of the human lower respiratory tract (i.e., lung alveolar cells) (24, 35) as well as tissues of the human upper respiratory tract (24). Consistent with these findings, HPAI H5N1 viruses have been shown to attach to and infect tissues belonging to the lower respiratory tract (i.e., trachea, bronchi, and lung) (5, 25, 35, 40, 42, 43) as well as tissues belonging to the upper respiratory tract (i.e., nasopharyngeal, adenoid, and tonsillar) (25). Glycans with α(2,6)-linked sialic acids are more widespread on epithelial cells of the upper airways than lung alveoli (24, 35). In accordance, human seasonal influenza viruses preferentially attach to and infect cells of the upper respiratory tract (6, 25, 35, 43). If cells with both types of receptors are present in the human respiratory tract, simultaneous infection of a person with both human and avian viruses could generate reassortant viruses.Although viruses derived by reassortment between avian H5N1 and human H3N2 progenitors have been generated in vitro (17), reassortment between these avian and human strains in a coinfected mammalian host has not been shown. Furthermore, our knowledge of the genetic and phenotypic repertoire of such reassortants generated in vivo and their potential for transmission to uninfected hosts is limited (2, 17). In the present study, we used the ferret model to better understand the generation of reassortant viruses in a host coinfected with contemporary avian (H5N1) and human (H3N2) viruses and the extent to which such reassortants replicate and transmit from animal to animal. The domestic ferret (Mustela putoris) serves as an ideal small-animal model for influenza because ferrets are susceptible to human and avian influenza viruses, including HPAI H5N1 viruses, and reflect the relative transmissibility of human and avian influenza viruses in humans (9, 17, 18, 31, 36, 39, 53). Our study revealed that coinfection of ferrets reproducibly generated reassortant viruses that could be recovered from tissues within and extending toward the upper respiratory tract. Although H5 reassortant viruses were recovered from the upper airways, they displayed no transmissibility to contact ferrets, suggesting that additional functional changes are required for these viral subtypes to become pandemic within human populations.     

Insertion of a Multibasic Cleavage Motif into the Hemagglutinin of a Low-Pathogenic Avian Influenza H6N1 Virus Induces a Highly Pathogenic Phenotype

The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus phenotype is restricted to influenza A viruses of the H5 and H7 hemagglutinin (HA) subtypes. To obtain more information on the apparent subtype-specific nature of the HPAI virus phenotype, a low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H6N1 virus was generated, containing an HPAI H5 RRRKKR↓G multibasic cleavage site (MBCS) motif in HA (the downward arrow indicates the site of cleavage). This insertion converted the LPAI virus phenotype into an HPAI virus phenotype in vitro and in vivo. The H6N1 virus with an MBCS displayed in vitro characteristics similar to those of HPAI H5 viruses, such as cleavage of HA₀ (the HA protein of influenza A virus initially synthesized as a single polypeptide precursor) and virus replication in the absence of exogenous trypsin. Studies of chickens confirmed the HPAI phenotype of the H6N1 virus with an MBCS, with an intravenous pathogenicity index of 1.4 and systemic virus replication upon intranasal inoculation, the hallmarks of HPAI viruses. This study provides evidence that the subtype-specific nature of the emergence of HPAI viruses is not at the molecular, structural, or functional level, since the introduction of an MBCS resulted in a fully functional virus with an HPAI virus genotype and phenotype.Wild birds represent the natural reservoir of avian influenza A viruses in nature (43). Influenza A viruses are classified on the basis of the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) surface glycoproteins. In wild birds throughout the world, influenza A viruses representing 16 HA and 9 NA antigenic subtypes have been found in numerous combinations (also called subtypes, e.g., H1N1, H6N1) (12). Besides classification based on the antigenic properties of HA and NA, avian influenza A viruses can also be classified based on their pathogenic phenotype in chickens. Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus, an acute generalized disease of poultry in which mortality may be as high as 100%, is restricted to subtypes H5 and H7. Other avian influenza A virus subtypes are generally low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses that cause much milder, primarily respiratory disease in poultry, sometimes with loss of egg production (6).The HA protein of influenza A virus is initially synthesized as a single polypeptide precursor (HA₀), which is cleaved into HA₁ and HA₂ subunits by host cell proteases. The mature HA protein mediates binding of the virus to host cells, followed by endocytosis and HA-mediated fusion with endosomal membranes (43). Influenza viruses of subtypes H5 and H7 may become highly pathogenic after introduction into poultry and cause outbreaks of HPAI. The switch from an LPAI phenotype to the HPAI phenotype of these H5 and H7 influenza A viruses is achieved by the introduction of basic amino acid residues into the HA₀ cleavage site by substitution or insertion, resulting in the so-called multibasic cleavage site (MBCS), which facilitates systemic virus replication (4, 5, 14, 44). The cleavage of the HA₀ of LPAI viruses is restricted to trypsin-like proteases which recognize the XXX(R/K)↓G cleavage motif, where the downward arrow indicates the site of cleavage. Replication of these LPAI viruses is therefore restricted to sites in the host where these enzymes are expressed, i.e., the respiratory and intestinal tract (32, 38). The introduction of an RX(R/K)R↓G or R(R/K)XR↓G minimal MBCS motif into the H5 and H7 subtype viruses facilitates the recognition and cleavage of the HA₀ by ubiquitous proprotein convertases, such as furin (20, 32, 41, 45). H5 influenza A viruses with a minimal MBCS motif only have the highly pathogenic phenotype if the masking glycosylation site at position 11 in the HA is replaced by a nonglycosylation site. Otherwise, at least one additional basic amino acid has to be inserted to allow the shift from an LPAI virus phenotype to an HPAI virus phenotype to occur (15, 18, 21, 22, 28). No information is available on the minimal prerequisites of H7 influenza A viruses to become highly pathogenic, but all HPAI H7 viruses have at least 2 basic amino acid insertions in the HA₀ cleavage site (22). HA₀ with the MBCS is activated in a broad range of different host cells and therefore enables HPAI viruses to replicate systemically in poultry (46). To date, little is known about the apparent subtype-specific nature of the introduction of the MBCS into LPAI viruses and the evolutionary processes involved in the emergence of HPAI viruses. When an MBCS was introduced in a laboratory-adapted strain of influenza virus, A/Duck/Ukraine/1/1963 (H3N8), it did not result in a dramatic change in pathogenic phenotype (35). Here, the effect of the introduction of an MBCS into a primary LPAI H6N1 virus, A/Mallard/Sweden/81/2002, is described. The introduction of an MBCS resulted in trypsin-independent replication in vitro and enhanced pathogenesis in a chicken model. Understanding the basis of the HA subtype specificity of the introduction of an MBCS into avian influenza viruses will lead to a better understanding of potential molecular restrictions involved in emergence of HPAI outbreaks.     

Selection of H5N1 Influenza Virus PB2 during Replication in Humans

Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses continue to cause concern, even though currently circulating strains are not efficiently transmitted among humans. For efficient transmission, amino acid changes in viral proteins may be required. Here, we examined the amino acids at positions 627 and 701 of the PB2 protein. A direct analysis of the viral RNAs of H5N1 viruses in patients revealed that these amino acids contribute to efficient virus propagation in the human upper respiratory tract. Viruses grown in culture or eggs did not always reflect those in patients. These results emphasize the importance of the direct analysis of original specimens.Given the continued circulation of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza viruses and their sporadic transmission to humans, the threat of a pandemic persists. However, for H5N1 influenza viruses to be efficiently transmitted among humans, amino acid substitutions in the avian viral proteins may be necessary.Two positions in the PB2 protein affect the growth of influenza viruses in mammalian cells (3, 11, 18): the amino acid at position 627 (PB2-627), which in most human influenza viruses is lysine (PB2-627Lys) and most avian viruses is glutamic acid (PB2-627Glu), and the amino acid at position 701. PB2-627Lys is associated with the efficient replication (16) and high virulence (5) of H5N1 viruses in mice. Moreover, an H7N7 avian virus isolated from a fatal human case of pneumonia possessed PB2-627Lys, whereas isolates from a nonfatal human case of conjunctivitis and from chickens during the same outbreak possessed PB2-627Glu (2).The amino acid at position 701 in PB2 is important for the high pathogenicity of H5N1 viruses in mice (11). Most avian influenza viruses possess aspartic acid at this position (PB2-701Asp); however, A/duck/Guangxi/35/2001 (H5N1), which is highly virulent in mice (11), possesses asparagine at this position (PB2-701Asn). PB2-701Asn is also found in equine (4) and swine (15) viruses, as well as some H5N1 human isolates (7, 9). Thus, both amino acids appear to be markers for the adaptation of H5N1 viruses in humans (1, 3, 17).Massin et al. (13) reported that the amino acid at PB2-627 affects viral RNA replication in cultured cells at low temperatures. Recently, we demonstrated that viruses, including those of the H5N1 subtype, with PB2-627Lys (human type) grow better at low temperatures in cultured cells than those with PB2-627Glu (avian type) (6). This association between the PB2 amino acid and temperature-dependent growth correlates with the body temperatures of hosts; the human upper respiratory tract is at a lower temperature (around 33°C) than the lower respiratory tract (around 37°C) and the avian intestine, where avian influenza viruses usually replicate (around 41°C). The ability to replicate at low temperatures may be crucial for viral spread among humans via sneezing and coughing by being able to grow in the upper respiratory organs. Therefore, the Glu-to-Lys mutation in PB2-627 is an important step for H5N1 viruses to develop pandemic potential.However, there is no direct evidence that the substitutions of PB2-627Glu with PB2-627Lys and PB2-701Asp with PB2-701Asn occur during the replication of H5N1 avian influenza viruses in human respiratory organs. Therefore, here, we directly analyzed the nucleotide sequences of viral genes from several original specimens collected from patients infected with H5N1 viruses.