Evolutionary equilibrium strategies.

This paper re-examines the concept of evolutionary stability proposed by Maynard Smith.For any finite population it is shown that a strategy which is stable in the sense of Maynard Smith may have a lower fitness than a mutant strategy regardless of the proportion of contestants using the latter.Two alternative concepts of evolutionary stability are then proposed. A strategy is described as being strongly stable if no mutant is able to invade because of its higher fitness and weakly stable if it has a higher fitness whenever the contestants using any particular mutant strategy become sufficiently numerous.For the “war of attrition” between contestants of a given species Maynard Smith and others have argued that the evolutionarily stable strategy is for a contestant to bid (for food or territory) by attempting to wait out its opponent according to an exponential mixed strategy. This paper establishes that such a strategy is only weakly stable and that for any number n there exists a mutant strategy with a higher fitness until the number of mutants in the population exceeds n.The final section reconsiders the stability issue when a natural informational asymmetry is introduced. Each contestant is assumed to be uncertain as to the value its opponent places on the object over which they are competing. In contrast to the symmetric case it is shown that there is a strategy which is strongly stable with respect to any feasible mutant as long as the population is sufficiently large.     

Finite populations choose an optimal language

This paper studies the evolution of a proto-language in a finite population under the frequency-dependent Moran process. A proto-language can be seen as a collection of concept-to-sign mappings. An efficient proto-language is a bijective mapping from objects of communication to used signs and vice versa. Based on the comparison of fixation probabilities, a method for deriving conditions of evolutionary stability in a finite population [Nowak et al., 2004. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428, 246-650], it is shown that efficient proto-languages are the only strategies that are protected by selection, which means that no mutant strategy can have a fixation probability that is greater than the inverse population size. In passing, the paper provides interesting results about the comparison of fixation probabilities as well as Maynard Smith's notion of evolutionary stability for finite populations [Maynard Smith, 1988. Can a mixed strategy be stable in a finite population? J. Theor. Biol. 130, 247-251] that are generally true for games with a symmetric payoff function.     

Evolutionary stability for large populations

We present a revision of Maynard Smith's evolutionary stability criteria for populations which are very large (though technically finite) and of unknown size. We call this the large population ESS, as distinct from Maynard Smith's infinite population ESS and Schaffer's finite population ESS. Building on Schaffer's finite population model, we define the large population ESS as a strategy which cannot be invaded by any finite number of mutants, as long as the population size is sufficiently large. The large population ESS is not equivalent to the infinite population ESS: we give examples of games in which a large population ESS exists but an infinite population ESS does not, and vice versa. Our main contribution is a simple set of two criteria for a large population ESS, which are similar (but not identical) to those originally proposed by Maynard Smith for infinite populations.     

Evolutionarily stable strategies for a finite population and a variable contest size

This paper presents a generalization of Maynard Smith's concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) to cover the cases of a finite population and a variable contest size. Both equilibrium and stability conditions are analysed. The standard Maynard Smith ESS with an infinite population and a contest size of two (pairwise contests) is shown to be a special case of this generalized ESS. An important implication of the generalized ESS is that in finite populations the behaviour of an ESS player is "spiteful", in the sense that an ESS player acts not only to increase his payoff but also to decrease the payoffs of his competitors. The degree of this "spiteful" behaviour is shown to increase with a decrease in the population size, and so is most likely to be observed in small populations. The paper concludes with an extended example: a symmetric two-pure-strategies two-player game for a finite population. It is shown that a mixed strategy ESS is globally stable against invasion by any one type of mutant strategist. The condition for the start of simultaneous invasion by two types of mutant is also given.     

Evolutionary stability in Lotka-Volterra systems

The Lotka-Volterra model of population ecology, which assumes all individuals in each species behave identically, is combined with the behavioral evolution model of evolutionary game theory. In the resultant monomorphic situation, conditions for the stability of the resident Lotka-Volterra system, when perturbed by a mutant phenotype in each species, are analysed. We develop an evolutionary ecology stability concept, called a monomorphic evolutionarily stable ecological equilibrium, which contains as a special case the original definition by Maynard Smith of an evolutionarily stable strategy for a single species. Heuristically, the concept asserts that the resident ecological system must be stable as well as the phenotypic evolution on the "stationary density surface". The conditions are also shown to be central to analyse stability issues in the polymorphic model that allows arbitrarily many phenotypes in each species, especially when the number of species is small. The mathematical techniques are from the theory of dynamical systems, including linearization, centre manifolds and Molchanov's Theorem.     

Does frequency-dependent selection optimize fitness?

In evolutionary biology, the axiom that natural selection tends ideally to maximize inclusive fitness of the individual or some other suitable quantity is often advanced (Cody, 1974; Maynard Smith, 1978; Krebs & McCleery, 1984; Houston et al., 1988). Moreover, the evolutionists generally distinguish two situations (Dawkins, 1980; Maynard Smith, 1982): one in which fitness is independent of the frequency of the phenotypes present in the population (frequency-independent selection), and one in which it does depend on this frequency (frequency-dependent selection). This led some authors such as Parker (1984), and more recently Parker & Maynard Smith (1990), to consider "a 2-speed optimization": frequency-independent selection should lead to a "simple optimum" at the end of the selective process, since all the individuals should have the same strategy and the mean fitness of the population should be maximized; frequency-dependent selection, formulated in terms of the theory of games, should lead to a "competitive optimum" even though the "evolutionary stable strategy" (or "ESS"; Maynard Smith & Price, 1973) characterizing the equilibrium "is not the strategy that maximizes fitness in a population sense" (Parker & Maynard Smith, 1990: 30). Our aim in this short communication is to criticize the concept of "competitive optimum" by Parker & Maynard Smith, as well as the general ability of natural selection to "maximize fitness", even in "phenotypic models" (Lloyd, 1977). These models, devoid of genetic constraints since each strategist is assumed to reproduce its own kind, are especially suitable for examining the ideal effect of natural selection.     

Sex ratio under the haystack model

This paper investigates the evolution of the sex ratio under an extension of the haystack model of Maynard Smith (1964). At the beginning of each season a stack is colonized by a number of fertilized females, and their offspring breed there for several generations until new haystacks are available for colonization. We intend this as a model for populations which undergo periodical population explosions and crashes. With mating before dispersal, the number of generations in the stack has little effect on the equilibrium sex ratio, but it has a marked effect with mating after dispersal. This model is then used to investigate the evolutionary stability of the mechanism of sex determination found in the wood lemming which leads to a population sex ratio of three females to one male.     

Stability in an evolutionary game

A behavior or strategy which is evolutionarily stable must be both optimal and stable. The strategy must be optimal in that it maximizes the expected fitness of all the individuals using it. In addition, the strategy must be resistant to invasion by a mutant. The difference between the Nash solution of game theory and the ESS used in ecology is that the Nash solution only satisfies an optimality criterion and not an evolutionary stability criterion. We extend the ESS definition of Maynard Smith and Price so that it can be applied directly to two-strategy evolutionary games. The concept of a balanced game is introduced, and necessary conditions are derived which are similar to the Nash necessary conditions. The balanced game necessary conditions may be used for direct calculation of ESS candidates. These results are used to examine the optimal flowering time of an annual plant experiencing competition from neighboring plants. The plant competition model is general, and the results may be applied to a wide range of interference competition problems.     

Coevolution of competing species: ecological character displacement

Character displacement of competing species is studied. A model, originally developed by MacArthur and Levins (Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 51 (1964), 1207-1210) and further analyzed by Lawlor and Maynard Smith (Amer. Nat. 110 (1976), 70-99), has been reanalyzed. In the present paper, a more formally correct analysis of the MacArthur-Levins model is provided. A standard population genetics approach to sexually reproducing populations is adopted. The same conclusion as proposed by Lawlor and Maynard Smith emerges; competition can lead only to character divergence. In our analysis we either require that allopatrically evolved consumer populations must be able to coexist at an ecologically stable equilibrium (hence, we require mutual invasibility), or consider the feasibility of allopatric equilibria.     

Further remarks on Darwinian selection and “altruism”

In a recent note, Maynard Smith (Theor. Pop. Biol., in press) has claimed that there are certain difficulties in applying the method developed by us (Theor. Pop. Biol.14, 268–280) which incorporates the evolution of altruism into the population genetic theory of frequency-dependent selection. Of the four examples presented by Maynard Smith, the case of alarm calls was shown to have a natural expression in our multiplicative framework, and to produce conclusions different from those expected under the usual additive assumptions. We show here that the examples of the sterile worker, and of parental care are both simply expressible in terms of our conditional probability approach. The fourth example, the case of incest taboos, will be discussed elsewhere. Using Maynard Smith's examples important differences between the results for the additive and multiplicative fitness constructions are revealed. It is concluded that the heuristic approach using “inclusive fitness” offers no substantive advantages over exact population genetic modelling.     

Individual-based simulations of the War of Attrition

The War of Attrition model of John Maynard Smith predicts a single, mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for animal contests which are settled by conventional displays with no assessment of the opponent's fighting ability. We test the predictions of the model by simulating the evolution of strategies in a finite population of animals under various assumptions on how possible strategies are coded and mutated. While our simulations for the most part confirm the predictions of the model, we also discovered some significant deviations from the theoretically predicted ESS. Specifically, we found that if inheritance of strategies is somewhat imprecise, then a population can evolve that achieves on average a higher payoff than a population at the theoretically predicted ESS. Moreover, if the ESS is realized as a polymorphism of fixed persistence times, then for small populations, sufficiently stringent statistical tests will reject the hypothesis that these times are distributed as theoretically predicted.     

ESS-theory for finite populations

On the basis of some principles from the philosophy of science, the inadequacy of the ESS-theory as introduced by Maynard Smith and Price as a biological theory is discussed, and an improved ESS-theory for finite populations is presented which can adopt the ideas of the original formalism, although modified. Resulting are explicit conditions on the population sizes that ensure certain strategies to be evolutionarily stable.     

Population structure,spite, and the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Evolutionary stability (sensu Maynard Smith: Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) of TIT FOR TAT (TFT) under the social ecology of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is a function of the number of pure TFT groups (dyads) in the population, relative to the social position of a focal invading defector. Defecting against TFT always raises the defector's relative intragroup fitness; when Axelrod's (Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 75:306–318, 1981; The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 1984) Evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) conditions are met, defection also lowers the absolute fitness of the defector. Here the retaliatory (punishing) character of TFT converts defection into spite, permitting pure TFT groups to sufficiently outproduce the defector for the latter's evolutionary suppression. Increasing the relative impact of spiteful defection on a population lowers the range of evolutionary stability for TFT. When individuals participate in multiple dyads, those participating in the greatest number of dyads are most likely to provide a vehicle for the successful invasion of defection. Within social networks, ESS conditions for TFT are thus individual specific. This logic is generalized to the context of an interated n-person Prisoner's Dilemma, providing a cooperative solution conceptually identical with TFT in the two-person game.     

John Maynard Smith and the importance of consistency in evolutionary game theory

John Maynard Smith was the founder of evolutionary game theory. He has also been the major influence on the direction of this field, which now pervades behavioural ecology and evolutionary biology. In its original formulation the theory had three components: a set of strategies, a payoff structure, and a concept of evolutionary stability. These three key components are still the basis of the theory, but what is assumed about each component is often different to the original assumptions. We review modern approaches to these components. We emphasis that if a game is considered in isolation, and arbitrary payoffs are assumed, then the payoffs may not be consistent with other components of the system which are not modelled. Modelling the whole system, including not only the focal game, but also the future behaviour of the players and the behaviour of other population members, allows a consistent model to be constructed. We illustrate this in the case of two models of parental care, showing how linking a focal game to other aspects of the system alters what is predicted.     

The Maynard Smith model of sympatric speciation

The paper entitled "Sympatric speciation," which was published by John Maynard Smith in 1966, initiated the development of mathematical models aiming to identify the conditions for sympatric speciation. A part of that paper was devoted to a specific two-locus, two-allele model of sympatric speciation in a population occupying a two-niche system. Maynard Smith provided some initial numerical results on this model. Later, Dickinson and Antonovics (1973) and Caisse and Antonovics (1978) performed more extensive numerical studies on the model. Here, I report analytical results on the haploid version of the Maynard Smith model. I show how the conditions for sympatric and parapatric speciation and the levels of resulting genetic divergence and reproductive isolation are affected by the strength of disruptive selection and nonrandom mating, recombination rate, and the rates of male and female dispersal between the niches.     

Maynard Smith,optimization, and evolution

Maynard Smith’s defenses of adaptationism and of the value of optimization theory in evolutionary biology are both criticized. His defense does not adequately respond to the criticism of adaptationism by Gould and Lewontin. It is also argued here that natural selection cannot be interpreted as an optimization process if the objective function to be optimized is either (i) interpretable as a fitness, or (ii) correlated with the mean population fitness. This result holds even if fitnesses are frequency-independent; the problem is further exacerbated in the frequency-dependent context modeled by evolutionary game theory. However, Eshel and Feldman’s new results on “long-term” evolution may provide some hope for the continuing relevance of the game-theoretic framework. These arguments also demonstrate the irrelevance of attempts by Intelligent Design creationists to use computational limits on optimization algorithms as evidence against evolutionary theory. It is pointed out that adaptation, natural selection, and optimization are not equivalent processes in the context of biological evolution. It is a pleasure to dedicate this paper to the memory of John Maynard Smith. Thanks are due to James Justus and Samir Okasha for comments on an earlier draft.     

ESS equations sometimes do not specify an ESS

The equations used to find an evolutionarily stable strategy in the basic game theory model (Maynard Smith, 1974, 1982; Maynard Smith & Price, 1973), and in sexual conflict models (Maynard Smith, 1977; Parker, 1979) do not, in fact, specify an ESS when the expected number of contests entered is not the same for each strategy. This means that the conclusions of many game theory models may be incorrect. This is particularly likely to be true when the mean durations of contests for different strategies are not the same, or when the probability that an individual enters a contest is not the same for all strategies. New ESS equations are developed which incorporate the expected number of contests entered.     

An ESS-analysis for ensembles of prisoner's dilemma strategies

The ESS (Evolutionary Stable Strategy) concept of Maynard Smith can be applied in its weak form to ensembles of competing PD ("Prisoner's Dilemma") strategies memorizing two to three of one's own and one's opponent's moves. The format of our study is: (1) games have very long duration; (2) Taylor-Jonker dynamics applies; (3) Effects of finite population size can be ignored. It is shown that in the case R greater than (T + S)/2 a set of strategies can be singled out which do not lose against any other strategy while co-operating with themselves. Such a set is uninvadable by other PD strategies if it constitutes more than half of the total population.     

Conditions for the evolution of altruism under darwinian selection

A model of population structure is discussed which under certain circumstances allows for evolution of altruistic traits, beyond the classical restrictions imposed by kin selection theory and related concepts such as reciprocal altruism. Essentially, the model sees a large population as socially subdivided into small groups without any barriers, however, to free random mating. An altruistic trait is defined as lowering, locally, the fitness of a carrier below that of noncarriers within the same group; but the local fitness of an individual randomly chosen in a group increases with the number of altruists. It is shown that altruism can evolve even if the groups are randomly formed. The conditions for such evolution are contrasted with those prevailing when the groups are formed either with some phenotypic assortment between the members or on the basis of kinship. It is shown that any possibility of evolution tends to rapidly disappear as groups become large, unless there is complete positive assortment or individuals in the groups are kin. The example of alarm calls is also considered, and the two extremes of random and sib-groups are contrasted, using a model by Maynard Smith. It is shown that alarm calls can evolve in small groups of unrelated individuals under conditions qualitatively similar but quantitatively more rigorous than those prevailing for sib-groups.