Blushing and the philosophy of mind

The introduction, an imaginary dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist, is followed by a brief discussion of the interactions between science, philosophy, and religion. Next comes an analysis of the three most popular philosophies of mind: classical mind-body dualism, computerism, and psychoneural monism. It is argued that the latter, held by medical psychologists since Hippocrates, and formulated explicitly by Cajal and Hebb, is the philosophy of mind that underlies contemporary cognitive and affective neuroscience. The standard objections to psychoneural monism (or materialism) are examined. Evolutionary psychology, though promissory, is judged to be more fancy than fact at its present stage. The conclusion is that the philosophy of mind is still in a poor shape, but that it can advance if it learns more from the science of mind. It would also help if scientific psychologists were to replace such tacitly dualistic expressions as "organ N instantiates (or subserves) mental function M" with "organ N performs mental function M", just as we say "the legs walk" instead of "walking is subserved by legs," and "the lungs breathe" instead of "the lungs instantiate breathing."     

The future of philosophy

There is no sharp dividing line between science and philosophy, but philosophical problems tend to have three special features. First, they tend to concern large frameworks rather than specific questions within the framework. Second, they are questions for which there is no generally accepted method of solution. And third they tend to involve conceptual issues. For these reasons a philosophical problem such as the nature of life can become a scientific problem if it is put into a shape where it admits of scientific resolution. Philosophy in the 20th century was characterized by a concern with logic and language, which is markedly different from the concerns of earlier centuries of philosophy. However, it shared with the European philosophical tradition since the 17th century an excessive concern with issues in the theory of knowledge and with scepticism. As the century ends, we can see that scepticism no longer occupies centre stage, and this enables us to have a more constructive approach to philosophical problems than was possible for earlier generations. This situation is somewhat analogous to the shift from the sceptical concerns of Socrates and Plato to the constructive philosophical enterprise of Aristotle. With that in mind, we can discuss the prospects for the following six philosophical areas: (1) the traditional mind-body problem; (ii) the philosophy of mind and cognitive science; (iii) the philosophy of language; (iv) the philosophy of society; (v) ethics and practical reasons; (vi) the philosophy of science. The general theme of these investigations, I believe, is that the appraisal of the true significance of issues in the philosophy of knowledge enables us to have a more constructive account of various other philosophical problems than has typically been possible for the past three centuries.     

Interdisciplinary integration in biology? An overview

Philosophical theories about reduction and integration in science are at variance with what is happenign in science. A realistic approach to science show that possibilities for reduction and integration are limited. The classical ideal of a unified science has since long been rejected in philosophy. But the current emphasis on interdisciplinary integration in philosophy and in science shows that it survives in a different guise. It is necessary to redress the balance, specifically in biology. Methodological analysis shows that many of the grand interdisciplinary theories involving biology actually represent pseudo-integration covered up by inappropriate, overgeneral concepts. Integrationism is not bad, but it must be kept within reasonable bounds. If the present analysis is appropriate, there will have to be fundamental changes in research strategy both in science and in the philosophy of science.     

The racialization of the globe: an interactive interpretation

This article argues that racist belief systems are global although they are neither uniform nor universal. It suggests that racist belief systems share a common language based on science, that they have a common political tension derived from an egalitarian philosophy and that they can also diverge considerably according to local cognitive traditions and political agendas. The article contends that an interactive approach alone can take into account how racist belief systems were negotiated, appropriated and transformed within historically specific contexts, and it provides a number of detailed discussions of cases ranging from Rwanda to China.     

An Indigenous Philosophical Ecology: Situating the Human

Can Indigenous ecological knowledge contribute to major debates in Western science and philosophy? I argue that it offers a ‘philosophical ecology’ that works synergistically with Western eco‐philosophy and some streams of ecological science. This paper takes up the challenge offered by Val Plumwood: that anthropology can contribute to the work of re‐situating the human. It examines an ecological philosophy of mutual benefits, and shows patterns, and a broader meta‐pattern, in which life is both for itself and for others, and in which connectivity and stability are achieved through densely recursive benefits. I identify these and other contexts as areas for further dialogue.     

Towards disciplinary disintegration in biology

Interdisciplinary integration has fundamental limitations. This is not sufficiently realized in science and in philosophy. Concerning scientific theories there are many examples of pseudo-integration which should be unmasked by elementary philosophical analysis. For example, allegedly over-arching theories of stress which are meant to unite biology and psychology, upon analysis, turn out to represent terminological rather than substantive unity. They should be replaced by more specific, local theories. Theories of animal orientation, likewise, have been formulated in unduly general terms. A natural history approach is more suitable for the study of animal orientation. The tendency to formulate overgeneral theories is also present in evolutionary biology. Philosophy of biology can only deal with these matters if it takes a normative turn. Undue emphasis on interdisciplinary integration is a modern variant of the old unity of science ideal. The replacement of the ideal by a better one is an important challenge for the philosophy of science.     

Biohumanities: rethinking the relationship between biosciences, philosophy and history of science, and society

We argue that philosophical and historical research can constitute a "Biohumanities" that deepens our understanding of biology itself engages in constructive "science criticism," helps formulate new "visions of biology," and facilitates "critical science communication." We illustrate these ideas with two recent "experimental philosophy" studies of the concept of the gene and of the concept of innateness conducted by ourselves and collaborators. We conclude that the complex and often troubled relations between science and society are critical to both parties, and argue that the philosophy and history of science can help to make this relationship work.     

Samir Okasha: Evolution and the levels of selection

The debate about the levels of selection has been one of the most controversial both in evolutionary biology and in philosophy of science. Okasha’s book makes the sort of contribution that simply will not be able to be ignored by anyone interested in this field for many years to come. However, my interest here is in highlighting some examples of how Okasha goes about discussing his material to suggest that his book is part of an increasingly interesting trend that sees scientists and philosophers coming together to build a broadened concept of “theory” through a combination of standard mathematical treatments and conceptual analyses. Given the often contentious history of the relationship between philosophy and science, such trend cannot but be welcome.     

Causality and complexity: the myth of objectivity in science

Two distinctly different worldviews dominate today's thinking in science and in the world of ideas outside of science. Using the approach advocated by Robert M. Hutchins, it is possible to see a pattern of interaction between ideas in science and in other spheres such as philosophy, religion, and politics. Instead of compartmentalizing these intellectual activities, it is worthwhile to look for common threads of mutual influence. Robert Rosen has created an approach to scientific epistemology that might seem radical to some. However, it has characteristics that resemble ideas in other fields, in particular in the writings of George Lakoff, Leo Strauss, and George Soros. Historically, the atmosphere at the University of Chicago during Hutchins' presidency gave rise to Rashevsky's relational biology, which Rosen carried forward. Strauss was writing his political philosophy there at the same time. One idea is paramount in all this, and it is Lakoff who gives us the most insight into how the worldviews differ using this idea. The central difference has to do with causality, the fundamental concept that we use to build a worldview. Causal entailment has two distinct forms in Lakoff 's analysis: direct causality and complex causality. Rosen's writings on complexity create a picture of complex causality that is extremely useful in its detail, grounding in the ideas of Aristotle. Strauss asks for a return to the ancients to put philosophy back on track. Lakoff sees the weaknesses in Western philosophy in a similar way, and Rosen provides tools for dealing with the problem. This introduction to the relationships between the thinking of these authors is meant to stimulate further discourse on the role of complex causal entailment in all areas of thought, and how it brings them together in a holistic worldview. The worldview built on complex causality is clearly distinct from that built around simple, direct causality. One important difference is that the impoverished causal entailment that accompanies the machine metaphor in science is unable to give us a clear way to distinguish living organisms from machines. Complex causality finds a dichotomy between organisms, which are closed to efficient cause, and machines, which require entailment from outside. An argument can be made that confusing living organisms with machines, as is done in the worldview using direct cause, makes religion a necessity to supply the missing causal entailment.     

What is stemness?

This paper, addressed to both philosophers of science and stem cell biologists, aims to reduce the obscurity of and disagreements over the nature of stemness. The two most prominent current theories of stemness—the entity theory and the state theory—are both biologically and philosophically unsatisfactory. Improved versions of these theories are likely to converge. Philosophers of science can perform a much needed service in clarifying and formulating ways of testing entity and state theories of stemness. To do so, however, philosophers should acquaint themselves with the latest techniques and approaches employed by bench scientists, such as the use of proteomics, genome-wide association studies, and ChIP-on-chip arrays. An overarching theme of this paper is the desirability of bringing closer together the philosophy of science and the practice of scientific research.     

The tribunal of philosophy and its norms: history and philosophy in Georges Canguilhem’s historical epistemology

In this article I assess Georges Canguilhem’s historical epistemology with both theoretical and historical questions in mind. From a theoretical point of view, I am concerned with the relation between history and philosophy, and in particular with the philosophical assumptions and external norms that are involved in history writing. Moreover, I am concerned with the role that history can play in the understanding and evaluation of philosophical concepts. From a historical point of view, I regard historical epistemology, as developed by Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, as a conception and practice which came out of the project, elaborated in France from the 1920s to the 1940s, of combining history of science and philosophy. I analyse in particular Canguilhem’s epistemology in his theory and practice of history of science. What he called ‘normative history’ is the focus of my analysis. I evaluate the question of the nature and provenience of the norm employed in normative history, and I compare it with the norm as discussed by Canguilhem in Le normal et le pathologique. While I am critical of Canguilhem’s treatment of history, I conclude that his philosophical suggestion to analyse the formation of scientific concepts ‘from below’ represents a useful model for history and philosophy of science, and that it can be very profitably extended to philosophical concepts.     

On some theoretical grounds for an organism-centered biology: Property emergence, supervenience, and downward causation

In this paper, we investigate some theoretical grounds for bridging the gap between an organism-centered biology and the chemical basis of biological explanation, as expressed in the prevailing molecular perspective in biological research. First, we present a brief survey of the role of the organism concept in biological thought. We advance the claim that emergentism (with its fundamental tenets: ontological physicalism, qualitative novelty, property emergence, theory of levels, irreducibility of the emergents, and downward causation) can provide a metaphysical basis for a coherent sort of organicism. Downward causation (DC) is the key notion in emergentist philosophy, as shown by the tension between the aspects of dependence and nonreducibility in the concept of supervenience, preferred by many philosophers to emergence as a basis for nonreductive physicalism. As supervenience physicalism does not lead, arguably, to a stable nonreductive physicalist account, we maintain that a philosophical alternative worthy of investigation is that of a combination of supervenience and property emergence in the formulation of such a stance. Taking as a starting-point O’Connor’s definition of an emergent property, we discuss how a particular interpretation of downward causation (medium DC), inspired by Aristotelian causal modes, results in an explanation of property emergence compatible with both physicalism and non-reductionism. In this account of emergence, one may claim that biology, as a science of living organization, is and remains a science of the organism, even if completely explained by the laws of chemistry. We conclude the paper with a new definition of an emergent property.     

Half a Century on the Concepts of Innateness and Instinct: Survey,Synthesis and Philosophical Implications

This paper first surveys and criticizes the various attempts by students of behavior to define the concept of innateness. A new definition, based on these (especially that of Lorenz), and reformulable in terms of now classic notions in genetics and evolutionary theory, is then offered: A trait is innate if, and only if, it is canalized and such that any phenotype in the reaction norm which does not possess the trait is a morphose — hence maladapted — and such that all modifications do possess the trait. A narrower definition of innateness, based on the first definition, is suggested to delimit what is called “the Lorenzian notions of innateness” and to provide a framework within which to discuss the notion of a fixed action pattern. Evidence, from the recent literature, is adduced to show the existence and importance of such patterns — even for human behavior. In the final section, it is argued that a paradigm shift has indeed occurred and that although this scientific revolution has been accompanied by many of the irrational elements noted by the Kuhnian school of philosophy of science, the shift has in fact been made upon perfectly rational grounds. That this should be true of so controversial a field is strong evidence against the irrationalist thesis in philosophy of science.     

The Role of History in Science

The case often made by scientists (and philosophers) against history and the history of science in particular is clear. Insofar as a field of study is historical as opposed to law-based, it is trivial. Insofar as a field attends to the past of science as opposed to current scientific issues, its efforts are derivative and, by diverting attention from acquiring new knowledge, deplorable. This case would be devastating if true, but it has almost everything almost exactly wrong. The study of history and the study of laws are not mutually exclusive, but unavoidably linked. Neither can be pursued without the other. Much the same can be said of the history of science. The history of science is neither a distraction from “real” science nor even merely a help to science. Rather, the history of science is an essential part of each science. Seeing that this is so requires a broader understanding of both history and science.     

``Why Study History for Science?'

David Hull has demonstrated a marvelous ability to annoy everyone who caresabout science (or should), by forcing us to confront deep truths about howscience works. Credit, priority, precularities, and process weave together tomake the very fabric of science. As Hull's studies reveal, the story is bothmessier and more irritating than those limited by a single disciplinaryperspective generally admit. By itself history is interesting enough, andphilosophy valuable enough. But taken together, they do so much in tellingus about science and by puncturing the comfortable popular illusion abouthow science works. Ultimately, David Hull shows by his example thathistory and philosophy of science can make science better. I agree, and withits focus on the history of science in particular, this paper explores why.     

What history tells us

The history of science was long considered to be something peripheral to science itself. By supplying interesting stories and gossip, it seemed, at best, to provide material for enlivening lectures. In general, it was deemed a suitable activity for retired scientists. This view has been revised considerably in the past years and indeed, today seems hopelessly out of date. History and philosophy of science are increasingly held to be an essential component of the education of scientists. By becoming acquainted with these areas, practicing scientists — and in particular biologists — can better appreciate the significance of the models and theories that underpin their research, especially with the accelerating succession of one idea by the next. The present series, of which the article that follows is the first, aims to give historical glimpses that bear on contemporary biology. The hope is that these glimpses will be both a source of inspiration and of help in resisting useless fashions.     

Systems Bioethics and Stem Cell Biology

The complexities of modern science are not adequately reflected in many bioethical discussions. This is especially problematic in highly contested cases where there is significant pressure to generate clinical applications fast, as in stem cell research. In those cases a more integrated approach to bioethics, which we call systems bioethics, can provide a useful framework to address ethical and policy issues. Much as systems biology brings together different experimental and methodological approaches in an integrative way, systems bioethics integrates aspects of the history and philosophy of science, social and political theory, and normative analysis with the science in question. In this paper we outline how a careful analysis of the science of stem cell research can help to refocus the discussions related to the clinical applications of stem cells. We show how inaccurate or inadequate scientific assumptions help to create a set of unrealistic expectations and badly inform ethical deliberations and policy development. Systems bioethics offers resources for moving beyond the current impasse.