What are you doing? How active and observational experience shape infants' action understanding

From early in life, infants watch other people''s actions. How do young infants come to make sense of actions they observe? Here, we review empirical findings on the development of action understanding in infancy. Based on this review, we argue that active action experience is crucial for infants'' developing action understanding. When infants execute actions, they form associations between motor acts and the sensory consequences of these acts. When infants subsequently observe these actions in others, they can use their motor system to predict the outcome of the ongoing actions. Also, infants come to an understanding of others’ actions through the repeated observation of actions and the effects associated with them. In their daily lives, infants have plenty of opportunities to form associations between observed events and learn about statistical regularities of others’ behaviours. We argue that based on these two forms of experience—active action experience and observational experience—infants gradually develop more complex action understanding capabilities.     

Getting back to the rough ground: deception and 'social living'

At the heart of the social intelligence hypothesis is the central role of 'social living'. But living is messy and psychologists generally seek to avoid this mess in the interests of getting clean data and cleaner logical explanations. The study of deception as intelligent action is a good example of the dangers of such avoidance. We still do not have a full picture of the development of deceptive actions in human infants and toddlers or an explanation of why it emerges. This paper applies Byrne & Whiten's functional taxonomy of tactical deception to the social behaviour of human infants and toddlers using data from three previous studies. The data include a variety of acts, such as teasing, pretending, distracting and concealing, which are not typically considered in relation to human deception. This functional analysis shows the onset of non-verbal deceptive acts to be surprisingly early. Infants and toddlers seem to be able to communicate false information (about themselves, about shared meanings and about events) as early as true information. It is argued that the development of deception must be a fundamentally social and communicative process and that if we are to understand why deception emerges at all, the scientist needs to get 'back to the rough ground' as Wittgenstein called it and explore the messy social lives in which it develops.     

Neuronal chains for actions in the parietal lobe: a computational model

The inferior part of the parietal lobe (IPL) is known to play a very important role in sensorimotor integration. Neurons in this region code goal-related motor acts performed with the mouth, with the hand and with the arm. It has been demonstrated that most IPL motor neurons coding a specific motor act (e.g., grasping) show markedly different activation patterns according to the final goal of the action sequence in which the act is embedded (grasping for eating or grasping for placing). Some of these neurons (parietal mirror neurons) show a similar selectivity also during the observation of the same action sequences when executed by others. Thus, it appears that the neuronal response occurring during the execution and the observation of a specific grasping act codes not only the executed motor act, but also the agent's final goal (intention).In this work we present a biologically inspired neural network architecture that models mechanisms of motor sequences execution and recognition. In this network, pools composed of motor and mirror neurons that encode motor acts of a sequence are arranged in form of action goal-specific neuronal chains. The execution and the recognition of actions is achieved through the propagation of activity bursts along specific chains modulated by visual and somatosensory inputs.The implemented spiking neuron network is able to reproduce the results found in neurophysiological recordings of parietal neurons during task performance and provides a biologically plausible implementation of the action selection and recognition process.Finally, the present paper proposes a mechanism for the formation of new neural chains by linking together in a sequential manner neurons that represent subsequent motor acts, thus producing goal-directed sequences.     

The frames of reference of the motor-visual aftereffect

Repeatedly performing similar motor acts produces short-term adaptive changes in the agent's motor system. One striking use-dependent effect is the motor-to-visual aftereffect (MVA), a short-lasting negative bias in the conceptual categorization of visually-presented training-related motor behavior. The MVA is considered the behavioral counterpart of the adaptation of visuomotor neurons that code for congruent executed and observed motor acts. Here we characterize which features of the motor training generate the MVA, along 3 main dimensions: a) the relative role of motor acts vs. the semantics of the task-set; b) the role of muscular-specific vs. goal-specific training and c) the spatial frame of reference with respect to the whole body. Participants were asked to repeatedly push or pull some small objects in a bowl as we varied different components of adapting actions across three experiments. The results show that a) the semantic value of the instructions given to the participant have no role in generating the MVA, which depends only on the motor meaning of the training act; b) both intrinsic body movements and extrinsic action goals contribute simultaneously to the genesis of the MVA and c) changes in the relative position of the acting hand compared to the observed hand, when they do not involve changes to the movement performed or to the action meaning, do not have an effect on the MVA. In these series of experiments we confirm that recent motor experiences produce measurable changes in how humans see each others' actions. The MVA is an exquisite motor effect generated by two distinct motor sub-systems, one operating in an intrinsic, muscular specific, frame of reference and the other operating in an extrinsic motor space.     

Design, Development and Decisions

Evolutionary ideas and modern biological knowledge have important roles to play in the understanding of human behaviour. Nevertheless, it is deeply misleading to regard humans as robots in the grip of their genes. A well designed brain should respond to the consequences of behaviour; if an understanding of the likely consequences can be achieved without actually performing the act, then a person who knows that they will be rewarded or punished for certain acts is bound to be influenced by that knowledge. A brain designed in that way facilitates the evolution of societies with explicit social approval of certain activities and explicit disapproval of others. The evolutionary approach to psychology does not imply that individuals do not make free choices. Individuals clearly do make a big difference to what happens in their lives through their decisions. They may be surprised by the consequences of their own actions. A well designed brain should be able to anticipate the consequences of various courses of action and choose between them on the basis of their likely costs and benefits. Planning before doing is clearly of great advantage. People do make well considered decisions and they benefit from doing so.     

Predictive motor activation during action observation in human infants

Certain regions of the human brain are activated both during action execution and action observation. This so-called ‘mirror neuron system’ has been proposed to enable an observer to understand an action through a process of internal motor simulation. Although there has been much speculation about the existence of such a system from early in life, to date there is little direct evidence that young infants recruit brain areas involved in action production during action observation. To address this question, we identified the individual frequency range in which sensorimotor alpha-band activity was attenuated in nine-month-old infants'' electroencephalographs (EEGs) during elicited reaching for objects, and measured whether activity in this frequency range was also modulated by observing others'' actions. We found that observing a grasping action resulted in motor activation in the infant brain, but that this activity began prior to observation of the action, once it could be anticipated. These results demonstrate not only that infants, like adults, display overlapping neural activity during execution and observation of actions, but that this activation, rather than being directly induced by the visual input, is driven by infants'' understanding of a forthcoming action. These results provide support for theories implicating the motor system in action prediction.     

Mirroring and the development of action understanding

The discovery of mirror neurons in the monkey motor cortex has inspired wide-ranging hypotheses about the potential relationship between action control and social cognition. In this paper, we consider the hypothesis that this relationship supports the early development of a critical aspect of social understanding, the ability to analyse others’ actions in terms of goals. Recent investigations of infant action understanding have revealed rich connections between motor development and the analysis of goals in others’ actions. In particular, infants’ own goal-directed actions influence their analysis of others’ goals. This evidence indicates that the cognitive systems that drive infants’ own actions contribute to their analysis of goals in others’ actions. These effects occur at a relatively abstract level of analysis both in terms of the structure infants perceive in others’ actions and relevant structure in infants’ own actions. Although the neural bases of these effects in infants are not yet well understood, current evidence indicates that connections between action production and action perception in infancy involve the interrelated neural systems at work in generating planned, intelligent action.     

Nonvisual motor learning influences abstract action observation

Neuroimaging studies have recently provided support for the existence of a human equivalent of the "mirror-neuron" system as first described in monkeys [1], involved in both the execution of movements as well as the observation and imitation of actions performed by others (e.g., [2-6]). A widely held conception concerning this system is that the understanding of observed actions is mediated by a covert simulation process [7]. In the present fMRI experiment, this simulation process was probed by asking subjects to discriminate between visually presented trajectories that either did or did not match previously performed but unseen continuous movement sequences. A specific network of learning-related premotor and parietal areas was found to be reactivated when participants were confronted with their movements' visual counterpart. Moreover, the strength of these reactivations was dependent on the observers' experience with executing the corresponding movement sequence. These findings provide further support for the emerging view that embodied simulations during action observation engage widespread activations in cortical motor regions beyond the classically defined mirror-neuron system. Furthermore, the obtained results extend previous work by showing experience-dependent perceptual modulations at the neural systems level based on nonvisual motor learning.     

Imitative behavior. A theoretical view

This article reviews the results of experimental studies on imitative behavior reported by various investigators, and then discusses the possible brain mechanisms responsible for this behavior. It was found that human infants in their first hours of life were already capable of spontaneous imitation of simple motor acts demonstrated by an adult, without previous training or reward; these observations suggest that imitative behavior is an innate process that can be considered an unconditional reflex of imitation. It was also found that satiated animals resumed eating when they saw their companions eating. In the latter case, the imitative reflex triggered the previously acquired feeding behavior. Similar mechanisms could be responsible for the phenomenon of eating more in the presence of companions than in their absence, as well as that of preferring the food chosen by companions. When followed by a reward, the imitative act can be learned--that is, transformed into an instrumental conditional response; learning by imitation of simple motor acts was observed in animals, and that of complex motor acts was observed in children who had already achieved a certain developmental stage. In animals, learning complex motor tasks was facilitated by previous observation of a companion performing this task. In this case, the presence of the observer during the session could lead to habituation of the experimental situation and production of associations between this situation and stimuli or emotions related to the reward or punishment, and might result in more efficient learning later. The imitative behavior can be inhibited by stimuli producing responses antagonistic to the act of imitation.     

Dissociating object directed and non-object directed action in the human mirror system; implications for theories of motor simulation

Mirror neurons are single cells found in macaque premotor and parietal cortices that are active during action execution and observation. In non-human primates, mirror neurons have only been found in relation to object-directed movements or communicative gestures, as non-object directed actions of the upper limb are not well characterized in non-human primates. Mirror neurons provide important evidence for motor simulation theories of cognition, sometimes referred to as the direct matching hypothesis, which propose that observed actions are mapped onto associated motor schemata in a direct and automatic manner. This study, for the first time, directly compares mirror responses, defined as the overlap between action execution and observation, during object directed and meaningless non-object directed actions. We present functional MRI data that demonstrate a clear dissociation between object directed and non-object directed actions within the human mirror system. A premotor and parietal network was preferentially active during object directed actions, whether observed or executed. Moreover, we report spatially correlated activity across multiple voxels for observation and execution of an object directed action. In contrast to predictions made by motor simulation theory, no similar activity was observed for non-object directed actions. These data demonstrate that object directed and meaningless non-object directed actions are subserved by different neuronal networks and that the human mirror response is significantly greater for object directed actions. These data have important implications for understanding the human mirror system and for simulation theories of motor cognition. Subsequent theories of motor simulation must account for these differences, possibly by acknowledging the role of experience in modulating the mirror response.     

Complementary systems for understanding action intentions

How humans understand the intention of others' actions remains controversial. Some authors have suggested that intentions are recognized by means of a motor simulation of the observed action with the mirror-neuron system [1-3]. Others emphasize that intention recognition is an inferential process, often called "mentalizing" or employing a "theory of mind," which activates areas well outside the motor system [4-6]. Here, we assessed the contribution of brain regions involved in motor simulation and mentalizing for understanding action intentions via functional brain imaging. Results show that the inferior frontal gyrus (part of the mirror-neuron system) processes the intentionality of an observed action on the basis of the visual properties of the action, irrespective of whether the subject paid attention to the intention or not. Conversely, brain areas that are part of a "mentalizing" network become active when subjects reflect about the intentionality of an observed action, but they are largely insensitive to the visual properties of the observed action. This supports the hypothesis that motor simulation and mentalizing have distinct but complementary functions for the recognition of others' intentions.     

Humans but Not Chimpanzees Vary Face-Scanning Patterns Depending on Contexts during Action Observation

Human and nonhuman primates comprehend the actions of other individuals by detecting social cues, including others’ goal-directed motor actions and faces. However, little is known about how this information is integrated with action understanding. Here, we present the ontogenetic and evolutionary foundations of this capacity by comparing face-scanning patterns of chimpanzees and humans as they viewed goal-directed human actions within contexts that differ in whether or not the predicted goal is achieved. Human adults and children attend to the actor’s face during action sequences, and this tendency is particularly pronounced in adults when observing that the predicted goal is not achieved. Chimpanzees rarely attend to the actor’s face during the goal-directed action, regardless of whether the predicted action goal is achieved or not. These results suggest that in humans, but not chimpanzees, attention to actor’s faces conveying referential information toward the target object indicates the process of observers making inferences about the intentionality of an action. Furthermore, this remarkable predisposition to observe others’ actions by integrating the prediction of action goals and the actor’s intention is developmentally acquired.     

Self and other in the human motor system

Observation of another's action can selectively facilitate the brain's motor circuits for making the same action . A "mirror-matching mechanism" might map observed actions onto the observer's own motor representations . Crucially, this view suggests that the brain represents others' actions like one's own. However, this hypothesis has been difficult to test because the experience of one's own body differs from that of others' bodies with respect to viewpoint, morphological features, familiarity, and the hallmark feature of kinaesthetic experience. We used an established method for manipulating the sense of body ownership ("rubber-hand illusion") to compare effects of observing actions that either were or were not illusorily attributed to the subject's own body. We show that observing another's actions facilitated the motor system, whereas observing identical actions, which were illusorily attributed to the subject's own body, showed the opposite pattern. Thus, motor facilitation strongly depends on the agent to whom the observed action is attributed. This result contradicts previous concepts of equivalence between one's own actions and actions of others and suggests that social differentiation, not equivalence, is characteristic of the human action system.     

The mirror mechanism: recent findings and perspectives

Mirror neurons are a specific type of visuomotor neuron that discharge both when a monkey executes a motor act and when it observes a similar motor act performed by another individual. In this article, we review first the basic properties of these neurons. We then describe visual features recently investigated which indicate that, besides encoding the goal of motor acts, mirror neurons are modulated by location in space of the observed motor acts, by the perspective from which the others’ motor acts are seen, and by the value associated with the object on which others’ motor acts are performed. In the last part of this article, we discuss the role of the mirror mechanism in planning actions and in understanding the intention underlying the others’ motor acts. We also review some human studies suggesting that motor intention in humans may rely, as in the monkey, on the mirror mechanism.     

Motor representation of actions in children with autism

Background

Children with Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are frequently hampered by motor impairment, with difficulties ranging from imitation of actions to recognition of motor intentions. Such a widespread inefficiency of the motor system is likely to interfere on the ontogeny of both motor planning and understanding of the goals of actions, thus delivering its ultimate effects on the emergence of social cognition.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We investigate the organization of action representation in 15 high functioning ASD (mean age: 8.11) and in two control samples of typically developing (TD) children: the first one, from a primary school, was matched for chronological age (CA), the second one, from a kindergarten, comprised children of much younger age (CY). We used nine newly designed behavioural motor tasks, aiming at exploring three domains of motor cognition: 1) imitation of actions, 2) production of pantomimes, and 3) comprehension of pantomimes. The findings reveal that ASD children fare significantly worse than the two control samples in each of the inspected components of the motor representation of actions, be it the imitation of gestures, the self-planning of pantomimes, or the (verbal) comprehension of observed pantomimes. In the latter task, owing to its cognitive complexity, ASD children come close to the younger TD children’s level of performance; yet they fare significantly worse with respect to their age-mate controls. Overall, ASD children reveal a profound damage to the mechanisms that control both production and pre-cognitive “comprehension” of the motor representation of actions.

Conclusions/Significance

Our findings suggest that many of the social cognitive impairments manifested by ASD individuals are likely rooted in their incapacity to assemble and directly grasp the intrinsic goal-related organization of motor behaviour. Such impairment of motor cognition might be partly due to an early damage of the Mirror Neuron Mechanism (MNM).     

Human ecology, crime, and crime control: linking individual behavior and aggregate crime

The paper extends previous research published by Cohen, Machalek, Vila, and others on the evolutionary-ecological paradigm for understanding criminal behavior. After reviewing literature related to human ecology and crime, the paper focuses on elements relevant to human ecology-biology, development, and ecological factors--and their role in criminal behavior. Major emphasis is placed on the linkages between individual factors and macro-level crime using chronic offending as a case in point. The principles of evolutionary ecology then are used to discuss counterstrategies to crime, and the prospects for protection/avoidance, deterrent, and nurturant strategies in light of evidence on chronic offending.     

Empathy and the somatotopic auditory mirror system in humans

How do we understand the actions of other individuals if we can only hear them? Auditory mirror neurons respond both while monkeys perform hand or mouth actions and while they listen to sounds of similar actions . This system might be critical for auditory action understanding and language evolution . Preliminary evidence suggests that a similar system may exist in humans . Using fMRI, we searched for brain areas that respond both during motor execution and when individuals listened to the sound of an action made by the same effector. We show that a left hemispheric temporo-parieto-premotor circuit is activated in both cases, providing evidence for a human auditory mirror system. In the left premotor cortex, a somatotopic pattern of activation was also observed: A dorsal cluster was more involved during listening and execution of hand actions, and a ventral cluster was more involved during listening and execution of mouth actions. Most of this system appears to be multimodal because it also responds to the sight of similar actions. Finally, individuals who scored higher on an empathy scale activated this system more strongly, adding evidence for a possible link between the motor mirror system and empathy.     

Grasping the Intentions of Others with One's Own Mirror Neuron System

Understanding the intentions of others while watching their actions is a fundamental building block of social behavior. The neural and functional mechanisms underlying this ability are still poorly understood. To investigate these mechanisms we used functional magnetic resonance imaging. Twenty-three subjects watched three kinds of stimuli: grasping hand actions without a context, context only (scenes containing objects), and grasping hand actions performed in two different contexts. In the latter condition the context suggested the intention associated with the grasping action (either drinking or cleaning). Actions embedded in contexts, compared with the other two conditions, yielded a significant signal increase in the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent sector of the ventral premotor cortex where hand actions are represented. Thus, premotor mirror neuron areas—areas active during the execution and the observation of an action—previously thought to be involved only in action recognition are actually also involved in understanding the intentions of others. To ascribe an intention is to infer a forthcoming new goal, and this is an operation that the motor system does automatically.     

Optimality,stochasticity, and variability in motor behavior

Recent theories of motor control have proposed that the nervous system acts as a stochastically optimal controller, i.e. it plans and executes motor behaviors taking into account the nature and statistics of noise. Detrimental effects of noise are converted into a principled way of controlling movements. Attractive aspects of such theories are their ability to explain not only characteristic features of single motor acts, but also statistical properties of repeated actions. Here, we present a critical analysis of stochastic optimality in motor control which reveals several difficulties with this hypothesis. We show that stochastic control may not be necessary to explain the stochastic nature of motor behavior, and we propose an alternative framework, based on the action of a deterministic controller coupled with an optimal state estimator, which relieves drawbacks of stochastic optimality and appropriately explains movement variability. Action Editor: Frances K. Skinner