Genetic Characteristics of 2009 Pandemic H1N1 Influenza A Viruses Isolated from Mainland China

A total of 100 H1N1 flu real-time-PCR positive throat swabs collected from fever patients in Zhejiang, Hubei and Guangdong between June and November 2009, were provided by local CDC laboratories. After MDCK cell culture, 57 Influenza A Pandemic (H1N1) viruses were isolated and submitted for whole genome sequencing. A total of 39 HA sequences, 52 NA sequences, 36 PB2 sequences, 31 PB1 sequences, 40 PA sequences, 48 NP sequences, 51 MP sequences and 36 NS sequences were obtained, including 20 whole genome seq...     

Phylogenetic analyses of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus in university students at Tobetsu, Hokkaido, Japan

Pandemic influenza H1N1 virus (A[H1N1]pdm09) emerged in 2009. To determine the phylogeography of A(H1N1)pdm09 in a single population, 70 strains of the virus were isolated from university students or trainee doctors at Tobetsu, Hokkaido, Japan, between September and December 2009. The nucleotide sequences of the HA1 region of the HA genes and described phylogenetic relationships of the strains circulating among them were analyzed. It was found that the 70 isolates could be phylogenetically separated into three groups and that two epidemics were caused by different groups of the virus. The three groups were also distinguishable from each other by three amino acid changes: A197T, S203T and Q293H. The substitution of S203T, which is located in the antigenic site, suggests antigenic drift of the virus.     

Assessment of border control measures and community containment measures used in Japan during the early stages of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009

Background

In the early stages of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, border control measures were taken by quarantine stations to block the entry of infected individuals into Japan and community containment measures were implemented to prevent the spreading. The objectives of this study were to describe these measures and the characteristics of infected individuals, and to assess the measures'' effectiveness.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Border control and community containment measures implemented from April to June (Period I: April 28–May 21, Period II: May 22–June 18) 2009 were described. Number of individuals identified and disease characteristics were analyzed. For entry screening, a health declaration form and an infrared thermoscanner were used to detect symptomatic passengers. Passengers indicated for the rapid influenza test underwent the test followed by RT-PCR. Patients positive for H1N1 were isolated, and close contacts were quarantined. Entry cards were handed out to all asymptomatic passengers informing them about how to contact a health center in case they developed symptoms. Nine individuals were identified by entry screening and 1 during quarantine to have Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Health monitoring by health centers was performed in period I for passengers arriving from affected countries and in period II for those who had come into contact with the individuals identified by entry screening. Health monitoring identified 3 infected individuals among 129,546 in Period I and 5 among 746 in Period II. Enhanced surveillance, which included mandatory reporting of details of the infected individuals, identified 812 individuals, 141 (18%) of whom had a history of international travel. Twenty-four of these 141 passengers picked up by enhanced surveillance had been developing symptoms on entry and were missed at screening.

Conclusion/Significance

Symptomatic passengers were detected by the various entry screening measures put in place. Enhanced surveillance provided data for the improvement of public health measures in future pandemics.     

Improving the evidence base for decision making during a pandemic: the example of 2009 influenza A/H1N1

This article synthesizes and extends discussions held during an international meeting on "Surveillance for Decision Making: The Example of 2009 Pandemic Influenza A/H1N1," held at the Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics (CCDD), Harvard School of Public Health, on June 14 and 15, 2010. The meeting involved local, national, and global health authorities and academics representing 7 countries on 4 continents. We define the needs for surveillance in terms of the key decisions that must be made in response to a pandemic: how large a response to mount and which control measures to implement, for whom, and when. In doing so, we specify the quantitative evidence required to make informed decisions. We then describe the sources of surveillance and other population-based data that can presently--or in the future--form the basis for such evidence, and the interpretive tools needed to process raw surveillance data. We describe other inputs to decision making besides epidemiologic and surveillance data, and we conclude with key lessons of the 2009 pandemic for designing and planning surveillance in the future.     

Severe pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza disease due to pathogenic immune complexes

Pandemic influenza viruses often cause severe disease in middle-aged adults without preexisting comorbidities. The mechanism of illness associated with severe disease in this age group is not well understood. Here we find preexisting serum antibodies that cross-react with, but do not protect against, 2009 H1N1 influenza virus in middle-aged adults. Nonprotective antibody is associated with immune complex-mediated disease after infection. We detected high titers of serum antibody of low avidity for H1-2009 antigen, and low-avidity pulmonary immune complexes against the same protein, in severely ill individuals. Moreover, C4d deposition--a marker of complement activation mediated by immune complexes--was present in lung sections of fatal cases. Archived lung sections from middle-aged adults with confirmed fatal influenza 1957 H2N2 infection revealed a similar mechanism of illness. These observations provide a previously unknown biological mechanism for the unusual age distribution of severe cases during influenza pandemics.     

Influenza A virus protein PB1-F2 from different strains shows distinct structural signatures

The proapoptotic influenza A virus PB1-F2 protein contributes to viral pathogenicity and is present in most human and avian influenza isolates. The structures of full-length PB1-F2 of the influenza strains Pandemic flu 2009 H1N1, 1918 Spanish flu H1N1, Bird flu H5N1 and H1N1 PR8, have been characterized by NMR and CD spectroscopy. The study was conducted using chemically synthesized full-length PB1-F2 protein and fragments thereof. The amino acid residues 30–70 of PR8 PB1-F2 were found to be responsible for amyloid formation of the protein, which could be assigned to formation of β-sheet structures, although α-helices were the only structural features detected under conditions that mimic a membranous environment. At membranous conditions, in which the proteins are found in their most structured state, significant differences become apparent between the PB1-F2 variants investigated. In contrast to Pandemic flu 2009 H1N1 and PR8 PB1-F2, which exhibit a continuous extensive C-terminal α-helix, both Spanish flu H1N1 and Bird flu H5N1 PB1-F2 contain a loop region with residues 66–71 that divides the C-terminus into two shorter helices. The observed structural differences are located to the C-terminal ends of the proteins to which most of the known functions of these proteins have been assigned. A C-terminal helix–loop–helix motif might be a structural signature for PB1-F2 of the highly pathogenic influenza viruses as observed for 1918 Spanish flu H1N1 and Bird flu H5N1 PB1-F2. This signature could indicate the pathological nature of viruses emerging in the future and thus aid in the recognition of these viruses.     

Influenza A: From highly pathogenic H5N1 to pandemic 2009 H1N1. Epidemiology and clinical features

The last decade has seen the emergence of two new influenza A subtypes and they have become a cause of concern for the global community. These are the highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza A virus (H5N1) and the Pandemic 2009 influenza H1N1 virus. Since 2003 the H5N1 virus has caused widespread disease and death in poultry, mainly in south East Asia and Africa. In humans the number of cases infected with this virus is few but the mortality has been about 60%. Most patients have presented with severe pneumonia and acute respiratory distress syndrome. The second influenza virus, the pandemic H1N1 2009, emerged in Mexico in March this year. This virus acquired the ability for sustained human to human spread and within a few months spread throughout the world and infected over 4 lakh individuals. The symptoms of infection with this virus are similar to seasonal influenza but it currently affecting younger individuals more often. Fortunately the mortality has been low. Both these new influenza viruses are currently circulating and have different clinical and epidemiological characteristics.     

Multiplexed detection and differentiation of the DNA strains for influenza A (H1N1 2009) using a silicon-based microfluidic system

Pandemic influenza by the swine-origin influenza virus (H1N1 2009) has attracted considerable concern worldwide. A convenient and accurate diagnostic approach that can be deployed at the point of care, such as in a doctor's office or at an airport, is critical for disease control. Here we report the development of a silicon-based microfluidic system for subtype differentiation of the novel H1N1 2009 strain vs. the seasonal influenza A (FluA) strain. The proposed system included two functional modules: a multiplexed PCR module for amplification of nucleic acid targets and a multiplexed silicon nanowire (SiNW) module for sequence determination. The PCR module consisted of a microfluidic PCR chamber and an electrical controller to perform a multiplexed protocol that simultaneously enriched specific segments of both H1N1 and FluA strains (if present), with 10(4)-10(5) amplification efficiency. The PCR amplicon was subsequently denatured and transferred to the SiNW sensing module for a label-free, multiplexed detection. A control SiNW was implemented, for the first time, in order to eliminate background interference. The detection module demonstrated a 10× change in the magnitude of differential current when the target DNA was injected. Overall, the system achieved a sensitivity of 20-30 fg/μl for H1N1 and seasonal FluA nucleic acids in a 10 μl sample. The low sample consumption, high sensitivity and high specificity render it a potential point-of-care (POC) platform to help doctors reach a yes/no decision for infectious diseases.     

Genetic characteristics of 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza a viruses isolated from Mainland China

A total of 100 HIN1 flu real-time-PCR positive throat swabs collected from fever patients in Zhejiang,Hubei and Guangdong between June and November 2009,were provided by local CDC laboratories.After MDCK cell culture,57 Influenza A Pandemic (H1N1) viruses were isolated and submitted for whole genome sequencing.A total of 39 HA sequences,52 NA sequences,36 PB2 sequences,31 PB1 sequences,40 PA sequences,48 NP sequences,51 MP sequences and 36 NS sequences were obtained,including 20 whole genome sequences.Sequence comparison revealed they shared a high degree of homology (96％～99％) with known epidemic strains (A/Califomia/04/2009(H1N1).Phylogenetic analysis showed that although the sequences were highly conserved,they clustered into a small number of groups with only a few distinct strains.Site analysis revealed three substitutions at loop 220 (221-228) of the HA receptor binding site in the 39 HA sequences:A/Hubei/86/2009 PKVRDQEG→PKVRDQEA,A/Zhejiang/08/2009 PKVRDQEG→PKVRDQER,A/Hubei/75/2009PKVRDQEG→PKVRDQGG,the A/Hubei/75/2009 was isolated from an acute case,while the other two were from patients with mild symptoms.Other key sites such as 119,274,292 and 294 amino acids of NA protein,627 of PB2 protein were conserved.Meanwhile,all the M2 protein sequences possessed the Ser32Asn mutation,suggesting that these viruses were resistant to adamantanes.Comparison of these sequences with other H1N1 viruses collected from the NCBI database provides insight into H1N1 transmission and circulation patterns.     

Focus: Vaccines: Achieving Global Vaccine Equity: The Case for an International Pandemic Treaty

This paper presents an ethical argument in support of an international Pandemic Treaty. It argues that an international Pandemic Treaty is the best way to mark progress on global vaccine equity and broader issues of global pandemic preparedness and response which came to light during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Section I evaluates principles of multilateral charity, national security, and international diplomacy standardly invoked in debates about global vaccine allocation and argues that these approaches fall short. Section II explicates notions of solidarity, duties to the least well-off, and mutual aid as ethical values more fitting for an era of emerging infectious diseases. Section III relates the discussion to an international Pandemic Treaty and presents legal, pragmatic, and ethical reasons to support it. The paper concludes that in an interconnected world, fair sharing of vaccines between nations is morally mandatory.     

Characterization In Vitro and In Vivo of a Pandemic H1N1 Influenza Virus from a Fatal Case

Pandemic 2009 H1N1 (pH1N1) influenza viruses caused mild symptoms in most infected patients. However, a greater rate of severe disease was observed in healthy young adults and children without co-morbid conditions. Here we tested whether influenza strains displaying differential virulence could be present among circulating pH1N1 viruses. The biological properties and the genotype of viruses isolated from a patient showing mild disease (M) or from a fatal case (F), both without known co-morbid conditions were compared in vitro and in vivo. The F virus presented faster growth kinetics and stronger induction of cytokines than M virus in human alveolar lung epithelial cells. In the murine model in vivo, the F virus showed a stronger morbidity and mortality than M virus. Remarkably, a higher proportion of mice presenting infectious virus in the hearts, was found in F virus-infected animals. Altogether, the data indicate that strains of pH1N1 virus with enhanced pathogenicity circulated during the 2009 pandemic. In addition, examination of chemokine receptor 5 (CCR5) genotype, recently reported as involved in severe influenza virus disease, revealed that the F virus-infected patient was homozygous for the deleted form of CCR5 receptor (CCR5Δ32).     

Pandemic bounds for an epidemic on an infinite lattice

Exact results have previously been obtained concerning the spread of infection in continuous space contact models describing a class of multi-type epidemics. Pandemic lower and upper bounds were obtained for the spatial final size. Pandemic results have also been obtained for a discrete space model on the integer lattice using an infinite matrix formulation of the final size equations. However, the proof required restrictive constraints to be placed on the model parameters which do not hold in general and will not be valid when infection modifies behaviour. The purpose of this paper is to remove these constraints and give a general proof of the pandemic results for the multi-type epidemic on the lattice Z(N).     

Cross-neutralizing antibodies to pandemic 2009 H1N1 and recent seasonal H1N1 influenza A strains influenced by a mutation in hemagglutinin subunit 2

Pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza A virus (2009 H1N1) differs from H1N1 strains that circulated in the past 50 years, but resembles the A/New Jersey/1976 H1N1 strain used in the 1976 swine influenza vaccine. We investigated whether sera from persons immunized with the 1976 swine influenza or recent seasonal influenza vaccines, or both, neutralize 2009 H1N1. Using retroviral pseudovirions bearing hemagglutinins on their surface (HA-pseudotypes), we found that 77% of the sera collected in 1976 after immunization with the A/New Jersey/1976 H1N1 swine influenza vaccine neutralized 2009 H1N1. Forty five percent also neutralized A/New Caledonia/20/1999 H1N1, a strain used in seasonal influenza vaccines during the 2000/01-2006/07 seasons. Among adults aged 48-64 who received the swine influenza vaccine in 1976 and recent seasonal influenza vaccines during the 2004/05-2008/09 seasons, 83% had sera that neutralized 2009 H1N1. However, 68% of age-matched subjects who received the same seasonal influenza vaccines, but did not receive the 1976 swine influenza vaccine, also had sera that neutralized 2009 H1N1. Sera from both 1976 and contemporary cohorts frequently had cross-neutralizing antibodies to 2009 H1N1 and A/New Caledonia/20/1999 that mapped to hemagglutinin subunit 2 (HA2). A conservative mutation in HA2 corresponding to a residue in the A/Solomon Islands/3/2006 and A/Brisbane/59/2007 H1N1 strains that circulated in the 2006/07 and 2007/08 influenza seasons, respectively, abrogated this neutralization. These findings highlight a cross-neutralization determinant influenced by a point mutation in HA2 and suggest that HA2 may be evolving under direct or indirect immune pressure.     

Evolution of the Hemagglutinin Protein of the New Pandemic H1N1 Influenza Virus: Maintaining Optimal Receptor Binding by Compensatory Substitutions

Pandemic influenza A H1N1 (pH1N1) virus emerged in 2009. In the subsequent 4 years, it acquired several genetic changes in its hemagglutinin (HA). Mutations may be expected while virus is adapting to the human host or upon evasion from adaptive immune responses. However, pH1N1 has not displayed any major antigenic changes so far. We examined the effect of the amino acid substitutions found to be most frequently occurring in the pH1N1 HA protein before 1 April 2012 on the receptor-binding properties of the virus by using recombinant soluble HA trimers. Two changes (S186P and S188T) were shown to increase the receptor-binding avidity of HA, whereas two others (A137T and A200T) decreased binding avidity. Construction of an HA protein tree revealed the worldwide emergence of several HA variants during the past few influenza seasons. Strikingly, two major variants harbor combinations of substitutions (S186P/A137T and S188T/A200T, respectively) with opposite individual effects on binding. Stepwise reconstruction of the HA proteins of these variants demonstrated that the mutations that increase receptor-binding avidity are compensated for by the acquisition of subsequent mutations. The combination of these substitutions restored the receptor-binding properties (avidity and specificity) of these HA variants to those of the parental virus. The results strongly suggest that the HA of pH1N1 was already optimally adapted to the human host upon its emergence in April 2009. Moreover, these results are in agreement with a recent model for antigenic drift, in which influenza A virus mutants with high and low receptor-binding avidity alternate.     

Sentinel Surveillance of Influenza-Like Illness in Two Hospitals in Maracay,Venezuela: 2006–2010

Background

Limited information exists on the epidemiology of acute febrile respiratory illnesses in tropical South American countries such as Venezuela. The objective of the present study was to examine the epidemiology of influenza-like illness (ILI) in two hospitals in Maracay, Venezuela.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We performed a prospective surveillance study of persons with ILI who presented for care at two hospitals in Maracay, Venezuela, from October 2006 to December 2010. A respiratory specimen and clinical information were obtained from each participant. Viral isolation and identification with immunofluorescent antibodies and molecular methods were employed to detect respiratory viruses such as adenovirus, influenza A and B, parainfluenza, and respiratory sincytial virus, among others. There were 916 participants in the study (median age: 17 years; range: 1 month – 86 years). Viruses were identified in 143 (15.6%) subjects, and one participant was found to have a co-infection with more than one virus. Influenza viruses, including pandemic H1N1 2009, were the most frequently detected pathogens, accounting for 67.4% (97/144) of the viruses detected. Adenovirus (15/144), parainfluenza virus (13/144), and respiratory syncytial virus (11/144) were also important causes of ILI in this study. Pandemic H1N1 2009 virus became the most commonly isolated influenza virus during its initial appearance in 2009. Two waves of the pandemic were observed: the first which peaked in August 2009 and the second - higher than the preceding - that peaked in October 2009. In 2010, influenza A/H3N2 re-emerged as the most predominant respiratory virus detected.

Conclusions/Significance

Influenza viruses were the most commonly detected viral organisms among patients with acute febrile respiratory illnesses presenting at two hospitals in Maracay, Venezuela. Pandemic H1N1 2009 influenza virus did not completely replace other circulating influenza viruses during its initial appearance in 2009. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 was the most common influenza virus in the post-pandemic phase.     

Bulls, Bears, and Birds: Preparing the Financial Industry for an Avian Influenza Pandemic

Bulls, Bears, and Birds: Preparing the Financial Industry for an Avian Influenza Pandemic was a half day symposium on avian influenza for senior leaders and decision makers from the financial sector with responsibility for business continuity, health, and security. The event brought together experts and leaders from the medical, public health, business continuity, and financial communities to appraise financial industry leaders on the threat of avian influenza and to offer suggestions regarding what the financial industry could do to prepare and respond.     

Characterization of an artificial swine-origin influenza virus with the same gene combination as H1N1/2009 virus: a genesis clue of pandemic strain

Pandemic H1N1/2009 influenza virus, derived from a reassortment of avian, human, and swine influenza viruses, possesses a unique gene segment combination that had not been detected previously in animal and human populations. Whether such a gene combination could result in the pathogenicity and transmission as H1N1/2009 virus remains unclear. In the present study, we used reverse genetics to construct a reassortant virus (rH1N1) with the same gene combination as H1N1/2009 virus (NA and M genes from a Eurasian avian-like H1N1 swine virus and another six genes from a North American triple-reassortant H1N2 swine virus). Characterization of rH1N1 in mice showed that this virus had higher replicability and pathogenicity than those of the seasonal human H1N1 and Eurasian avian-like swine H1N1 viruses, but was similar to the H1N1/2009 and triple-reassortant H1N2 viruses. Experiments performed on guinea pigs showed that rH1N1 was not transmissible, whereas pandemic H1N1/2009 displayed efficient transmissibility. To further determine which gene segment played a key role in transmissibility, we constructed a series of reassortants derived from rH1N1 and H1N1/2009 viruses. Direct contact transmission studies demonstrated that the HA and NS genes contributed to the transmission of H1N1/2009 virus. Second, the HA gene of H1N1/2009 virus, when combined with the H1N1/2009 NA gene, conferred efficient contact transmission among guinea pigs. The present results reveal that not only gene segment reassortment but also amino acid mutation were needed for the generation of the pandemic influenza virus.