Relational Memory Is Evident in Eye Movement Behavior despite the Use of Subliminal Testing Methods

While it is generally agreed that perception can occur without awareness, there continues to be debate about the type of representational content that is accessible when awareness is minimized or eliminated. Most investigations that have addressed this issue evaluate access to well-learned representations. Far fewer studies have evaluated whether or not associations encountered just once prior to testing might also be accessed and influence behavior. Here, eye movements were used to examine whether or not memory for studied relationships is evident following the presentation of subliminal cues. Participants assigned to experimental or control groups studied scene-face pairs and test trials evaluated implicit and explicit memory for these pairs. Each test trial began with a subliminal scene cue, followed by three visible studied faces. For experimental group participants, one face was the studied associate of the scene (implicit test); for controls none were a match. Subsequently, the display containing a match was presented to both groups, but now it was preceded by a visible scene cue (explicit test). Eye movements were recorded and recognition memory responses were made. Participants in the experimental group looked disproportionately at matching faces on implicit test trials and participants from both groups looked disproportionately at matching faces on explicit test trials, even when that face had not been successfully identified as the associate. Critically, implicit memory-based viewing effects seemed not to depend on residual awareness of subliminal scene cues, as subjective and objective measures indicated that scenes were successfully masked from view. The reported outcomes indicate that memory for studied relationships can be expressed in eye movement behavior without awareness.     

Spatial and Temporal Attention Modulate the Early Stages of Face Processing: Behavioural Evidence from a Reaching Paradigm

A presently unresolved question within the face perception literature is whether attending to the location of a face modulates face processing (i.e. spatial attention). Opinions on this matter diverge along methodological lines – where neuroimaging studies have observed that the allocation of spatial attention serves to enhance the neural response to a face, findings from behavioural paradigms suggest face processing is carried out independently of spatial attention. In the present study, we reconcile this divide by using a continuous behavioural response measure that indexes face processing at a temporal resolution not available in discrete behavioural measures (e.g. button press). Using reaching trajectories as our response measure, we observed that although participants were able to process faces both when attended and unattended (as others have found), face processing was not impervious to attentional modulation. Attending to the face conferred clear benefits on sex-classification processes at less than 350ms of stimulus processing time. These findings constitute the first reliable demonstration of the modulatory effects of both spatial and temporal attention on face processing within a behavioural paradigm.     

Functional neuroimaging of the vegetative state

A number of recent studies have demonstrated a role for state-of-the-art neuroimaging methods in the assessment of patients in the vegetative state and other so-called 'disorders of consciousness'. In several cases, functional MRI has been used to show that aspects of speech perception, emotional processing, language comprehension and even conscious awareness might be retained in some patients who behaviourally meet all of the criteria that define the vegetative state. This work has profound implications for clinical care, diagnosis, prognosis and medical-legal decision making (relating to the prolongation, or otherwise, of life after severe brain injury), as well as for more basic scientific questions about the nature of consciousness and the neural representation of our own thoughts and intentions.     

Primary visual cortex and visual awareness

The primary visual cortex (V1) is probably the best characterized area of primate cortex, but whether this region contributes directly to conscious visual experience is controversial. Early neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies found that visual awareness was best correlated with neural activity in extrastriate visual areas, but recent studies have found similarly powerful effects in V1. Lesion and inactivation studies have provided further evidence that V1 might be necessary for conscious perception. Whereas hierarchical models propose that damage to V1 simply disrupts the flow of information to extrastriate areas that are crucial for awareness, interactive models propose that recurrent connections between V1 and higher areas form functional circuits that support awareness. Further investigation into V1 and its interactions with higher areas might uncover fundamental aspects of the neural basis of visual awareness.     

Decoding visual roughness perception: an fMRI study

Abstract

The neural substrates of tactile roughness perception have been investigated by many neuroimaging studies, while relatively little effort has been devoted to the investigation of neural representations of visually perceived roughness. In this human fMRI study, we looked for neural activity patterns that could be attributed to five different roughness intensity levels when the stimuli were perceived visually, i.e., in absence of any tactile sensation. During functional image acquisition, participants viewed video clips displaying a right index fingertip actively exploring the sandpapers that had been used for the behavioural experiment. A whole brain multivariate pattern analysis found four brain regions in which visual roughness intensities could be decoded: the bilateral posterior parietal cortex (PPC), the primary somatosensory cortex (S1) extending to the primary motor cortex (M1) in the right hemisphere, and the inferior occipital gyrus (IOG). In a follow-up analysis, we tested for correlations between the decoding accuracies and the tactile roughness discriminability obtained from a preceding behavioural experiment. We could not find any correlation between both although, during scanning, participants were asked to recall the tactilely perceived roughness of the sandpapers. We presume that a better paradigm is needed to reveal any potential visuo-tactile convergence. However, the present study identified brain regions that may subserve the discrimination of different intensities of visual roughness. This finding may contribute to elucidate the neural mechanisms related to the visual roughness perception in the human brain.     

Towards a functional neuroanatomy of conscious perception and its modulation by volition: implications of human auditory neuroimaging studies.

Conscious sensory perception and its modulation by volition are integral to human mental life. Functional neuroimaging techniques provide a direct means of identifying and characterizing in vivo the systems-level patterns of brain activity associated with such mental functions. In a series of positron emission tomography activation experiments, we and our colleagues have examined a range of normal and abnormal auditory states that, when contrasted, provide dissociations relevant to the question of the neural substrates of sensory awareness. These dissociations include sensory awareness in the presence and absence of external sensory stimuli, the transition from sensory unawareness to awareness (or vice versa) in the presence of sensory stimuli, and sensory awareness with and without volition. The auditory states studied include hallucinations, mental imagery, cortical deafness modulated by attention, and hearing modulated by sedation. The results of these studies highlight the distributed nature of the functional neuroanatomy that is sufficient, if not necessary, for sensory awareness. The probable roles of unimodal association (as compared with primary) cortices, heteromodal cortices, limbic/paralimbic regions and subcortical structures (such as the thalamus) are discussed. In addition, interactions between pre- and post-rolandic regions are examined in the context of top-down, volitional modulation of sensory awareness.     

Self-awareness and action

In this review we discuss how we are aware that actions are self-generated. We review behavioural data that suggest that a prediction of the sensory consequences of movement might be used to label actions and their consequences as self-generated. We also describe recent functional neuroimaging experiments and studies of neurological and psychiatric patients, which suggest that the parietal cortex plays a crucial role in the awareness of action.     

Are All Beliefs Equal? Implicit Belief Attributions Recruiting Core Brain Regions of Theory of Mind

Humans possess efficient mechanisms to behave adaptively in social contexts. They ascribe goals and beliefs to others and use these for behavioural predictions. Researchers argued for two separate mental attribution systems: an implicit and automatic one involved in online interactions, and an explicit one mainly used in offline deliberations. However, the underlying mechanisms of these systems and the types of beliefs represented in the implicit system are still unclear. Using neuroimaging methods, we show that the right temporo-parietal junction and the medial prefrontal cortex, brain regions consistently found to be involved in explicit mental state reasoning, are also recruited by spontaneous belief tracking. While the medial prefrontal cortex was more active when both the participant and another agent believed an object to be at a specific location, the right temporo-parietal junction was selectively activated during tracking the false beliefs of another agent about the presence, but not the absence of objects. While humans can explicitly attribute to a conspecific any possible belief they themselves can entertain, implicit belief tracking seems to be restricted to beliefs with specific contents, a content selectivity that may reflect a crucial functional characteristic and signature property of implicit belief attribution.     

Extrinsic information influences taste and flavor perception: A review from psychological and neuroimaging perspectives

The perception of taste and flavor can be greatly biased by extrinsic cues, or the information about a food that comes from outside of the food itself, such as package designs, brands, prices, and so on. In order to understand taste/flavor experiences in a broader context, it is necessary to consider factors other than the food/tastants themselves. This review aims to summarize some of the relevant findings from psychological and neuroimaging studies, focusing on depicting how extrinsic cues exert their effect on taste and flavor. Currently, the most frequently considered psychological mediator for the effects of extrinsic cues is expectation. Depending on the gap between expectation and taste/flavor experience, four major models predict outcomes of expectation effects: (1) assimilation, (2) generalized-negativity, (3) contrast, and (4) assimilation-contrast. Among them, the most influential is the assimilation model proposing that taste/flavor experiences are modified toward what one expects. Thus far, all the neuroimaging studies examining the influence of extrinsic cues have dealt with assimilation effects. They suggest that when extrinsic cues influence taste/flavor perception, cortical representations of taste/flavor are also modulated. Collectively neuroimaging findings partly answer questions arising from psychological aspects: the influence of extrinsic cues is not due to superficial response bias but to truly changed perception. These findings, albeit limited to assimilation effects, suggest that combined understanding from both psychological and neuroimaging studies would help deepen our understanding of the taste experience.     

The cerebral signature for pain perception and its modulation

Our understanding of the neural correlates of pain perception in humans has increased significantly since the advent of neuroimaging. Relating neural activity changes to the varied pain experiences has led to an increased awareness of how factors (e.g., cognition, emotion, context, injury) can separately influence pain perception. Tying this body of knowledge in humans to work in animal models of pain provides an opportunity to determine common features that reliably contribute to pain perception and its modulation. One key system that underpins the ability to change pain intensity is the brainstem's descending modulatory network with its pro- and antinociceptive components. We discuss not only the latest data describing the cerebral signature of pain and its modulation in humans, but also suggest that the brainstem plays a pivotal role in gating the degree of nociceptive transmission so that the resultant pain experienced is appropriate for the particular situation of the individual.     

An evolving view of duplex vision: separate but interacting cortical pathways for perception and action

In 1992, Goodale and Milner proposed a division of labour in the visual pathways of the primate cerebral cortex between a dorsal stream specialised for the visual control of action and a ventral stream dedicated to the perception of the visual world. In the years since this original proposal, support for the perception-action hypothesis has come from neuroimaging experiments, human neuropsychology, monkey neurophysiology, and human psychophysical experiments. Indeed, some of the strongest support for this hypothesis has come from behavioural experiments showing that visually guided actions are largely refractory to perceptual illusions. Although controversial, the findings from this literature both support the original hypothesis and suggest important modifications. The ongoing challenge for neurobiologists is to map these behavioural findings onto their corresponding neural substrates.     

Structural and Functional Alterations in Right Dorsomedial Prefrontal and Left Insular Cortex Co-Localize in Adolescents with Aggressive Behaviour: An ALE Meta-Analysis

Recent neuroimaging work has suggested that aggressive behaviour (AB) is associated with structural and functional brain abnormalities in processes subserving emotion processing and regulation. However, most neuroimaging studies on AB to date only contain relatively small sample sizes. To objectively investigate the consistency of previous structural and functional research in adolescent AB, we performed a systematic literature review and two coordinate-based activation likelihood estimation meta-analyses on eight VBM and nine functional neuroimaging studies in a total of 783 participants (408 [224AB/184 controls] and 375 [215 AB/160 controls] for structural and functional analysis respectively). We found 19 structural and eight functional foci of significant alterations in adolescents with AB, mainly located within the emotion processing and regulation network (including orbitofrontal, dorsomedial prefrontal and limbic cortex). A subsequent conjunction analysis revealed that functional and structural alterations co-localize in right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and left insula. Our results are in line with meta-analytic work as well as structural, functional and connectivity findings to date, all of which make a strong point for the involvement of a network of brain areas responsible for emotion processing and regulation, which is disrupted in AB. Increased knowledge about the behavioural and neuronal underpinnings of AB is crucial for the development of novel and implementation of existing treatment strategies. Longitudinal research studies will have to show whether the observed alterations are a result or primary cause of the phenotypic characteristics in AB.     

综述: 人脑视觉意识的神经机制

意识的存在决定了人类生命的意义.意识问题被认为是21世纪科学要回答的一个最重要问题.意识科学正在成为认知和心理科学的皇冠,成为基础科学的顶峰.近20年来,随着认知科学、心理科学、神经科学和脑成像技术的发展,人们开始通过实验科学地研究意识问题,特别是与视觉意识相关的研究工作取得了很多重要进展.在这篇综述中,我们对以往的视觉意识研究工作进行了总结,并对未来的研究方向进行了展望.     

Implicitly Priming the Social Brain: Failure to Find Neural Effects

Humans have a fundamental need for social relationships. Rejection from social groups is especially detrimental, rendering the ability to detect threats to social relationships and respond in adaptive ways critical. Indeed, previous research has shown that experiencing social rejection alters the processing of subsequent social cues in a variety of socially affiliative and avoidant ways. Because social perception and cognition occurs spontaneously and automatically, detecting threats to social relationships may occur without conscious awareness or control. Here, we investigated the automaticity of social threat detection by examining how implicit primes affect neural responses to social stimuli. However, despite using a well-established implicit priming paradigm and large sample size, we failed to find any evidence that implicit primes induced changes at the neural level. That implicit primes influence behavior has been demonstrated repeatedly and across a variety of domains, and our goal is not to question these effects. Rather, we offer the present study as cautionary evidence that such a paradigm may not be amenable to scanning in an fMRI environment.     

Who Learns More? Cultural Differences in Implicit Sequence Learning

Background

It is well documented that East Asians differ from Westerners in conscious perception and attention. However, few studies have explored cultural differences in unconscious processes such as implicit learning.

Methodology/Principal Findings

The global-local Navon letters were adopted in the serial reaction time (SRT) task, during which Chinese and British participants were instructed to respond to global or local letters, to investigate whether culture influences what people acquire in implicit sequence learning. Our results showed that from the beginning British expressed a greater local bias in perception than Chinese, confirming a cultural difference in perception. Further, over extended exposure, the Chinese learned the target regularity better than the British when the targets were global, indicating a global advantage for Chinese in implicit learning. Moreover, Chinese participants acquired greater unconscious knowledge of an irrelevant regularity than British participants, indicating that the Chinese were more sensitive to contextual regularities than the British.

Conclusions/Significance

The results suggest that cultural biases can profoundly influence both what people consciously perceive and unconsciously learn.     

The Neural Basis of Object-Context Relationships on Aesthetic Judgment

The relationship between contextual information and object perception has received considerable attention in neuroimaging studies. In the work reported here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the relationship between aesthetic judgment and images of objects in their normal contextual setting versus images of objects in abnormal contextual settings and the underlying brain activity. When object-context relationships are violated changes in visual perception and aesthetic judgment emerges that exposes the contribution of vision to interpretations shaped by previous experience. We found that effects of context on aesthetic judgment modulates different memory sub-systems, while aesthetic judgment regardless of context recruit medial and lateral aspects of the orbitofrontal cortex, consistent with previous findings. Visual cortical areas traditionally associated with the processing of visual features are recruited in normal contexts, irrespective of aesthetic ratings, while prefrontal areas are significantly more engaged when objects are viewed in unaccustomed settings.     

Body Conscious? Interoceptive Awareness,Measured by Heartbeat Perception,Is Negatively Correlated with Self-Objectification

Background

‘Self-objectification’ is the tendency to experience one''s body principally as an object, to be evaluated for its appearance rather than for its effectiveness. Within objectification theory, it has been proposed that self-objectification accounts for the poorer interoceptive awareness observed in women, as measured by heartbeat perception. Our study is, we believe, the first specifically to test this relationship.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Using a well-validated and reliable heartbeat perception task, we measured interoceptive awareness in women and compared this with their scores on the Self-Objectification Questionnaire, the Self-Consciousness Scale and the Body Consciousness Questionnaire. Interoceptive awareness was negatively correlated with self-objectification. Interoceptive awareness, public body consciousness and private body consciousness together explained 31% of the variance in self-objectification. However, private body consciousness was not significantly correlated with interoceptive awareness, which may explain the many nonsignificant results in self-objectification studies that have used private body consciousness as a measure of body awareness.

Conclusions/Significance

We propose interoceptive awareness, assessed by heartbeat perception, as a measure of body awareness in self-objectification studies. Our findings have implications for those clinical conditions, in women, which are characterised by self-objectification and low interoceptive awareness, such as eating disorders.     

Unconscious mental imagery

Historically, mental imagery has been defined as an experiential state—as something necessarily conscious. But most behavioural or neuroimaging experiments on mental imagery—including the most famous ones—do not actually take the conscious experience of the subject into consideration. Further, recent research highlights that there are very few behavioural or neural differences between conscious and unconscious mental imagery. I argue that treating mental imagery as not necessarily conscious (as potentially unconscious) would bring much needed explanatory unification to mental imagery research. It would also help us to reassess some of the recent aphantasia findings inasmuch as at least some subjects with aphantasia would be best described as having unconscious mental imagery.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.     

Nonvisual Multisensory Impairment of Body Perception in Anorexia Nervosa: A Systematic Review of Neuropsychological Studies

Background

Body image distortion is a central symptom of Anorexia Nervosa (AN). Even if corporeal awareness is multisensory majority of AN studies mainly investigated visual misperception. We systematically reviewed AN studies that have investigated different nonvisual sensory inputs using an integrative multisensory approach to body perception. We also discussed the findings in the light of AN neuroimaging evidence.

Methods

PubMed and PsycINFO were searched until March, 2014. To be included in the review, studies were mainly required to: investigate a sample of patients with current or past AN and a control group and use tasks that directly elicited one or more nonvisual sensory domains.

Results

Thirteen studies were included. They studied a total of 223 people with current or past AN and 273 control subjects. Overall, results show impairment in tactile and proprioceptive domains of body perception in AN patients. Interoception and multisensory integration have been poorly explored directly in AN patients. A limitation of this review is the relatively small amount of literature available.

Conclusions

Our results showed that AN patients had a multisensory impairment of body perception that goes beyond visual misperception and involves tactile and proprioceptive sensory components. Furthermore, impairment of tactile and proprioceptive components may be associated with parietal cortex alterations in AN patients. Interoception and multisensory integration have been weakly explored directly. Further research, using multisensory approaches as well as neuroimaging techniques, is needed to better define the complexity of body image distortion in AN.

Key Findings

The review suggests an altered capacity of AN patients in processing and integration of bodily signals: body parts are experienced as dissociated from their holistic and perceptive dimensions. Specifically, it is likely that not only perception but memory, and in particular sensorimotor/proprioceptive memory, probably shapes bodily experience in patients with AN.