The Romantic Conception of Robert J. Richards

In his new book, The RomanticConception of Life: Science and Philosophyin the Age of Goethe, Robert J. Richardsargues that Charles Darwin's trueevolutionary roots lie in the German Romanticbiology that flourished around thebeginning of the nineteenth century. It isargued that Richards is quite wrong in thisclaim and that Darwin's roots are in theBritish society within which he was born,educated, and lived.     

Evolutionary Ethics: An Irresistible Temptation: Some Reflections on Paul Farber‘s The Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics

In his recent The Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics, Paul Farber has given a negative assessment of the last one hundred years of attempts in Anglo-American philosophy, beginning with Darwin, to develop an evolutionary ethics. Farber identifies some version of the naturalistic fallacy as one of the central sources for the failures of evolutionary ethics. For this reason, and others, Farber urges that though it has its attraction, evolutionary ethics is a temptation to be resisted. In this discussion I identify three major, historically relevant forms of the naturalistic fallacy, the (1) the deductive, (2) genetic, and (3) open question forms and argue that none of them pose an intrinsic problem for evolutionary ethics. I conclude that on this score at least there is no reason to resist temptation.     

Darwinian Ethics and Error

Suppose that the human tendency to think of certain actions andomissions as morally required – a notion that surely lies at the heart of moral discourse – is a trait that has been naturallyselected for. Many have thought that from this premise we canjustify or vindicate moral concepts. I argue that this is mistaken, and defend Michael Ruse's view that the moreplausible implication is an error theory – the idea thatmorality is an illusion foisted upon us by evolution. Thenaturalistic fallacy is a red herring in this debate,since there is really nothing that counts as a fallacy at all. If morality is an illusion, it appears to followthat we should, upon discovering this, abolish moraldiscourse on pain of irrationality. I argue that thisconclusion is too hasty, and that we may be able usefullyto employ a moral discourse, warts and all, withoutbelieving in it.     

Really taking Darwin seriously: An alternative to Michael Ruse's Darwinian metaethics

Michael Ruse has proposed in his recent book Taking Darwin Seriously and elsewhere a new Darwinian ethics distinct from traditional evolutionary ethics, one that avoids the latter's inadequate accounts of the nature of morality and its failed attempts to provide a naturalistic justification of morality. Ruse argues for a sociobiologically based account of moral sentiments, and an evolutionary based casual explanation of their function, rejecting the possibility of ultimate ethical justification. We find that Ruse's proposal distorts, overextends and weakens both Darwinism and naturalism. So we propose an alternative Darwinian metaethics that both remedies the problems in Ruse's proposal and shows how a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness avoids the naturalistic fallacy and can provide genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Thus, we propose to really take Darwin seriously.The authors are equally responsible for the writing of this paper.     

Really taking Darwin and the naturalistic fallacy seriously: An objection to Rottschaefer and Martinsen

Out of a concern to respect the naturalistic fallacy, Ruse (1986) argues for the possibility of causal, but not justificatory, explanations of morality in terms of evolutionary processes. In a discussion of Ruse's work, Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990) claim that he erroneously limits the explanatory scope of evolutionary concepts, because he fails to see that one can have objective moral properties without committing either of two forms of the naturalistic fallacy, if one holds that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties. In this short paper I argue that Rottschaefer and Martinsen's solution fails. If one takes moral properties to supervene on non-moral properties, then either one ends up committing one of the two forms of the naturalistic fallacy or else one is left postulating unbelievable brute metaphysical facts.     

The insufficience of supervenient explanations of moral actions: Really taking Darwin and the naturalistic fallacy seriously

In a recent paper in this journal (Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1990) we have proposed a view of Darwinian evolutionary metaethics that we believe improves upon Michael Ruse's (e.g., Ruse 1986) proposals by claiming that there are evolutionary based objective moral values and that a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness can be given that avoids the naturalistic fallacy in both its definitional and derivational forms while providing genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Jonathan Barrett (this issue) has objected to our proposal contending that we cannot hold for the reality of supervenient moral properties without either falling foul of the naturalistic fallacy or suffering the consequences of postulating inexplicable moral properties. In reply, we show that Barrett's explicit arguments that we commit either the definitional or derivational form of the naturalistic fallacy fail and that his naturalistic intuitions that supervenience explanations of moral properties by nonmoral properties force us into what we call the explanatory form of the naturalistic fallacy also fail. Positively, his objections help us to clarify the nature of the naturalistic fallacy within an evolutionary based naturalistic ethics and to point out the proper role of both supervenience explanations and moral explanations in such an ethics.     

The Philosophy of Donald T. Campbell: A Short Review and Critical Appraisal

Aside from his remarkable studies in psychology and the social sciences, Donald Thomas Campbell (1916–1996) made significant contributions to philosophy, particularly philosophy of science,epistemology, and ethics. His name and his work are inseparably linked with the evolutionary approach to explaining human knowledge (evolutionary epistemology). He was an indefatigable supporter of the naturalistic turn in philosophy and has strongly influenced the discussion of moral issues (evolutionary ethics). The aim of this paper is to briefly characterize Campbells work and to discuss its philosophical implications. In particular, I show its relevance to some current debates in the intersection of biology and philosophy. In fact, philosophy of biology would look poorer without Campbells influence. The present paper is not a hagiography but an attempt to evaluate and critically discuss the meaning of Campbells work for philosophy of biology and to encourage scholars working in this field to read and re-read this work which is both challenging and inspiring.     

分子生物学与进化的新理论

论述了由于分子生物学取得的成就,而形成的生物进化的新理论,并阐述了若干新理论指导生产实践取得的巨大应用成果。     

Synthetic Biology and the Moral Significance of Artificial Life: A Reply to Douglas,Powell and Savulescu

I discuss the moral significance of artificial life within synthetic biology via a discussion of Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's paper 'Is the creation of artificial life morally significant’. I argue that the definitions of 'artificial life’ and of 'moral significance’ are too narrow. Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's definition of artificial life does not capture all core projects of synthetic biology or the ethical concerns that have been voiced, and their definition of moral significance fails to take into account the possibility that creating artificial life is conditionally acceptable. Finally, I show how several important objections to synthetic biology are plausibly understood as arguing that creating artificial life in a wide sense is only conditionally acceptable.     

The current status of REH theory

Summary The recent evaluation by Fitch (1980) of REH theory for macromolecular divergence is a severely erroneous and distorted analysis of our work over the past decade. We reply to those distortions here. At present, there is no factual basis for believing Fitch's assessment that corrections which move evolutionary estimates of total mutations fixed closer to the true distance must do so at the expense of an increased variance sufficient to compromise the value of the improvement. By direct calculation the variance in the estimates of total mutations fixed given by REH theory is comparable to that of other models now in the literature for the case in which genetic events are equiprobable. A general argument is given that suggests that, as we consider more and more carefully the selective, functional, and structural constraints on the evolution of genes and proteins, this variance may be expected to decrease toward a lower bound.     

The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making

We critically review themushrooming literature addressing the neuralmechanisms of moral cognition (NMMC), reachingthe following broad conclusions: (1) researchmainly focuses on three inter-relatedcategories: the moral emotions, moral socialcognition, and abstract moral reasoning. (2)Research varies in terms of whether it deploysecologically valid or experimentallysimplified conceptions of moral cognition. Themore ecologically valid the experimentalregime, the broader the brain areas involved.(3) Much of the research depends on simplifyingassumptions about the domain of moral reasoningthat are motivated by the need to makeexperimental progress. This is a valuablebeginning, but as more is understood about theneural mechanisms of decision-making, morerealistic conceptions will need to replace thesimplified conceptions. (4) The neuralcorrelates of real-life moral cognition areunlikely to consist in anything remotely like a``moral module' or a ``morality center.' Moralrepresentations, deliberations and decisionsare probably highly distributed and notconfined to any particular brainsub-system. Discovering the basic neuralprinciples governing planning, judgment anddecision-making will require vastly more basicresearch in neuroscience, but correlatingactivity in certain brain regions withwell-defined psychological conditions helpsguide neural level research. Progress on socialphenomena will also require theoreticalinnovation in understanding the brain'sdistinctly biological form of computationthat is anchored by emotions, needs, drives,and the instinct for survival.     

The roots of ethics: an anthropological approach

The roots of ethics are to be found within man's freedom and his ability to pursue values from the choices he makes. These values may be sought within the structure of the human being. Some of these values will correspond to man's vital needs (such as socializing, cooperation, family ties, etc.), yet they are not to be interpreted as being genetically determined, since they are consciously interiorized and experienced and planned at both individual and group level. Other values, such as religion, a moral sense, or art transcend those needs strictly linked with physical life. These values may be considered to be “natural universals” or ‘trans-cultural” values because they are to be found in various cultures. The fact that they offer man an advantage, does not necessarily mean that they are genetically determined or that they have been fixed through selection processes. These can be extended to include the values that have matured from the historical experience of single human beings and groups. The transcendental value of the person-man as opposed to infra-human beings, has also been confirmed as a priority criterion for value judgements and for a rational ethics, particularly within the field of bio-ethics.     

The ethics of public policy RCTs: The principle of policy equipoise

In this article, I ask whether a principle analogous to the principle of clinical equipoise should govern the design and conduct of RCTs evaluating the effectiveness of policy interventions. I answer this question affirmatively, and introduce and defend the principle of policy equipoise. According to this principle, all arms of a policy RCT must be, at minimum, in a state of equipoise with the best proven policy that is also morally and practically attainable and sustainable. For all arms of a policy RCT, policy experts must either (1) reasonably disagree about whether the trial arms are more effective than this policy, or (2) know that they are.     

The development of the critical theory of evolution: The scientific career of Wolfgang F. Gutmann

Summary The critical theory of evolution was developed by a group of scientists working together with Wolfgang F. Gutmann at the Senckenberg-Research-Institute in Frankfurt am Main. Gutmann worked at Senckenberg for 37 years. In this time he presented 247 contributions which are distributed over 47 periodicals and books. The ideas that were developed by Gutmann and his colleagues were innovative and pathbreaking for morphology and evolutionary biology. The large number of his morphological publications is indicative of the wide field that was opened up by the concepts of constructional morphology. As some of his colleagues have suggested, constructional morphology as an engineering approach to the study of organisms (i. e., engineering morphology) may replace the traditional concepts of morphology and anatomy and provides the observational base for the historical reconstruction of evolutionary pathways. Constructional morphology as a quasi-engineering approach can be the morphological pendant to the contemporary molecular approaches to biology, as it can provide the necessary morphological basis for the interpretation of the results of molecular studies in the light of evolution.     

Introduction to "Cruelty, Suffering, Imagination: The Lessons of J. M. Coetzee"

For over two decades, Nobel laureate J. M. Coetzee has brilliantly addressed issues of interest to anthropologists: the brutal effects of racist tyranny and injustice in South Africa; the reach of empire; guilt and revenge; and the problem of language in particular historical and political moments. In his recent work Elizabeth Costello (2003a), Coetzee confronts a particularly pressing set of contemporary political and ethical concerns, ones to which anthropologists have much to add. In this "In Focus," anthropologists from each of the subdisciplines use Elizabeth Costello as a lens for working through such concerns, addressing a range of questions—including the nature of evil and its relationship to state power, the burden of belief, the legacy of colonialism, the ethical limits of representations of horror, what it means to live in a world of cruelty and suffering, and the power of humans' sympathetic imagination to confront such a world.