Social orienting in gaze leading: a mechanism for shared attention

Here, we report a novel social orienting response that occurs after viewing averted gaze. We show, in three experiments, that when a person looks from one location to an object, attention then shifts towards the face of an individual who has subsequently followed the person''s gaze to that same object. That is, contrary to ‘gaze following’, attention instead orients in the opposite direction to observed gaze and towards the gazing face. The magnitude of attentional orienting towards a face that ‘follows’ the participant''s gaze is also associated with self-reported autism-like traits. We propose that this gaze leading phenomenon implies the existence of a mechanism in the human social cognitive system for detecting when one''s gaze has been followed, in order to establish ‘shared attention’ and maintain the ongoing interaction.     

Partner Choice Drives the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity potentially provides an important means for generating cooperation based on helping those who help others. However, the use of ‘image scores’ to summarize individuals’ past behaviour presents a dilemma: individuals withholding help from those of low image score harm their own reputation, yet giving to defectors erodes cooperation. Explaining how indirect reciprocity could evolve has therefore remained problematic. In all previous treatments of indirect reciprocity, individuals are assigned potential recipients and decide whether to cooperate or defect based on their reputation. A second way of achieving discrimination is through partner choice, which should enable individuals to avoid defectors. Here, I develop a model in which individuals choose to donate to anyone within their group, or to none. Whereas image scoring with random pairing produces cycles of cooperation and defection, with partner choice there is almost maximal cooperation. In contrast to image scoring with random pairing, partner choice results in almost perfect contingency, producing the correlation between giving and receiving required for cooperation. In this way, partner choice facilitates much higher and more stable levels of cooperation through image scoring than previously reported and provides a simple mechanism through which systems of helping those who help others can work.     

Norway rats reciprocate help according to the quality of help they received

Direct reciprocity, according to the decision rule ‘help someone who has helped you before’, reflects cooperation based on the principle of postponed benefits. A predominant factor influencing Homo sapiens'' motivation to reciprocate is an individ­ual''s perceived benefit resulting from the value of received help. But hitherto it has been unclear whether other species also base their decision to cooperate on the quality of received help. Previous experiments have demonstrated that Norway rats, Rattus norvegicus, cooperate using direct reciprocity decision rules in a variant of the iterated Prisoner''s Dilemma, where they preferentially help cooperators instead of defectors. But, as the quality of obtained benefits has not been varied, it is yet unclear whether rats use the value of received help as decision criterion to pay help back. Here, we tested whether rats distinguish between different cooperators depending purely on the quality of their help. Our data show that a rat''s propensity to reciprocate help is, indeed, adjusted to the perceived quality of the partner''s previous help. When cooperating with two conspecific partners expending the same effort, rats apparently rely on obtained benefit to adjust their level of returned help.     

The evolution of matrilineal kinship organization

Matrilineal kinship organization is a human social system that emphasizes interactions between matrilineal kin, i.e. individuals related only through females. The ‘matrilineal puzzle’ refers to the potential for tension characteristic of this social system, owing to the conflict between the interests and responsibilities of men in their roles as brother/uncle versus husband/father. From an evolutionary perspective, matrilineal kinship organization is puzzling when it diverts investment of resources from the individuals who provide the potentially highest reproductive returns. I use a game-theoretic framework to investigate a particular form of matrilineal inheritance—the transfer of property from a maternal uncle to a sororal nephew. The analysis reveals two mechanisms that may make this strategy a stable evolutionary outcome. First, a polygynous male has multiple wives, and hence multiple brothers-in-law; with matrilineal inheritance, each additional brother-in-law may transfer resources to the male''s wife''s offspring, thus potentially contributing to the male''s inclusive fitness. Second, the husband of a polyandrous female is effectively ‘sharing’ paternity with other men; depending on the number of husbands, he may be better off investing in his sister''s offspring. I conclude by discussing how these results address the challenges posed by the occurrence of matrilineal kinship organization.     

Models of social evolution: can we do better to predict ‘who helps whom to achieve what’?

Models of social evolution and the evolution of helping have been classified in numerous ways. Two categorical differences have, however, escaped attention in the field. Models tend not to justify why they use a particular assumption structure about who helps whom: a large number of authors model peer-to-peer cooperation of essentially identical individuals, probably for reasons of mathematical convenience; others are inspired by particular cooperatively breeding species, and tend to assume unidirectional help where subordinates help a dominant breed more efficiently. Choices regarding what the help achieves (i.e. which life-history trait of the helped individual is improved) are similarly made without much comment: fecundity benefits are much more commonly modelled than survival enhancements, despite evidence that these may interact when the helped individual can perform life-history reallocations (load-lightening and related phenomena). We review our current theoretical understanding of effects revealed when explicitly asking ‘who helps whom to achieve what’, from models of mutual aid in partnerships to the very few models that explicitly contrast the strength of selection to help enhance another individual''s fecundity or survival. As a result of idiosyncratic modelling choices in contemporary literature, including the varying degree to which demographic consequences are made explicit, there is surprisingly little agreement on what types of help are predicted to evolve most easily. We outline promising future directions to fill this gap.     

Upstream reciprocity and the evolution of gratitude

If someone is nice to you, you feel good and may be inclined to be nice to somebody else. This every day experience is borne out by experimental games: the recipients of an act of kindness are more likely to help in turn, even if the person who benefits from their generosity is somebody else. This behaviour, which has been called ‘upstream reciprocity’, appears to be a misdirected act of gratitude: you help somebody because somebody else has helped you. Does this make any sense from an evolutionary or a game theoretic perspective? In this paper, we show that upstream reciprocity alone does not lead to the evolution of cooperation, but it can evolve and increase the level of cooperation if it is linked to either direct or spatial reciprocity. We calculate the random walks of altruistic acts that are induced by upstream reciprocity. Our analysis shows that gratitude and other positive emotions, which increase the willingness to help others, can evolve in the competitive world of natural selection.     

Human primary motor cortex is both activated and stabilized during observation of other person's phasic motor actions

When your favourite athlete flops over the high-jump bar, you may twist your body in front of the TV screen. Such automatic motor facilitation, ‘mirroring’ or even overt imitation is not always appropriate. Here, we show, by monitoring motor-cortex brain rhythms with magnetoencephalography (MEG) in healthy adults, that viewing intermittent hand actions of another person, in addition to activation, phasically stabilizes the viewer''s primary motor cortex, with the maximum of half a second after the onset of the seen movement. Such a stabilization was evident as enhanced cortex–muscle coherence at 16–20 Hz, despite signs of almost simultaneous suppression of rolandic rhythms of approximately 7 and 15 Hz as a sign of activation of the sensorimotor cortex. These findings suggest that inhibition suppresses motor output during viewing another person''s actions, thereby withholding unintentional imitation.     

Personal experience and reputation interact in human decisions to help reciprocally

There is ample evidence that human cooperative behaviour towards other individuals is often conditioned on information about previous interactions. This information derives both from personal experience (direct reciprocity) and from experience of others (i.e. reputation; indirect reciprocity). Direct and indirect reciprocity have been studied separately, but humans often have access to both types of information. Here, we experimentally investigate information use in a repeated helping game. When acting as donor, subjects can condition their decisions to help recipients with both types of information at a small cost to access such information. We find that information from direct interactions weighs more heavily in decisions to help, and participants tend to react less forgivingly to negative personal experience than to negative reputation. Moreover, effects of personal experience and reputation interact in decisions to help. If a recipient''s reputation is positive, the personal experience of the donor has a weak effect on the decision to help, and vice versa. Yet if the two types of information indicate conflicting signatures of helpfulness, most decisions to help follow personal experience. To understand the roles of direct and indirect reciprocity in human cooperation, they should be studied in concert, not in isolation.     

Evolution of direct and indirect reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity (IR) occurs when individuals help those who help others. It is important as a potential explanation for why people might develop cooperative reputations. However, previous models of IR are based on the assumption that individuals never meet again. Yet humans and other animals often interact repeatedly within groups, thereby violating the fundamental basis of these models. Whenever re-meeting can occur, discriminating reciprocators can decide whether to help those who helped others (IR) or those who helped them (direct reciprocity, DR). Here I used simulation models to investigate the conditions in which we can expect the different forms of reciprocity to predominate. I show that IR through image scoring becomes unstable with respect to DR by experience scoring as the probability of re-meeting increases. However, using the standing strategy, which takes into account the context of observed defections, IR can be stable with respect to DR even when individuals interact with few partners many times. The findings are important in showing that IR cannot explain a concern for reputation in typical societies unless reputations provide as reliable a guide to cooperative behaviour as does experience.     

No Evidence for Audience Effects in Reciprocal Cooperation of Norway Rats

Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) cooperate according to indirect reciprocity, which implies the involvement of a reputation mechanism. Here, we test whether the rats employ such mechanism in repeated cooperative interactions. Focal subjects were first trained individually to pull food towards a social partner. During the experiment, the focal rats were confronted with two types of trained social partners: one always cooperated and the other one always defected, either in the presence or in the absence of an audience. Based on the hypotheses that the rats possess a reputation mechanism involving image scoring, we predicted them to be more helpful in the presence of an audience, independently of the partner's cooperative behaviour. If, in contrast, reputation involved a standing strategy, we predicted the rats to distinguish more between cooperators and defectors in the presence of an audience than in its absence. The rats helped cooperative partners more than defectors, but against both predictions the presence or absence of an audience did not influence their helping propensity. This indicates that either reputation is not included in the decision of rats to help an individual that has helped others, or that reputation is neither involving image scoring nor a standing strategy. Although the rats have been shown to modulate their decision to help a social partner based on its helpful behaviour towards others, they do not seem to adjust their behaviour strategically to the presence of an audience.     

Genetic composition of social groups influences male aggressive behaviour and fitness in natural genotypes of Drosophila melanogaster

Indirect genetic effects (IGEs) describe how an individual''s behaviour—which is influenced by his or her genotype—can affect the behaviours of interacting individuals. IGE research has focused on dyads. However, insights from social networks research, and other studies of group behaviour, suggest that dyadic interactions are affected by the behaviour of other individuals in the group. To extend IGE inferences to groups of three or more, IGEs must be considered from a group perspective. Here, I introduce the ‘focal interaction’ approach to study IGEs in groups. I illustrate the utility of this approach by studying aggression among natural genotypes of Drosophila melanogaster. I chose two natural genotypes as ‘focal interactants’: the behavioural interaction between them was the ‘focal interaction’. One male from each focal interactant genotype was present in every group, and I varied the genotype of the third male—the ‘treatment male’. Genetic variation in the treatment male''s aggressive behaviour influenced the focal interaction, demonstrating that IGEs in groups are not a straightforward extension of IGEs measured in dyads. Further, the focal interaction influenced male mating success, illustrating the role of IGEs in behavioural evolution. These results represent the first manipulative evidence for IGEs at the group level.     

The police are not the army: context-dependent aggressiveness in a clonal ant

Animals often exhibit particular ‘personalities’, i.e. their behaviour is correlated across different situations. Recent studies suggest that this limitation of behavioural plasticity may be adaptive, since continuous adjustment of one''s behaviour may be time-consuming and costly. In social insects, particularly aggressive workers might efficiently take over fighting in the contexts of both nest defence and ‘policing’, i.e. the regulation of kin conflict in the society. Here, we examine whether workers who engage in aggressive policing in the ant Platythyrea punctata play a prominent role also in nest defence against intruders. The participation of individuals in policing and nest defence was highly skewed and a minority of workers exhibited most of the aggression. Workers who attacked reproductives after experimental colony fusion were less active during nest defence and vice versa. This suggests that workers show situation-dependent behavioural plasticity rather than consistently aggressive personalities.     

Trust and cooperation among economic agents

The units that are subject to selection pressure in evolutionary biology are ‘strategies’, which are conditional actions (‘Do P if X occurs, otherwise do Q’). In contrast, the units in economics select strategies from available menus so as to further their projects and purposes. As economic agents do not live in isolation, each agent''s optimum choice, in general, depends on the choices made by others. Because their projects and purposes involve the future, not just the present, each agent reasons about the likely present and future consequences of their respective choices. That is why beliefs, about what others may do and what the consequences of those choices could be, are at the basis of strategy selection. A catalogue of social environments is constructed in which agents not only promise each other''s cooperation, but also rationally believe that the promises will be kept. Unfortunately, non-cooperation arising from mistrust can be the outcome in those same environments: societies harbour multiple ‘equilibria’ and can skid from cooperation to non-cooperation. Moreover, a pre-occupation among analysts with the Prisoners'' Dilemma game has obscured the fact that cooperative arrangements can harbour not only inequality, but also exploitation. The analysis is used to discuss why international cooperation over the use of global public goods has proved to be so elusive.     

How should we define goodness?--reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity

Theory of indirect reciprocity is important in explaining cooperation between humans. Since a partner of a social interaction often changes, an individual should assess his partner by using social information such as reputation and make decisions whether to help him or not. To those who have 'good' social reputation does a player give aid as reciprocation, whereas he has to refuse to help those who have 'bad' reputation. Otherwise benefits of altruism is easily exploited by them. Little has been known, however, about the definition of 'goodness' in reputation. What kind of actions are and should be regarded as good and what kind of actions bad? And what sort of goodness enables sustaining exchange of altruism? We herein challenge this question with an evolutionary perspective. We generalize social reputation as 'Honor-score' (H-score) and examine the conditions under which individuals in a group stably maintain cooperative relationships based on indirect reciprocity. We examine the condition for evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) over 4096 possible cases exhaustively. Mathematical analysis reveals that only eight cases called 'leading eight' are crucial to the evolution of indirect reciprocity. Each in the leading eight shares two common characteristics: (i) cooperation with good persons is regarded as good while defection against them is regarded as bad, and (ii) defection against bad persons should be regarded as a good behavior because it works as sanction. Our results give one solution to the definition of goodness from an evolutionary viewpoint. In addition, we believe that the formalism of reputation dynamics gives general insights into the way social information is generated, handled, and transmitted in animal societies.     

Distributed Patterns of Event-Related Potentials Predict Subsequent Ratings of Abstract Stimulus Attributes

Exposure to pleasant and rewarding visual stimuli can bias people''s choices towards either immediate or delayed gratification. We hypothesised that this phenomenon might be based on carry-over effects from a fast, unconscious assessment of the abstract ‘time reference’ of a stimuli, i.e. how the stimulus relates to one''s personal understanding and connotation of time. Here we investigated whether participants'' post-experiment ratings of task-irrelevant, positive background visual stimuli for the dimensions ‘arousal’ (used as a control condition) and ‘time reference’ were related to differences in single-channel event-related potentials (ERPs) and whether they could be predicted from spatio-temporal patterns of ERPs. Participants performed a demanding foreground choice-reaction task while on each trial one task-irrelevant image (depicting objects, people and scenes) was presented in the background. Conventional ERP analyses as well as multivariate support vector regression (SVR) analyses were conducted to predict participants'' subsequent ratings. We found that only SVR allowed both ‘arousal’ and ‘time reference’ ratings to be predicted during the first 200 ms post-stimulus. This demonstrates an early, automatic semantic stimulus analysis, which might be related to the high relevance of ‘time reference’ to everyday decision-making and preference formation.     

Neural signatures of betrayal aversion: an fMRI study of trust

Decisions are said to be ‘risky’ when they are made in environments with uncertainty caused by nature. By contrast, a decision is said to be ‘trusting’ when its outcome depends on the uncertain decisions of another person. A rapidly expanding literature reveals economically important differences between risky and trusting decisions, and further suggests these differences are due to ‘betrayal aversion’. While its neural foundations have not been previously illuminated, the prevailing hypothesis is that betrayal aversion stems from a desire to avoid negative emotions that arise from learning one''s trust was betrayed. Here, we provide evidence from an fMRI study that supports this hypothesis. In particular, our data indicate that the anterior insula modulates trusting decisions that involve the possibility of betrayal.     

A dynamic over games drives selfish agents to win–win outcomes

Understanding human institutions, animal cultures and other social systems requires flexible formalisms that describe how their members change them from within. We introduce a framework for modelling how agents change the games they participate in. We contrast this between-game ‘institutional evolution’ with the more familiar within-game ‘behavioural evolution’. We model institutional change by following small numbers of persistent agents as they select and play a changing series of games. Starting from an initial game, a group of agents trace trajectories through game space by navigating to increasingly preferable games until they converge on ‘attractor’ games. Agents use their ‘institutional preferences'' for game features (such as stability, fairness and efficiency) to choose between neighbouring games. We use this framework to pose a pressing question: what kinds of games does institutional evolution select for; what is in the attractors? After computing institutional change trajectories over the two-player space, we find that attractors have disproportionately fair outcomes, even though the agents who produce them are strictly self-interested and indifferent to fairness. This seems to occur because game fairness co-occurs with the self-serving features these agents do actually prefer. We thus present institutional evolution as a mechanism for encouraging the spontaneous emergence of cooperation among small groups of inherently selfish agents, without space, reputation, repetition, or other more familiar mechanisms. Game space trajectories provide a flexible, testable formalism for modelling the interdependencies of behavioural and institutional evolutionary processes, as well as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation.     

Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of direct reciprocity

Evolutionary game theory is the study of frequency-dependent selection. The success of an individual depends on the frequencies of strategies that are used in the population. We propose a new model for studying evolutionary dynamics in games with a continuous strategy space. The population size is finite. All members of the population use the same strategy. A mutant strategy is chosen from some distribution over the strategy space. The fixation probability of the mutant strategy in the resident population is calculated. The new mutant takes over the population with this probability. In this case, the mutant becomes the new resident. Otherwise, the existing resident remains. Then, another mutant is generated. These dynamics lead to a stationary distribution over the entire strategy space. Our new approach generalizes classical adaptive dynamics in three ways: (i) the population size is finite; (ii) mutants can be drawn non-locally and (iii) the dynamics are stochastic. We explore reactive strategies in the repeated Prisoner''s Dilemma. We perform ‘knock-out experiments’ to study how various strategies affect the evolution of cooperation. We find that ‘tit-for-tat’ is a weak catalyst for the emergence of cooperation, while ‘always cooperate’ is a strong catalyst for the emergence of defection. Our analysis leads to a new understanding of the optimal level of forgiveness that is needed for the evolution of cooperation under direct reciprocity.     

Brown spider monkeys (Ateles hybridus): a model for differentiating the role of social networks and physical contact on parasite transmission dynamics

Elevated risk of disease transmission is considered a major cost of sociality, although empirical evidence supporting this idea remains scant. Variation in spatial cohesion and the occurrence of social interactions may have profound implications for patterns of interindividual parasite transmission. We used a social network approach to shed light on the importance of different aspects of group-living (i.e. within-group associations versus physical contact) on patterns of parasitism in a neotropical primate, the brown spider monkey (Ateles hybridus), which exhibits a high degree of fission–fusion subgrouping. We used daily subgroup composition records to create a ‘proximity’ network, and built a separate ‘contact’ network using social interactions involving physical contact. In the proximity network, connectivity between individuals was homogeneous, whereas the contact network highlighted high between-individual variation in the extent to which animals had physical contact with others, which correlated with an individual''s age and sex. The gastrointestinal parasite species richness of highly connected individuals was greater than that of less connected individuals in the contact network, but not in the proximity network. Our findings suggest that among brown spider monkeys, physical contact impacts the spread of several common parasites and supports the idea that pathogen transmission is one cost associated with social contact.     

Able-Bodied Wild Chimpanzees Imitate a Motor Procedure Used by a Disabled Individual to Overcome Handicap

Chimpanzee culture has generated intense recent interest, fueled by the technical complexity of chimpanzee tool-using traditions; yet it is seriously doubted whether chimpanzees are able to learn motor procedures by imitation under natural conditions. Here we take advantage of an unusual chimpanzee population as a ‘natural experiment’ to identify evidence for imitative learning of this kind in wild chimpanzees. The Sonso chimpanzee community has suffered from high levels of snare injury and now has several manually disabled members. Adult male Tinka, with near-total paralysis of both hands, compensates inability to scratch his back manually by employing a distinctive technique of holding a growing liana taut while making side-to-side body movements against it. We found that seven able-bodied young chimpanzees also used this ‘liana-scratch’ technique, although they had no need to. The distribution of the liana-scratch technique was statistically associated with individuals'' range overlap with Tinka and the extent of time they spent in parties with him, confirming that the technique is acquired by social learning. The motivation for able-bodied chimpanzees copying his variant is unknown, but the fact that they do is evidence that the imitative learning of motor procedures from others is a natural trait of wild chimpanzees.