Prosocial primates: selfish and unselfish motivations

Non-human primates are marked by well-developed prosocial and cooperative tendencies as reflected in the way they support each other in fights, hunt together, share food and console victims of aggression. The proximate motivation behind such behaviour is not to be confused with the ultimate reasons for its evolution. Even if a behaviour is ultimately self-serving, the motivation behind it may be genuinely unselfish. A sharp distinction needs to be drawn, therefore, between (i) altruistic and cooperative behaviour with knowable benefits to the actor, which may lead actors aware of these benefits to seek them by acting cooperatively or altruistically and (ii) altruistic behaviour that offers the actor no knowable rewards. The latter is the case if return benefits occur too unpredictably, too distantly in time or are of an indirect nature, such as increased inclusive fitness. The second category of behaviour can be explained only by assuming an altruistic impulse, which—as in humans—may be born from empathy with the recipient''s need, pain or distress. Empathy, a proximate mechanism for prosocial behaviour that makes one individual share another''s emotional state, is biased the way one would predict from evolutionary theories of cooperation (i.e. by kinship, social closeness and reciprocation). There is increasing evidence in non-human primates (and other mammals) for this proximate mechanism as well as for the unselfish, spontaneous nature of the resulting prosocial tendencies. This paper further reviews observational and experimental evidence for the reciprocity mechanisms that underlie cooperation among non-relatives, for inequity aversion as a constraint on cooperation and on the way defection is dealt with.     

Cooperation and the evolution of intelligence

The high levels of intelligence seen in humans, other primates, certain cetaceans and birds remain a major puzzle for evolutionary biologists, anthropologists and psychologists. It has long been held that social interactions provide the selection pressures necessary for the evolution of advanced cognitive abilities (the 'social intelligence hypothesis'), and in recent years decision-making in the context of cooperative social interactions has been conjectured to be of particular importance. Here we use an artificial neural network model to show that selection for efficient decision-making in cooperative dilemmas can give rise to selection pressures for greater cognitive abilities, and that intelligent strategies can themselves select for greater intelligence, leading to a Machiavellian arms race. Our results provide mechanistic support for the social intelligence hypothesis, highlight the potential importance of cooperative behaviour in the evolution of intelligence and may help us to explain the distribution of cooperation with intelligence across taxa.     

Charitable giving as a signal of trustworthiness: Disentangling the signaling benefits of altruistic acts

It has been shown that psychological predispositions to benefit others can motivate human cooperation and the evolution of such social preferences can be explained with kin or multi-level selection models. It has also been shown that cooperation can evolve as a costly signal of an unobservable quality that makes a person more attractive with regard to other types of social interactions. Here we show that if a proportion of individuals with social preferences is maintained in the population through kin or multi-level selection, cooperative acts that are truly altruistic can be a costly signal of social preferences and make altruistic individuals more trustworthy interaction partners in social exchange. In a computerized laboratory experiment, we test whether altruistic behavior in the form of charitable giving is indeed correlated with trustworthiness and whether a charitable donation increases the observing agents' trust in the donor. Our results support these hypotheses and show that, apart from trust, responses to altruistic acts can have a rewarding or outcome-equalizing purpose. Our findings corroborate that the signaling benefits of altruistic acts that accrue in social exchange can ease the conditions for the evolution of social preferences.     

Culture and the evolution of human cooperation

The scale of human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. All of the available evidence suggests that the societies of our Pliocene ancestors were like those of other social primates, and this means that human psychology has changed in ways that support larger, more cooperative societies that characterize modern humans. In this paper, we argue that cultural adaptation is a key factor in these changes. Over the last million years or so, people evolved the ability to learn from each other, creating the possibility of cumulative, cultural evolution. Rapid cultural adaptation also leads to persistent differences between local social groups, and then competition between groups leads to the spread of behaviours that enhance their competitive ability. Then, in such culturally evolved cooperative social environments, natural selection within groups favoured genes that gave rise to new, more pro-social motives. Moral systems enforced by systems of sanctions and rewards increased the reproductive success of individuals who functioned well in such environments, and this in turn led to the evolution of other regarding motives like empathy and social emotions like shame.     

How institutions shaped the last major evolutionary transition to large-scale human societies

What drove the transition from small-scale human societies centred on kinship and personal exchange, to large-scale societies comprising cooperation and division of labour among untold numbers of unrelated individuals? We propose that the unique human capacity to negotiate institutional rules that coordinate social actions was a key driver of this transition. By creating institutions, humans have been able to move from the default ‘Hobbesian’ rules of the ‘game of life’, determined by physical/environmental constraints, into self-created rules of social organization where cooperation can be individually advantageous even in large groups of unrelated individuals. Examples include rules of food sharing in hunter–gatherers, rules for the usage of irrigation systems in agriculturalists, property rights and systems for sharing reputation between mediaeval traders. Successful institutions create rules of interaction that are self-enforcing, providing direct benefits both to individuals that follow them, and to individuals that sanction rule breakers. Forming institutions requires shared intentionality, language and other cognitive abilities largely absent in other primates. We explain how cooperative breeding likely selected for these abilities early in the Homo lineage. This allowed anatomically modern humans to create institutions that transformed the self-reliance of our primate ancestors into the division of labour of large-scale human social organization.     

The Effects of Extra-Somatic Weapons on the Evolution of Human Cooperation towards Non-Kin

Human cooperation and altruism towards non-kin is a major evolutionary puzzle, as is ‘strong reciprocity’ where no present or future rewards accrue to the co-operator/altruist. Here, we test the hypothesis that the development of extra-somatic weapons could have influenced the evolution of human cooperative behaviour, thus providing a new explanation for these two puzzles. Widespread weapons use could have made disputes within hominin groups far more lethal and also equalized power between individuals. In such a cultural niche non-cooperators might well have become involved in such lethal disputes at a higher frequency than cooperators, thereby increasing the relative fitness of genes associated with cooperative behaviour. We employ two versions of the evolutionary Iterated Prisoner''s Dilemma (IPD) model – one where weapons use is simulated and one where it is not. We then measured the performance of 25 IPD strategies to evaluate the effects of weapons use on them. We found that cooperative strategies performed significantly better, and non-cooperative strategies significantly worse, under simulated weapons use. Importantly, the performance of an ‘Always Cooperate’ IPD strategy, equivalent to that of ‘strong reciprocity’, improved significantly more than that of all other cooperative strategies. We conclude that the development of extra-somatic weapons throws new light on the evolution of human altruistic and cooperative behaviour, and particularly ‘strong reciprocity’. The notion that distinctively human altruism and cooperation could have been an adaptive trait in a past environment that is no longer evident in the modern world provides a novel addition to theory that seeks to account for this major evolutionary puzzle.     

Social structure of primate interaction networks facilitates the emergence of cooperation

Animal cooperation has puzzled biologists for a long time as its existence seems to contravene the basic notion of evolutionary biology that natural selection favours ‘selfish’ genes that promote only their own well-being. Evolutionary game theory has shown that cooperators can prosper in populations of selfish individuals if they occur in clusters, interacting more frequently with each other than with the selfish. Here we show that social networks of primates possess the necessary social structure to promote the emergence of cooperation. By simulating evolutionary dynamics of cooperative behaviour on interaction networks of 70 primate groups, we found that for most groups network reciprocity augmented the fixation probability for cooperation. The variation in the strength of this effect can be partly explained by the groups’ community modularity—a network measure for the groups’ heterogeneity. Thus, given selective update and partner choice mechanisms, network reciprocity has the potential to explain socially learned forms of cooperation in primate societies.     

Direct reciprocity under uncertainty does not explain one-shot cooperation,but demonstrates the benefits of a norm psychology

Humans in many societies cooperate in economic experiments at much higher levels than would be expected if their goal was maximizing economic returns, even when their interactions are anonymous and one-shot. This is a puzzle because paying a cost to benefit another in one-shot interactions gives no direct or indirect benefits to the cooperator. This paper explores the logic of two competing evolutionary hypotheses to explain this behavior. The ``norm psychology'' hypothesis holds that a player's choice of strategy reflects socially-learned cultural norms. Its premise is that over the course of human evolutionary history, cultural norms varied considerably across human societies, and through a process of gene-culture co-evolution, humans evolved mechanisms to learn and adopt the norms that are successful in their particular society. The ``mismatch'' hypothesis holds that pro-social preferences evolved genetically in our hunter–gatherer past where one-shot anonymous interactions were rare and these preferences are misapplied in modern laboratory settings. I compare these hypotheses by adopting a well-known model of the mismatch hypothesis and show that selection for one-shot cooperation in the model is an artifact of agents being confined to only two strategies: Tit-for-Tat and Always Defect. Allowing for repentant and forgiving strategies reverses selection away from one-shot cooperation under all environmental parameters. Direct reciprocity does not necessarily lead to cooperation, but instead generates many different normative equilibria depending on a group's idiosyncratic evolutionary history. Therefore, an agent whose behavior is evoked solely from non-cultural environmental cues will be disadvantaged relative to an agent who learns the locally successful norms. Cooperation in one-shot laboratory experiments is thus more easily explained as the result of a psychology evolved for learning social norms than as a genetic mismatch.     

Was monogamy a key step on the hominin road? reevaluating the monogamy hypothesis in the evolution of cooperative breeding

Because human mothers routinely rely on others to help raise their young, humans have been characterized as cooperative breeders.^1–9 Several large‐scale phylogenetic analyses have presented compelling evidence that monogamy preceded the evolution of cooperative breeding in a wide variety of nonhuman animals.^10–14 These studies have suggested that monogamy provides a general rule (the monogamy hypothesis) for explaining evolutionary transitions to cooperative breeding.¹⁵ Given the prevalence of cooperative breeding in contemporary human societies, we evaluate whether this suggests a monogamous hominin past.     

A test of evolutionary policing theory with data from human societies

In social groups where relatedness among interacting individuals is low, cooperation can often only be maintained through mechanisms that repress competition among group members. Repression-of-competition mechanisms, such as policing and punishment, seem to be of particular importance in human societies, where cooperative interactions often occur among unrelated individuals. In line with this view, economic games have shown that the ability to punish defectors enforces cooperation among humans. Here, I examine a real-world example of a repression-of-competition system, the police institutions common to modern human societies. Specifically, I test evolutionary policing theory by comparing data on policing effort, per capita crime rate, and similarity (used as a proxy for genetic relatedness) among citizens across the 26 cantons of Switzerland. This comparison revealed full support for all three predictions of evolutionary policing theory. First, when controlling for policing efforts, crime rate correlated negatively with the similarity among citizens. This is in line with the prediction that high similarity results in higher levels of cooperative self-restraint (i.e. lower crime rates) because it aligns the interests of individuals. Second, policing effort correlated negatively with the similarity among citizens, supporting the prediction that more policing is required to enforce cooperation in low-similarity societies, where individuals' interests diverge most. Third, increased policing efforts were associated with reductions in crime rates, indicating that policing indeed enforces cooperation. These analyses strongly indicate that humans respond to cues of their social environment and adjust cheating and policing behaviour as predicted by evolutionary policing theory.     

Fairness expectations and altruistic sharing in 15-month-old human infants

Human cooperation is a key driving force behind the evolutionary success of our hominin lineage. At the proximate level, biologists and social scientists have identified other-regarding preferences--such as fairness based on egalitarian motives, and altruism--as likely candidates for fostering large-scale cooperation. A critical question concerns the ontogenetic origins of these constituents of cooperative behavior, as well as whether they emerge independently or in an interrelated fashion. The answer to this question will shed light on the interdisciplinary debate regarding the significance of such preferences for explaining how humans become such cooperative beings. We investigated 15-month-old infants' sensitivity to fairness, and their altruistic behavior, assessed via infants' reactions to a third-party resource distribution task, and via a sharing task. Our results challenge current models of the development of fairness and altruism in two ways. First, in contrast to past work suggesting that fairness and altruism may not emerge until early to mid-childhood, 15-month-old infants are sensitive to fairness and can engage in altruistic sharing. Second, infants' degree of sensitivity to fairness as a third-party observer was related to whether they shared toys altruistically or selfishly, indicating that moral evaluations and prosocial behavior are heavily interconnected from early in development. Our results present the first evidence that the roots of a basic sense of fairness and altruism can be found in infancy, and that these other-regarding preferences develop in a parallel and interwoven fashion. These findings support arguments for an evolutionary basis--most likely in dialectical manner including both biological and cultural mechanisms--of human egalitarianism given the rapidly developing nature of other-regarding preferences and their role in the evolution of human-specific forms of cooperation. Future work of this kind will help determine to what extent uniquely human sociality and morality depend on other-regarding preferences emerging early in life.     

Primate reciprocity and its cognitive requirements

Humans can engage in relatively indiscriminate altruistic behaviors such as donating money to charities, giving blood, and volunteering to review scientific papers. They also live in societies characterized by examples of cooperation of unmatched complexity, such as organized armies, the cooperative building of infrastructures such as roads and railways, and tax‐paying, among others. (We exclude, of course, the “anonymous” societies of some social insects in which the animals themselves are not aware of the cooperative roles they play.) The emphasis on these unique aspects of our behavior 1 has sometimes distracted scientists from paying attention to the more common aspects of our daily lives, which share characteristics with those of our fellow primates. We invite friends for dinner, console others after a loss, intervene in ongoing fights, and even groom others. 2 - 4 These small acts of altruism, which constitute a large part of our daily social life, tend to resemble those of nonhuman primates.     

The development of tag-based cooperation via a socially acquired trait

Recent theoretical models have demonstrated that phenotypic traits can support the non-random assortment of cooperators in a population, thereby permitting the evolution of cooperation. In these “tag-based models”, cooperators modulate cooperation according to an observable and hard-to-fake trait displayed by potential interaction partners. Socially acquired vocalizations in general, and speech accent among humans in particular, are frequently proposed as hard to fake and hard to hide traits that display sufficient cross-populational variability to reliably guide such social assortment in fission–fusion societies. Adults’ sensitivity to accent variation in social evaluation and decisions about cooperation is well-established in sociolinguistic research. The evolutionary and developmental origins of these biases are largely unknown, however. Here, we investigate the influence of speech accent on 5–10-year-old children's developing social and cooperative preferences across four Brazilian Amazonian towns. Two sites have a single dominant accent, and two sites have multiple co-existing accent varieties. We found that children's friendship and resource allocation preferences were guided by accent only in sites characterized by accent heterogeneity. Results further suggest that this may be due to a more sensitively tuned ear for accent variation. The demonstrated local-accent preference did not hold in the face of personal cost. Results suggest that mechanisms guiding tag-based assortment are likely tuned according to locally relevant tag-variation.     

Social life: the paradox of multiple-queen colonies

The evolution of animal societies in which some individuals forego their own reproductive opportunities to help others to reproduce poses an evolutionary paradox that can be traced to Darwin. Altruism may evolve through kin selection when the donor and recipient of altruistic acts are related to each other, as generally is the case in social birds and mammals. Similarly, social insect workers are highly related to the brood they rear when colonies are headed by a single queen. However, recent studies have shown that insect colonies frequently contain several queens, with the effect of decreasing relatedness among colony members. How can one account for the origin and maintenance of such colonies? This evolutionary enigma presents many of the same theoretical challenges as does the evolution of cooperative breeding and eusociality.     

The evolution of cooperative breeding in birds: kinship,dispersal and life history

The evolution of cooperation among animals has posed a major problem for evolutionary biologists, and despite decades of research into avian cooperative breeding systems, many questions about the evolution of their societies remain unresolved. A review of the kin structure of avian societies shows that a large majority live in kin-based groups. This is consistent with the proposed evolutionary routes to cooperative breeding via delayed dispersal leading to family formation, or limited dispersal leading to kin neighbourhoods. Hypotheses proposed to explain the evolution of cooperative breeding systems have focused on the role of population viscosity, induced by ecological/demographic constraints or benefits of philopatry, in generating this kin structure. However, comparative analyses have failed to generate robust predictions about the nature of those constraints, nor differentiated between the viscosity of social and non-social populations, except at a coarse level. I consider deficiencies in our understanding of how avian dispersal strategies differ between social and non-social species, and suggest that research has focused too narrowly on population viscosity and that a broader perspective that encompasses life history and demographic processes may provide fresh insights into the evolution of avian societies.     

Digit length may reveal unusual breeding behaviour in a seabird

The hormonal environment experienced during prenatal development may affect adult phenotype and behaviour. Digit lengths may provide an estimate of steroid levels encountered during embryonic development in humans and other vertebrates. Finger patterns in humans have been shown to reveal sexual orientation or cooperative behaviour. We explored individual breeding behaviour in a monogamous seabird, the Balearic shearwater Puffinus mauretanicus and unexpectedly detected some cooperative breeders. Furthermore, we show evidence of correlation between digit lengths and cooperative breeding in this species. Additionally, we suggest that the first digit could be a possible indicator of prenatal steroid levels. These results are the starting point for further tests of the hypothesis that first digit length is an indicator of prenatal hormone levels in other vertebrate species. Moreover, these results may offer practical use in wild populations to study the implications of the changes in prenatal environment for adult social behaviour.     

Cooperation and conflict: field experiments in Northern Ireland

The idea that cohesive groups, in which individuals help each other, have a competitive advantage over groups composed of selfish individuals has been widely suggested as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation in humans. Recent theoretical models propose the coevolution of parochial altruism and intergroup conflict, when in-group altruism and out-group hostility contribute to the group''s success in these conflicts. However, the few empirical attempts to test this hypothesis do not use natural groups and conflate measures of in-group and unbiased cooperative behaviour. We conducted field experiments based on naturalistic measures of cooperation (school/charity donations and lost letters'' returns) with two religious groups with an on-going history of conflict—Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Conflict was associated with reduced donations to out-group schools and the return of out-group letters, but we found no evidence that it influences in-group cooperation. Rather, socio-economic status was the major determinant of cooperative behaviour. Our study presents a challenge to dominant perspectives on the origins of human cooperation, and has implications for initiatives aiming to promote conflict resolution and social cohesion.     

Fitness increases with partner and neighbour allopreening

Altruism and selfishness are fundamental characteristics of human and animal societies. Among colonial biparental species, breeding outcome depends on interactions between mates and neighbours. However, the relationships between cooperation within and among partnerships and fitness have not been fully investigated. We show that in the highly colonial common guillemot (Uria aalge), altruistic behaviour (allopreening) towards a mate was positively related to long-term fitness, whereas allopreening a neighbour was related to current fitness. Turnover is much lower within than between pairs, so our results suggest that allopreening within pairs generates fitness returns at longer timescales than between pairs. Allopreening not only removes ectoparasites and maintains plumage condition, but may also have important social functions. We found a negative relationship between fight rate and allopreen rate between breeding neighbours, with nests exhibiting low breeding success having a higher frequency of fights with neighbours. We also found evidence for reciprocity in allopreening. Thus, allopreening may function as a reciprocal stress reducer, to decrease the likelihood of fights and associated breeding failure. We suggest that altruistic behaviour has long-term benefits for the survival of the offspring when living in a crowded neighbourhood.     

How is human cooperation different?

Although cooperation is a widespread phenomenon in nature, human cooperation exceeds that of all other species with regard to the scale and range of cooperative activities. Here we review and discuss differences between humans and non-humans in the strategies employed to maintain cooperation and control free-riders. We distinguish forms of cooperative behaviour based on their influence on the immediate payoffs of actor and recipient. If the actor has immediate costs and only the recipient obtains immediate benefits, we term this investment. If the behaviour has immediate positive effects for both actor and recipient, we call this a self-serving mutually beneficial behaviour or mutual cooperation. We argue that humans, in contrast to all other species, employ a wider range of enforcement mechanisms, which allow higher levels of cooperation to evolve and stabilize among unrelated individuals and in large groups. We also discuss proximate mechanisms underlying cooperative behaviour and focus on our experimental work with humans and our closest primate relatives. Differences in the proximate mechanisms also seem to contribute to explaining humans'' greater ability to cooperate and enforce cooperation.     

Signalling and the evolution of cooperative foraging in dynamic environments

Understanding cooperation in animal social groups remains a significant challenge for evolutionary theory. Observed behaviours that benefit others but incur some cost appear incompatible with classical notions of natural selection; however, these behaviours may be explained by concepts such as inclusive fitness, reciprocity, intra-specific mutualism or manipulation. In this work, we examine a seemingly altruistic behaviour, the active recruitment of conspecifics to a food resource through signalling. Here collective, cooperative behaviour may provide highly nonlinear benefits to individuals, since group functionality has the potential to be far greater than the sum of the component parts, for example by enabling the effective tracking of a dynamic resource. We show that due to this effect, signalling to others is an evolutionarily stable strategy under certain environmental conditions, even when there is a cost associated to this behaviour. While exploitation is possible, in the limiting case of a sparse, ephemeral but locally abundant nutrient source, a given environmental profile will support a fixed number of signalling individuals. Through a quantitative analysis, this effective carrying capacity for cooperation is related to the characteristic length and time scales of the resource field.