The Effect of Power Asymmetries on Cooperation and Punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

Recent work has suggested that punishment is detrimental because punishment provokes retaliation, not cooperation, resulting in lower overall payoffs. These findings may stem from the unrealistic assumption that all players are equal: in reality individuals are expected to vary in the power with which they can punish defectors. Here, we allowed strong players to interact with weak players in an iterated prisoner''s dilemma game with punishment. Defecting players were most likely to switch to cooperation if the partner cooperated: adding punishment yielded no additional benefit and, under some circumstances, increased the chance that the partner would both defect and retaliate against the punisher. Our findings show that, in a two-player game, cooperation begets cooperation and that punishment does not seem to yield any additional benefits. Further work should explore whether strong punishers might prevail in multi-player games.     

Long-term social bonds promote cooperation in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Reciprocal altruism, one of the most probable explanations for cooperation among non-kin, has been modelled as a Prisoner''s Dilemma. According to this game, cooperation could evolve when individuals, who expect to play again, use conditional strategies like tit-for-tat or Pavlov. There is evidence that humans use such strategies to achieve mutual cooperation, but most controlled experiments with non-human animals have failed to find cooperation. One reason for this could be that subjects fail to cooperate because they behave as if they were to play only once. To assess this hypothesis, we conducted an experiment with monogamous zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata) that were tested in a two-choice apparatus, with either their social partner or an experimental opponent of the opposite sex. We found that zebra finches maintained high levels of cooperation in an iterated Prisoner''s Dilemma game only when interacting with their social partner. Although other mechanisms may have contributed to the observed difference between the two treatments, our results support the hypothesis that animals do not systematically give in to the short-term temptation of cheating when long-term benefits exist. Thus, our findings contradict the commonly accepted idea that reciprocal altruism will be rare in non-human animals.     

Standing genetic variation in host preference for mutualist microbial symbionts

Many models of mutualisms show that mutualisms are unstable if hosts lack mechanisms enabling preferential associations with mutualistic symbiotic partners over exploitative partners. Despite the theoretical importance of mutualism-stabilizing mechanisms, we have little empirical evidence to infer their evolutionary dynamics in response to exploitation by non-beneficial partners. Using a model mutualism—the interaction between legumes and nitrogen-fixing soil symbionts—we tested for quantitative genetic variation in plant responses to mutualistic and exploitative symbiotic rhizobia in controlled greenhouse conditions. We found significant broad-sense heritability in a legume host''s preferential association with mutualistic over exploitative symbionts and selection to reduce frequency of associations with exploitative partners. We failed to detect evidence that selection will favour the loss of mutualism-stabilizing mechanisms in the absence of exploitation, as we found no evidence for a fitness cost to the host trait or indirect selection on genetically correlated traits. Our results show that genetic variation in the ability to preferentially reduce associations with an exploitative partner exists within mutualisms and is under selection, indicating that micro-evolutionary responses in mutualism-stabilizing traits in the face of rapidly evolving mutualistic and exploitative symbiotic bacteria can occur in natural host populations.     

Partner switching can favour cooperation in a biological market

Intraspecific cooperation and interspecific mutualisms can be promoted by mechanisms that reduce the frequency with which cooperative organisms are exploited by unhelpful partners. One such mechanism consists of changing partners after interacting with an uncooperative individual. I used McNamara et al.'s (Nature, 451, 2008, 189) partner switching model as a framework to examine whether this mechanism can select for increased cooperative investment by house sparrows (Passer domesticus) collaborating to rear offspring; previous research on this species has shown that substantial cooperative investments by both pair members are required to achieve high pay‐offs from collaborating. I found that the poorer the outcome of a breeding attempt relative to the number of eggs the female invested, the greater the likelihood of partner switching. The incidence of partner switching changed seasonally, with peak switching coinciding with an increase in the number of alternative partners available to females. After females switched partners, their breeding outcomes rose to match those of females that remained with the same partner; this was not the case for males that switched partners. Consistent with the model's prediction, males in stable partnerships achieved over 25% higher than average reproductive success, which was attributable to both persistently good breeding outcomes and their older partners' high fecundity. These results provide empirical support for the hypothesis that partner switching favours increased cooperative investment levels, and they demonstrate that variation in the relative value of by‐product benefits can enhance that process.     

Conflict, cheats and the persistence of symbioses

Many symbioses are widespread, abundant, and evolutionarily persistent. This is despite unambiguous evidence for conflict between the partners and the existence of cheats that use benefits derived from their partners while providing reduced or no services in return. Evidence from a diversity of associations suggests that symbioses are robust to cheating in several ways. Some symbioses persist despite conflict and cheating because of the selective advantage of cost-free interactions (also known as byproduct mutualistic interactions), which incur no conflict. There is also evidence for the suppression of cheating by sanctions imposed by partners in some symbioses, and vertical transmission has been shown experimentally to promote traits that enhance partner performance. It is argued that these processes contribute to the apparent rarity of evolutionary transitions from symbiosis to parasitism. There is strong phylogenetic evidence for the evolutionary reversion of various symbiotic organisms to free-living lifestyles, but at least some of these transitions can be attributed to selection pressures other than within-symbiosis conflict. The principal conclusion is that, although conflict is common in symbioses, it is generally managed and contained.     

Nash Equilibria in Multi-Agent Motor Interactions

Social interactions in classic cognitive games like the ultimatum game or the prisoner''s dilemma typically lead to Nash equilibria when multiple competitive decision makers with perfect knowledge select optimal strategies. However, in evolutionary game theory it has been shown that Nash equilibria can also arise as attractors in dynamical systems that can describe, for example, the population dynamics of microorganisms. Similar to such evolutionary dynamics, we find that Nash equilibria arise naturally in motor interactions in which players vie for control and try to minimize effort. When confronted with sensorimotor interaction tasks that correspond to the classical prisoner''s dilemma and the rope-pulling game, two-player motor interactions led predominantly to Nash solutions. In contrast, when a single player took both roles, playing the sensorimotor game bimanually, cooperative solutions were found. Our methodology opens up a new avenue for the study of human motor interactions within a game theoretic framework, suggesting that the coupling of motor systems can lead to game theoretic solutions.     

Is the repeated prisoner's dilemma a good model of reciprocal altruism?

Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) used the repeated prisoner's dilemma game as a basis for their widely cited analysis of the evolution of reciprocal altruism. Recently, it has been argued that the repeated prisoner's dilemma is not a good model for this task. Some critics have argued that the single period prisoner's dilemma represents mutualistic rather than altruistic social interactions. Others have argued that reciprocal altruism requires that the opportunities for altruism occur sequentially, first one individual and then after some delay the other. Here I begin by arguing that the single period prisoner's dilemma game is consistent with the definition of altruism that is widely accepted in evolutionary biology. Then I present two modified versions of the repeated prisoner's dilemma, one in which behavior is sequential, and a second in which behavior occurs in continuous time. Each of these models shares the essential qualitative properties with the version used by Axelrod and Hamilton.     

Feel good,do good? Disentangling reciprocity from unconditional prosociality

Direct and generalised reciprocity can establish evolutionarily stable levels of cooperation among unrelated individuals, with animals reciprocating help based on whether they have been helped by a social partner before. It has been argued that the actual cooperative act by a social partner may be of minor importance for seemingly reciprocal cooperation and that a mere positive experience might suffice to enhance helpful behaviour towards a conspecific (‘feel good, do good’). However, this effect could easily be exploited by defectors free‐riding on an individual's enhanced propensity to cooperate after an unspecific positive experience, without investing in reciprocity themselves. Here, we use female Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) to test if a positive experience that was not provided by a helping partner increases the propensity to subsequently help a social partner. We manipulated the experience of test subjects by providing them with treats, either in the presence or absence of a conspecific. Thereafter, we assessed whether they produce treats and if so, how many, for an unfamiliar social partner compared to a situation in which they had not received treats before. As the treats the test subject received had not been provided by a social partner even if the partner was present, we predicted that the rats should not be more cooperative after they had received treats than if they had not. Indeed, the helping behaviour of rats was apparently not influenced by prior experience made either in a social or non‐social context. Rats have been shown previously to perform both direct and generalised reciprocity in the same variant of the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Our results suggest that this behaviour cannot be explained by an unspecific positive experience. The decision to help a social partner seems to be contingent on previously receiving help from a social partner (reciprocity), not on any positive experience (unconditional prosociality).     

Can Machines Think? Interaction and Perspective Taking with Robots Investigated via fMRI

Background

When our PC goes on strike again we tend to curse it as if it were a human being. Why and under which circumstances do we attribute human-like properties to machines? Although humans increasingly interact directly with machines it remains unclear whether humans implicitly attribute intentions to them and, if so, whether such interactions resemble human-human interactions on a neural level. In social cognitive neuroscience the ability to attribute intentions and desires to others is being referred to as having a Theory of Mind (ToM). With the present study we investigated whether an increase of human-likeness of interaction partners modulates the participants'' ToM associated cortical activity.

Methodology/Principal Findings

By means of functional magnetic resonance imaging (subjects n = 20) we investigated cortical activity modulation during highly interactive human-robot game. Increasing degrees of human-likeness for the game partner were introduced by means of a computer partner, a functional robot, an anthropomorphic robot and a human partner. The classical iterated prisoner''s dilemma game was applied as experimental task which allowed for an implicit detection of ToM associated cortical activity. During the experiment participants always played against a random sequence unknowingly to them. Irrespective of the surmised interaction partners'' responses participants indicated having experienced more fun and competition in the interaction with increasing human-like features of their partners. Parametric modulation of the functional imaging data revealed a highly significant linear increase of cortical activity in the medial frontal cortex as well as in the right temporo-parietal junction in correspondence with the increase of human-likeness of the interaction partner (computerConclusions/SignificanceBoth regions correlating with the degree of human-likeness, the medial frontal cortex and the right temporo-parietal junction, have been associated with Theory-of-Mind. The results demonstrate that the tendency to build a model of another''s mind linearly increases with its perceived human-likeness. Moreover, the present data provides first evidence of a contribution of higher human cognitive functions such as ToM in direct interactions with artificial robots. Our results shed light on the long-lasting psychological and philosophical debate regarding human-machine interaction and the question of what makes humans being perceived as human.     

Competitive helping increases with the size of biological markets and invades defection

Cooperation between unrelated individuals remains a puzzle in evolutionary biology. Recent work indicates that partner choice can select for high levels of helping. More generally, helping can be seen as but one strategy used to compete for partners within a broader biological market, yet giving within such markets has received little mathematical investigation. In the present model, individuals help others to attract attention from them and thus receive a larger share of any help actively or passively provided by those others. The evolutionarily stable level of helping increases with the size of the biological market and the degree of partner choice. Furthermore, if individuals passively produce some no-cost help to partners, competitive helping can then invade populations of non-helpers because helpers directly benefit from increasing their access to potential partners. This framework of competitive helping demonstrates how high helping can be achieved and why different populations may differ in helping levels.     

Kin selection and the Evolution of Mutualisms between Species

Hamilton's theory of kin selection has revolutionized and inspired fifty years of additional theories and experiments on social evolution. Whereas Hamilton's broader intent was to explain the evolutionary stability of cooperation, his focus on shared genetic history appears to have limited the application of his theory to populations within a single species rather than across interacting species. The evolutionary mechanisms for cooperation between species require both spatial and temporal correlations among interacting partners for the benefits to be not only predictable but of sufficient duration to be reliably delivered. As a consequence when the benefits returned by mutualistic partners are redirected to individuals other than the original donor, cooperation usually becomes unstable and parasitism may evolve. However, theoretically, such redirection of mutualistic benefits may actually reinforce, rather than undermine, mutualisms between species when the recipients of these redirected benefits are genetically related to the original donor. Here, I review the few mathematical models that have used Hamilton's theory of kin selection to predict the evolution of mutualisms between species. I go on to examine the applicability of these models to the most well‐studied case of mutualism, pollinating seed predators, where the role of kin selection may have been previously overlooked. Future detailed studies of the direct, and indirect, benefits of mutualism are likely to reveal additional possibilities for applying Hamilton's theory of kin selection to mutualisms between species.     

具有Allee效应的合作进化

Allee效应对物种的续存是潜在的干扰因素,在很大程度上将增加种群局部甚至全局灭绝的可能性。对许多物种,尤其是濒临物种更容易受其影响。将Allee效应引入囚徒困境博弈模型,通过理论分析与数值模拟相结合的方法分析讨论了Allee效应对合作进化的影响。研究结果表明:在恶劣的环境条件下,Allee效应极易使物种灭绝,不利于合作进化;在相对优越的环境条件下(死亡率较低),Allee效应促进合作进化,且Allee效应强度越强,更有利于合作进化,不过种群的空间斑块占有率也会随着Allee效应强度的增强而降低,使物种最终灭绝。     

The evolution of matrilineal kinship organization

Matrilineal kinship organization is a human social system that emphasizes interactions between matrilineal kin, i.e. individuals related only through females. The ‘matrilineal puzzle’ refers to the potential for tension characteristic of this social system, owing to the conflict between the interests and responsibilities of men in their roles as brother/uncle versus husband/father. From an evolutionary perspective, matrilineal kinship organization is puzzling when it diverts investment of resources from the individuals who provide the potentially highest reproductive returns. I use a game-theoretic framework to investigate a particular form of matrilineal inheritance—the transfer of property from a maternal uncle to a sororal nephew. The analysis reveals two mechanisms that may make this strategy a stable evolutionary outcome. First, a polygynous male has multiple wives, and hence multiple brothers-in-law; with matrilineal inheritance, each additional brother-in-law may transfer resources to the male''s wife''s offspring, thus potentially contributing to the male''s inclusive fitness. Second, the husband of a polyandrous female is effectively ‘sharing’ paternity with other men; depending on the number of husbands, he may be better off investing in his sister''s offspring. I conclude by discussing how these results address the challenges posed by the occurrence of matrilineal kinship organization.     

Can natural selection favour altruism between species?

Darwin suggested that the discovery of altruism between species would annihilate his theory of natural selection. However, it has not been formally shown whether between‐species altruism can evolve by natural selection, or why this could never happen. Here, we develop a spatial population genetic model of two interacting species, showing that indiscriminate between species helping can be favoured by natural selection. We then ask if this helping behaviour constitutes altruism between species, using a linear‐regression analysis to separate the total action of natural selection into its direct and indirect (kin selected) components. We show that our model can be interpreted in two ways, as either altruism within species, or altruism between species. This ambiguity arises depending on whether or not we treat genes in the other species as predictors of an individual's fitness, which is equivalent to treating these individuals as agents (actors or recipients). Our formal analysis, which focuses upon evolutionary dynamics rather than agents and their agendas, cannot resolve which is the better approach. Nonetheless, because a within‐species altruism interpretation is always possible, our analysis supports Darwin's suggestion that natural selection does not favour traits that provide benefits exclusively to individuals of other species.     

Female cleaner fish cooperate more with unfamiliar males

Joint group membership is of major importance for cooperation in humans, and close ties or familiarity with a partner are also thought to promote cooperation in other animals. Here, we present the opposite pattern: female cleaner fish, Labroides dimidiatus, behave more cooperatively (by feeding more against their preference) when paired with an unfamiliar male rather than with their social partner. We propose that cooperation based on asymmetric punishment causes this reversed pattern. Males are larger than and dominant to female partners and are more aggressive to unfamiliar than to familiar female partners. In response, females behave more cooperatively with unfamiliar male partners. Our data suggest that in asymmetric interactions, weaker players might behave more cooperatively with out-group members than with in-group members to avoid harsher punishment.     

Reputation,a universal currency for human social interactions

Decision rules of reciprocity include ‘I help those who helped me’ (direct reciprocity) and ‘I help those who have helped others’ (indirect reciprocity), i.e. I help those who have a reputation to care for others. A person''s reputation is a score that members of a social group update whenever they see the person interacting or hear at best multiple gossip about the person''s social interactions. Reputation is the current standing the person has gained from previous investments or refusal of investments in helping others. Is he a good guy, can I trust him or should I better avoid him as a social partner? A good reputation pays off by attracting help from others, even from strangers or members from another group, if the recipient''s reputation is known. Any costly investment in others, i.e. direct help, donations to charity, investment in averting climate change, etc. increases a person''s reputation. I shall argue and illustrate with examples that a person''s known reputation functions like money that can be used whenever the person needs help. Whenever possible I will present tests of predictions of evolutionary theory, i.e. fitness maximizing strategies, mostly by economic experiments with humans.     

Whose trait is it anyways? Coevolution of joint phenotypes and genetic architecture in mutualisms

Evolutionary biologists typically envision a trait’s genetic basis and fitness effects occurring within a single species. However, traits can be determined by and have fitness consequences for interacting species, thus evolving in multiple genomes. This is especially likely in mutualisms, where species exchange fitness benefits and can associate over long periods of time. Partners may experience evolutionary conflict over the value of a multi-genomic trait, but such conflicts may be ameliorated by mutualism’s positive fitness feedbacks. Here, we develop a simulation model of a host–microbe mutualism to explore the evolution of a multi-genomic trait. Coevolutionary outcomes depend on whether hosts and microbes have similar or different optimal trait values, strengths of selection and fitness feedbacks. We show that genome-wide association studies can map joint traits to loci in multiple genomes and describe how fitness conflict and fitness feedback generate different multi-genomic architectures with distinct signals around segregating loci. Partner fitnesses can be positively correlated even when partners are in conflict over the value of a multi-genomic trait, and conflict can generate strong mutualistic dependency. While fitness alignment facilitates rapid adaptation to a new optimum, conflict maintains genetic variation and evolvability, with implications for applied microbiome science.     

Cooperation beyond the dyad: on simple models and a complex society

Players in Axelrod and Hamilton''s model of cooperation were not only in a Prisoner''s Dilemma, but by definition, they were also trapped in a dyad. But animals are rarely so restricted and even the option to interact with third parties allows individuals to escape from the Prisoner''s Dilemma into a much more interesting and varied world of cooperation, from the apparently rare ‘parcelling’ to the widespread phenomenon of market effects. Our understanding of by-product mutualism, pseudo-reciprocity and the snowdrift game is also enriched by thinking ‘beyond the dyad’. The concepts of by-product mutualism and pseudo-reciprocity force us to think again about our basic definitions of cooperative behaviour (behaviour by a single individual) and cooperation (the outcome of an interaction between two or more individuals). Reciprocity is surprisingly rare outside of humans, even among large-brained ‘intelligent’ birds and mammals. Are humans unique in having extensive cooperative interactions among non-kin and an integrated cognitive system for mediating reciprocity? Perhaps, but our best chance for finding a similar phenomenon may be in delphinids, which also live in large societies with extensive cooperative interactions among non-relatives. A system of nested male alliances in bottlenose dolphins illustrates the potential and difficulties of finding a complex system of cooperation close to our own.     

The Benefits of Mutualism: A Conceptual Framework

There are three general mechanisms by which phenotypic benefits are transferred between unrelated organisms. First, one organism may purloin benefits from another by preying on or parasitizing the other organism. Second, one organism may enjoy benefits that are incidental to or a by-product of the self-serving traits of another organism. Third, an organism may invest in another organism if that investment produces return benefits which outweigh the cost of the investment. Interactions in which both parties gain a net benefit are mutualistic. The three mechanisms by which benefits are transferred between organisms can be combined in pairs to produce six possible kinds of original or 'basal' mutualisms that can arise from an amutualistic state. A review of the literature suggests that most or all interspecific mutualism have origins in three of the six possible kinds of basal mutualism. Each of these three basal mutualisms have byproduct benefits flowing in at least one direction. The transfer of by-product benefits and investment are common to both intra- and interspecific mutualisms, so that some interspecific mutualisms have intraspecific analogs. A basal mutualism may evolve to the point where each party invests in the other, sometimes obscuring the nature of the original interaction along the way. Two prominent models for the evolution of mutualism do not include by-product benefits: Roughgarden's model for the evolution of the damsel-fish anemone mutualism and the 'Tit-for-Tat' model of reciprocity. Using the conceptual framework presented here, including in particular by-product benefits, I have shown how it is possible to construct more parsimonious alternatives to both models.     

Female macaques compete for ‘power’ and ‘commitment’ in their male partners

The formation of male-female social bonds and the resulting competition among females for male partners is a core element of human societies. While female competition for a male partner outside the mating context is well studied in humans, evidence from non-human primates is scarce, and its evolutionary roots remain to be explored. We studied two multi male – multi female groups of wild Assamese macaques (Macaca assamensis), a species where females gain benefits from selectively affiliating with particular males. Using a behavioral data set collected over several years, we tested whether females competed over access to male social partners, whether success in competition was driven by female dominance rank, and which male traits were most attractive for females. We found assortative bonding by dominance rank between females and males, which together with females initiating and maintaining contact suggests direct female competition over males. Two male traits independently predicted male attractiveness to females: (1) current dominance rank, a measure of 'power' or a male's ability to provide access to resources, and (2) prior male affiliation with immatures, a measure of a male's potential paternal proclivity or 'commitment' to infant care. Both traits have been consistently identified as drivers of female partner choice in humans. Our study adds to the evidence that female competition for valuable male partners is not unique to humans, suggesting deep evolutionary origins of women's mate choice tendencies for ‘power’ and ‘commitment’.