Ectogenesis, justice and utility: a reply to James

In one chapter of their 1984 book The Reproductive Revolution (published in North America as Making Babies), Wells and Peter Singer make a case for the development of ectogenesis, the complete gestation of a human fetus outside the womb. David N. James responded with "Ectogenesis: a reply to Singer and Wells" (Bioethics, 1987 Jan; 1(1): 80-99), in which he refuted one of their arguments at length, opposed two briefly, and set two aside. Here Wells answers James, devoting most of his essay to reiterating an argument for ectogenesis based on the justice of remedying a correctable disability (infertility) by allocating resources to develop a biotechnology (ectogenesis). Wells then touches upon James's response to the Wells/Singer argument for ectogenesis as a possible solution to the abortion dilemma. He concludes by commenting briefly on the arguments about ectogenesis and parenting, and on ectogenesis as a source of transplantable tissue and organs.     

Ectogenesis: a reply to Singer and Wells

The possibility of achieving ectogenesis, or the growing of a human fetus to term in an artificial womb, is approaching reality as a result of advances in treatment of premature newborns and in in vitro fertilization techniques. In their 1984 book, The Reproductive Revolution, issued in North America as Making Babies, Peter Singer and Deane Wells offered several arguments for ectogenesis. James examines their arguments and rejects two of them, that ectogenesis offers a less problematic alternative to surrogate motherhood, and that ectogenesis could make it possible to reconcile fetal rights with the right to abortion on demand. He grants Singer and Wells' argument that the childless have a claim to state support of their desire to nurture, but contends that government-supported ectogenesis should still be rejected because the adoption of unwanted children is a preferable alternative to the use of an exotic, expensive, and still unproven technology.     

There is,indeed, a misunderstanding: A reply to Hekala and Buell

We believe that the misunderstanding is on the part of Hekala and Buell. They criticize us for using data from different historic periods. If sociobiology has value in accounting for human conduct, sociobiological principles should operate in all cultures and in all eras. While our data may be incomplete in the eyes of historians, they are complete enough to inform us of the genetic relatedness of persons in real or potential conflicts and to tell us the outcomes of these conflicts.     

Just a hypothesis: a reply to Hanski

Hanski's critique of the habitat amount hypothesis (Hanski, 2015, Journal of Biogeography, 42 , 989–993) does not actually constitute a test of the hypothesis, but rather a series of arguments for why he suspects that it is not correct. But the habitat amount hypothesis is exactly that – a hypothesis. It will remain ‘just’ a hypothesis until it has been rigorously tested against empirical data. To facilitate such testing, in Fahrig (2013, Journal of Biogeography, 40 , 1649–1663) I presented specific, testable predictions of the hypothesis. Here, I reiterate the main tests needed, in the hope that some readers will be encouraged to carry them out. I appreciate this opportunity to emphasize that the habitat amount hypothesis needs to be tested against empirical data, and I look forward to seeing the results of such tests.     

Killing, letting die and moral perception: a reply to Grant Gillett

A number of philosophers in recent times have employed arguments to show that there is no morally relevant difference between killing a patient and allowing that patient to die in those circumstances where the outcome is virtually identical and where death is preventable, at least for a significant time. From his perspective as both a philosopher and a clinician, Grant Gillett has rejected such general and abstract arguments in the light of the intuitions and moral perceptions available to clinicians and those who care for the terminally ill. I argue that his strategy fails, is massively question-begging, and that his appeal to the notion of 'moral particularism', far from being an alternative to cogent philosophical argument, actually supports the very position he has attempted to discredit.     

Cloning and adoption: a reply to Levy and Lotz

In previous articles I discussed the ethics of human reproductive cloning, focusing on a possible future scenario in which reproductive cloning can be accomplished without an elevated risk of anomalies to the children who are created. I argued that in such a scenario it would be ethically permissible for infertile couples to use cloning as a way to have genetically related children and that such use should not be prohibited. In 'Reproductive Cloning and a (Kind of) Genetic Fallacy', Neil Levy and Mianna Lotz raise objections to my conclusions. They disagree with the view, for which I argued, that some couples can have defensible reasons for desiring genetically related children. They also offer several new arguments against reproductive cloning, including an argument that it would diminish the number of adoptions, thereby adversely affecting the welfare of children who need to be adopted. In this paper I point out that Levy and Lotz's criticisms misconstrue my arguments and that there are serious problems with their arguments for prohibiting infertile couples from using cloning, including their argument from adoption.     

The friendship model: a reply to Illingworth

Patricia M.L. Illingworth, in an article in the January 1988 issue of Bioethics, maintained that a friendship model of the physician patient relationship violates the autonomy of patients who do not want to be friends with their physicians and diminishes the autonomy of patients who seek such friendship based on "psychological oppression" stemming from internalization of feelings of inferiority. James contends in this reply that much of Illingworth's critique of the model was beside the point. He argues that trust between doctor and patient is a moral good in the therapeutic relationship and that this trust has enough similarities to trust between friends to make a model which develops these similarities well worth exploring.