Origins of altruism diversity I: the diverse ecological roles of altruistic strategies and their evolutionary responses to local competition

Nature abounds with a rich variety of altruistic strategies, including public resource enhancement, resource provisioning, communal foraging, alarm calling, and nest defense. Yet, despite their vastly different ecological roles, current theory typically treats diverse altruistic traits as being favored under the same general conditions. Here, we introduce greater ecological realism into social evolution theory and find evidence of at least four distinct modes of altruism. Contrary to existing theory, we find that altruistic traits contributing to "resource-enhancement" (e.g., siderophore production, provisioning, agriculture) and "resource-efficiency" (e.g., pack hunting, communication) are most strongly favored when there is strong local competition. These resource-based modes of helping are "K-strategies" that increase a social group's growth yield, and should characterize species with scarce resources and/or high local crowding caused by low mortality, high fecundity, and/or mortality occurring late in the process of resource-acquisition. The opposite conditions, namely weak local competition (abundant resource, low crowding), favor survival (e.g., nest defense) and fecundity (e.g., nurse workers) altruism, which are "r-strategies" that increase a social group's growth rate. We find that survival altruism is uniquely favored by a novel evolutionary force that we call "sunk cost selection." Sunk cost selection favors helping that prevents resources from being wasted on individuals destined to die before reproduction. Our results contribute to explaining the observed natural diversity of altruistic strategies, reveal the necessary connection between the evolution and the ecology of sociality, and correct the widespread but inaccurate view that local competition uniformly impedes the evolution of altruism.     

Lower group productivity under kin-selected reproductive altruism

Abstract Hamilton's rule provides the foundation for understanding the genetic evolution of social behavior, showing that altruism is favored by increased relatedness and increased productivity of altruists. But how likely is it that a new altruistic mutation will satisfy Hamilton's rule by increasing the reproductive efficiency of the group? Altruism per se does not improve efficiency, and hence we would not expect a typical altruistic mutation to increase the mean productivity of the population. We examined the conditions under which a mutation causing reproductive altruism can spread when it does not increase productivity. We considered a population divided into temporary groups of genetically similar individuals (typically family groups). We show that the spread of altruism requires a pleiotropic link between altruism and enhanced productivity in diploid organisms, but not in haplodiploid organisms such as Hymenoptera. This result provides a novel biological understanding of the barrier to the spread of reproductive altruism in diploids. In haplodiploid organisms, altruism within families that lowers productivity may spread, provided daughters sacrifice their own reproduction to raise full‐sisters. We verified our results using three single‐locus genetic models that explore a range of the possible reproductive costs of helping. The advantage of female‐to‐female altruism in haplodiploids is a well‐known prediction of Hamilton's rule, but its importance in relaxing the linkage between altruism and efficiency has not been explored. We discuss the possible role of such unproductive altruism in the origins of sociality. We also note that each model predicts a large region of parameter space were polymorphism between altruism and selfishness is maintained, a pattern independent of dominance.     

Distinctions among reciprocal altruism,kin selection,and cooperation and a model for the initial evolution of beneficent behavior

Reciprocal altruism is usually regarded as distinct from kin selection. However, because reciprocators are likely to establish long-term relations and to deliver most of their aid to other individuals genetically predisposed to reciprocation, most acts of reciprocal altruism should involve indirect increments to inclusive fitness, at least as regards alleles for reciprocation. Thus, as usually defined, reciprocal altruism is not clearly distinct from kin selection because both involve indirect increments to inclusive fitness. We propose a new definition for reciprocal altruism that makes the phenomenon distinct from kin selection and allows for reciprocation between nonrelatives in which current costs exceed future benefits returned to the reciprocal altruist. Cooperation and reciprocal altruism are often considered synonymous or different only in the timing of donating and receiving aid. We show, however, that there are other critical differences between reciprocal altruism and other forms of cooperation, most importantly, the latter often involve no clearly identifiable aid. We propose a four-category system to encompass the range of cooperative and beneficent behaviors that occur in nature (reciprocal altruism, pseudoreciprocity, simultaneous cooperation and by-product beneficence). Reciprocal altruism must involve aid that is returned to an original donor as a result of behavior that has a net cost to an original recipient. Our simplest category of cooperative/beneficent behavior, “by-product beneficence,” occurs when a selfish act also benefits another individual and requires no prior or subsequent interactions between the individuals involved. By-product beneficence may be the primitive state from which more complicated types of cooperative/beneficent behavior evolved. We show via simple models that by-product beneficence can allow for the initial increase of helping behavior in a completely unstructured population although the individuals showing such behavior pay all the costs while sharing the benefits with other individuals. Previous models that attempted to explain the initial increase of cooperative/beneficent behavior were much more complex and were based on the prisoner's dilemma, which does not accurately reflect most forms of cooperation and beneficence that occur in nature.     

Hamilton's rule and kin competition: the Kipsigis case

Evolutionary studies of human behavior have emphasized the importance of kin selection in explaining social institutions and fitness outcomes. Our relatives can nevertheless be competitors as well as sources of altruism. This is particularly likely when there is local competition over resources, where conflict can lead to strife among nondispersing relatives, reducing or even negating the effects of relatedness on promoting altruism. Here, I present demographic data on a land-limited human population, utilizing large within-population variation in land ownership to determine the interactions between local resource competition and the benefits of kin in enhancing child survival, a key component of fitness in this population. As predicted, wealth affects the extent of kin altruism, in that paternal relatives (specifically father's brothers) appear to buffer young children from mortality much more effectively in rich than in poor households. This interaction effect is interpreted as evidence that the extent of nepotism among humans depends critically on resource availability. Further unanticipated evidence that maternal kin play a role in buffering children from mortality in situations where paternal kin control few resources speaks to the important role that specific local circumstance plays in shaping kin contributions to child welfare.     

A behavioral analysis of altruism

Altruistic acts have been defined, in economic terms, as “…costly acts that confer economic benefits on other individuals” (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). In multi-player, one-shot prisoner's dilemma games, a significant number of players behave altruistically; their behavior benefits each of the other players but is costly to them. We consider three potential explanations for such altruism. The first explanation, following a suggestion by the philosopher Derek Parfit, assumes that players devise a strategy to avoid being free-loaders—and that in the present case this strategy dictates cooperation. The second explanation says that cooperators reject the one-shot aspect of the game and behave so as to maximize reward over a series of choices extending beyond the present situation (even though reward is not maximized in the present case). This explanation assumes that people may learn to extend the boundaries of their selves socially (beyond their own skin) as well as temporally (beyond the present moment). We propose a learning mechanism for such behavior analogous to the biological, evolutionary mechanism of group selection. The third explanation assumes that people's altruism is based on a straightforward balancing of undiscounted costs to themselves against discounted benefits to others (social discounting). The three proposed explanations of altruism complement each other.     

Fecundity and MHC affects ejaculation tactics and paternity bias in sand lizards

We demonstrate that extending copulation enhances probability of paternity in sand lizards and that determinants of copulation duration depend on a males' mating order (first or second). First males, with no information on presence of rivals, extend copulation when mating with a more fecund female. Second males, however, adjust copula duration in relation to a first male's relatedness with his female, which there is reason to believe can be deduced from the MHC-related odor of the copulatory plug. Male-female relatedness negatively influences a male's probability of paternity, and when second males are in a favored role (i.e., the first male is the one more closely related to the female), second males transfer larger ejaculates, resulting in higher probability of paternity. This result corroborates predictions from recent theoretical models on sperm expenditure theory incorporating cryptic female choice and sexual conflict. More specifically, the results conform to a "random roles" model, which depicts males as being favored by some females and disfavored by others, but not to a "constant-type" model, in which a male is either favored or disfavored uniformly by all females in a population.     

ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS INFLUENCE THE EMERGENCE OF COOPERATIVE BREEDING WHEN POPULATION DYNAMICS DETERMINE THE FITNESS OF HELPERS

Cooperative breeding is a system in which certain individuals facilitate the production of offspring by others. The ecological constraints hypothesis states that ecological conditions deter individuals from breeding independently, and so individuals breed cooperatively to make the best of a bad situation. Current theoretical support for the ecological constraints hypothesis is lacking. We formulate a mathematical model that emphasizes the underlying ecology of cooperative breeders. Our goal is to derive theoretical support for the ecological constraints hypothesis using an ecological model of population dynamics. We consider a population composed of two kinds of individuals, nonbreeders (auxiliaries) and breeders. We suppose that help provided by an auxiliary increases breeder fecundity, but reduces the probability with which the auxiliary becomes a breeder. Our main result is a condition that guarantees success of auxiliary help. We predict that increasing the cost of dispersal promotes helping, in agreement with verbal theory. We also predict that increasing breeder mortality can either hinder helping (at high population densities), or promote it (at low population densities). We conclude that ecological constraints can exert influence over the evolution of auxiliary help when population dynamics are considered; moreover, that influence need not coincide with direct fitness benefits as previously found.     

Social and demographic effects of anthropogenic mortality: a test of the compensatory mortality hypothesis in the red wolf

Whether anthropogenic mortality is additive or compensatory to natural mortality in animal populations has long been a question of theoretical and practical importance. Theoretically, under density-dependent conditions populations compensate for anthropogenic mortality through decreases in natural mortality and/or increases in productivity, but recent studies of large carnivores suggest that anthropogenic mortality can be fully additive to natural mortality and thereby constrain annual survival and population growth rate. Nevertheless, mechanisms underlying either compensatory or additive effects continue to be poorly understood. Using long-term data on a reintroduced population of the red wolf, we tested for evidence of additive vs. compensatory effects of anthropogenic mortality on annual survival and population growth rates, and the preservation and reproductive success of breeding pairs. We found that anthropogenic mortality had a strong additive effect on annual survival and population growth rate at low population density, though there was evidence for compensation in population growth at high density. When involving the death of a breeder, anthropogenic mortality was also additive to natural rates of breeding pair dissolution, resulting in a net decrease in the annual preservation of existing breeding pairs. However, though the disbanding of a pack following death of a breeder resulted in fewer recruits per litter relative to stable packs, there was no relationship between natural rates of pair dissolution and population growth rate at either high or low density. Thus we propose that short-term additive effects of anthropogenic mortality on population growth in the red wolf population at low density were primarily a result of direct mortality of adults rather than indirect socially-mediated effects resulting in reduced recruitment. Finally, we also demonstrate that per capita recruitment and the proportion of adults that became reproductive declined steeply with increasing population density, suggesting that there is potential for density-dependent compensation of anthropogenically-mediated population regulation.     

From reciprocity to unconditional altruism through signalling benefits

Cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals is commonly explained by the potential for future reciprocity or by the risk of being punished by group members. However, unconditional altruism is more difficult to explain. We demonstrate that unconditional altruism can evolve as a costly signal of individual quality (i.e. a handicap) as a consequence of reciprocal altruism. This is because the emergent correlation between altruism and individual quality in reciprocity games can facilitate the use of altruism as a quality indicator in a much wider context, outside the reciprocity game, thus affecting its further evolution through signalling benefits. Our model, based on multitype evolutionary game theory shows that, when the additive signalling benefit of donating help exceeds the cost for only some individuals (of high-quality state) but not for others (of low-quality state), the population possesses an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) profile wherein high-quality individuals cooperate unconditionally while low-quality individuals defect or play tit-for-tat (TfT). Hence, as predicted by Zahavi's handicap model, signalling benefits of altruistic acts can establish a stable generosity by high-quality individuals that no longer depends on the probability of future reciprocation or punishment.     

Can natural selection favour altruism between species?

Darwin suggested that the discovery of altruism between species would annihilate his theory of natural selection. However, it has not been formally shown whether between‐species altruism can evolve by natural selection, or why this could never happen. Here, we develop a spatial population genetic model of two interacting species, showing that indiscriminate between species helping can be favoured by natural selection. We then ask if this helping behaviour constitutes altruism between species, using a linear‐regression analysis to separate the total action of natural selection into its direct and indirect (kin selected) components. We show that our model can be interpreted in two ways, as either altruism within species, or altruism between species. This ambiguity arises depending on whether or not we treat genes in the other species as predictors of an individual's fitness, which is equivalent to treating these individuals as agents (actors or recipients). Our formal analysis, which focuses upon evolutionary dynamics rather than agents and their agendas, cannot resolve which is the better approach. Nonetheless, because a within‐species altruism interpretation is always possible, our analysis supports Darwin's suggestion that natural selection does not favour traits that provide benefits exclusively to individuals of other species.     

Hamilton's rule and the causes of social evolution

Hamilton''s rule is a central theorem of inclusive fitness (kin selection) theory and predicts that social behaviour evolves under specific combinations of relatedness, benefit and cost. This review provides evidence for Hamilton''s rule by presenting novel syntheses of results from two kinds of study in diverse taxa, including cooperatively breeding birds and mammals and eusocial insects. These are, first, studies that empirically parametrize Hamilton''s rule in natural populations and, second, comparative phylogenetic analyses of the genetic, life-history and ecological correlates of sociality. Studies parametrizing Hamilton''s rule are not rare and demonstrate quantitatively that (i) altruism (net loss of direct fitness) occurs even when sociality is facultative, (ii) in most cases, altruism is under positive selection via indirect fitness benefits that exceed direct fitness costs and (iii) social behaviour commonly generates indirect benefits by enhancing the productivity or survivorship of kin. Comparative phylogenetic analyses show that cooperative breeding and eusociality are promoted by (i) high relatedness and monogamy and, potentially, by (ii) life-history factors facilitating family structure and high benefits of helping and (iii) ecological factors generating low costs of social behaviour. Overall, the focal studies strongly confirm the predictions of Hamilton''s rule regarding conditions for social evolution and their causes.     

The adaptive dynamics of altruism in spatially heterogeneous populations

Abstract.— We study the spatial adaptive dynamics of a continuous trait that measures individual investment in altruism. Our study is based on an ecological model of a spatially heterogeneous population from which we derive an appropriate measure of fitness. The analysis of this fitness measure uncovers three different selective processes controlling the evolution of altruism: the direct physiological cost, the indirect genetic benefits of cooperative interactions, and the indirect genetic costs of competition for space. In our model, habitat structure and a continuous life cycle makes the cost of competing for space with relatives negligible. Our study yields a classification of adaptive patterns of altruism according to the shape of the costs of altruism (with decelerating, linear, or accelerating dependence on the investment in altruism). The invasion of altruism occurs readily in species with accelerating costs, but large mutations are critical for altruism to evolve in selfish species with decelerating costs. Strict selfishness is maintained by natural selection only under very restricted conditions. In species with rapidly accelerating costs, adaptation leads to an evolutionarily stable rate of investment in altruism that decreases smoothly with the level of mobility. A rather different adaptive pattern emerges in species with slowly accelerating costs: high altruism evolves at low mobility, whereas a quasi-selfish state is promoted in more mobile species. The high adaptive level of altruism can be predicted solely from habitat connectedness and physiological parameters that characterize the pattern of cost. We also show that environmental changes that cause increased mobility in those highly altruistic species can beget selection-driven self-extinction, which may contribute to the rarity of social species.     

Reciprocal altruism in birds: A critical review

Many proposed examples of reciprocal altruism are either misidentified or involve questionable assumptions concerning the costs and benefits accruing to the interactors. Waltz's (Am. Nat. 118: 588–592, 1981) definition of reciprocal altruism as an interaction in which “one individual aids another in anticipation that the recipient will return the favor benefiting the actor in the future” is not sufficiently restrictive: there must also be a direct fitness cost to the individual performing the original beneficent act that is less than the fitness benefit received when the act is reciprocated (again at a cost) by the second individual.Several recurring problems in identifying potential examples of reciprocal altruism are discussed, including the assumption that restraint is an act of altruism and the misclassification of “generational mutualisms,” in which individuals helping to raise young are “repaid” one generation later by the offspring they assisted in raising. No definite case of reciprocal altruism is currently known in birds, but examples in which this phenomenon may be involved include helping behavior in a few cooperative breeders and communal feeding in several taxa including gulls, jays, and juncos.     

Population viscosity can promote the evolution of altruistic sterile helpers and eusociality

Because it increases relatedness between interacting individuals, population viscosity has been proposed to favour the evolution of altruistic helping. However, because it increases local competition between relatives, population viscosity may also act as a brake for the evolution of helping behaviours. In simple models, the kin selected fecundity benefits of helping are exactly cancelled out by the cost of increased competition between relatives when helping occurs after dispersal. This result has lead to the widespread view, especially among people working with social organisms, that special conditions are required for the evolution of altruism. Here, we re-examine this result by constructing a simple population genetic model where we analyse whether the evolution of a sterile worker caste (i.e. an extreme case of altruism) can be selected for by limited dispersal. We show that a sterile worker caste can be selected for even under the simplest life-cycle assumptions. This has relevant consequences for our understanding of the evolution of altruism in social organisms, as many social insects are characterized by limited dispersal and significant genetic population structure.     

Heterogeneity stabilizes reciprocal altruism interactions

In considering the phenomena of reciprocal altruism few would dispute that there are differences in individual quality-in particular, that for some individuals, at least on occasion, the cost of doing favors will exceed the potential of future benefits. That is, at any given time, a typical population is heterogeneous with respect to the affordability of reciprocal altruism. However, methodological limitations of the traditional analytical framework-Single Type (symmetric) Evolutionary Game Theory-have restricted previous analytical efforts to addressing populations idealized in terms of their averages. Here we use the methods of Multitype Evolutionary Game Theory to analyse the role of individual differences in direct reciprocity interactions. Multitype analysis shows that non-idealized populations possess an ESS profile wherein individuals who cannot afford reciprocity (low-quality) defect, while individuals who derive net benefits from reciprocity (high-quality) cooperate. Furthermore, this cooperation is implemented via unmodified tit-for-tat (TfT) strategy. Hence, our results may help resolve a long-standing problem concerning the evolutionary stability of TfT in direct reciprocal altruism. Finally, this difference between idealized and real populations is not restricted to direct reciprocal cooperation. Previously (Lotem et al., 1999) we have demonstrated evolutionarily stable indirect reciprocal cooperation among high-quality individuals in heterogeneous populations.     

Responding to environmental change: plastic responses vary little in a synchronous breeder

The impact of environmental change on animal populations is strongly influenced by the ability of individuals to plastically adjust key life-history events. There is therefore considerable interest in establishing the degree of plasticity in traits and how selection acts on plasticity in natural populations. Breeding time is a key life-history trait that affects fitness and recent studies have found that females vary significantly in their breeding time-environment relationships, with selection often favouring individuals exhibiting stronger plastic responses. In contrast, here, we show that although breeding time in the common guillemot, Uria aalge, is highly plastic at the population level in response to a large-scale environmental cue (the North Atlantic Oscillation, NAO), there is very little between-individual variation-most individuals respond to this climate cue very similarly. We demonstrate strong stabilizing selection against individuals who deviate from the average population-level response to NAO. This species differs significantly from those previously studied in being a colonial breeder, in which reproductive synchrony has a substantial impact on fitness; we suggest that counter selection imposed by a need for synchrony could limit individuals in their response and potential for directional selection to act. This demonstrates the importance of considering the relative costs and benefits of highly plastic responses in assessing the likely response of a population to the environmental change.     

THE EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF SPITE IN FINITE POPULATIONS

Spite, the shady relative of altruism, involves paying a fitness cost to inflict a cost on some recipient. Here, we investigate a density dependent dynamic model for the evolution of spite in populations of changing size. We extend the model by introducing a dynamic carrying capacity. Our analysis shows that it is possible for unconditionally spiteful behavior to evolve without population structure in any finite population. In some circumstances spiteful behavior can contribute to its own stability by limiting population growth. We use the model to show that there are differences between spite and altruism, and to refine Hamilton’s original argument about the insignificance of spite in the wild. We also discuss the importance of fixing the measure of fitness to classify behaviors as selfish or spiteful.     

Second-to-Fourth Digit Ratio Has a Non-Monotonic Impact on Altruism

Gene-culture co-evolution emphasizes the joint role of culture and genes for the emergence of altruistic and cooperative behaviors and behavioral genetics provides estimates of their relative importance. However, these approaches cannot assess which biological traits determine altruism or how. We analyze the association between altruism in adults and the exposure to prenatal sex hormones, using the second-to-fourth digit ratio. We find an inverted U-shaped relation for left and right hands, which is very consistent for men and less systematic for women. Subjects with both high and low digit ratios give less than individuals with intermediate digit ratios. We repeat the exercise with the same subjects seven months later and find a similar association, even though subjects'' behavior differs the second time they play the game. We then construct proxies of the median digit ratio in the population (using more than 1000 different subjects), show that subjects'' altruism decreases with the distance of their ratio to these proxies. These results provide direct evidence that prenatal events contribute to the variation of altruistic behavior and that the exposure to fetal hormones is one of the relevant biological factors. In addition, the findings suggest that there might be an optimal level of exposure to these hormones from social perspective.