Conjecture and explanation: A reply to Reydon

Reydon (2012) comments on my account of how-possibly explanation (Forber, 2010). I distinguish between three types of explanation (global how-possibly, local how-possibly, and how actually) and argue that these distinctions track various roles explanations play in evolutionary biology. While Reydon accepts the distinctions, he questions whether the two different types of how-possibly explanation count as genuine explanations. He summarizes his analysis with a slogan: “global how-possibly explanations are explanations but not how-possibly; local explanations are how-possibly but not explanations.” Reydon’s commentary raises a number of insightful points, and I will not be able to address them all. Instead, after clarifying certain points in my original paper (4 1), I will respond to Reydon’s slogan by addressing whether global how-possibly explanations should count as explaining how possible (4 2), and what (so-called) local how-possibly explanations are, if not explanations (4 3).     

Learning from Instructional Explanations: Effects of Prompts Based on the Active-Constructive-Interactive Framework

Although instructional explanations are commonly provided when learners are introduced to new content, they often fail because they are not integrated into effective learning activities. The recently introduced active-constructive-interactive framework posits an effectiveness hierarchy in which interactive learning activities are at the top; these are then followed by constructive and active learning activities, respectively. Against this background, we combined instructional explanations with different types of prompts that were designed to elicit these learning activities and tested the central predictions of the active-constructive-interactive framework. In Experiment 1, N = 83 students were randomly assigned to one of four combinations of instructional explanations and prompts. To test the active < constructive learning hypothesis, the learners received either (1) complete explanations and engaging prompts designed to elicit active activities or (2) explanations that were reduced by inferences and inference prompts designed to engage learners in constructing the withheld information. Furthermore, in order to explore how interactive learning activities can be elicited, we gave the learners who had difficulties in constructing the prompted inferences adapted remedial explanations with either (3) unspecific engaging prompts or (4) revision prompts. In support of the active < constructive learning hypothesis, we found that the learners who received reduced explanations and inference prompts outperformed the learners who received complete explanations and engaging prompts. Moreover, revision prompts were more effective in eliciting interactive learning activities than engaging prompts. In Experiment 2, N = 40 students were randomly assigned to either (1) a reduced explanations and inference prompts or (2) a reduced explanations and inference prompts plus adapted remedial explanations and revision prompts condition. In support of the constructive < interactive learning hypothesis, the learners who received adapted remedial explanations and revision prompts as add-ons to reduced explanations and inference prompts acquired more conceptual knowledge.     

Children’s Intuitive Teleology: Shifting the Focus of Evolution Education Research

Research has shown that children usually provide teleological explanations for the features of organisms and artifacts, from a very early age (3–4 years old). However, there is no consensus on whether teleological explanations are given in the same manner for non-living natural objects as well. The present study aimed to document the teleological explanations of 5- to 8-year-old children for particular features (color and shape) of organisms, artifacts and non-living natural objects. In addition, it was examined if there was any correlation between these explanations and children’s explanations for the usefulness of those features. Our results indicate a developmental shift in children’s teleological explanations, from a non-selective teleology in pre-school to a selective one in the second grade. In the latter case, children provided teleological explanations mostly for the shape of the feet of organisms and for the shape of artifacts, whereas pre-school children provided teleological explanations for non-living natural objects as well, both for the color and for the shape in all cases. Our results are not conclusive and further research is required, including a larger spectrum of students, since teleology is one of the most important conceptual obstacles in understanding evolution that persists even into adulthood. We conclude by proposing a particular research program for this purpose.     

Inferential explanations in biology

Among philosophers of science, there is now a widespread agreement that the DN model of explanation is poorly equipped to account for explanations in biology. Rather than identifying laws, so the consensus goes, researchers explain biological capacities by constructing a model of the underlying mechanism.We think that the dichotomy between DN explanations and mechanistic explanations is misleading. In this article, we argue that there are cases in which biological capacities are explained without constructing a model of the underlying mechanism. Although these explanations do not conform to Hempel’s DN model (they do not deduce the explanandum from laws of nature), they do invoke more or less stable generalisations. Because they invoke generalisations and have the form of an argument, we call them inferential explanations. We support this claim by considering two examples of explanations of biological capacities: pigeon navigation and photoperiodism. Next, we will argue that these non-mechanistic explanations are crucial to biology in three ways: (i) sometimes, they are the only thing we have (there is no alternative available), (ii) they are heuristically useful, and (iii) they provide genuine understanding and so are interesting in their own right.In the last sections we discuss the relation between types of explanations and types of experiments and situate our views within some relevant debates on explanatory power and explanatory virtues.     

Ultimate explanations concern the adaptive rationale for organism design

My understanding is that proximate explanations concern adaptive mechanism and that ultimate explanations concern adaptive rationale. Viewed in this light, the two kinds of explanation are quite distinct, but they interact in a complementary way to give a full understanding of biological adaptations. In contrast, Laland et al. (2013)—following a literal reading of Mayr (Science 134:1501–1506, 1961)—have characterized ultimate explanations as concerning any and all mechanisms that have operated over the course of an organism’s evolutionary history. This has unfortunate consequences, such as allowing random drift to form the basis for ultimate explanations, and allowing proximate and ultimate explanations to bleed into each other until their distinction is meaningless. Here, I suggest Laland et al’s explanatory framework of “reciprocal causation” is not conducive to successful biological science, and that they have misunderstood key elements of the theory of Darwinian adaptation.     

Moral Reasoning and the Meaning of Cancer: Causal Explanations of Oncologists and Patients in Southern Mexico

Moral themes were a striking feature of the causal explanations for female cancers discussed by oncologists and patients in an ethnographic study of hospital-based cancer care in southern Mexico. These explanations integrate general biomedical explanations with everyday expectations and experiences, giving meaning to otherwise arbitrary events. Analysis of case examples shows that causal models incorporate local constructs about what constitutes a virtuous life, especially in terms of class- and gender-based values. Although patients and physicians draw on similar concepts of moral order, they apply these constructs in distinct ways. Because physicians' explanations are necessarily framed in terms of object, their causal stories employ generalized presumptions about how categories of persons behave (e.g., women, the lower class). In contrast, patients' explanations are framed in terms of subject; they are based on the specific details of their personal history. The article examines the distinct perspectives of physicians and patients, and provides an illustration of how biomedical culture articulates with the local moral constructs of a particular community, [cancer; Mexico; culture of biomedicine; concepts of illness; oncology, models of illness]     

How-possibly explanations in biology

Biologists in many different fields of research give how-possibly explanations of the phenomena they study. Although such explanations lack empirical support, and might be regarded by some as unscientific, they play an important heuristic role in biology by helping biologists develop theories and concepts and suggesting new areas of research. How-possibly explanations serve as a useful framework for conducting research in the absence of adequate empiri cal data, and they can even become how-actually explanations if they gain enough empirical support.I am grateful to Robert Brandon and Michael Resnik for helpful comments and criticism.     

Rationality Wars and the War on Terror: Explaining Terrorism and Social Unrest

Terrorism is problematic at multiple levels. Social scientists debate its cause; policymakers debate what to do about it; many debate the meaning and political use of the term; and many live in fear of it. Current explanations of terrorism hinge on competing models of decision making. Anthropologists are increasingly influential in decision theory as issues of rationality, culture, and evolutionary psychology are invoked to explain patterns in human decision making. In this article, I review and critique current explanations of terrorism, I relate these explanations to larger debates in decision theory and anthropology, and I present an example of how current schisms may be transcended.     

Oppositions in panbiogeography: Can the conflicts between selection,constraint, ecology,and history be resolved?

Abstract

Croizat’s radical attack on traditional modes of biological inquiry has produced strongly polarised responses. Instead of arguing for or against the panbiogeographic approach I attempt to analyse some basic assumptions shared by both its defenders and critics. Although their emphasis is quite different both sides rely on two central oppositions. In evolutionary arguments selective explanations are opposed to those emphasising phylogenetic constraint (orthogenesis). In biogeographic arguments ecological explanations are opposed to historical explanations. I discuss how the legendary opposition between nature and nurture was resolved by reformulating the way in which causation was viewed. I suggest that the selection/constraint opposition shares many features in common with the nature/nurture opposition and argue that it can be resolved in a similar manner. Conflicts between ecological and historical explanations in biogeography are explored by contrasting Diamond’s analysis of New Guinea bird distributions with that of Croizat’s. By again drawing on the resolution of the nature/nurture dispute a way of synthesising ecological and historical explanations is outlined.     

Can Evolution Explain Insanity?

I distinguish three evolutionary explanations of mental illness: first, breakdowns in evolved computational systems; second, evolved systems performing their evolutionary function in a novel environment; third, evolved personality structures. I concentrate on the second and third explanations, as these are distinctive of an evolutionary psychopathology, with progressively less credulity in the light of the empirical evidence. General morals are drawn for evolutionary psychiatry.     

Physical explanations and biological explanations,empirical laws and a priori laws

Philosophers intent upon characterizing the difference between physics and biology often seize upon the purported fact that physical explanations conform more closely to the covering law model than biological explanations. Central to this purported difference is the role of laws of nature in the explanations of these two sciences. However, I argue that, although certain important differences between physics and biology can be highlighted by differences between physical and biological explanations, these differences are not differences in the degree to which those explanations conform to the covering law model, which fits biology about as well as it does physics.     

Homology thinking

This paper explores an important type of biological explanation called ‘homology thinking.’ Homology thinking explains the properties of a homologue by citing the history of a homologue. Homology thinking is significant in several ways. First, it offers more detailed explanations of biological phenomena than corresponding analogy explanations. Second, it provides an important explanation of character similarity and difference. Third, homology thinking offers a promising account of multiple realizability in biology.     

Beyond persons: extending the personal/subpersonal distinction to non-rational animals and artificial agents

The distinction between personal level explanations and subpersonal ones has been subject to much debate in philosophy. We understand it as one between explanations that focus on an agent’s interaction with its environment, and explanations that focus on the physical or computational enabling conditions of such an interaction. The distinction, understood this way, is necessary for a complete account of any agent, rational or not, biological or artificial. In particular, we review some recent research in Artificial Life that pretends to do completely without the distinction, while using agent-centred concepts all the way. It is argued that the rejection of agent level explanations in favour of mechanistic ones is due to an unmotivated need to choose among representationalism and eliminativism. The dilemma is a false one if the possibility of a radical form of externalism is considered.

Theory of negative capacitance in membrane impedance measurements

Summary Three possible explanations of the negative capacitance seen in theChara corallina membrane impedance are critically examined. These explanations are based on: (1) voltage-dependent channel kinetics; (2) electro-osmosis; and (3) extracellular negative capacitance. It is shown that the first two can produce negative capacitance only with parameters which differ by several orders of magnitude from measured values. The last mechanism can produce a very large magnitude negative capacitance, in the appropriate frequency range. Possible experimental tests are discussed.     

A third explanation for female infanticide

Two directly opposed explanations for the distribution of female infanticide across cultures have recently appeared. Divale and Harris propose to explain this practice as part of a system which reduces population growth. Dickemann says that the practice serves to increase reproductive success. I criticize each of these explanations and propose a third which depends on the technoecological and economic constraints given precedence by Harris and Divale, combined with the insights of sexual selection which are central to Dickemann's account.     

The autonomy of functional biology: a reply to Rosenberg

Rosenberg has recently argued that explanations supplied by (what he calls) functional biology are mere promissory notes for macromolecular adaptive explanations. Rosenberg's arguments currently constitute one of the most substantial challenges to the autonomy, irreducibility, and indispensability of the explanations supplied by functional biology. My responses to Rosenberg's arguments will generate a novel account of the autonomy of functional biology. This account will turn on the relations between counterfactuals, scientific explanations, and natural laws. Crucially, in their treatment of the laws' relation to counterfactuals, Rosenberg's arguments beg the question against the autonomy of functional biology. This relation is considerably more subtle than is suggested by familiar slogans such as Laws support counterfactuals; accidents don't.     

Phyletic size change and brain/body allometry: A consideration based on the African pongids and other primates

A problematic aspect of brain/body allometry is the frequency of interspecific series which exhibit allometry coefficients of approximately 0.33. This coefficient is significantly lower than the 0.66 value which is usually taken to be the interspecific norm. A number of explanations have been forwarded to account for this finding. These include (1) intraspecificallometry explanations, (2) nonallometric explanations, and (3) Jerison’s “extraneurons” hypothesis, among others. The African apes, which exhibit a lowered interspecific allometry coefficient, are used here to consider previous explanations. These are found to be inadequate in a number of ways, and an alternative explanation is proposed. This explanation is based on patterns of brain and body size change during ontogeny and phytogeny. It is argued that the interspecific allometry coefficient in African apes parallels the intraspecific one because similar ontogenetic modifications of body growth separate large and small forms along each curve. In both cases, body size differences are produced primarily by growth in later postnatal periods, during which little brain growth occurs. Data on body growth, neonatal scaling, and various lifehistory traits support this explanation. This work extends previous warnings that sizecorrected estimates of relative brain size may not correspond very closely to our understanding of the behavioral capacities of certain species in lineages characterized by rapid change in body size.     

How selective migration enables socioeconomic mobility

ABSTRACT

Jennifer Lee and Min Zhou’s new book, The Asian American Achievement Paradox, revives Asian American scholarship from a period of relative stagnation and elevates the discussion from the morass of cultural essentialism. Its major contributions are to extensively articulate: (1) how much cultural explanations are actually class-based explanations and (2) how selective migration creates the conditions that promote social mobility. This book resolves empirical paradoxes in the scholarship and engages broader debates on race, immigration and inequality.     

Hempel's view on functional explanation some critical comments

Summary Functional explanations are regarded as a special type of explanation by many biologists. Philosophers of science tend to agree that they are weak forms of the common modes of explanation, although the elucidation of the logical structure involved is difficult. The present paper shows that Hempel's reconstruction of functional explanations is inadequate on pragmatic grounds. Thus his conclusion that such explanations are necessarily weak is also objectionable. There is no reason for allotting functional explanations a special logical status.     

Explanatory unification and natural selection explanations

The debate between the dynamical and the statistical interpretations of natural selection is centred on the question of whether all explanations that employ the concepts of natural selection and drift are reducible to causal explanations. The proponents of the statistical interpretation answer negatively, but insist on the fact that selection/drift arguments are explanatory. However, they remain unclear on where the explanatory power comes from. The proponents of the dynamical interpretation answer positively and try to reduce selection/drift arguments to some of the most prominent accounts of causal explanation. In turn, they face the criticism raised by statisticalists that current accounts of causation have to be violated in some of their core conditions or otherwise used in a very loose manner in order to account for selection/drift explanations. We propose a reconciliation of both interpretations by conveying evolutionary explanations within the unificationist model of scientific explanation. Therefore, we argue that the explanatory power in natural selection arguments is a result of successful unification of individual- and population-level facts. A short case study based on research on sympatric speciation will be presented as an example of how population- and individual-level facts are unified to explain the morphological mosaic of bill shape in island scrub jays (Aphelocoma insularis).