A lost cause? Fundamental problems for causal theories of parenthood

In this paper, I offer a critique of (actual and possible) causal theories of parenthood. I do not offer a competing account of who incurs parental obligations and why; rather, I aim to show that there are fundamental problems for any account of who acquires parental obligations and why by appeal to causal responsibility for a child’s existence. I outline and justify three criteria that any plausible causal account of parental obligation must meet, and demonstrate that attempting to fulfil all three criteria simultaneously will give rise to one or both of two potentially insurmountable dilemmas.     

Embryo donation or embryo adoption? Conceptual and normative issues

A central question in the ethical debate on the practice of relinquishing in vitro fertilization surplus embryos for family building is whether we ought to think of it more in terms of donating these embryos or in terms of having them adopted. Deciding between these two alternatives is more than a matter of mere terminology. It has an impact on normative questions, e.g., on the question of what criteria for parent selection ought to be applied to the recipients of the embryos, and on the moral evaluation of the act of ‘donating’ the embryo or ‘having it adopted’. In this article, I defend the view that we should conceptualize the relinquishment of spare embryos according to the adoption model, not as a donation. Section 2 sketches the outline of the argument by making clear how we may ground a defense of the adoption model in a theory of parental responsibility without implicitly elevating the moral status of the embryo. Section 3 contains a preliminary defense of the adoption model that draws on geneticism as what seems to me the most persuasive theory of parental responsibility. In section 4, I examine three objections to geneticism and either rebut them or, insofar as they are justified, try to accommodate them into my view. In section 5, I point out some features that distinguish embryo adoption from the adoption of (born) children. I contend, however, that these differences are compatible with the adoption model. Section 6 is concerned with the normative ramifications of this view.     

In vitro gametogenesis: The end of egg donation?

This paper explores whether egg donation could still be ethically justified if in vitro gametogenesis (IVG) became reliable and safe. In order to do this, issues and concerns that might inform a patient’s reasoning in choosing to use donor eggs instead of IVG are explored and assessed. It is concluded that egg donation would only be ethically justified in a narrow range of special cases given the (hypothetical) availability of IVG treatment and, further, that egg donation could itself be replaced by donation through IVG techniques. Two possible criticisms of this position are then considered: Ones based on respect for patient wishes, and on loss of donor benefit. It is concluded that whilst neither argument constitutes a strong enough reason to continue with programmes of egg donation, egg‐sharing programmes could still be permitted come the advent of IVG; these could then provide a morally acceptable source of “natural” donor eggs.     

Who gets the gametes? An argument for a points system for fertility patients

This paper argues that the convention of allocating donated gametes on a ‘first come, first served’ basis should be replaced with an allocation system that takes into account more morally relevant criteria than waiting time. This conclusion was developed using an empirical bioethics methodology, which involved a study of the views of 18 staff members from seven U.K. fertility clinics, and 20 academics, policy‐makers, representatives of patient groups, and other relevant professionals, on the allocation of donated sperm and eggs. Against these views, we consider some nuanced ways of including criteria in a points allocation system. We argue that such a system is more ethically robust than ‘first come, first served’, but we acknowledge that our results suggest that a points system will meet with resistance from those working in the field. We conclude that criteria such as a patient's age, potentially damaging substance use, and parental status should be used to allocate points and determine which patients receive treatment and in what order. These and other factors should be applied according to how they bear on considerations like child welfare, patient welfare, and the effectiveness of the proposed treatment.     

THE FUCUS (PHAEOPHYCEAE) SPERM RECEPTOR FOR EGGS. I. DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF A BINDING ASSAY1

To explore the molecular basis of egg-sperm recognition in the brown alga , Fucus serratus L., we developed an in vitro binding assay involving egg plasma membrane vesicles (PMVs) and proteins contained in a KCl extract of sperm. Binding between the two components was measured using biotinylated PMVs followed by the addition of streptavidin conjugated to alkaline phosphatase and the appropriate substrate. Biotinylation did not affect the ability of egg PMVs to inhibit fertilization in a species-preferential manner. Binding of labeled egg PMVs to the sperm KCl extract was saturable and competable with unlabeled PMVs but was not species-specific. Protease treatment of the KCl extract abolished binding, whereas periodate had no effect, suggesting that sperm protein rather than carbohydrate was involved. Preincubation of the sperm extract with sulfated polysaccharides (e.g. fucoidan and ascophyllan) inhibited binding of egg plasma membranes. Sulfation seems to be important for this effect since desulfated fucoidan was far less effective at blocking binding. Polysaccharides which inhibited binding also inhibited fertilization. Overall, the results indicate that at least some aspects of binding between Fucus sperm and eggs are mediated by a protein(s) derived from sperm which recognizes sulfated glycoconjugates on the egg plasma membrane .