Religious and secular death: a parting of the ways

Most organized religions have indicated a level of support for organ donation including the diagnosis of death by the brain criterion. Organ donation is seen as a gift of love and fits within a communitarian ethos that most religions embrace. The acceptance of the determination of death by the brain criterion, where it has been explained, is reconciled with religious views of soul and body by using a notion of integration. Because the soul may be seen as that which integrates the human body, in the absence of any other signs of human functioning, loss of integration is considered to be an indication that soul and body have separated. To some extent this view would seem to be informed by an Aristotelian notion of the soul, but it fits well enough with religious notions of the person continuing after death. There have been several developments internationally that indicate that the acceptance of so-called 'brain death' by organized religions has been challenged by new developments including the acceptance of a lesser standard than loss of all brain function and a rejection by the US President's Council on Bioethics of the notion of loss of integration as an explanation of death by the brain criterion.     

ARGUMENTS AGAINST PROMOTING ORGAN TRANSPLANTS FROM BRAIN‐DEAD DONORS,AND VIEWS OF CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE ON LIFE AND DEATH

As of 2009, the number of donors in Japan is the lowest among developed countries. On July 13, 2009, Japan's Organ Transplant Law was revised for the first time in 12 years. The revised and old laws differ greatly on four primary points: the definition of death, age requirements for donors, requirements for brain‐death determination and organ extraction, and the appropriateness of priority transplants for relatives. In the four months of deliberations in the National Diet before the new law was established, various arguments regarding brain death and organ transplantation were offered. An amazing variety of opinions continue to be offered, even after more than 40 years have elapsed since the first heart organ transplant in Japan. Some are of the opinion that with the passage of the revised law, Japan will finally become capable of performing transplants according to global standards. Contrarily, there are assertions that organ transplants from brain‐dead donors are unacceptable because they result in organs being taken from living human beings. Considering the current conditions, we will organize and introduce the arguments for and against organ transplants from brain‐dead donors in contemporary Japan. Subsequently, we will discuss the primary arguments against organ transplants from brain‐dead donors from the perspective of contemporary Japanese views on life and death. After introducing the recent view that brain death should not be regarded as equivalent to the death of a human being, we would like to probe the deeply‐rooted views on life and death upon which it is based.     

Brain stem death and organ donation.

Organs for donation are in short supply in the United Kingdom, resulting in allegations that relatives of potential donors are not being asked for consent. Legislation on "required request" has been proposed to overcome this. The incidence, causes, complications, and patterns of organ donation in brain stem dead patients in one referral centre were studied over 12 months. Data were collected on all patients fulfilling criteria for brain stem death or considered suitable for donating organs after circulatory arrest. Forty two patients fulfilled the criteria for brain stem death, and in 10 further patients circulatory arrest occurred before formal testing was finished. The major causes of brain stem death were head injury (28) and intracranial haemorrhage (17). Consent to organ donation was obtained for 24 potential donors, and organs were donated by 23 of them. Twenty nine patients did not donate organs. The commonest reasons for failure to donate were medical unsuitability (13) and the coroner not releasing the body (eight). Consent was not sought in three cases, and the relatives refused consent in the remaining five. This study suggests that required request will not considerably increase the supply of donor organs.     

CONTINUING THE DEFINITION OF DEATH DEBATE: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS ON CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

The President's Council on Bioethics has recently released a report supportive of the continued use of brain death as a criterion for human death. The Council's conclusions were based on a conception of life that stressed external work as the fundamental marker of organismic life. With respect to human life, it is spontaneous respiration in particular that indicates an ability to interact with the external environment, and so indicates the presence of life. Conversely, irreversible apnoea marks an inability to carry out the necessary work of life, an inability which the Council considers an indicator of death. This conception has been conceived to circumvent criticisms of the previous model of loss of somatic integration, a model the Council admits that, in the presence of evidence of continuing functional integration in brain dead patients, was looking less than convincing. Nevertheless, by focusing on external work and ignoring the more essential work of integrative unity, the Council's conception of the nature of life is untenable, and of no assistance in supporting a relation of equivalence between the concepts of brain death and death. Consequently, the Council's conclusions do little to advance the definition of death debate, a potentially intractable debate that may necessitate the investigation of alternate ethical justifications for organ harvesting.     

FROM THE EDITORS

The shortage of organs and tissues for transplantation in infants is particularly severe. Caplan considers the moral and public policy implications of utilizing abortuses and brain dead or anencephalic infants as donors. Arguments favoring their use include the potential benefits for research, benefits to existing infants born with fatal conditions, the ethical cost of relying on primates as sources of organs, and the providing of solace to grieving parents. Arguments against their use include the potential for coercion or conflict of interest in parental decisions about donation, the possibility that abortion may be encouraged, the fact that brain death is difficult to diagnose in infants while organ procurement from anencephalics may be considered murder, and the charge that an increase in infant transplants would be too costly. Caplan concludes that the arguments for using abortuses, anencephalics, and brain dead infants as organ and tissue donors outweigh the arguments against.     

Assessment of platelet function in patients with stroke using multiple electrode platelet aggregometry: a prospective observational study

The Qatari law, as in many other countries, uses brain death as the main criteria for organ donation and cessation of medical support. By contrast, most of the public in Qatar do not agree with the limitation or withdrawal of medical care until the time of cardiac death. The current study aims to examine the duration of somatic survival after brain death, organ donation rate in brain-dead patients as well as review the underlying etiologies and level of support provided in the state of Qatar. This is a retrospective study of all patients diagnosed with brain death over a 10-year period conducted at the largest tertiary center in Qatar (Hamad General Hospital). Among the 53 patients who were diagnosed with brain death during the study period, the median and mean somatic survivals of brain-dead patients in the current study were 3 and 4.5 days respectively. The most common etiology was intracranial hemorrhage (45.3%) followed by ischemic stroke (17%). Ischemic stroke patients had a median survival of 11 days. Organ donation was accepted by only two families (6.6%) of the 30 brain dead patients deemed suitable for organ donation. The average somatic survival of brain-dead patients is less than one week irrespective of supportive measures provided. Organ donation rate was extremely low among brain-dead patients in Qatar. Improved public education may lead to significant improvement in resource utilization as well as organ transplant donors and should be a major target area of future health care policies.     

Brain death and organ donation in a neurosurgical unit: audit of recent practice.

OBJECTIVE--To assess the potential for increasing the yield of donors by comparing the current pattern of brain death and organ donation in a neurosurgical unit with that reported in 1981 and with a recent national audit. DESIGN--Retrospective review of all deaths for 1986, 1987, and 1988 and prospective data for 1989. SETTING--A regional neurosurgical unit serving 2.7 million population. RESULTS--Of 553 deaths, 35% (191) patients died while on a ventilator and 17% (92) after discontinuation of ventilation. Medical contraindications to donation were found in 23% (32) of 141 patients tested for brain death, in 38% (19) of 50 patients who died while being ventilated who were not tested, and in 12% (11) of 92 patients no longer being ventilated. Consent for donation was sought in 88% (96) of 109 medically suitable brain dead patients and granted in 70% (67) of these. Half those with permission for multiorgan donation had only the kidneys removed. CONCLUSIONS--More organs may be lost owing to transplant team logistics than by failure to seek consent from relatives of brain dead patients. The estimated size of the pool of potential donors depends on what types of patients might be considered. Ensuring that all who die while being ventilated are tested for brain death and considering the potential for donation before withdrawing ventilation could yield more donors. Ventilating more patients who are hopelessly brain damaged to secure more donors raises ethical and economic issues.     

ARE RECENT DEFENCES OF THE BRAIN DEATH CONCEPT ADEQUATE?

Brain death is accepted in most countries as death. The rationales to explain why brain death is death are surprisingly problematic. The standard rationale that in brain death there has been loss of integrative unity of the organism has been shown to be false, and a better rationale has not been clearly articulated. Recent expert defences of the brain death concept are examined in this paper, and are suggested to be inadequate. I argue that, ironically, these defences demonstrate the lack of a defensible rationale for why brain death should be accepted as death itself. If brain death is death, a conceptual rationale for brain death being equivalent to death should be clarified, and this should be done urgently.     

Ensembled neural networks for brain death prediction for patients with severe head injury

The concept of organ donation has gradually been accepted by people in recent years so the judicial brain death determination process becomes very important. Clinically, patients with irreversible apnoeic coma (IAC) will be considered legally as brain death based on a judicial process, but this process can only be applied to people who had already signed the letter of consent to organ donation. The main idea behind the proposed model is to find out an easier way to diagnose the prognosis of patients with severe head injury, and offer the medical staffs more information to determine brain death. Therefore, the technique of ensembled neural networks (ENN) based on multi-layer perceptron (MLP) network has been applied to construct the prediction model of brain death index (BDI). Ten different signals were chosen to be the input data. Using these ten parameters, medical doctors depend on their experience to score the BDI hourly values. The BDI values from medical doctors become the training target of the ANN training process and the standard index of testing process. Moreover, in order to compare the differences between doctors’ and the network's rankings for the input data, the ranking of order of precedence of each input signal is analyzed via sensitivity analysis. The results show that the 4 layers network with validation has better performance than 3 layers. For sensitivity analysis, most of the input variables’ ranking from trained model were similar to the ranking of the medical doctors except RR/RR(Set) this parameter and 4 other parameters (PS-R, PR-R, PS-L, and PR-L) are difficult to rank, even medical doctors cannot decide the ranking accurately. Using the best topology structure of MLP 10-10-5-1, the ensemble neural network could effectively predict the BDI with small errors (i.e. training error = 0.219087; validation error = 0.370485; testing error = 0.280515). In conclusion, this model can provide medical staffs a reference index to evaluate the status of IAC and brain death patients. However, more clinical data are still needed, perhaps to refine the weights of EANN, and certainly to see how widely the model is applicable.     

From the editors

Kuhse and Singer, the editors of this special issue of Bioethics, introduce seven articles on conflicting concepts, public policies, and standards for the determination of cardiorespiratory and brain death and the relationship of brain death to the beginning of "brain life" and to organ donation, especially from anencephalic infants. The articles are "Consciousness, the brain and what matters," by Grant Gillett; "Brain death and the anencephalic newborn," by Robert D. Truog and John C. Fletcher; "Brain death and brain life: rethinking the connection," by Jocelyn Downie; "A plea for the heart," by Martyn Evans; "The importance of knowledge and trust in the definition of death," by Bo Andreassen Rix; "Death, democracy and public ethical choice," by Reid Cushman and Soren Holm; and "Misunderstanding death on a respirator," by Tom Tomlinson.     

THE ONGOING CHARITY OF ORGAN DONATION. CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH SUNNI FATWAS ON ORGAN DONATION AND BLOOD TRANSFUSION

Background: Empirical studies in Muslim communities on organ donation and blood transfusion show that Muslim counsellors play an important role in the decision process. Despite the emerging importance of online English Sunni fatwas, these fatwas on organ donation and blood transfusion have hardly been studied, thus creating a gap in our knowledge of contemporary Islamic views on the subject. Method: We analysed 70 English Sunni e‐fatwas and subjected them to an in‐depth text analysis in order to reveal the key concepts in the Islamic ethical framework regarding organ donation and blood transfusion. Results: All 70 fatwas allow for organ donation and blood transfusion. Autotransplantation is no problem at all if done for medical reasons. Allotransplantation, both from a living and a dead donor, appears to be possible though only in quite restricted ways. Xenotransplantation is less often mentioned but can be allowed in case of necessity. Transplantation in general is seen as an ongoing form of charity. Nearly half of the fatwas allowing blood transfusion do so without mentioning any restriction or problem whatsoever. The other half of the fatwas on transfusion contain the same conditional approval as found in the arguments pro organ transplantation. Conclusion: Our findings are very much in line with the international literature on the subject. We found two new elements: debates on the definition of the moment of death are hardly mentioned in the English Sunni fatwas and organ donation and blood transfusion are presented as an ongoing form of charity.     

Organ donation from intensive care units in England.

OBJECTIVE--To audit all deaths in intensive care units (excepting coronary care only and neonatal intensive care units) in England to assess potential for organ procurement. DESIGN--An audit in which 14 regional health authorities and London special health authorities each designated a regional liaison officer to identify intensive care units and liaise with Department of Health and the Medical Research Council''s biostatistics unit in distribution, return, and checking of audit forms. Audit took place from 1 January to 31 March 1989 and will continue to 31 December 1990. SETTING--278 Intensive care units in England. PARTICIPANTS--Colleagues in intensive care units (doctors, nurses, coordinators, and others), who completed serially numbered audit forms for all patients who died in intensive care. RESULTS--The estimated number of deaths in intensive care units was 3085, and validated audit forms were received for 2853 deaths (92%). Brain stem death was a possible diagnosis in only 407 (14%) patients (about 1700 cases a year) and was confirmed in 282 (10%) patients (an estimated 1200 cases a year). Half the patients (95% confidence interval 45% to 57%) in whom brain stem death was confirmed became actual donors of solid organs. Tests for brain stem death were not performed in 106 (26%) of 407 patients with brain stem death as a possible diagnosis, and general medical contraindication to organ donation was recorded for 48 (17%) of 282 patients who fulfilled brain stem death criteria before cessation of heart beat. The criteria were fulfilled before cessation of heart beat and in the absence of any general medical contraindication to organ donation in 234 patients, 8% of those dying in intensive care (an estimated 1000 cases a year). Consent for organ donation was given in 152 (70%) of 218 cases (64% to 76%) when the possibility of organ donation was suggested to relatives. In only 14 out of 232 families (6%; 3% to 9%) was there no discussion of organ donation with relatives. Corneal suitability was recorded as "not known" in a high proportion (1271; 45%) of all deaths and intensive care units reported only 123 corneal donors (4% of all audited deaths). CONCLUSION--When brain stem death is a possible diagnosis tests should always be carried out for confirmation. Early referral to the transplant team or coordinator should occur in all cases of brain stem death to check contraindications to organ donation. There should be increased use of asystolic kidney donation, and patients should be routinely assessed for suitability for corneal donation. Finally, more publicity and education are necessary to promote consent.     

The Consequences of Vagueness in Consent to Organ Donation

In this article I argue that vagueness concerning consent to post‐mortem organ donation causes considerable harm in several ways. First, the information provided to most people registering as organ donors is very vague in terms of what is actually involved in donation. Second, the vagueness regarding consent to donation increases the distress of families of patients who are potential organ donors, both during and following the discussion about donation. Third, vagueness also increases the chances that the patient's intention to donate will not be fulfilled due to the family's distress. Fourth, the consequent reduction in the number of donated organs leads to avoidable deaths and increased suffering among potential recipients, and distresses them and their families. There are three strategies which could be used to reduce the harmful effects of this vagueness. First, recategorizing the reasons (commonly referred to as ‘overrules’ under the current system) given by families who refuse donation from registered donors would bring greater clarity to donation discussions. Second, people who wish to donate their organs should be encouraged to discuss their wishes in detail with their families, and to consider recording their wishes in other ways. Finally, the consent system for organ donation could be made more detailed, ensuring both that more information is provided to potential donors and that they have more flexibility in how their intentions are indicated; this last strategy, however, could have the disadvantage of discouraging some potential donors from registering.     

Prenatal care: a comparative evaluation of nurse-midwives and family physicians

We review various organ procurement strategies from ethical and practical perspectives to understand why these strategies have been relatively unsuccessful. We propose that the CMA recommend the implementation of a required-request policy in hospitals. We also propose a possible new approach in which people from the age of 18 years would voluntarily enrol in an organ donation program, agreeing to permit all usable organs to be taken for transplantation at the time of death. In return they would have priority for receiving organs made available by the program. We believe that this program would save lives, respect the donor''s autonomy and satisfy the principles of justice and beneficence.     

Informing about mammographic screening: Ethical challenges and suggested solutions

Providing high quality and user oriented information about mammographic screening is no easy task, as screening has been subject to heated professional and public debates. Although the information has to be developed and provided in context for each screening program, the basic challenges are very much the same for all programs. Accordingly, the objective of this article is to analyze key ethical challenges in informing about mammographic screening, and based on these, to suggest some guiding principles for practical solutions. A literature review identifies five crucial issues with respect to informing women about mammographic screening. By analyzing and addressing these issues, five guiding principles are suggested: the content and the form of information should be developed through open and transparent processes with strong stakeholder involvement. Facts should be presented in a balanced way and uncertainties should be acknowledged, e.g., by presenting outcomes in ranges. Information should be layered without attempts to frame information. Attending mammographic screening should be as easy as not attending. Although apparently trivial, the suggested principles can be useful for elaborating specific information material about mammographic screening in a field of great ethical controversy.     

Against the family veto in organ procurement: Why the wishes of the dead should prevail when the living and the deceased disagree on organ donation

The wishes of registered organ donors are regularly set aside when family members object to donation. This genuine overruling of the wishes of the deceased raises difficult ethical questions. A successful argument for providing the family with a veto must (a) provide reason to disregard the wishes of the dead, and (b) establish why the family should be allowed to decide. One branch of justification seeks to reconcile the family veto with important ideas about respecting property rights, preserving autonomy, and preventing harm. These arguments are ultimately unsuccessful. Another branch of arguments is consequentialist, pointing out the negative consequences of removing the veto. Whether construed as concerning family distress or as a potential drop in the organs available, these arguments are unsuccessful; the first fails to recognize the tremendous distress associated with waiting for an organ, while the second has little supporting evidence. A final section considers and rejects whether combining some of the arguments just examined could justify the family veto. We should thus remove the family veto in organ donation.     

Factors that influence decisions by families to donate brain tissue for medical research

Whilst mainstream transplant literature provides valuable insights into the influences on families to donate organs and tissues for transplant, the relevance of these findings in relation to organ donation for research remain speculative. The present study aims to expand the research donation literature, by exploring factors that influence a family’s decision to donate brain tissue to neuroscience research. The verbal responses of the senior available next-of-kin (NOK), to the question of brain donation for research, are analysed. The donation rate was high (54%) over the 5-year-period. NOK relationship to the deceased, and post mortem interval were the main factors associated with a positive donation. Parents were most likely to donate and this may result from a lifetime of decision-making on behalf of the deceased. Also, the longer the interval between death of the potential donor and the question being asked, the greater the likelihood of donation.     

The Ethics of Continued Life‐Sustaining Treatment for those Diagnosed as Brain‐dead

Given the long‐standing controversy about whether the brain‐dead should be considered alive in an irreversible coma or dead despite displaying apparent signs of life, the ethical and policy issues posed when family members insist on continued treatment are not as simple as commentators have claimed. In this article, we consider the kind of policy that should be adopted to manage a family's insistence that their brain‐dead loved one continues to receive supportive care. We argue that while it would be ethically inappropriate to continue to devote scarce acute care resources to such patients in a hospital setting, it may not be ethically inappropriate for patients to receive these resources in certain other settings. Thus, if a family insists on continuing to care for their brain‐dead loved at their home, we should not, from a policy perspective, interfere with the family's wishes. We also argue that healthcare professionals should make some effort to facilitate the transfer of brain‐dead patients to these other settings when families insist on continued treatment despite being informed about the lack of any potential for recovery of consciousness. Our arguments are strengthened by the fact that patients in a persistent vegetative state, who, when correctly diagnosed, also have no potential for recovery of consciousness, are routinely transferred from hospitals to nursing homes or long‐term care facilities where they continue to be ventilated, tube fed and to receive other supportive care. We also briefly explore the question of who should be responsible for the costs of such treatment at the long‐term care facility.