Variation and the response to variation as a basis for successful cooperation

In applying game theory to problems in biology, differences between individuals are often ignored. In particular, when analysing the evolution of cooperation it is often implicitly assumed that ignoring variation will produce predictions that approximate the solution when differences are included. This need not be true. As we demonstrate, differences are not innocuous noise, but can fundamentally change the nature of a game. Even small amounts of variability can stabilize cooperation by, for example, maintaining the need to deal with cheaters. Differences promote the need to learn about others in an interaction, leading to contingent behaviour that can reduce conflict, and to negotiated outcomes that may or may not be more cooperative than unconditional actions. Once there are mechanisms such as mutation and environmental influences that maintain variation within populations, whether cooperation evolves may depend on the variation in the cooperativeness trait. Variation means that it may be worth taking a chance that a partner is cooperative by being cooperative. When there are markets, so that individuals can break off interactions to seek a better partner, variation promotes choosiness and hence penalizes those uncooperative individuals, who are rejected. Variation promotes the need to monitor the previous behaviour of others, and once this social sensitivity exists, the need to maintain a good reputation can promote cooperation.     

Social life histories: jackdaw dominance increases with age,terminally declines and shortens lifespan

Behaviour may contribute to changes in fitness prospects with age, for example through effects of age-dependent social dominance on resource access. Older individuals often have higher dominance rank, which may reflect a longer lifespan of dominants and/or an increase in social dominance with age. In the latter case, increasing dominance could mitigate physiological senescence. We studied the social careers of free-living jackdaws over a 12 year period, and found that: (i) larger males attained higher ranks, (ii) social rank increased with age within individuals, and (iii) high-ranked individuals had shorter lifespan suggesting that maintaining or achieving high rank and associated benefits comes at a cost. Lastly, (iv) social rank declined substantially in the last year an individual was observed in the colony, and through its effect on resource access this may accelerate senescence. We suggest that behaviour affecting the ability to secure resources is integral to the senescence process via resource effects on somatic state, where behaviour may include not only social dominance, but also learning, memory, perception and (sexual) signalling. Studying behavioural effects on senescence via somatic state may be most effective in the wild, where there is competition for resources, which is usually avoided in laboratory conditions.     

Individual differences in behaviour explain variation in survival: a meta‐analysis

Research focusing on among‐individual differences in behaviour (‘animal personality’) has been blooming for over a decade. Central theories explaining the maintenance of such behavioural variation posits that individuals expressing greater “risky” behaviours should suffer higher mortality. Here, for the first time, we synthesize the existing empirical evidence for this key prediction. Our results did not support this prediction as there was no directional relationship between riskier behaviour and greater mortality; however there was a significant absolute relationship between behaviour and survival. In total, behaviour explained a significant, but small, portion (5.8%) of the variance in survival. We also found that risky (vs. “shy”) behavioural types live significantly longer in the wild, but not in the laboratory. This suggests that individuals expressing risky behaviours might be of overall higher quality but the lack of predation pressure and resource restrictions mask this effect in laboratory environments. Our work demonstrates that individual differences in behaviour explain important differences in survival but not in the direction predicted by theory. Importantly, this suggests that models predicting behaviour to be a mediator of reproduction‐survival trade‐offs may need revision and/or empiricists may need to reconsider their proxies of risky behaviours when testing such theory.     

Integration of environmental and host-derived signals with quorum sensing during plant-microbe interactions

Many plant-associated microbes use secreted autoinducer molecules, including N-acylhomoserine lactones (AHLs), to regulate diverse behaviours in association with their population density (quorum sensing). Often, these responses are affected by environmental conditions, including the presence of other AHL-producing bacterial species. In addition, plant-derived metabolites, including products that arise as a direct result of the bacterial infection, may profoundly influence AHL-regulated behaviours. These plant products can interact directly and indirectly with the quorum-sensing network and can profoundly affect the quorum-sensing behaviour. Local conditions on a microscopic scale may affect signal molecule longevity, stability and accumulation, and this could be used to give information in addition to cell density. Furthermore, in many Gram-negative bacteria, AHL signalling is subservient to an additional two-component signalling system dependent upon homologues of GacS and GacA. The signal(s) to which GacS responds are not known, but recent research suggests that a self-produced ligand may be being detected. This review will focus on two well-studied examples of AHL-regulated plant-associated behaviour, Erwinia carotovora and Agrobacterium tumefaciens, to illustrate the complexity of such signalling networks.     

Evolutionary causes and consequences of consistent individual variation in cooperative behaviour

Behaviour is typically regarded as among the most flexible of animal phenotypic traits. In particular, expression of cooperative behaviour is often assumed to be conditional upon the behaviours of others. This flexibility is a key component of many hypothesized mechanisms favouring the evolution of cooperative behaviour. However, evidence shows that cooperative behaviours are often less flexible than expected and that, in many species, individuals show consistent differences in the amount and type of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviours displayed. This phenomenon is known as ‘animal personality’ or a ‘behavioural syndrome’. Animal personality is evolutionarily relevant, as it typically shows heritable variation and can entail fitness consequences, and hence, is subject to evolutionary change. Here, we review the empirical evidence for individual variation in cooperative behaviour across taxa, we examine the evolutionary processes that have been invoked to explain the existence of individual variation in cooperative behaviour and we discuss the consequences of consistent individual differences on the evolutionary stability of cooperation. We highlight that consistent individual variation in cooperativeness can both stabilize or disrupt cooperation in populations. We conclude that recognizing the existence of consistent individual differences in cooperativeness is essential for an understanding of the evolution and prevalence of cooperation.     

Behavioural flexibility and reputation formation

Limited flexibility in behaviour gives rise to behavioural consistency, so that past behaviour is partially predictive of current behaviour. The consequences of limits to flexibility are investigated in a population in which pairs of individuals play a game of trust. The game can either be observed by others or not. Reputation is based on trustworthiness when observed and acts as a signal of behaviour in future interactions with others. Individuals use the reputation of partner in deciding whether to trust them, both when observed by others and when not observed. We explore the effects of costs of exhibiting a difference in behaviour between when observed and when not observed (i.e. a cost of flexibility). When costs are low, individuals do not attempt to signal that they will later be trustworthy: their signal should not be believed since it will always pay them to be untrustworthy if trusted. When costs are high, their local optimal behaviour automatically acts as an honest signal. At intermediate costs, individuals are very trustworthy when observed in order to convince others of their trustworthiness when unobserved. It is hypothesized that this type of strong signalling might occur in other settings.     

Behaviour in captivity predicts some aspects of natural behaviour,but not others,in a wild cricket population

Examining the relevance of ‘animal personality’ involves linking consistent among- and within-individual behavioural variation to fitness in the wild. Studies aiming to do this typically assay personality in captivity and rely on the assumption that measures of traits in the laboratory reflect their expression in nature. We examined this rarely tested assumption by comparing laboratory and field measurements of the behaviour of wild field crickets (Gryllus campestris) by continuously monitoring individual behaviour in nature, and repeatedly capturing the same individuals and measuring their behaviour in captivity. We focused on three traits that are frequently examined in personality studies: shyness, activity and exploration. All of them showed repeatability in the laboratory. Laboratory activity and exploration predicted the expression of their equivalent behaviours in the wild, but shyness did not. Traits in the wild were predictably influenced by environmental factors such as temperature and sunlight, but only activity showed appreciable within-individual repeatability. This suggests that some behaviours typically studied as personality traits can be accurately assayed in captivity, but the expression of others may be highly context-specific. Our results highlight the importance of validating the relevance of laboratory behavioural assays to analogous traits measured in the wild.     

Inspection behaviour and inter-individual cooperation in juvenile qingbo: the effects of prior predator exposure and food deprivation

The predation pressure and food availability to which individuals are exposed during their life histories shape inspection behaviour in animals. In this study, we aimed to test whether such behaviours varied with prior experience (predation, starvation or both treatments) or measurement condition (with or without the presence of a predator; here, the snakehead fish, Channa argus) in the fish species Spinibarbus sinensis, known as qingbo. Unexpectedly, prior predator experience showed no significant effect on inspection behaviour as demonstrated by either the frequency or the duration of each activity outside shelter or on cooperation as demonstrated by the inter-individual distance or synchronization of speed. This may have been due to the different adjustments in behaviour among individuals (more shelter use vs. more inspection), the predator treatment used in the present study (exposure to caged predator rather than direct predation) and/or a species-specific strategy in the qingbo. The starved fish displayed shorter inspection latency, increased inspection behaviour and greater cooperation when measured without the predator; however, when measured in the presence of the predator, the starved fish showed increased inspection frequency but shorter inspection duration, possibly due to the compromise between energy needs and predation risk. Similar to those of the predation group, the fish from the double-treated group showed no difference in inspection behaviour compared to the control group under the predator-absent condition, while the high-frequency, short-duration inspection behaviours remained the same as in the starved group. These findings suggested that the adjustment of inspection behaviour and related cooperation are rather complicated according to either predator experience or food deprivation, partially due to the inter-individual differences in behavioural adjustment and/or different environmental conditions.     

Social evolution theory for microorganisms

Microorganisms communicate and cooperate to perform a wide range of multicellular behaviours, such as dispersal, nutrient acquisition, biofilm formation and quorum sensing. Microbiologists are rapidly gaining a greater understanding of the molecular mechanisms involved in these behaviours, and the underlying genetic regulation. Such behaviours are also interesting from the perspective of social evolution - why do microorganisms engage in these behaviours given that cooperative individuals can be exploited by selfish cheaters, who gain the benefit of cooperation without paying their share of the cost? There is great potential for interdisciplinary research in this fledgling field of sociomicrobiology, but a limiting factor is the lack of effective communication of social evolution theory to microbiologists. Here, we provide a conceptual overview of the different mechanisms through which cooperative behaviours can be stabilized, emphasizing the aspects most relevant to microorganisms, the novel problems that microorganisms pose and the new insights that can be gained from applying evolutionary theory to microorganisms.     

Signal value of stress behaviour

Physiological and psychological stress are accompanied by nonverbal behaviour across a wide range of species. The function of this ‘stress behaviour’ is not well understood but is often assumed to be read by others as a cue to stress. Displaying signs of weakness is, however, difficult to understand from an evolutionary perspective and therefore further investigation into why these behaviours exist is needed. Here, we test whether displacement behaviours (i.e., those known to be associated with stress) are reliable indicators of stress in humans. To do this, we presented raters (N = 133) with videos of individuals (N = 31) undergoing a stress-inducting task. Self-directed displacement behaviours and self-reported stress were both associated with stress ratings given by raters. Therefore, such behaviours can provide reliable information to others and can be considered communicative. Individuals producing more nonverbal stress behaviour were rated as more likeable by raters (perhaps presenting as more honest signallers), indicating a benefit and potential adaptive function of displaying stress. Raters also differed in their accuracy in detecting stress from nonverbal cues. Findings suggest that the accuracy with which individuals were able to detect stress was linked to the number of social connections they reported to have. However, this association was non-linear, with individuals who were most and least accurate reporting the least network connections. This could indicate that the ability to read behaviour is associated with an ability to form and maintain social networks.     

Cooperation can improve the resilience of common-pool resource systems against over-harvesting

Currently common-pool resource systems world-wide are under pressure due to overexploitation and environmental change. To ensure that these systems continue to provide vital ecosystem services it is necessary to sustain or increase their resilience against such pressure. One way of doing this may be to improve cooperation among agents who are heavily involved in common-pool resource systems, such as farmers, fishers, managers, and companies. Historical examples suggest that the persistence or collapse of common-pool resource systems may hinge on agents collaborating or not, but cooperation as a mechanism to improve resilience is not commonly included in existing models for studying resilience. Cooperation may be sustained through indirect reciprocity, i.e., cooperative behaviour by one agent that may be repaid by other agents. In this paper we develop a suite of agent-based models that represent an abstract version of a generic spatial common-pool resource system. This suite of models contains various mechanisms for cooperation based on trust. We investigate how the resilience of the models is affected by these mechanisms. The resilience of the models is assessed by applying various shocks which make it more difficult to gather resource, and measuring whether and how fast the agent population can recover from these shocks. The results suggest that although indirect reciprocity positively affects the level of cooperation in the system, cooperation could be common even without indirect reciprocity. It is shown that the presence of cooperation increases the resilience of the models against shocks.     

Calling by Concluding Sentinels: Coordinating Cooperation or Revealing Risk?

Efficient cooperation requires effective coordination of individual contributions to the cooperative behaviour. Most social birds and mammals involved in cooperation produce a range of vocalisations, which may be important in regulating both individual contributions and the combined group effort. Here we investigate the role of a specific call in regulating cooperative sentinel behaviour in pied babblers (Turdoides bicolor). 'Fast-rate chuck' calls are often given by sentinels as they finish guard bouts and may potentially coordinate the rotation of individuals as sentinels, minimising time without a sentinel, or may signal the presence or absence of predators, regulating the onset of the subsequent sentinel bout. We ask (i) when fast-rate chuck calls are given and (ii) what effect they have on the interval between sentinel bouts. Contrary to expectation, we find little evidence that these calls are involved in regulating the pied babbler sentinel system: observations revealed that their utterance is influenced only marginally by wind conditions and not at all by habitat, while observations and experimental playback showed that the giving of these calls has no effect on inter-bout interval. We conclude that pied babblers do not seem to call at the end of a sentinel bout to maximise the efficiency of this cooperative act, but may use vocalisations at this stage to influence more individually driven behaviours.     

The effects of dominance on leadership and energetic gain: a dynamic game between pairs of social foragers

Although social behaviour can bring many benefits to an individual, there are also costs that may be incurred whenever the members of a social group interact. The formation of dominance hierarchies could offer a means of reducing some of the costs of social interaction, but individuals within the hierarchy may end up paying differing costs dependent upon their position within the hierarchy. These differing interaction costs may therefore influence the behaviour of the group, as subordinate individuals may experience very different benefits and costs to dominants when the group is conducting a given behaviour. Here, a state-dependent dynamic game is described which considers a pair of social foragers where there is a set dominance relationship within the pair. The model considers the case where the subordinate member of the pair pays an interference cost when it and the dominant individual conduct specific pairs of behaviours together. The model demonstrates that if the subordinate individual pays these energetic costs when it interacts with the dominant individual, this has effects upon the behaviour of both subordinate and the dominant individuals. Including interaction costs increases the amount of foraging behaviour both individuals conduct, with the behaviour of the pair being driven by the subordinate individual. The subordinate will tend to be the lighter individual for longer periods of time when interaction costs are imposed. This supports earlier suggestions that lighter individuals should act as the decision-maker within the pair, giving leadership-like behaviours that are based upon energetic state. Pre-existing properties of individuals such as their dominance will be less important for determining which individual makes the decisions for the pair. This suggests that, even with strict behavioural hierarchies, identifying which individual is the dominant one is not sufficient for identifying which one is the leader.     

Communication networks: social environments for receiving and signalling behaviour

Communication and social behaviour are inextricably linked, with communication mediating important social behaviours such as resource defence and mate attraction. However, the social environment in which communication occurs is often ignored in discussions of communication behaviour. We argue that networks of several individuals are the common social environment for communication behaviour. The consequences for receivers and signallers of communicating in a network environment are the main subjects of this review. Eavesdropping is a receiving behaviour that is only possible in the environment of a network and therefore we concentrate on this behaviour. The main effect of communication networks on signallers is to create competition with other signallers for receiver attention. We discuss the consequences of such competition. To conclude, we explore the role of signals and signalling interactions as sources of information that animals exploit to direct their behaviour. Received: 1 December 1999 / Received in revised form: 18 January 2000 / Accepted: 18 January 2000     

Social eavesdropping and the evolution of conditional cooperation and cheating strategies

The response of bystanders to information available in their social environment can have a potent influence on the evolution of cooperation and signalling systems. In the presence of bystanders, individuals might be able to increase their payoff by exaggerating signals beyond their means (cheating) or investing to help others despite considerable costs. In doing so, animals can accrue immediate benefits by manipulating (or helping) individuals with whom they are currently interacting and delayed benefits by convincing bystanders that they are more fit or cooperative than perhaps is warranted. In this paper, I provide some illustrative examples of how bystanders could apply added positive selection pressure on both cooperative behaviour and dishonest signalling during courtship or conflict. I also discuss how the presence of bystanders might select for greater flexibility in behavioural strategies (e.g. conditional or condition dependence), which could maintain dishonesty at evolutionarily stable frequencies under some ecological conditions. By recognizing bystanders as a significant selection pressure, we might gain a more realistic approximation of what drives signalling and/or interaction dynamics in social animals.     

Public goods games with reward in finite populations

Public goods games paraphrase the problem of cooperation in game theoretical terms. Cooperators contribute to a public good and thereby increase the welfare of others at a cost to themselves. Defectors consume the public good but do not pay its cost and therefore outperform cooperators. Hence, according to genetic or cultural evolution, defectors should be favored and the public good disappear – despite the fact that groups of cooperators are better off than groups of defectors. The maximization of short term individual profits causes the demise of the common resource to the detriment of all. This outcome can be averted by introducing incentives to cooperate. Negative incentives based on the punishment of defectors efficiently stabilize cooperation once established but cannot initiate cooperation. Here we consider the complementary case of positive incentives created by allowing individuals to reward those that contribute to the public good. The finite-population stochastic dynamics of the public goods game with reward demonstrate that reward initiates cooperation by providing an escape hatch out of states of mutual defection. However, in contrast to punishment, reward is unable to stabilize cooperation but, instead, gives rise to a persistent minority of cooperators.     

Individual differences affect honest signalling in a songbird

Research in the past decade has established the existence of consistent individual differences or ‘personality’ in animals and their important role in many aspects of animal behaviour. At the same time, research on honest signalling of aggression has revealed that while some of the putative aggression signals are reliable, they are only imperfectly so. This study asks whether a significant portion of the variance in the aggression-signal regression may be explained by individual differences in signalling strategies. Using the well-studied aggressive signalling system of song sparrows (Melospiza melodia), we carried out repeated assays to measure both aggressive behaviours and aggressive signalling of territorial males. Through these assays, we found that aggressive behaviours and aggressive signalling were both highly repeatable, and moreover that aggressive behaviours in 2009–2010 predicted whether the birds would attack a taxidermic mount over a year later. Most significantly, we found that residual variation in signalling behaviours, after controlling for aggressive behaviour, was individually consistent, suggesting there may be a second personality trait determining the level of aggressive signalling. We term this potential personality trait ‘communicativeness’ and discuss these results in the context of honest signalling theories and recent findings reporting prevalence of ‘under-signalling’.     

Heritabilities,social environment effects and genetic correlations of social behaviours in a cooperatively breeding vertebrate

Social animals interact frequently with conspecifics, and their behaviour is influenced by social context, environmental cues and the behaviours of interaction partners, allowing for adaptive, flexible adjustments to social encounters. This flexibility can be limited by part of the behavioural variation being genetically determined. Furthermore, behaviours can be genetically correlated, potentially constraining independent evolution. Understanding social behaviour thus requires carefully disentangling genetic, environmental, maternal and social sources of variations as well as the correlation structure between behaviours. Here, we assessed heritability, maternal, common environment and social effects of eight social behaviours in Neolamprologus pulcher, a cooperatively breeding cichlid. We bred wild‐caught fish in a paternal half‐sibling design and scored ability to defend a resource against conspecifics, to integrate into a group and the propensity to help defending the group territory (“helping behaviour”). We assessed genetic, social and phenotypic correlations within clusters of behaviours predicted to be functionally related, namely “competition,” “aggression,” “aggression‐sociability,” “integration” and “integration‐help.” Helping behaviour and two affiliative behaviours were heritable, whereas there was little evidence for a genetic basis in all other traits. Phenotypic social effects explained part of the variation in a sociable and a submissive behaviour, but there were no maternal or common environment effects. Genetic and phenotypic correlation within clusters was mostly positive. A group's social environment influenced covariances of social behaviours. Genetic correlations were similar in magnitude but usually exceeding the phenotypic ones, indicating that conclusions about the evolution of social behaviours in this species could be provisionally drawn from phenotypic data in cases where data for genetic analyses are unobtainable.     

Density-dependent cooperation as a mechanism for persistence and coexistence

To overcome stress, such as resource limitation, an organism often needs to successfully mediate competition with other members of its own species. This may favor the evolution of defective traits that are harmful to the species population as a whole, and that may lead to its dilution or even to its extinction (the tragedy of the commons). Here, we show that this phenomenon can be circumvented by cooperation plasticity, in which an individual decides, based on environmental conditions, whether to cooperate or to defect. Specifically, we analyze the evolution of density-dependent cooperation. In our model, the population is spatially subdivided, periodically remixed, and comprises several species. We find that evolution pushes individuals to be more cooperative when their own species is at lower densities, and we show that not only could this cooperation prevent the tragedy of the commons, but it could also facilitate coexistence between many species that compete for the same resource.     

Competitive altruism: from reciprocity to the handicap principle

Current work on cooperation is focused on the theory of reciprocal altruism. However, reciprocity is just one way of getting a return on an investment in altruism and is difficult to apply to many examples. Reciprocity theory addresses how animals respond dynamically to others so as to cooperate without being exploited. I discuss how introducing differences in individual generosity together with partner choice into models of reciprocity can lead to an escalation in altruistic behaviour. Individuals may compete for the most altruistic partners and non-altruists may become ostracized. I refer to this phenomenon as competitive altruism and propose that it can represent a move away from the dynamic responsiveness of reciprocity. Altruism may be rewarded in kind, but rewards may be indirectly accrued or may not involve the return of altruism at all, for example if altruists tend to be chosen as mates. This variety makes the idea of competitive altruism relevant to behaviours which cannot be explained by reciprocity. I consider whether altruism might act as a signal of quality, as proposed by the handicap principle. I suggest that altruistic acts could make particularly effective signals because of the inherent benefits to receivers. I consider how reciprocity and competitive altruism are related and how they may be distinguished.