From applied ethics to empirical ethics to contextual ethics

Bioethics became applied ethics when it was assimilated to moral philosophy. Because deduction is the rationality of moral philosophy, subsuming facts under moral principles to deduce conclusions about what ought to be done became the prescribed reasoning of bioethics, and bioethics became a theory comprised of moral principles. Bioethicists now realize that applied ethics is too abstract and spare to apprehend the specificity, particularity, complexity and contingency of real moral issues. Empirical ethics and contextual ethics are needed to incorporate these features into morality, not just bioethics. The relevant facts and features of problems have to be identified, investigated and framed coherently, and potential resolutions have to be constructed and assessed. Moreover, these tasks are pursued and melded within manifold contexts, for example, families, work and health care systems, as well as societal, economic, legal and political backgrounds and encompassing worldviews. This naturalist orientation and both empirical ethics and contextual ethics require judgment, but how can judgment be rational? Rationality, fortunately, is more expansive than deductive reasoning. Judgment is rational when it emanates from a rational process of deliberation, and a process of deliberation is rational when it uses the resources of non‐formal reason: observation, creative construction, formal and informal reasoning methods and systematic critical assessment. Empirical ethics and contextual ethics recognize that finite, fallible human beings live in complex, dynamic, contingent worlds, and they foster creative, critical deliberation and employ non‐formal reason to make rational moral judgments.     

Evolutionary theory and the foundation of moral principles

Evolutionary biology is supposed to be relevant to ethics by a number of authors. Some of them believe that it may provide and justify basic moral values. Others argue that evolutionary biology is relevant only in a negative way. They assume that it reveals the illusory nature of any attempt to justify basic moral values. In this paper one example of either approach is criticized. An analysis of examples can hardly offer sufficient grounds for a general conclusion. Nevertheless I believe that evolutionary theory is of little help when we deal with the most basic ethical questions. Three themes which are often though to provide a link between evolutionary biology and (meta)ethics — altruism, sociality and human nature — do not in fact establish that link.     

A Kantian ethics approach to moral bioenhancement

It seems, at first glance, that a Kantian ethics approach to moral enhancement would tend towards the position that there could be no place for emotional modulation in any understanding of the endeavour, owing to the typically understood view that Kantian ethics does not allow any role for emotion in morality as a whole. It seems then that any account of moral bioenhancement which places emotion at its centre would therefore be rejected. This article argues, however, that this assumption is incorrect. Given later writings by Kant on the role of sympathy, and taking into account other concerns in Kantian ethics (such as bodily integrity), it may in fact be the case that Kantian ethics would allow for an account of moral bioenhancement through emotional modulation, and that in some (rare) cases such an intervention might even be considered to be a duty.     

The roots of ethics: an anthropological approach

The roots of ethics are to be found within man's freedom and his ability to pursue values from the choices he makes. These values may be sought within the structure of the human being. Some of these values will correspond to man's vital needs (such as socializing, cooperation, family ties, etc.), yet they are not to be interpreted as being genetically determined, since they are consciously interiorized and experienced and planned at both individual and group level. Other values, such as religion, a moral sense, or art transcend those needs strictly linked with physical life. These values may be considered to be “natural universals” or ‘trans-cultural” values because they are to be found in various cultures. The fact that they offer man an advantage, does not necessarily mean that they are genetically determined or that they have been fixed through selection processes. These can be extended to include the values that have matured from the historical experience of single human beings and groups. The transcendental value of the person-man as opposed to infra-human beings, has also been confirmed as a priority criterion for value judgements and for a rational ethics, particularly within the field of bio-ethics.     

Enriching Our Views on Clinical Ethics: Results of a Qualitative Study of the Moral Psychology of Healthcare Ethics Committee Members

The contribution of healthcare ethics committee (HEC) members to HECs is fundamental. However, little is known about how HEC members view clinical ethics. We report results from a qualitative study of the moral psychology of HEC members. We found that contrary to the existing Kohlberg-based studies, HEC members hold a pragmatic non-expert view of clinical ethics based mainly on respect for persons and a commitment to the patient’s good. In general, HEC members hold deflationary views regarding moral theory. Ethical principles are not abstract foundations but the expression of moral commitments to patients that pre-exist awareness of moral theory. Emotions and proximity to patient sufferance fundamentally shape the views of HEC members on clinical ethics. Further work at the intersection of clinical ethics and qualitative research could bring to the foreground lay perspectives on moral problems that may differ from bioethics expert views.     

Meaning Matters: The Biosemiotic Basis of Bioethics

If the central problem in philosophical ethics is determining and defining the scope of moral value, our normative ethical theories must be able to explain on what basis and to what extent entities have value. The scientific foundation of contemporary biosemiotic theory grounds a theory of moral value capable of addressing this problem. Namely, it suggests that what is morally relevant is semiosis. Within this framework, semiosis is a morally relevant and natural property of all living things thereby offering us an ecological, as opposed to merely environmental, ethic. A consequence of this semiotic theory is that living things are accorded inherent moral value based on their natural relational properties—their ability to signify. This consequence establishes a hierarchy of inherent moral value based on the scope of signification: the larger the Umwelten, the greater the value. This paper argues that a robust semiotic moral theory can take into account a much wider scope of inherent value.. These consequences have positive ramifications for environmental ethics in their recognition of the natural ecological networks in which each organism is bound. This presentation of a biosemiotic model of value offers a justificatory strategy for our contemporary moral intuitions concerning our semiotic/moral relationships with living things while also productively pushing our normative ethical boundaries.     

Looking back, looking beyond: revisiting the ethics of genome generation

This paper will explore some of the ethical imperatives that have shaped strategic and policy frameworks for the use of new genetic technologies and how these play a role in shaping the nature of research and changing attitudes; with an attempt to conceptualize some theories of genetic determinism. I analyse why there is a need to put bioethical principles within a theoretical framework in the context of new technologies, and how, by doing so, their practical applications for agriculture, environment medicine and health care can be legitimized. There are several theories in favour of and against the use of genetic technologies that focus on genes and their role in our existence. In particular the theory of geneticisation is commonly debated. It highlights the conflicting interests of science, society and industry in harnessing genetic knowledge when the use of such knowledge could challenge ethical principles. Critics call it a ‘reductionist’ approach, based on arguments that are narrowed down to genes, often ignoring other factors including biological, social and moral ones. A parallel theory is that there is something special about genes, and it is this “genetic exceptionalism” that creates hopes and myths. Either way, the challenging task is to develop a common ground for understanding the importance of ethical sensitivities. As research agendas become more complex, ethical paradigms will need to be more influential. New principles are needed to answer the complexities of ethical issues as complex technologies develop. This paper reflects on global ethical principles and the tensions between ethical principles in legitimizing genetic technologies at the social and governance level.     

Really taking Darwin seriously: An alternative to Michael Ruse's Darwinian metaethics

Michael Ruse has proposed in his recent book Taking Darwin Seriously and elsewhere a new Darwinian ethics distinct from traditional evolutionary ethics, one that avoids the latter's inadequate accounts of the nature of morality and its failed attempts to provide a naturalistic justification of morality. Ruse argues for a sociobiologically based account of moral sentiments, and an evolutionary based casual explanation of their function, rejecting the possibility of ultimate ethical justification. We find that Ruse's proposal distorts, overextends and weakens both Darwinism and naturalism. So we propose an alternative Darwinian metaethics that both remedies the problems in Ruse's proposal and shows how a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness avoids the naturalistic fallacy and can provide genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Thus, we propose to really take Darwin seriously.The authors are equally responsible for the writing of this paper.     

The insufficience of supervenient explanations of moral actions: Really taking Darwin and the naturalistic fallacy seriously

In a recent paper in this journal (Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1990) we have proposed a view of Darwinian evolutionary metaethics that we believe improves upon Michael Ruse's (e.g., Ruse 1986) proposals by claiming that there are evolutionary based objective moral values and that a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness can be given that avoids the naturalistic fallacy in both its definitional and derivational forms while providing genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Jonathan Barrett (this issue) has objected to our proposal contending that we cannot hold for the reality of supervenient moral properties without either falling foul of the naturalistic fallacy or suffering the consequences of postulating inexplicable moral properties. In reply, we show that Barrett's explicit arguments that we commit either the definitional or derivational form of the naturalistic fallacy fail and that his naturalistic intuitions that supervenience explanations of moral properties by nonmoral properties force us into what we call the explanatory form of the naturalistic fallacy also fail. Positively, his objections help us to clarify the nature of the naturalistic fallacy within an evolutionary based naturalistic ethics and to point out the proper role of both supervenience explanations and moral explanations in such an ethics.     

Evolutionary ethics from Darwin to Moore

Evolutionary ethics has a long history, dating all the way back to Charles Darwin. Almost immediately after the publication of the Origin, an immense interest arose in the moral implications of Darwinism and whether the truth of Darwinism would undermine traditional ethics. Though the biological thesis was certainly exciting, nobody suspected that the impact of the Origin would be confined to the scientific arena. As one historian wrote, 'whether or not ancient populations of armadillos were transformed into the species that currently inhabit the new world was certainly a topic about which zoologists could disagree. But it was in discussing the broader implications of the theory...that tempers flared and statements were made which could transform what otherwise would have been a quiet scholarly meeting into a social scandal' (Farber 1994, 22). Some resistance to the biological thesis of Darwinism sprung from the thought that it was incompatible with traditional morality and, since one of them had to go, many thought that Darwinism should be rejected. However, some people did realize that a secular ethics was possible so, even if Darwinism did undermine traditional religious beliefs, it need not have any effects on moral thought. Before I begin my discussion of evolutionary ethics from Darwin to Moore, I would like to make some more general remarks about its development. There are three key events during this history of evolutionary ethics. First, Charles Darwin published On the Origin of the Species (Darwin 1859). Since one did not have a fully developed theory of evolution until 1859, there exists little work on evolutionary ethics until then. Shortly thereafter, Herbert Spencer (1898) penned the first systematic theory of evolutionary ethics, which was promptly attacked by T.H. Huxley (Huxley 1894). Second, at about the turn of the century, moral philosophers entered the fray and attempted to demonstrate logical errors in Spencer's work; such errors were alluded to but never fully brought to the fore by Huxley. These philosophers were the well known moralists from Cambridge: Henry Sidgwick (Sidgwick 1902, 1907) and G.E. Moore (Moore 1903), though their ideas hearkened back to David Hume (Hume 1960). These criticisms were so strong that the industry of evolutionary ethics was largely abandoned (though with some exceptions) for many years. Third, E.O. Wilson, a Harvard entomologist, published Sociobiology: The New Synthesis in 1975 (Wilson E.O. 1975), which sparked renewed interest in evolutionary ethics and offered new directions of investigation. These events suggest the following stages for the history of evolutionary ethics: development, criticism and abandonment, revival. In this paper, I shall focus on the first two stages, since those are the ones on which the philosophical merits have already been largely decided. The revival stage is still in progress and we shall eventually find out whether it was a success.     

Implications of Odera Oruka's ethics of consumerism for reducing globesity

In this paper, I advance Odera Oruka's insights on the ethics of consumerism in order to draw relevant implications of his thoughts on rethinking the problem of obesity. I argue that Oruka's ethics of consumerism and his right to human minimum theory entail some salient ideas that might serve as a better ethical model for reducing the global obesity prevalence. Though Oruka's African moral philosophy is yet to receive universal attention it arguably deserves, the interests of the international and ‘globesity’ community would be better served learning from the contributions of an African moral theory to contemporary bioethical discourse on obesity. Oruka's moral thoughts are by constitution, a deontological and cosmopolitan call for reducing hunger in globalized world, while also indirectly, addressing obesity of the poor. I show the limitations of his ethics of consumerism, and the shortcomings of such ethics in the context of obesity of the poor. Consequently, I develop a neo‐Orukan virtue based ethics that is worthy of attention in efforts towards addressing the obesity tide. No such perspective currently exists in the context of obesity; yet the exigent need for one is necessitated by the defects of the libertarian and harm principle approaches in Western bioethical discourse.     

God’s punishment and public goods

Cooperation towards public goods relies on credible threats of punishment to deter cheats. However, punishing is costly, so it remains unclear who incurred the costs of enforcement in our evolutionary past. Theoretical work suggests that human cooperation may be promoted if people believe in supernatural punishment for moral transgressions. This theory is supported by new work in cognitive psychology and by anecdotal ethnographic evidence, but formal quantitative tests remain to be done. Using data from 186 societies around the globe, I test whether the likelihood of supernatural punishment—indexed by the importance of moralizing “high gods”—is associated with cooperation. Dominic Johnson is a fellow in the Princeton University Society of Fellows. He holds a D.Phil. in biology from Oxford University and a Ph.D. in political science from Geneva University. His research revolves around the evolutionary biology of human behavior and how this impacts on conflict, cooperation, politics, and religion. His recent book, Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions, was published in 2004 by Harvard University Press.     

EMPIRICAL ETHICS AS DIALOGICAL PRACTICE

In this article, we present a dialogical approach to empirical ethics, based upon hermeneutic ethics and responsive evaluation. Hermeneutic ethics regards experience as the concrete source of moral wisdom. In order to gain a good understanding of moral issues, concrete detailed experiences and perspectives need to be exchanged. Within hermeneutic ethics dialogue is seen as a vehicle for moral learning and developing normative conclusions. Dialogue stands for a specific view on moral epistemology and methodological criteria for moral inquiry. Responsive evaluation involves a structured way of setting up dialogical learning processes, by eliciting stories of participants, exchanging experiences in (homogeneous and heterogeneous) groups and drawing normative conclusions for practice. By combining these traditions we develop both a theoretical and a practical approach to empirical ethics, in which ethical issues are addressed and shaped together with stakeholders in practice. Stakeholders' experiences are not only used as a source for reflection by the ethicist; stakeholders are involved in the process of reflection and analysis, which takes place in a dialogue between participants in practice, facilitated by the ethicist. This dialogical approach to empirical ethics may give rise to questions such as: What contribution does the ethicist make? What role does ethical theory play? What is the relationship between empirical research and ethical theory in the dialogical process? In this article, these questions will be addressed by reflecting upon a project in empirical ethics that was set up in a dialogical way. The aim of this project was to develop and implement normative guidelines with and within practice, in order to improve the practice concerning coercion and compulsion in psychiatry.     

Bioaltruism reconsidered

Altruistic behavior is often regarded as sociobiology's most central theoretical problem, but is it? Altruism in biology, bioaltruism, has many meanings, which can be grouped into two categories. The first I will callcommon bioaltruism. It is primarily of ethological relevance. The second,evolutionary bioaltruism, is a special category in evolutionary respects in that it may indeed pose a problem for evolutionary theory. These categories are logically independent. Moreover, both of them are logically different from altruism in its everyday psychological or moral sense. Sociobiological examples of bioaltruistic behavior concern bioaltruism in the first sense only, so the theoretical problem ‘altruism’ is supposed to pose, is indeed nothing but a theoretical problem and the bioaltruism that actually occurs has no evolutionary relevance. Nevertheless, evolutionary theory is relevant to our understanding of the possibility of common bioaltruism, and that possibility — even though bioaltruism is conceptually different from ethical altruism — is relevant for ethicists: it sheds light on what we can ask people to do or not to do.     

Morphological interpretation of darwinism

The development of evolutionary theory requires the resolution of the problem of relationships between random and regular processes in historical development of biological systems. According to the theory of natural selection, ecological factors play a leading role in evolution. Variations are nondirectional, unpredictable, and provide chaotic diversity of variants, only some of which are potentially useful. However, based on random processes, new variants that are useful for organisms and remain adaptive significance in various ecological situations are infrequent. At the same time, morphology demonstrates certain evolutionary patterns. The morphological approach takes into account the role in evolution of structural features of organism and social systems and evolutionary significance of “constructive technologies,” which distinguish morphological interpretation of evolutionary processes. The constructive and evolutionary patterns revealed in biological systems provide the basis for morphological interpretation of the principle of natural selection: both natural and artificial selection is interaction between social systems (populations, ecosystems, biogeocoenoses) and organisms composing them.     

Theory and practice of clinical ethics support services: narrative and hermeneutical perspectives

In this paper we introduce narrative and hermeneutical perspectives to clinical ethics support services (CESS). We propose a threefold consideration of 'theory' and show how it is interwoven with 'practice' as we go along. First, we look at theory in its foundational role: in our case 'narrative ethics' and 'philosophical hermeneutics' provide a theoretical base for clinical ethics by focusing on human identities entangled in stories and on moral understanding as a dialogical process. Second, we consider the role of theoretical notions in helping practitioners to understand their situation in clinical ethics practice, by using notions like 'story', 'responsibility', or 'vulnerability' to make explicit and explain their practical experience. Such theoretical notions help us to interpret clinical situations from an ethical perspective and to foster moral awareness of practitioners. And, thirdly, we examine how new theoretical concepts are developed by interpreting practice, using practice to form and improve our ethical theory. In this paper, we discuss this threefold use of theory in clinical ethics support services by reflecting on our own theoretical assumptions, methodological steps and practical experiences as ethicists, and by providing examples from our daily work. In doing so, we illustrate that theory and practice are interwoven, as theoretical understanding is dependent upon practical experience, and vice-versa.     

A moderate Buddhist animal research ethics

Though there is a burgeoning interest in applied Buddhist ethics, Buddhist animal research ethics remains an underdeveloped area. In this paper I will explore how some central Buddhist ethical considerations can usefully engage our use of other animals (henceforth, animals) in science. As the scientific use of animals is broad, I will narrow my focus to laboratory science. I will show that, though a Buddhist abolitionism would not be unmotivated, it is possible to reject it. While doing so, it will be important to resist emphasizing elements of Buddhist thought that merely provide reasons to adopt the dominant ethical framework governing laboratory animal research ethics, known as the 3Rs. Though I will suggest how a Buddhist animal research ethics can sometimes permit the use of animals in harmful research, it will also require ethical constraints that resonate with some of the more progressive elements in ‘Western’ bioethics.     

Developing a ‘moral compass tool’ based on moral case deliberations: A pragmatic hermeneutic approach to clinical ethics

Although moral case deliberation (MCD) is evaluated positively as a form of clinical ethics support (CES), it has limitations. To address these limitations our research objective was to develop a thematic CES tool. In order to assess the philosophical characteristics of a CES tool based on MCDs, we drew on hermeneutic ethics and pragmatism. We distinguished four core characteristics of a CES tool: (a) focusing on an actual situation that is experienced as morally challenging by the user; (b) stimulating moral inquiry into the moral concepts, questions and routines in the lived experience of the CES tool user; (c) stimulating moral learning by exploring other perspectives; and (d) incorporating contextual details. We provide an example of a CES tool developed for moral dilemmas over client autonomy. Our article ends with some reflections on the normativity of the CES tool, other application areas and the importance of evaluation studies of CES tools.     

Biosemantics: An Evolutionary Theory of Thought

Evolutionary theory has an unexpected application in philosophy of mind, where it is used by the so-called biosemantic program—also called the teleosemantic program—to account for the representational capacities of neural states and processes in a way that conforms to an overarching scientific naturalism. Biosemantic theories account for the representational capacities of neural states and processes by appealing in particular to their evolutionary function, as that function is determined by a process of natural selection. As a result, biosemantic theories have distinct advantages over other theories of mental representation—e.g., Fodor’s causal theory. Foremost among the advantages of biosemantic theories is their ability to account for the possibility of mental misrepresentation.     

Buddhism and neuroethics: the ethics of pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement

This paper integrates some Buddhist moral values, attitudes and self-cultivation techniques into a discussion of the ethics of cognitive enhancement technologies – in particular, pharmaceutical enhancements. Many Buddhists utilize meditation techniques that are both integral to their practice and are believed to enhance the cognitive and affective states of experienced practitioners. Additionally, Mahāyāna Buddhism's teaching on skillful means permits a liberal use of methods or techniques in Buddhist practice that yield insight into our selfnature or aid in alleviating or eliminating du     kha (i.e. dissatisfaction). These features of many, if not most, Buddhist traditions will inform much of the Buddhist assessment of pharmaceutical enhancements offered in this paper. Some Buddhist concerns about the effects and context of the use of pharmaceutical enhancements will be canvassed in the discussion. Also, the author will consider Buddhist views of the possible harms that may befall human and nonhuman research subjects, interference with a recipient's karma , the artificiality of pharmaceutical enhancements, and the possible motivations or intentions of healthy individuals pursuing pharmacological enhancement. Perhaps surprisingly, none of these concerns will adequately ground a reflective Buddhist opposition to the further development and continued use of pharmaceutical enhancements, either in principle or in practice. The author argues that Buddhists, from at least certain traditions – particularly Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions – should advocate the development or use of pharmaceutical enhancements if a consequence of their use is further insight into our self-nature or the reduction or alleviation of du     kha .