Taking the Relational Turn: Biosemiotics and Some New Trends in Biology

A cluster of similar trends emerging in separate fields of science and philosophy points to new opportunities to apply biosemiotic ideas as tools for conceptual integration in theoretical biology. I characterize these developments as the outcome of a “relational turn” in these disciplines. They signal a shift of attention away from objects and things and towards relational structures and processes. Increasingly sophisticated research technologies of molecular biology have generated an enormous quantity of experimental data, sparking a need for relational approaches that could help to find recurrent patterns in the mass of data. Earlier conceptions of relational biology and cybernetics, once deemed too abstract and speculative, are now resurrected and applied by means of new computational and simulation tools. I think this receptivity should be extended to incorporate nets of semiotic relations as heuristic guides for discerning global patterns of interactions in living systems. In this article I review aspects of systems biology and new directions in evolutionary theory, focusing on the role of circular and downward causation in relational structures and dynamical networks. I also indicate promising avenues of integration of some ideas of biosemiotics with those emerging from these new currents in biology. Relational developments in biology bear a telling similarity to a parallel relational turn presently manifest in the philosophy of science, rooted in the philosophy of physics and mathematics and in different varieties of structural and informational realism. The recognition of the relational nature of reality within these disciplines entails a tacit repudiation of nominalistic biases in science that have hindered the reception of semitiotic conceptions in biology. In previous investigations I explored connections between two kinds of relational structures: the networks of self-referential circular loops that appear pervasively in living systems, and the triadic relational structures that Peircean semiotics places at the basis of all semiotic transactions. Current relational views in the sciences seem oblivious to the difference between dyadic and triadic relations. Incorporating this essential distinction from biosemiotics into other fields could be a first step in seizing the opportunities opened by the relational turn for a renewal of biology and of natural philosophy in general, across disciplinary boundaries.     

Anatomy,metaphysics, and values: The ape brain debate reconsidered

Conventional wisdom teaches that Thomas Huxley discredited Richard Owen in their debate over ape and human brains. This paper reexamines the dispute and uses it as a test case for evaluating the metaphysical realist, internal realist, and social constructivist theories of scientific knowledge. Since Owen worked in the Kantian tradition, his anatomical research illustrates the implications of internal realism for scientific practice. As an avowed Cartesian, Huxley offered a well developed attack on Owen's position from a metaphysical realist perspective. Adrian Desmond's political retrospective on the dispute affords the additional opportunity to contrast internal realism with social constructivism. I argue that since Huxley ultimately based his attack on his valuing Europeans as superior to blacks, his argument illustrates the hazards of accepting the metaphysical realist promise of value free science. Desmond overlooks this racial dimension of the dispute, and his work shows how social constructivism can distract the historian and philosopher from even the social meaning of science. As internal realists like Putnam have argued, values enter science not from without, but from within the very process of science itself.     

Mathematics, structuralism and biology

A new approach is gaining ground in biology, one that has much in common with the structuralist tradition in other fields. It is very much in the spirit of an earlier view of biology and indeed of science in general. It is also, though this is not generally recognized, in the spirit of twentieth century physics. As in modern physics, however, it is not a question of ignoring all the progress that has been made within the former paradigm. On the contrary, the aim is to use it as a basis for setting out in a somewhat different direction. Complex phenomena do not generally lend themselves to reductionist analyses which seek explanation only in terms of detailed mechanisms, but a proper scientific discussion of structure must make full use of what we have already learned - by whatever means - about the processes that underly the phenomena we are trying to understand.     

Bringing physics to bear on the phenomenon of life: the divergent positions of Bohr, Delbrück, and Schrödinger

The received view on the contributions of the physics community to the birth of molecular biology tends to present the physics community as sharing a basic level consensus on how physics should be brought to bear on biology. I argue, however, that a close examination of the views of three leading physicists involved in the birth of molecular biology, Bohr, Delbrück, and Schr?dinger, suggests that there existed fundamental disagreements on how physics should be employed to solve problems in biology even within the physics community. In particular, I focus on how these three figures differed sharply in their assessment of the relevance of complementarity, the potential of chemical methods, and the relative importance of classical physics. In addition, I assess and develop Roll-Hansen's attempt to conceptualize this history in terms of models of scientific change advanced by Kuhn and Lakatos. Though neither model is fully successful in explaining the divergence of views among these three physicists, I argue that the extent and quality of difference in their views help elucidate and extend some themes that are left opaque in Kuhn's model.     

'Like all that lives': biology,medicine and bacteria in the age of Pasteur and Koch

This essay draws a new picture of the science of bacteria in its 'golden age', circa 1880-1900: the organization of its knowledge and practice, its germ theory of disease, the difference between its two major research traditions, and, above all, its place in life science in this period that bristled with theories and debates over inheritance, variation, selection, evolution and that witnessed the transition from natural history to laboratory biology. Pasteur and Koch's science acquired this biological dimension not despite being outside academic biology, nor despite the limitations of its applied, medical matrix, but rather because of that framework. The very practices of vaccine development constituted, at the same time, a new biological model of bacterial species and variation, which aligned them with other living things. Finally, the new picture reveals unsuspected continuity to later microbiology and molecular biology. In illuminating the self-perceptions of these sciences in relation to the past, it situates and opens a critical perspective on writings by bacteriologists such as Ludwik Fleck, Fran?ois Jacob and René Dubos, which have widely informed how we understand science.     

Popper, falsifiability, and evolutionary biology

First, a brief history is provided of Popper's views on the status of evolutionary biology as a science. The views of some prominent biologists are then canvassed on the matter of falsifiability and its relation to evolutionary biology. Following that, I argue that Popper's programme of falsifiability does indeed exclude evolutionary biology from within the circumference of genuine science, that Popper's programme is fundamentally incoherent, and that the correction of this incoherence results in a greatly expanded and much more realistic concept of what is empirical, resulting in the inclusion of evolutionary biology. Finally, this expanded concept of empirical is applied to two particular problems in evolutionary biology — viz., the species problem and the debate over the theory of punctuated equilibria — and it is argued that both of them are still mainly metaphysical.     

Save the planet: eliminate biodiversity

Recent work in the philosophy of biology has attempted to clarify and defend the use of the biodiversity concept in conservation science. I argue against these views, and give reasons to think that the biodiversity concept is a poor fit for the role we want it to play in conservation biology on both empirical and conceptual grounds. Against pluralists, who hold that biodiversity consists of distinct but correlated properties of natural systems, I argue that the supposed correlations between these properties are not tight enough to warrant treating and measuring them as a bundle. I additionally argue that deflationary theories of biodiversity don’t go far enough, since a large proportion of what we value in the environment falls outside bounds of what could reasonably be called “diversity”. I suggest that in current scientific practice biodiversity is generally an unnecessary placeholder for biological value of all sorts, and that we are better off eliminating it from conservation biology, or at least drastically reducing its role.     

The nature of psychiatric disorders

A foundational question for the discipline of psychiatry is the nature of psychiatric disorders. What kinds of things are they? In this paper, I review and critique three major relevant theories: realism, pragmatism and constructivism. Realism assumes that the content of science is real and independent of human activities. I distinguish two “flavors” of realism: chemistry‐based, for which the paradigmatic example is elements of the periodic table, and biology‐based, for which the paradigm is species. The latter is a much better fit for psychiatry. Pragmatism articulates a sensible approach to psychiatric disorders just seeking categories that perform well in the world. But it makes no claim about the reality of those disorders. This is problematic, because we have a duty to advocate for our profession and our patients against other physicians who never doubt the reality of the disorders they treat. Constructivism has been associated with anti‐psychiatry activists, but we should admit that social forces play a role in the creation of our diagnoses, as they do in many sciences. However, truly socially constructed psychiatric disorders are rare. I then describe powerful arguments against a realist theory of psychiatric disorders. Because so many prior psychiatric diagnoses have been proposed and then abandoned, can we really claim that our current nosologies have it right? Much of our current nosology arose from a series of historical figures and events which could have gone differently. If we re‐run the tape of history over and over again, the DSM and ICD would not likely have the same categories on every iteration. Therefore, we should argue more confidently for the reality of broader constructs of psychiatric illness rather than our current diagnostic categories, which remain tentative. Finally, instead of thinking that our disorders are true because they correspond to clear entities in the world, we should consider a coherence theory of truth by which disorders become more true when they fit better into what else we know about the world. In our ongoing project to study and justify the nature of psychiatric disorders, we ought to be broadly pragmatic but not lose sight of an underlying commitment, despite the associated difficulties, to the reality of psychiatric illness.     

Physical models of biological information and adaptation

The bio-informational equivalence asserts that biological processes reduce to processes of information transfer. In this paper, that equivalence is treated as a metaphor with deeply anthropomorphic content of a sort that resists constitutive-analytical definition, including formulation within mathematical theories of information. It is argued that continuance of the metaphor, as a quasi-theoretical perspective in biology, must entail a methodological dislocation between biological and physical science. It is proposed that a general class of functions, drawn from classical physics, can serve to eliminate the anthropomorphism. Further considerations indicate that the concept of biological adaptation is central to the general applicability of the informational idea in biology; a non-anthropomorphic treatment of adaptive phenomena is suggested in terms of variational principles.     

Fostering Change from Within: Influencing Teaching Practices of Departmental Colleagues by Science Faculty with Education Specialties

Globally, calls for the improvement of science education are frequent and fervent. In parallel, the phenomenon of having Science Faculty with Education Specialties (SFES) within science departments appears to have grown in recent decades. In the context of an interview study of a randomized, stratified sample of SFES from across the United States, we discovered that most SFES interviewed (82%) perceived having professional impacts in the realm of improving undergraduate science education, more so than in research in science education or K-12 science education. While SFES reported a rich variety of efforts towards improving undergraduate science education, the most prevalent reported impact by far was influencing the teaching practices of their departmental colleagues. Since college and university science faculty continue to be hired with little to no training in effective science teaching, the seeding of science departments with science education specialists holds promise for fostering change in science education from within biology, chemistry, geoscience, and physics departments.     

DNA Codes and Information: Formal Structures and Relational Causes

Recently the terms "codes" and "information" as used in the context of molecular biology have been the subject of much discussion. Here I propose that a variety of structural realism can assist us in rethinking the concepts of DNA codes and information apart from semantic criteria. Using the genetic code as a theoretical backdrop, a necessary distinction is made between codes qua symbolic representations and information qua structure that accords with data. Structural attractors are also shown to be entailed by the mapping relation that any DNA code is a part of (as the domain). In this framework, these attractors are higher-order informational structures that obviate any "DNA-centric" reductionism. In addition to the implications that are discussed, this approach validates the array of coding systems now recognized in molecular biology.     

Symbiosis,selection, and individuality

A recent development in biology has been the growing acceptance that holobionts, entities comprised of symbiotic microbes and their host organisms, are widespread in nature. There is agreement that holobionts are evolved outcomes, but disagreement on how to characterize the operation of natural selection on them. The aim of this paper is to articulate the contours of the disagreement. I explain how two distinct foundational accounts of the process of natural selection give rise to competing views about evolutionary individuality.     

Typology Reconsidered: Two Doctrines on the History of Evolutionary Biology

Recent historiography of 19th century biology supports the revision of two traditional doctrines about the history of biology. First, the most important and widespread biological debate around the time of Darwin was not evolution versus creation, but biological functionalism versus structuralism. Second, the idealist and typological structuralist theories of the time were not particularly anti-evolutionary. Typological theories provided argumentation and evidence that was crucial to the refutation of Natural Theological creationism. The contrast between functionalist and structuralist approaches to biology continues today, and the historical misunderstanding of 19th century typological biology may be one of its effects. This historical case can shed light on current controversies regarding the relevance of developmental biology to evolution.     

PROSPECTS FOR “GENETIC THERAPY” - CAN A PERSON BENEFIT FROM BEING ALTERED?

Mapping the human genome is an immense project with numerous objectives. Indeed, it is likely that some of its most important ramifications and applications remain as yet unglimpsed. All we can presently attempt is to focus on some of the more obvious possibilities and prepare for the problems already looming on our horizon. One such possibility is that of Prenatal Genetic Intervention (PGI), which might be said to be a therapeutic intervention on behalf of the embryonic child. In this paper, I argue that "genetic therapy" is likely to be a misnomer, and that if PGI becomes possible, we should generally resist its inclusion under the special moral duty of providing health care. "Therapy" necessarily means helping a person, while PGI -- though effecting improvements from an impersonal perspective -- will frequently not consist in directly helping any person. This is due not to the embryo not being a person, but rather to the basic philosophical problem of personal identity persisting through significant alterations -- especially the alteration of genotype. The decisive moral question then hinges on the definition of "significant" alteration. I shall examine the feasibility of drawing analogies from criteria for personal identity proposed in discussions of how persons maintain their identity across time and through physical and psychological change. Certain metaphysical aspects of human identity and individuality will be also touched upon, partly in terms derived from classical Judaism. In conclusion I argue that, regarding embryos in particular, persistence of genotype must generally be deemed a necessary condition for maintaining personal identity. Therefore, many proposals for PGI should be excluded from the notion of therapeutic intervention and thus denied the special moral status of requests for therapy.     

Lysenko Affair and Polish Botany

This article describes the slight impact of Lysenkoism upon Polish botany. I begin with an account of the development of plant genetics in Poland, as well as the attitude of scientists and the Polish intelligentsia toward Marxist philosophy prior to the World War II. Next I provide a short history of the introduction and demise of Lysenkoism in Polish science, with a focus on events in botany, in context with key events in Polish science from 1939 to 1958. The article outlines the little effects of Lysenkoism upon botanists and their research, as well as how botanists for the most part rejected what was often termed the “new biology.” My paper shows that though Lysenko’s theories received political support, and were actively promoted by a small circle of scientists and Communist party activists, they were never accepted by most botanists. Once the political climate in Poland altered after the events of 1956, Lysenko’s theories were immediately abandoned.     

Kinship vis-à-vis Myth Contrasts in Lévi-Strauss' Approaches to Cross-Cultural Comparison

The enormous secondary literature which relates Lévi-Strauss' comparative studies to different schools of thought has failed sufficiently to emphasize the major discontinuity within his own work. This paper characterizes the basic methodological differences in his approaches to "kinship" and to "myth." It then suggests how, by concentrating on the kinship/myth distinction, we might constructively refine various structuralist concepts, such as distinctive feature analysis and the logical foundations of the "elementary" kinship structures. Only by concentrating on the few inconsistencies in Lévi-Strauss' remarkably coherent corpus of work can an adequate critique of his theories of comparison be commenced.     

Speciation and bifurcations

The interrelations of physics and biology are discussed. It is shown that Darwin can be considered as one of the founders of the important field of contemporary physics called physics of dissipative structures or synergetics. The theories of gradual and punctual evolution are presented. The contradiction between these theories can be solved on the basis of molecular theory of evolution and on the basis of the phenomenological physical treatment. The general physical properties of living systems, considered as open systems being far from equilibrium, are listed and simple non-linear mathematical models describing gradual and punctual speciation are suggested. The usual pictures which present these two kinds of speciation can possess physico-mathematical sense. Punctuated speciation means bifurcation, a kind of non-equilibrium phase transition.