Dual Process for Intentional and Reactive Decisions

Efficient cognitive decisions should be adjustable to incoming novel information. However, most current models of decision making have so far neglected any potential interaction between intentional and stimulus-driven decisions. We report here behavioral results and a new model on the interaction between a perceptual decision and non-predictable novel information. We asked participants to anticipate their response to an external stimulus and presented this stimulus with variable delay. Participants were clearly able to adjust their initial decision to the new stimulus if this latter appeared sufficiently early. To account for these results, we present a two-stage model in which two systems, an intentional and a stimulus-driven, interact only in the second stage. In the first stage of the model, the intentional and stimulus-driven processes race independently to reach a transition threshold between the two stages. The model can also account for results of a second experiment where a response bias is introduced. Our model is consistent with some physiological results that indicate that both parallel and interactive processing take place between intentional and stimulus-driven information. It emphasizes that in natural conditions, both types of processing are important and it helps pinpoint the transition between parallel and interactive processing.     

Theta oscillations are sensitive to both early and late conflict processing stages: effects of alcohol intoxication

Prior neuroimaging evidence indicates that decision conflict activates medial and lateral prefrontal and parietal cortices. Theoretical accounts of cognitive control highlight anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) as a central node in this network. However, a better understanding of the relative primacy and functional contributions of these areas to decision conflict requires insight into the neural dynamics of successive processing stages including conflict detection, response selection and execution. Moderate alcohol intoxication impairs cognitive control as it interferes with the ability to inhibit dominant, prepotent responses when they are no longer correct. To examine the effects of moderate intoxication on successive processing stages during cognitive control, spatio-temporal changes in total event-related theta power were measured during Stroop-induced conflict. Healthy social drinkers served as their own controls by participating in both alcohol (0.6 g/kg ethanol for men, 0.55 g/kg women) and placebo conditions in a counterbalanced design. Anatomically-constrained magnetoencephalography (aMEG) approach was applied to complex power spectra for theta (4-7 Hz) frequencies. The principal generator of event-related theta power to conflict was estimated to ACC, with contributions from fronto-parietal areas. The ACC was uniquely sensitive to conflict during both early conflict detection, and later response selection and execution stages. Alcohol attenuated theta power to conflict across successive processing stages, suggesting that alcohol-induced deficits in cognitive control may result from theta suppression in the executive network. Slower RTs were associated with attenuated theta power estimated to ACC, indicating that alcohol impairs motor preparation and execution subserved by the ACC. In addition to their relevance for the currently prevailing accounts of cognitive control, our results suggest that alcohol-induced impairment of top-down strategic processing underlies poor self-control and inability to refrain from drinking.     

大脑中的抉择神经元

近年来神经科学领域的进展表明,大脑中不仅存在如位置神经元之类的特异性编码感觉信息的神经元,也存在能够特异性地反映动物思考过程的神经元。在一系列以侧内顶叶(LIP)为目标的猕猴电生理实验中,人们发现LIP神经元的动作电位发放率可以反映抉择思考的过程。抉择的研究为我们打开了一个研究大脑高级认知功能的窗口。抉择神经元的发现表明了大脑的高级认知功能是基于与感觉信息处理类似的神经计算原理。     

Social Influences in Sequential Decision Making

People often make decisions in a social environment. The present work examines social influence on people’s decisions in a sequential decision-making situation. In the first experimental study, we implemented an information cascade paradigm, illustrating that people infer information from decisions of others and use this information to make their own decisions. We followed a cognitive modeling approach to elicit the weight people give to social as compared to private individual information. The proposed social influence model shows that participants overweight their own private information relative to social information, contrary to the normative Bayesian account. In our second study, we embedded the abstract decision problem of Study 1 in a medical decision-making problem. We examined whether in a medical situation people also take others’ authority into account in addition to the information that their decisions convey. The social influence model illustrates that people weight social information differentially according to the authority of other decision makers. The influence of authority was strongest when an authority''s decision contrasted with private information. Both studies illustrate how the social environment provides sources of information that people integrate differently for their decisions.     

Imbalanced Decision Hierarchy in Addicts Emerging from Drug-Hijacked Dopamine Spiraling Circuit

Despite explicitly wanting to quit, long-term addicts find themselves powerless to resist drugs, despite knowing that drug-taking may be a harmful course of action. Such inconsistency between the explicit knowledge of negative consequences and the compulsive behavioral patterns represents a cognitive/behavioral conflict that is a central characteristic of addiction. Neurobiologically, differential cue-induced activity in distinct striatal subregions, as well as the dopamine connectivity spiraling from ventral striatal regions to the dorsal regions, play critical roles in compulsive drug seeking. However, the functional mechanism that integrates these neuropharmacological observations with the above-mentioned cognitive/behavioral conflict is unknown. Here we provide a formal computational explanation for the drug-induced cognitive inconsistency that is apparent in the addicts'' “self-described mistake”. We show that addictive drugs gradually produce a motivational bias toward drug-seeking at low-level habitual decision processes, despite the low abstract cognitive valuation of this behavior. This pathology emerges within the hierarchical reinforcement learning framework when chronic exposure to the drug pharmacologically produces pathologicaly persistent phasic dopamine signals. Thereby the drug hijacks the dopaminergic spirals that cascade the reinforcement signals down the ventro-dorsal cortico-striatal hierarchy. Neurobiologically, our theory accounts for rapid development of drug cue-elicited dopamine efflux in the ventral striatum and a delayed response in the dorsal striatum. Our theory also shows how this response pattern depends critically on the dopamine spiraling circuitry. Behaviorally, our framework explains gradual insensitivity of drug-seeking to drug-associated punishments, the blocking phenomenon for drug outcomes, and the persistent preference for drugs over natural rewards by addicts. The model suggests testable predictions and beyond that, sets the stage for a view of addiction as a pathology of hierarchical decision-making processes. This view is complementary to the traditional interpretation of addiction as interaction between habitual and goal-directed decision systems.     

A neural circuit model of flexible sensorimotor mapping: learning and forgetting on multiple timescales

Volitional behavior relies on the brain's ability to remap sensory flow to motor programs whenever demanded by a changed behavioral context. To investigate the circuit basis of such flexible behavior, we have developed a biophysically based decision-making network model of spiking neurons for arbitrary sensorimotor mapping. The model quantitatively reproduces behavioral and prefrontal single-cell data from an experiment in which monkeys learn visuomotor associations that are reversed unpredictably from time to time. We show that when synaptic modifications occur on multiple timescales, the model behavior becomes flexible only when needed: slow components of learning usually dominate the decision process. However, if behavioral contexts change frequently enough, fast components of plasticity take over, and the behavior exhibits a quick forget-and-learn pattern. This model prediction is confirmed by monkey data. Therefore, our work reveals a scenario for conditional associative learning that is distinct from instant switching between sets of well-established sensorimotor associations.     

Designing theoretically-informed implementation interventions

Background

A better theoretical base for understanding professional behaviour change is needed to support evidence-based changes in medical practice. Traditionally strategies to encourage changes in clinical practices have been guided empirically, without explicit consideration of underlying theoretical rationales for such strategies. This paper considers a theoretical framework for reasoning from within psychology for identifying individual differences in cognitive processing between doctors that could moderate the decision to incorporate new evidence into their clinical decision-making.

Discussion

Parallel dual processing models of reasoning posit two cognitive modes of information processing that are in constant operation as humans reason. One mode has been described as experiential, fast and heuristic; the other as rational, conscious and rule based. Within such models, the uptake of new research evidence can be represented by the latter mode; it is reflective, explicit and intentional. On the other hand, well practiced clinical judgments can be positioned in the experiential mode, being automatic, reflexive and swift. Research suggests that individual differences between people in both cognitive capacity (e.g., intelligence) and cognitive processing (e.g., thinking styles) influence how both reasoning modes interact. This being so, it is proposed that these same differences between doctors may moderate the uptake of new research evidence. Such dispositional characteristics have largely been ignored in research investigating effective strategies in implementing research evidence. Whilst medical decision-making occurs in a complex social environment with multiple influences and decision makers, it remains true that an individual doctor's judgment still retains a key position in terms of diagnostic and treatment decisions for individual patients. This paper argues therefore, that individual differences between doctors in terms of reasoning are important considerations in any discussion relating to changing clinical practice.

Summary

It is imperative that change strategies in healthcare consider relevant theoretical frameworks from other disciplines such as psychology. Generic dual processing models of reasoning are proposed as potentially useful in identifying factors within doctors that may moderate their individual uptake of evidence into clinical decision-making. Such factors can then inform strategies to change practice.     

Decision-Making for Risky Gains and Losses among College Students with Internet Gaming Disorder

Individuals with Internet gaming disorder (IGD) tend to exhibit disadvantageous risky decision-making not only in their real life but also in laboratory tasks. Decision-making is a complex multifaceted function and different cognitive processes are involved in decision-making for gains and losses. However, the relationship between impaired decision-making and gain versus loss processing in the context of IGD is poorly understood. The main aim of the present study was to separately evaluate decision-making for risky gains and losses among college students with IGD using the Cups task. Additionally, we further examined the effects of outcome magnitude and probability level on decision-making related to risky gains and losses respectively. Sixty college students with IGD and 42 matched healthy controls (HCs) participated. Results indicated that IGD subjects exhibited generally greater risk taking tendencies than HCs. In comparison to HCs, IGD subjects made more disadvantageous risky choices in the loss domain (but not in the gain domain). Follow-up analyses indicated that the impairment was associated to insensitivity to changes in outcome magnitude and probability level for risky losses among IGD subjects. In addition, higher Internet addiction severity scores were associated with percentage of disadvantageous risky options in the loss domain. These findings emphasize the effect of insensitivity to losses on disadvantageous decisions under risk in the context of IGD, which has implications for future intervention studies.     

Inferring visuomotor priors for sensorimotor learning

Sensorimotor learning has been shown to depend on both prior expectations and sensory evidence in a way that is consistent with Bayesian integration. Thus, prior beliefs play a key role during the learning process, especially when only ambiguous sensory information is available. Here we develop a novel technique to estimate the covariance structure of the prior over visuomotor transformations--the mapping between actual and visual location of the hand--during a learning task. Subjects performed reaching movements under multiple visuomotor transformations in which they received visual feedback of their hand position only at the end of the movement. After experiencing a particular transformation for one reach, subjects have insufficient information to determine the exact transformation, and so their second reach reflects a combination of their prior over visuomotor transformations and the sensory evidence from the first reach. We developed a Bayesian observer model in order to infer the covariance structure of the subjects' prior, which was found to give high probability to parameter settings consistent with visuomotor rotations. Therefore, although the set of visuomotor transformations experienced had little structure, the subjects had a strong tendency to interpret ambiguous sensory evidence as arising from rotation-like transformations. We then exposed the same subjects to a highly-structured set of visuomotor transformations, designed to be very different from the set of visuomotor rotations. During this exposure the prior was found to have changed significantly to have a covariance structure that no longer favored rotation-like transformations. In summary, we have developed a technique which can estimate the full covariance structure of a prior in a sensorimotor task and have shown that the prior over visuomotor transformations favor a rotation-like structure. Moreover, through experience of a novel task structure, participants can appropriately alter the covariance structure of their prior.     

Misattribution, false recognition and the sins of memory

Memory is sometimes a troublemaker. Schacter has classified memory's transgressions into seven fundamental 'sins': transience, absent-mindedness, blocking, misattribution, suggestibility, bias and persistence. This paper focuses on one memory sin, misattribution, that is implicated in false or illusory recognition of episodes that never occurred. We present data from cognitive, neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies that illuminate aspects of misattribution and false recognition. We first discuss cognitive research examining possible mechanisms of misattribution associated with false recognition. We also consider ways in which false recognition can be reduced or avoided, focusing in particular on the role of distinctive information. We next turn to neuropsychological research concerning patients with amnesia and Alzheimer's disease that reveals conditions under which such patients are less susceptible to false recognition than are healthy controls, thus providing clues about the brain mechanisms that drive false recognition. We then consider neuroimaging studies concerned with the neural correlates of true and false recognition, examining when the two forms of recognition can and cannot be distinguished on the basis of brain activity. Finally, we argue that even though misattribution and other memory sins are annoying and even dangerous, they can also be viewed as by-products of adaptive features of memory.     

Adapting to an Uncertain World: Cognitive Capacity and Causal Reasoning with Ambiguous Observations

Ambiguous causal evidence in which the covariance of the cause and effect is partially known is pervasive in real life situations. Little is known about how people reason about causal associations with ambiguous information and the underlying cognitive mechanisms. This paper presents three experiments exploring the cognitive mechanisms of causal reasoning with ambiguous observations. Results revealed that the influence of ambiguous observations manifested by missing information on causal reasoning depended on the availability of cognitive resources, suggesting that processing ambiguous information may involve deliberative cognitive processes. Experiment 1 demonstrated that subjects did not ignore the ambiguous observations in causal reasoning. They also had a general tendency to treat the ambiguous observations as negative evidence against the causal association. Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 included a causal learning task requiring a high cognitive demand in which paired stimuli were presented to subjects sequentially. Both experiments revealed that processing ambiguous or missing observations can depend on the availability of cognitive resources. Experiment 2 suggested that the contribution of working memory capacity to the comprehensiveness of evidence retention was reduced when there were ambiguous or missing observations. Experiment 3 demonstrated that an increase in cognitive demand due to a change in the task format reduced subjects’ tendency to treat ambiguous-missing observations as negative cues.     

Adaptive Sampling of Information in Perceptual Decision-Making

In many perceptual and cognitive decision-making problems, humans sample multiple noisy information sources serially, and integrate the sampled information to make an overall decision. We derive the optimal decision procedure for two-alternative choice tasks in which the different options are sampled one at a time, sources vary in the quality of the information they provide, and the available time is fixed. To maximize accuracy, the optimal observer allocates time to sampling different information sources in proportion to their noise levels. We tested human observers in a corresponding perceptual decision-making task. Observers compared the direction of two random dot motion patterns that were triggered only when fixated. Observers allocated more time to the noisier pattern, in a manner that correlated with their sensory uncertainty about the direction of the patterns. There were several differences between the optimal observer predictions and human behaviour. These differences point to a number of other factors, beyond the quality of the currently available sources of information, that influences the sampling strategy.     

Neural mechanisms of social learning and decision-making

One of the hallmarks of human society is the ubiquitous interactions among individuals. Indeed, a significant portion of human daily routine decision making is socially related. Normative economic theory, namely game theory, has prescribed the canonical decision strategy when "rational" social agents have full information about the decision environment. In reality, however, social decision is often influenced by the trait and state parameters of selves and others. Therefore, understanding the cognitive and neural processes of inferring the decision parameters is pivotal for social decision making. Recently, both correlational and causal non-invasive neuroimaging studies have started to reveal the critical neural computations underlying social learning and decision-making, and highlighted the unique roles of "social" brain structures such as temporal-parietal junction(TPJ) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex(dmPFC). Here we review recent advances in social decision neuroscience and maintain the focus on how the inference about others is dynamically acquired during social learning, as well as how the prosocial(altruistic)behavior results from orchestrated interactions of different brain regions specified under the social utility framework. We conclude by emphasizing the importance of combining computational decision theory with the identification of neural mechanisms that represent, evaluate and integrate value related social information and generate decision variables guiding behavioral output in the complex social environment.     

The illogicality of stock-brokers: psychological experiments on the effects of prior knowledge and belief biases on logical reasoning in stock trading

Background

Explanations for the current worldwide financial crisis are primarily provided by economists and politicians. However, in the present work we focus on the psychological-cognitive factors that most likely affect the thinking of people on the economic stage and thus might also have had an effect on the progression of the crises. One of these factors might be the effect of prior beliefs on reasoning and decision-making. So far, this question has been explored only to a limited extent.

Methods

We report two experiments on logical reasoning competences of nineteen stock-brokers with long-lasting vocational experiences at the stock market. The premises of reasoning problems concerned stock trading and the experiments varied whether or not their conclusions—a proposition which is reached after considering the premises—agreed with the brokers'' prior beliefs. Half of the problems had a conclusion that was highly plausible for stock-brokers while the other half had a highly implausible conclusion.

Results

The data show a strong belief bias. Stock-brokers were strongly biased by their prior knowledge. Lowest performance was found for inferences in which the problems caused a conflict between logical validity and the experts'' belief. In these cases, the stock-brokers tended to make logically invalid inferences rather than give up their existing beliefs.

Conclusions

Our findings support the thesis that cognitive factors have an effect on the decision-making on the financial market. In the present study, stock-brokers were guided more by past experience and existing beliefs than by logical thinking and rational decision-making. They had difficulties to disengage themselves from vastly anchored thinking patterns. However, we believe, that it is wrong to accuse the brokers for their “malfunctions”, because such hard-wired cognitive principles are difficult to suppress even if the person is aware of them.     

Mobility and control among nomadic shepherds: The case of theraikas. II

This paper analyzes the relationship between leaders and ordinary shepherds among the raikas—nomadic shepherds from western India. It uses a neo-institutional perspective to show how control over information is crucial if shepherds are to prevent their leader from misusing the extensive powers he possesses to make decisions on their behalf. Control over information is not, however, sufficient. The paper argues that shepherds must also possess the capacity to impose sanctions if their leader oversteps the bounds of delegated decision-making authority. The paper highlights the importance of politics and the divergent interests of the shepherds and their leaders. In so doing, it allows inquiry into a system of social interactions that is characterized by conflicting interests and the negotiation of conflict, but is often perceived as harmonious. At the same time, the investigation offers new insights into other social situations structured by principal-agent relationships.     

Composite collective decision-making

Individual animals are adept at making decisions and have cognitive abilities, such as memory, which allow them to hone their decisions. Social animals can also share information. This allows social animals to make adaptive group-level decisions. Both individual and collective decision-making systems also have drawbacks and limitations, and while both are well studied, the interaction between them is still poorly understood. Here, we study how individual and collective decision-making interact during ant foraging. We first gathered empirical data on memory-based foraging persistence in the ant Lasius niger. We used these data to create an agent-based model where ants may use social information (trail pheromones), private information (memories) or both to make foraging decisions. The combined use of social and private information by individuals results in greater efficiency at the group level than when either information source was used alone. The modelled ants couple consensus decision-making, allowing them to quickly exploit high-quality food sources, and combined decision-making, allowing different individuals to specialize in exploiting different resource patches. Such a composite collective decision-making system reaps the benefits of both its constituent parts. Exploiting such insights into composite collective decision-making may lead to improved decision-making algorithms.     

Testosterone disrupts human collaboration by increasing egocentric choices

Collaboration can provide benefits to the individual and the group across a variety of contexts. Even in simple perceptual tasks, the aggregation of individuals' personal information can enable enhanced group decision-making. However, in certain circumstances such collaboration can worsen performance, or even expose an individual to exploitation in economic tasks, and therefore a balance needs to be struck between a collaborative and a more egocentric disposition. Neurohumoral agents such as oxytocin are known to promote collaborative behaviours in economic tasks, but whether there are opponent agents, and whether these might even affect information aggregation without an economic component, is unknown. Here, we show that an androgen hormone, testosterone, acts as such an agent. Testosterone causally disrupted collaborative decision-making in a perceptual decision task, markedly reducing performance benefit individuals accrued from collaboration while leaving individual decision-making ability unaffected. This effect emerged because testosterone engendered more egocentric choices, manifest in an overweighting of one's own relative to others' judgements during joint decision-making. Our findings show that the biological control of social behaviour is dynamically regulated not only by modulators promoting, but also by those diminishing a propensity to collaborate.     

Evidence for social role in a dolphin social network

Social animals have to take into consideration the behaviour of conspecifics when making decisions to go by their daily lives. These decisions affect their fitness and there is therefore an evolutionary pressure to try making the right choices. In many instances individuals will make their own choices and the behaviour of the group will be a democratic integration of everyone’s decision. However, in some instances it can be advantageous to follow the choice of a few individuals in the group if they have more information regarding the situation that has arisen. Here I provide early evidence that decisions about shifts in activity states in a population of bottlenose dolphin follow such a decision-making process. This unshared consensus is mediated by a non-vocal signal, which can be communicated globally within the dolphin school. These signals are emitted by individuals that tend to have more information about the behaviour of potential competitors because of their position in the social network. I hypothesise that this decision-making process emerged from the social structure of the population and the need to maintain mixed-sex schools.     

Deficits in Implicit Attention to Social Signals in Schizophrenia and High Risk Groups: Behavioural Evidence from a New Illusion

Background

An increasing body of evidence suggests that the apparent social impairments observed in schizophrenia may arise from deficits in social cognitive processing capacities. The ability to process basic social cues, such as gaze direction and biological motion, effortlessly and implicitly is thought to be a prerequisite for establishing successful social interactions and for construing a sense of “social intuition.” However, studies that address the ability to effortlessly process basic social cues in schizophrenia are lacking. Because social cognitive processing deficits may be part of the genetic vulnerability for schizophrenia, we also investigated two groups that have been shown to be at increased risk of developing schizophrenia-spectrum pathology: first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients and men with Klinefelter syndrome (47,XXY).

Results

We compared 28 patients with schizophrenia, 29 siblings of patients with schizophrenia, and 29 individuals with Klinefelter syndrome with 46 matched healthy control subjects on a new paradigm. This paradigm measures one''s susceptibility for a bias in distance estimation between two agents that is induced by the implicit processing of gaze direction and biological motion conveyed by these agents. Compared to control subjects, patients with schizophrenia, as well as siblings of patients and Klinefelter men, showed a lack of influence of social cues on their distance judgments.

Conclusions

We suggest that the insensitivity for social cues is a cognitive aspect of schizophrenia that may be seen as an endophenotype as it appears to be present both in relatives who are at increased genetic risk and in a genetic disorder at risk for schizophrenia-spectrum psychopathology. These social cue–processing deficits could contribute, in part, to the difficulties in higher order social cognitive tasks and, hence, to decreased social competence that has been observed in these groups.     

Process evaluation of appreciative inquiry to translate pain management evidence into pediatric nursing practice

Background

Current healthcare systems have extended the evidence-based medicine (EBM) approach to health policy and delivery decisions, such as access-to-care, healthcare funding and health program continuance, through attempts to integrate valid and reliable evidence into the decision making process. These policy decisions have major impacts on society and have high personal and financial costs associated with those decisions. Decision models such as these function under a shared assumption of rational choice and utility maximization in the decision-making process.

Discussion

We contend that health policy decision makers are generally unable to attain the basic goals of evidence-based decision making (EBDM) and evidence-based policy making (EBPM) because humans make decisions with their naturally limited, faulty, and biased decision-making processes. A cognitive information processing framework is presented to support this argument, and subtle cognitive processing mechanisms are introduced to support the focal thesis: health policy makers' decisions are influenced by the subjective manner in which they individually process decision-relevant information rather than on the objective merits of the evidence alone. As such, subsequent health policy decisions do not necessarily achieve the goals of evidence-based policy making, such as maximizing health outcomes for society based on valid and reliable research evidence.

Summary

In this era of increasing adoption of evidence-based healthcare models, the rational choice, utility maximizing assumptions in EBDM and EBPM, must be critically evaluated to ensure effective and high-quality health policy decisions. The cognitive information processing framework presented here will aid health policy decision makers by identifying how their decisions might be subtly influenced by non-rational factors. In this paper, we identify some of the biases and potential intervention points and provide some initial suggestions about how the EBDM/EBPM process can be improved.