Individual differences affect honest signalling in a songbird

Research in the past decade has established the existence of consistent individual differences or ‘personality’ in animals and their important role in many aspects of animal behaviour. At the same time, research on honest signalling of aggression has revealed that while some of the putative aggression signals are reliable, they are only imperfectly so. This study asks whether a significant portion of the variance in the aggression-signal regression may be explained by individual differences in signalling strategies. Using the well-studied aggressive signalling system of song sparrows (Melospiza melodia), we carried out repeated assays to measure both aggressive behaviours and aggressive signalling of territorial males. Through these assays, we found that aggressive behaviours and aggressive signalling were both highly repeatable, and moreover that aggressive behaviours in 2009–2010 predicted whether the birds would attack a taxidermic mount over a year later. Most significantly, we found that residual variation in signalling behaviours, after controlling for aggressive behaviour, was individually consistent, suggesting there may be a second personality trait determining the level of aggressive signalling. We term this potential personality trait ‘communicativeness’ and discuss these results in the context of honest signalling theories and recent findings reporting prevalence of ‘under-signalling’.     

Cooperation beyond the dyad: on simple models and a complex society

Players in Axelrod and Hamilton''s model of cooperation were not only in a Prisoner''s Dilemma, but by definition, they were also trapped in a dyad. But animals are rarely so restricted and even the option to interact with third parties allows individuals to escape from the Prisoner''s Dilemma into a much more interesting and varied world of cooperation, from the apparently rare ‘parcelling’ to the widespread phenomenon of market effects. Our understanding of by-product mutualism, pseudo-reciprocity and the snowdrift game is also enriched by thinking ‘beyond the dyad’. The concepts of by-product mutualism and pseudo-reciprocity force us to think again about our basic definitions of cooperative behaviour (behaviour by a single individual) and cooperation (the outcome of an interaction between two or more individuals). Reciprocity is surprisingly rare outside of humans, even among large-brained ‘intelligent’ birds and mammals. Are humans unique in having extensive cooperative interactions among non-kin and an integrated cognitive system for mediating reciprocity? Perhaps, but our best chance for finding a similar phenomenon may be in delphinids, which also live in large societies with extensive cooperative interactions among non-relatives. A system of nested male alliances in bottlenose dolphins illustrates the potential and difficulties of finding a complex system of cooperation close to our own.     

Social structure of primate interaction networks facilitates the emergence of cooperation

Animal cooperation has puzzled biologists for a long time as its existence seems to contravene the basic notion of evolutionary biology that natural selection favours ‘selfish’ genes that promote only their own well-being. Evolutionary game theory has shown that cooperators can prosper in populations of selfish individuals if they occur in clusters, interacting more frequently with each other than with the selfish. Here we show that social networks of primates possess the necessary social structure to promote the emergence of cooperation. By simulating evolutionary dynamics of cooperative behaviour on interaction networks of 70 primate groups, we found that for most groups network reciprocity augmented the fixation probability for cooperation. The variation in the strength of this effect can be partly explained by the groups’ community modularity—a network measure for the groups’ heterogeneity. Thus, given selective update and partner choice mechanisms, network reciprocity has the potential to explain socially learned forms of cooperation in primate societies.     

Individual boldness is linked to protective shell shape in aquatic snails

The existence of consistent individual differences in behaviour (‘animal personality’) has been well documented in recent years. However, how such individual variation in behaviour is maintained over evolutionary time is an ongoing conundrum. A well-studied axis of animal personality is individual variation along a bold–shy continuum, where individuals differ consistently in their propensity to take risks. A predation-risk cost to boldness is often assumed, but also that the reproductive benefits associated with boldness lead to equivalent fitness outcomes between bold and shy individuals over a lifetime. However, an alternative or complementary explanation may be that bold individuals phenotypically compensate for their risky lifestyle to reduce predation costs, for instance by investing in more pronounced morphological defences. Here, we investigate the ‘phenotypic compensation’ hypothesis, i.e. that bold individuals exhibit more pronounced anti-predator defences than shy individuals, by relating shell shape in the aquatic snail Radix balthica to an index of individual boldness. Our analyses find a strong relationship between risk-taking propensity and shell shape in this species, with bolder individuals exhibiting a more defended shell shape than shy individuals. We suggest that this supports the ‘phenotypic compensation’ hypothesis and sheds light on a previously poorly studied mechanism to promote the maintenance of personality variation among animals.     

The Effects of Extra-Somatic Weapons on the Evolution of Human Cooperation towards Non-Kin

Human cooperation and altruism towards non-kin is a major evolutionary puzzle, as is ‘strong reciprocity’ where no present or future rewards accrue to the co-operator/altruist. Here, we test the hypothesis that the development of extra-somatic weapons could have influenced the evolution of human cooperative behaviour, thus providing a new explanation for these two puzzles. Widespread weapons use could have made disputes within hominin groups far more lethal and also equalized power between individuals. In such a cultural niche non-cooperators might well have become involved in such lethal disputes at a higher frequency than cooperators, thereby increasing the relative fitness of genes associated with cooperative behaviour. We employ two versions of the evolutionary Iterated Prisoner''s Dilemma (IPD) model – one where weapons use is simulated and one where it is not. We then measured the performance of 25 IPD strategies to evaluate the effects of weapons use on them. We found that cooperative strategies performed significantly better, and non-cooperative strategies significantly worse, under simulated weapons use. Importantly, the performance of an ‘Always Cooperate’ IPD strategy, equivalent to that of ‘strong reciprocity’, improved significantly more than that of all other cooperative strategies. We conclude that the development of extra-somatic weapons throws new light on the evolution of human altruistic and cooperative behaviour, and particularly ‘strong reciprocity’. The notion that distinctively human altruism and cooperation could have been an adaptive trait in a past environment that is no longer evident in the modern world provides a novel addition to theory that seeks to account for this major evolutionary puzzle.     

The evolutionary interplay of intergroup conflict and altruism in humans: a review of parochial altruism theory and prospects for its extension

Drawing on an idea proposed by Darwin, it has recently been hypothesized that violent intergroup conflict might have played a substantial role in the evolution of human cooperativeness and altruism. The central notion of this argument, dubbed ‘parochial altruism’, is that the two genetic or cultural traits, aggressiveness against the out-groups and cooperativeness towards the in-group, including self-sacrificial altruistic behaviour, might have coevolved in humans. This review assesses the explanatory power of current theories of ‘parochial altruism’. After a brief synopsis of the existing literature, two pitfalls in the interpretation of the most widely used models are discussed: potential direct benefits and high relatedness between group members implicitly induced by assumptions about conflict structure and frequency. Then, a number of simplifying assumptions made in the construction of these models are pointed out which currently limit their explanatory power. Next, relevant empirical evidence from several disciplines which could guide future theoretical extensions is reviewed. Finally, selected alternative accounts of evolutionary links between intergroup conflict and intragroup cooperation are briefly discussed which could be integrated with parochial altruism in the future.     

Interactions between personality and institutions in cooperative behaviour in humans

Laboratory attempts to identify relationships between personality and cooperative behaviour in humans have generated inconsistent results. This may partially stem from different practices in psychology and economics laboratories, with both hypothetical players and incentives typical only in the former. Another possible cause is insufficient consideration of the contexts within which social dilemmas occur. Real social dilemmas are often governed by institutions that change the payoff structure via rewards and punishments. However, such ‘strong situations’ will not necessarily suppress the effects of personality. On the contrary, they may affect some personalities differentially. Extraversion and neuroticism, reflecting variation in reward and punishment sensitivity, should predict modification of cooperative behaviour following changes to the payoff structure. We investigate interactions between personality and a punishment situation via two versions of a public goods game. We find that, even in a strong situation, personality matters and, moreover, it is related to strategic shifts in cooperation. Extraversion is associated with a shift from free-riding to cooperation in the presence of punishment, agreeableness is associated with initially higher contributions regardless of game, and, contrary to our predictions, neuroticism is associated with lower contributions regardless of game. Results should lead to new hypotheses that relate variation in biological functioning to individual differences in cooperative behaviour and that consider three-way interactions among personality, institutional context and sociocultural background.     

Behaviour in captivity predicts some aspects of natural behaviour,but not others,in a wild cricket population

Examining the relevance of ‘animal personality’ involves linking consistent among- and within-individual behavioural variation to fitness in the wild. Studies aiming to do this typically assay personality in captivity and rely on the assumption that measures of traits in the laboratory reflect their expression in nature. We examined this rarely tested assumption by comparing laboratory and field measurements of the behaviour of wild field crickets (Gryllus campestris) by continuously monitoring individual behaviour in nature, and repeatedly capturing the same individuals and measuring their behaviour in captivity. We focused on three traits that are frequently examined in personality studies: shyness, activity and exploration. All of them showed repeatability in the laboratory. Laboratory activity and exploration predicted the expression of their equivalent behaviours in the wild, but shyness did not. Traits in the wild were predictably influenced by environmental factors such as temperature and sunlight, but only activity showed appreciable within-individual repeatability. This suggests that some behaviours typically studied as personality traits can be accurately assayed in captivity, but the expression of others may be highly context-specific. Our results highlight the importance of validating the relevance of laboratory behavioural assays to analogous traits measured in the wild.     

Individual variation behind the evolution of cooperation

Life on Earth has two remarkable properties. The first is variation: even apart from the vast number of extant species, there are considerable differences between individuals within a single species. The second property is cooperation. It is surprising that until recently the interactions between these two properties have rarely been addressed from an evolutionary point of view. Here, I concentrate on how inter-individual differences influence the evolution of cooperation. First, I deal with cases where individuality is maintained by random processes like mutation or phenotypic noise. Second, I examine when differences in state cause differences in behaviour. Finally, I investigate the effects of individual role specialization. Variation can be important in several ways. Increased random variation can change the expectation about cooperativeness of future partners, altering behaviour in a current relationship. Differences in state may serve as a book-keeping mechanism that is necessary for the evolution of reciprocity. If the cost of cooperation can depend on state then strategic regulation of state makes it possible to coerce partners to cooperate. If conditions force individuals to specialize, cooperation becomes more valuable. My review of theoretical models suggests that variation plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation.     

Variation and the response to variation as a basis for successful cooperation

In applying game theory to problems in biology, differences between individuals are often ignored. In particular, when analysing the evolution of cooperation it is often implicitly assumed that ignoring variation will produce predictions that approximate the solution when differences are included. This need not be true. As we demonstrate, differences are not innocuous noise, but can fundamentally change the nature of a game. Even small amounts of variability can stabilize cooperation by, for example, maintaining the need to deal with cheaters. Differences promote the need to learn about others in an interaction, leading to contingent behaviour that can reduce conflict, and to negotiated outcomes that may or may not be more cooperative than unconditional actions. Once there are mechanisms such as mutation and environmental influences that maintain variation within populations, whether cooperation evolves may depend on the variation in the cooperativeness trait. Variation means that it may be worth taking a chance that a partner is cooperative by being cooperative. When there are markets, so that individuals can break off interactions to seek a better partner, variation promotes choosiness and hence penalizes those uncooperative individuals, who are rejected. Variation promotes the need to monitor the previous behaviour of others, and once this social sensitivity exists, the need to maintain a good reputation can promote cooperation.     

Tracking Changing Environments: Innovators Are Fast,but Not Flexible Learners

Behavioural innovations are increasingly thought to provide a rich source of phenotypic plasticity and evolutionary change. Innovation propensity shows substantial variation across avian taxa and provides an adaptive mechanism by which behaviour is flexibly adjusted to changing environmental conditions. Here, we tested for the first time the prediction that inter-individual variation in innovation propensity is equally a measure of behavioural flexibility. We used Indian mynas, Sturnus tristis, a highly successful worldwide invader. Results revealed that mynas that solved an extractive foraging task more quickly learnt to discriminate between a cue that predicted food, and one that did not more quickly. However, fast innovators were slower to change their behaviour when the significance of the food cues changed. This unexpected finding appears at odds with the well-established view that avian taxa with larger brains relative to their body size, and therefore greater neural processing power, are both faster, and more flexible learners. We speculate that the existence of this relationship across taxa can be reconciled with its absence within species by assuming that fast, innovative learners and non innovative, slow, flexible learners constitute two separate individual strategies, which are both underpinned by enhanced neural processing power. This idea is consistent with the recent proposal that individuals may differ consistently in ‘cognitive style’, differentially trading off speed against accuracy in cognitive tasks.     

If at first you don't succeed… Studies of ontogeny shed light on the cognitive demands of habitual tool use

Many species use tools, but the mechanisms underpinning the behaviour differ between species and even among individuals within species, depending on the variants performed. When considering tool use ‘as adaptation’, an important first step is to understand the contribution made by fixed phenotypes as compared to flexible mechanisms, for instance learning. Social learning of tool use is sometimes inferred based on variation between populations of the same species but this approach is questionable. Specifically, alternative explanations cannot be ruled out because population differences are also driven by genetic and/or environmental factors. To better understand the mechanisms underlying routine but non-universal (i.e. habitual) tool use, we suggest focusing on the ontogeny of tool use and individual variation within populations. For example, if tool-using competence emerges late during ontogeny and improves with practice or varies with exposure to social cues, then a role for learning can be inferred. Experimental studies help identify the cognitive and developmental mechanisms used when tools are used to solve problems. The mechanisms underlying the route to tool-use acquisition have important consequences for our understanding of the accumulation in technological skill complexity over the life course of an individual, across generations and over evolutionary time.     

Genetic and ‘cultural’ similarity in wild chimpanzees

The question of whether animals possess ‘cultures’ or ‘traditions’ continues to generate widespread theoretical and empirical interest. Studies of wild chimpanzees have featured prominently in this discussion, as the dominant approach used to identify culture in wild animals was first applied to them. This procedure, the ‘method of exclusion,’ begins by documenting behavioural differences between groups and then infers the existence of culture by eliminating ecological explanations for their occurrence. The validity of this approach has been questioned because genetic differences between groups have not explicitly been ruled out as a factor contributing to between-group differences in behaviour. Here we investigate this issue directly by analysing genetic and behavioural data from nine groups of wild chimpanzees. We find that the overall levels of genetic and behavioural dissimilarity between groups are highly and statistically significantly correlated. Additional analyses show that only a very small number of behaviours vary between genetically similar groups, and that there is no obvious pattern as to which classes of behaviours (e.g. tool-use versus communicative) have a distribution that matches patterns of between-group genetic dissimilarity. These results indicate that genetic dissimilarity cannot be eliminated as playing a major role in generating group differences in chimpanzee behaviour.     

Cooperation,clumping and the evolution of multicellularity

The evolution of multicellular organisms represents one of the major evolutionary transitions in the history of life. A potential advantage of forming multicellular clumps is that it provides an efficiency benefit to pre-existing cooperation, such as the production of extracellular ‘public goods’. However, this is complicated by the fact that cooperation could jointly evolve with clumping, and clumping could have multiple consequences for the evolution of cooperation. We model the evolution of clumping and a cooperative public good, showing that (i) when considered separately, both clumping and public goods production gradually increase with increasing genetic relatedness; (ii) in contrast, when the traits evolve jointly, a small increase in relatedness can lead to a major shift in evolutionary outcome—from a non-clumping state with low public goods production to a cooperative clumping state with high values of both traits; (iii) high relatedness makes it easier to get to the cooperative clumping state and (iv) clumping can be inhibited when it increases the number of cells that the benefits of cooperation must be shared with, but promoted when it increases relatedness between those cells. Overall, our results suggest that public goods sharing can facilitate the formation of well-integrated cooperative clumps as a first step in the evolution of multicellularity.     

Trust and cooperation among economic agents

The units that are subject to selection pressure in evolutionary biology are ‘strategies’, which are conditional actions (‘Do P if X occurs, otherwise do Q’). In contrast, the units in economics select strategies from available menus so as to further their projects and purposes. As economic agents do not live in isolation, each agent''s optimum choice, in general, depends on the choices made by others. Because their projects and purposes involve the future, not just the present, each agent reasons about the likely present and future consequences of their respective choices. That is why beliefs, about what others may do and what the consequences of those choices could be, are at the basis of strategy selection. A catalogue of social environments is constructed in which agents not only promise each other''s cooperation, but also rationally believe that the promises will be kept. Unfortunately, non-cooperation arising from mistrust can be the outcome in those same environments: societies harbour multiple ‘equilibria’ and can skid from cooperation to non-cooperation. Moreover, a pre-occupation among analysts with the Prisoners'' Dilemma game has obscured the fact that cooperative arrangements can harbour not only inequality, but also exploitation. The analysis is used to discuss why international cooperation over the use of global public goods has proved to be so elusive.     

Evolutionary Perspective on the Interplay Between Family Life,and Parent and Offspring Personality

Consistent inter‐individual variation in behaviour over time and across contexts has been reported for a wide variety of animals, a phenomenon commonly referred to as personality. As behavioural patterns develop inside families, rearing conditions could have lasting effects on the expression of adult personality. In species with parental care, conflicts among family members impose selection on parental and offspring behaviour through coadaptation. Here, we argue that the interplay between the evolution of personality traits (i.e. boldness, exploration, activity, aggressiveness and sociability) expressed outside the family context and the specialized behaviours expressed inside families (i.e. offspring begging behaviour and parental response to offspring solicitations) can have important evolutionary consequences. Personality differences between parents may relate to the typically observed variation in the way they respond to offspring demand, and dependent offspring may already express personality differences, which may relate to the way they communicate with their parents and siblings. However, there has been little research on how personality relates to parental and offspring behaviours. Future research should thus focus on how and why personality may be related to the specialized parent and offspring behaviour that evolved as adaptations to family life.     

Testing synaptic plasticity in dynamic mate choice decisions: N-methyl d-aspartate receptor blockade disrupts female preference

Social behaviours such as mate choice require context-specific responses, often with evolutionary consequences. Increasing evidence indicates that the behavioural plasticity associated with mate choice involves learning. For example, poeciliids show age-dependent changes in female preference functions and express synaptic-plasticity-associated molecular markers during mate choice. Here, we test whether social cognition is necessary for female preference behaviour by blocking the central player in synaptic plasticity, NMDAR (N-methyl d-aspartate receptor), in a poeciliid fish, Xiphophorus nigrensis. After subchronic exposure to NMDAR antagonist MK-801, female preference behaviours towards males were dramatically reduced. Overall activity levels were unaffected, but there was a directional shift from ‘social’ behaviours towards neutral activity. Multivariate gene expression patterns significantly discriminated between females with normal versus disrupted plasticity processes and correlated with preference behaviours—not general activity. Furthermore, molecular patterns support a distinction between ‘preference’ (e.g. neuroserpin, neuroligin-3, NMDAR) and ‘sociality’ (isotocin and vasotocin) gene clusters, highlighting a possible conservation between NMDAR disruption and nonapeptides in modulating behaviour. Our results suggest that mate preference may involve greater social memory processing than overall sociality, and that poeciliid preference functions integrate synaptic-plasticity-oriented ‘preference’ pathways with overall sociality to invoke dynamic, context-specific responses towards favoured males and away from unfavoured males.     

Approximating Optimal Behavioural Strategies Down to Rules-of-Thumb: Energy Reserve Changes in Pairs of Social Foragers

Functional explanations of behaviour often propose optimal strategies for organisms to follow. These ‘best’ strategies could be difficult to perform given biological constraints such as neural architecture and physiological constraints. Instead, simple heuristics or ‘rules-of-thumb’ that approximate these optimal strategies may instead be performed. From a modelling perspective, rules-of-thumb are also useful tools for considering how group behaviour is shaped by the behaviours of individuals. Using simple rules-of-thumb reduces the complexity of these models, but care needs to be taken to use rules that are biologically relevant. Here, we investigate the similarity between the outputs of a two-player dynamic foraging game (which generated optimal but complex solutions) and a computational simulation of the behaviours of the two members of a foraging pair, who instead followed a rule-of-thumb approximation of the game''s output. The original game generated complex results, and we demonstrate here that the simulations following the much-simplified rules-of-thumb also generate complex results, suggesting that the rule-of-thumb was sufficient to make some of the model outcomes unpredictable. There was some agreement between both modelling techniques, but some differences arose – particularly when pair members were not identical in how they gained and lost energy. We argue that exploring how rules-of-thumb perform in comparison to their optimal counterparts is an important exercise for biologically validating the output of agent-based models of group behaviour.     

Sexual Selection of Human Cooperative Behaviour: An Experimental Study in Rural Senegal

Human cooperation in large groups and between non-kin individuals remains a Darwinian puzzle. Investigations into whether and how sexual selection is involved in the evolution of cooperation represent a new and important research direction. Here, 69 groups of four men or four women recruited from a rural population in Senegal played a sequential public-good game in the presence of out-group observers, either of the same sex or of the opposite sex. At the end of the game, participants could donate part of their gain to the village school in the presence of the same observers. Both contributions to the public good and donations to the school, which reflect different components of cooperativeness, were influenced by the sex of the observers. The results suggest that in this non-Western population, sexual selection acts mainly on men’s cooperative behaviour with non-kin, whereas women’s cooperativeness is mainly influenced by nonsexual social selection.