The evolution of punishment in n-player public goods games: a volunteer's dilemma

The evolution of punishment to stabilize cooperation in n-player games has been treated as a second-order social dilemma, where contributions to punishment of free-riders are altruistic. Hence it may only evolve under highly restricted conditions. Here, we build on recent insights using the volunteer's dilemma as an alternative payoff matrix for the evolution of cooperation. The key feature of a volunteer's dilemma is that the benefits of cooperation are a nonlinear function of the number of contributors, meaning that cooperation is negatively frequency dependent. We propose that nonlinear returns are also an inherent feature of punishment and that this insight allows for a simple and novel explanation of how punishment evolves in groups.     

Sex-biased dispersal of adults mediates the evolution of altruism among juveniles

Population viscosity has been proposed as an important mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. The idea is that if individuals do not disperse far during the course of their lives, they will tend to interact with their genealogical relatives, which may give kin-selected benefits for cooperation. However, in the simplest model of population structure, the evolution of cooperation is unaffected by the rate of dispersal, owing to dispersal also mediating competition between social partners. This surprising result has generated much research interest in recent years. Here I show that dispersal does matter if there is a sex difference in dispersal rate, even when the expression of cooperation is not conditional upon the actor's dispersal status or sex. In particular, I show that cooperation among juveniles is relatively favoured when there is a small sex bias in adult dispersal in favour of the sex with the greatest variance in reproductive success, and is relatively disfavoured when this sex bias is large or in the opposite direction. This is because dispersal by individuals of each sex can have different consequences for the genetic structure of the population.     

Indirect reciprocity and the evolution of “moral signals”

Signals regarding the behavior of others are an essential element of human moral systems and there are important evolutionary connections between language and large-scale cooperation. In particular, social communication may be required for the reputation tracking needed to stabilize indirect reciprocity. Additionally, scholars have suggested that the benefits of indirect reciprocity may have been important for the evolution of language and that social signals may have coevolved with large-scale cooperation. This paper investigates the possibility of such a coevolution. Using the tools of evolutionary game theory, we present a model that incorporates primitive “moral signaling” into a simple setting of indirect reciprocity. This model reveals some potential difficulties for the evolution of “moral signals.” We find that it is possible for “moral signals” to evolve alongside indirect reciprocity, but without some external pressure aiding the evolution of a signaling system, such a coevolution is unlikely.     

When cooperation begets cooperation: the role of key individuals in galvanizing support

Life abounds with examples of conspecifics actively cooperating to a common end, despite conflicts of interest being expected concerning how much each individual should contribute. Mathematical models typically find that such conflict can be resolved by partial-response strategies, leading investors to contribute relatively equitably. Using a case study approach, we show that such model expectations can be contradicted in at least four disparate contexts: (i) bi-parental care; (ii) cooperative breeding; (iii) cooperative hunting; and (iv) human cooperation. We highlight that: (a) marked variation in contributions is commonplace; and (b) individuals can often respond positively rather than negatively to the contributions of others. Existing models have surprisingly limited power in explaining these phenomena. Here, we propose that, although among-individual variation in cooperative contributions will be influenced by differential costs and benefits, there is likely to be a strong genetic or epigenetic component. We then suggest that selection can maintain high investors (key individuals) when their contributions promote support by increasing the benefits and/or reducing the costs for others. Our intentions are to raise awareness in—and provide testable hypotheses of—two of the most poorly understood, yet integral, questions regarding cooperative ventures: why do individuals vary in their contributions and when does cooperation beget cooperation?     

Demography,life history and the evolution of age‐dependent social behaviour

Since the inception of modern social evolution theory, a vast majority of studies have sought to explain cooperation using relatedness‐driven hypotheses. Natural populations, however, show a substantial amount of variation in social behaviour that is uncorrelated with relatedness. Age offers a major alternative explanation for variation in behaviour that remains unaccounted for. Most natural populations are structured into age‐classes, with ageing being a nearly universal feature of most major taxa, including eukaryotic and prokaryotic organisms. Despite this, the theoretical underpinnings of age‐dependent social behaviour remain limited. Here, I investigate how group age‐composition, demography and life history shape trajectories of age‐dependent behaviours that are expressed conditionally on an actor and recipient's age. I show that demography introduces novel age‐dependent selective pressures acting on social phenotypes. Furthermore, I find that life history traits influence the costs and benefits of cooperation directly, but also indirectly. Life history has a strong impact not only on the genetic structure of the population but also on the distribution of group age‐compositions, with both of these processes influencing the expression of age‐dependent cooperation. Age of peak reproductive performance, in particular, is of chief importance for the evolution of cooperation, as this will largely determine the age and relatedness of social partners. Moreover, my results suggest that later‐life reproductive senescence may occur because of demographic effects alone, which opens new vistas on the evolution of menopause and related phenomena.     

Mutual benefit cooperation and ethnic cultural diversity

We show that mutual benefit cooperation can favor the evolution of a preference to interact with individuals that are similar to themselves with respect to one or several arbitrary cultural tags. One necessary requisite to obtain this result is an asymmetry between partners in such a way that one of them (actor) proposes the cooperation and elects the partner, whereas the other (receiver) never rejects the offer because cooperation always reports benefits. The advantage of individuals possessing allele for preferential assortment is due to receiving more offers of mutually beneficial cooperation when there is linkage disequilibrium between the assortment locus and the cultural tags. An especially favorable scenario for the evolution of such preference is a subdivided metapopulation. In this case, the homogeneity within populations and the divergence between populations is favored, facilitating the existence of ethnic groups.     

Self-structuring in spatial evolutionary ecology

Spatial self-structuring has been a focus of recent interest among evolutionary ecologists. We review recent developments in the study of the interplay between spatial self-structuring and evolution. We first discuss the relative merits of the various theoretical approaches to spatial modelling in ecology. Second, we synthesize the main theoretical studies of the evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations. We show that population viscosity is generally beneficial to cooperation, because cooperators can reap additional benefits from being clustered. A similar mechanism can explain the evolution of honest communication and of reduced virulence in host–parasite interactions. We also discuss some recent innovative empirical results that test these theories. Third, we show the relevance of these results to the general field of evolutionary ecology. An important conclusion is that kin selection is the main process that drives evolution of cooperation in viscous populations. Many results of kin selection theory can be recovered as emergent properties of spatial ecological dynamics. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of multilevel selection and evolutionary transitions. We conclude by sketching some perspectives for future research, with a particular emphasis on the topics of evolutionary branching, criticality, spatial fluctuations and experimental tests of theoretical predictions.     

Positive feedback and alternative stable states in inbreeding, cooperation, sex roles and other evolutionary processes

A large proportion of studies in systems science focus on processes involving a mixture of positive and negative feedbacks, which are also common themes in evolutionary ecology. Examples of negative feedback are density dependence (population regulation) and frequency-dependent selection (polymorphisms). Positive feedback, in turn, plays a role in Fisherian 'runaway' sexual selection, the evolution of cooperation, selfing and inbreeding tolerance under purging of deleterious alleles, and the evolution of sex differences in parental care. All these examples feature self-reinforcing processes where the increase in the value of a trait selects for further increases, sometimes via a coevolutionary feedback loop with another trait. Positive feedback often leads to alternative stable states (evolutionary endpoints), making the interpretation of evolutionary predictions challenging. Here, we discuss conceptual issues such as the relationship between self-reinforcing selection and disruptive selection. We also present an extension of a previous model on parental care, focusing on the relationship between the operational sex ratio and sexual selection, and the influence of this relationship on the evolution of biparental or uniparental care.     

Cooperating in the face of uncertainty: a consistent framework for understanding the evolution of cooperation

The evolution of cooperative behaviour, whereby individuals enhance the fitness of others at an apparent cost to themselves, represents one of the greatest paradoxes of evolution. Individuals that engage in such cooperative behaviour can, however, be favoured by natural selection if cooperative actions confer higher fitness than alternative actions. To understand the evolution of cooperative behaviour, the direct and indirect genetic benefits that individuals accrue in the present and future must be summed - this can be accomplished without any reference to the colorful vocabulary typically associated with studies of cooperation. When benefits are accrued indirectly through relatives or directly in the future individuals must be able to assess and enhance their probability of accruing those benefits and behave accordingly. We suggest that, in the same way that studies of kin recognition systems improved our understanding of how individuals assess and enhance their probability of accruing indirect benefits, studies of various forms of inheritance and reciprocation recognition systems will improve our understanding of how individuals assess and enhance their probability of accruing future benefits. Recognizing the parallel between studies of indirect fitness and future fitness, at multiple levels of analysis, will move us toward a simpler and more consistent framework for understanding the evolution of cooperative behaviour.     

Social heterosis and the maintenance of genetic diversity

Genetic diversity in species is often high in spite of directional selection or strong genetic drift. One resolution to this paradox may be through fitness benefits arising from interactions of genetically diverse individuals. Advantageous phenotypes that are impossible in single individuals (e.g. being simultaneously bold and shy) can be expressed by groups composed of genetically different individuals. Genetic diversity, therefore, can produce mutualistic benefits shared by all group members. We define this effect as 'social heterosis', and mathematically demonstrate maintenance of allelic diversity when diverse groups or neighbourhoods are more reproductively successful than homogenous ones. Through social heterosis, genetic diversity persists without: frequency dependence within groups, migration, balancing selection, genetic linkages, overdominance, antagonistic pleiotropy or nonrandom allele assortment. Social heterosis may also offer an alternative evolutionary pathway to cooperation that does not require clustering of related individuals, nepotistic favouritism towards kin, or overt reciprocity.     

Natural selection on a polymorphic disease-resistance locus in Ipomoea purpurea

Although disease-resistance polymorphisms are common in natural plant populations, the mechanisms responsible for this variation are not well understood. Theoretical models predict that balancing selection can maintain polymorphism within a population if the fitness effects of a resistance allele vary from a net cost to a net benefit, depending upon the extent of pathogen damage. However, there have been a few attempts to determine how commonly this mechanism operates in natural plant-pathogen interactions. Ipomoea purpurea populations are often polymorphic for resistance and susceptibility alleles at a locus that influences resistance to the fungal pathogen, Coleosporium ipomoeae. We measured the fitness effects of resistance over three consecutive years at natural and manipulated levels of damage to characterize the type of selection acting on this locus. Costs of resistance varied in magnitude from undetectable to 15.5%, whereas benefits of resistance sometimes equaled, but never exceeded, these costs. In the absence of net benefits of resistance at natural or elevated levels of disease, we conclude that selection within individual populations of I. purpurea probably does not account completely for maintenance of this polymorphism. Rather, the persistence of this polymorphism is probably best explained by a combination of variable selection and meta-population processes.     

Balancing Selection in Species with Separate Sexes: Insights from Fisher’s Geometric Model

How common is balancing selection, and what fraction of phenotypic variance is attributable to balanced polymorphisms? Despite decades of research, answers to these questions remain elusive. Moreover, there is no clear theoretical prediction about the frequency with which balancing selection is expected to arise within a population. Here, we use an extension of Fisher’s geometric model of adaptation to predict the probability of balancing selection in a population with separate sexes, wherein polymorphism is potentially maintained by two forms of balancing selection: (1) heterozygote advantage, where heterozygous individuals at a locus have higher fitness than homozygous individuals, and (2) sexually antagonistic selection (a.k.a. intralocus sexual conflict), where the fitness of each sex is maximized by different genotypes at a locus. We show that balancing selection is common under biologically plausible conditions and that sex differences in selection or sex-by-genotype effects of mutations can each increase opportunities for balancing selection. Although heterozygote advantage and sexual antagonism represent alternative mechanisms for maintaining polymorphism, they mutually exist along a balancing selection continuum that depends on population and sex-specific parameters of selection and mutation. Sexual antagonism is the dominant mode of balancing selection across most of this continuum.     

Multilevel selection analysis of a microbial social trait

The study of microbial communities often leads to arguments for the evolution of cooperation due to group benefits. However, multilevel selection models caution against the uncritical assumption that group benefits will lead to the evolution of cooperation. We analyze a microbial social trait to precisely define the conditions favoring cooperation. We combine the multilevel partition of the Price equation with a laboratory model system: swarming in Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We parameterize a population dynamics model using competition experiments where we manipulate expression, and therefore the cost‐to‐benefit ratio of swarming cooperation. Our analysis shows that multilevel selection can favor costly swarming cooperation because it causes population expansion. However, due to high costs and diminishing returns constitutive cooperation can only be favored by natural selection when relatedness is high. Regulated expression of cooperative genes is a more robust strategy because it provides the benefits of swarming expansion without the high cost or the diminishing returns. Our analysis supports the key prediction that strong group selection does not necessarily mean that microbial cooperation will always emerge.     

Evolutionary games of cooperation: Insights through integration of theory and data

Cooperation is central to the regulation of many ecological processes and the persistence of ecosystems and their associated functions. However, the evolution of cooperation amongst non-kin appears paradoxical. Games such as the prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift and stag hunt have been borrowed from game theory and used extensively to investigate cooperation. Advances in this area have been numerous and have been provided by both empirical and theoretical studies. We outline some of the common games used and review some of the major findings and recent advancements made in this area. We show a clear link between data and theory, and how this link has been key to our understanding of cooperation.     

Long-term familiarity promotes joining in neighbour nest defence

Familiarity plays an important role in the evolution of sociality and cooperation. Familiar individuals may gain a reputation for participating in, or defecting from, cooperative tasks. Previous research suggests that long-term familiarity with territorial neighbours benefits breeders. We tested the hypothesis that great tits (Parus major) are more likely to join in neighbours' nest defence if those neighbours are familiar from the previous year. We show that neighbours that shared a territory boundary the previous year are more likely to join their neighbours' nest defence than neighbours that did not share a boundary before. Closer neighbours did not differ from distant neighbours in their latency to join. For familiar neighbours that joined, there was no difference in call rate in relation to whether one or both members of the focal pair were familiar. First-time breeders (by definition unfamiliar) did not join each other's nest defence. This is the first evidence of a relationship between familiarity and joining in nest defence. Such direct benefits of familiarity may have important implications in the evolution of sociality.     

Evolution and the classification of social behavior

Recent studies in the evolution of cooperation have shifted focus from altruistic to mutualistic cooperation. This change in focus is purported to reveal new explanations for the evolution of prosocial behavior. We argue that the common classification scheme for social behavior used to distinguish between altruistic and mutualistic cooperation is flawed because it fails to take into account dynamically relevant game-theoretic features. This leads some arguments about the evolution of cooperation to conflate dynamical scenarios that differ regarding the basic conditions on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We use the tools of evolutionary game theory to increase the resolution of the classification scheme and analyze what evolutionary inferences classifying social behavior can license.     

Detecting the molecular signature of social conflict: theory and a test with bacterial quorum sensing genes

Extending social evolution theory to the molecular level opens the door to an unparalleled abundance of data and statistical tools for testing alternative hypotheses about the long-term evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and conflict. To this end, we take a collection of known sociality genes (bacterial quorum sensing [QS] genes), model their evolution in terms of patterns that are detectable using gene sequence data, and then test model predictions using available genetic data sets. Specifically, we test two alternative hypotheses of social conflict: (1) the "adaptive" hypothesis that cheaters are maintained in natural populations by frequency-dependent balancing selection as an evolutionarily stable strategy and (2) the "evolutionary null" hypothesis that cheaters are opposed by purifying kin selection yet exist transiently because of their recurrent introduction into populations by mutation (i.e., kin selection-mutation balance). We find that QS genes have elevated within- and among-species sequence variation, nonsignificant signatures of natural selection, and putatively small effect sizes of mutant alleles, all patterns predicted by our evolutionary null model but not by the stable cheater hypothesis. These empirical findings support our theoretical prediction that QS genes experience relaxed selection due to nonclonality of social groups, conditional expression, and the individual-level advantage enjoyed by cheaters. Furthermore, cheaters are evolutionarily transient, persisting in populations because of their recurrent introduction by mutation and not because they enjoy a frequency-dependent fitness advantage.     

The evolution of cooperation and altruism--a general framework and a classification of models

One of the enduring puzzles in biology and the social sciences is the origin and persistence of intraspecific cooperation and altruism in humans and other species. Hundreds of theoretical models have been proposed and there is much confusion about the relationship between these models. To clarify the situation, we developed a synthetic conceptual framework that delineates the conditions necessary for the evolution of altruism and cooperation. We show that at least one of the four following conditions needs to be fulfilled: direct benefits to the focal individual performing a cooperative act; direct or indirect information allowing a better than random guess about whether a given individual will behave cooperatively in repeated reciprocal interactions; preferential interactions between related individuals; and genetic correlation between genes coding for altruism and phenotypic traits that can be identified. When one or more of these conditions are met, altruism or cooperation can evolve if the cost-to-benefit ratio of altruistic and cooperative acts is greater than a threshold value. The cost-to-benefit ratio can be altered by coercion, punishment and policing which therefore act as mechanisms facilitating the evolution of altruism and cooperation. All the models proposed so far are explicitly or implicitly built on these general principles, allowing us to classify them into four general categories.     

Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict

Understanding how societies resolve conflicts between individual and common interests remains one of the most fundamental issues across disciplines. The observation that humans readily incur costs to sanction uncooperative individuals without tangible individual benefits has attracted considerable attention as a proximate cause as to why cooperative behaviours might evolve. However, the proliferation of individually costly punishment has been difficult to explain. Several studies over the last decade employing experimental designs with isolated groups have found clear evidence that the costs of punishment often nullify the benefits of increased cooperation, rendering the strong human tendency to punish a thorny evolutionary puzzle. Here, we show that group competition enhances the effectiveness of punishment so that when groups are in direct competition, individuals belonging to a group with punishment opportunity prevail over individuals in a group without this opportunity. In addition to competitive superiority in between-group competition, punishment reduces within-group variation in success, creating circumstances that are highly favourable for the evolution of accompanying group-functional behaviours. We find that the individual willingness to engage in costly punishment increases with tightening competitive pressure between groups. Our results suggest the importance of intergroup conflict behind the emergence of costly punishment and human cooperation.     

Repression of competition favours cooperation: experimental evidence from bacteria

Repression of competition (RC) within social groups has been suggested as a key mechanism driving the evolution of cooperation, because it aligns the individual’s proximate interest with the interest of the group. Despite its enormous potential for explaining cooperation across all levels of biological organization, ranging from fair meiosis, to policing in insect societies, to sanctions in mutualistic interactions between species, there has been no direct experimental test of whether RC favours the spread of cooperators in a well‐mixed population with cheats. To address this, we carried out an experimental evolution study to test the effect of RC upon a cooperative trait – the production of iron‐scavenging siderophore molecules – in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We found that cooperation was favoured when competition between siderophore producers and nonsiderophore‐producing cheats was repressed, but not in a treatment where competition between the two strains was permitted. We further show that RC altered the cost of cooperation, but did not affect the relatedness among interacting individuals. This confirms that RC per se, as opposed to increased relatedness, has driven the observed increase in bacterial cooperation.