Repression of competition favours cooperation: experimental evidence from bacteria

Repression of competition (RC) within social groups has been suggested as a key mechanism driving the evolution of cooperation, because it aligns the individual’s proximate interest with the interest of the group. Despite its enormous potential for explaining cooperation across all levels of biological organization, ranging from fair meiosis, to policing in insect societies, to sanctions in mutualistic interactions between species, there has been no direct experimental test of whether RC favours the spread of cooperators in a well‐mixed population with cheats. To address this, we carried out an experimental evolution study to test the effect of RC upon a cooperative trait – the production of iron‐scavenging siderophore molecules – in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We found that cooperation was favoured when competition between siderophore producers and nonsiderophore‐producing cheats was repressed, but not in a treatment where competition between the two strains was permitted. We further show that RC altered the cost of cooperation, but did not affect the relatedness among interacting individuals. This confirms that RC per se, as opposed to increased relatedness, has driven the observed increase in bacterial cooperation.     

Cooperation in humans: competition between groups and proximate emotions

Understanding the ultimate and proximate mechanisms that favour cooperation remains one of the greatest challenges in the biological and social sciences. A number of theoretical studies have suggested that competition between groups may have played a key role in the evolution of cooperation within human societies, and similar ideas have been discussed for other organisms, especially cooperative breeding vertebrates. However, there is a relative lack of empirical work testing these ideas. Our experiment found, in public goods games with humans, that when groups competed with other groups for financial rewards, individuals made larger contributions within their own groups. In such situations, participants were more likely to regard their group mates as collaborators rather than competitors. Variation in contribution among individuals, either with or without intergroup competition, was positively correlated with individuals' propensity to regard group mates as collaborators. We found that the levels of both guilt and anger individuals experienced were a function of their own contributions and those of their group mates. Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that the level of cooperation can be influenced by proximate emotions, which vary with the degree of intergroup competition.     

Sex-biased dispersal of adults mediates the evolution of altruism among juveniles

Population viscosity has been proposed as an important mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. The idea is that if individuals do not disperse far during the course of their lives, they will tend to interact with their genealogical relatives, which may give kin-selected benefits for cooperation. However, in the simplest model of population structure, the evolution of cooperation is unaffected by the rate of dispersal, owing to dispersal also mediating competition between social partners. This surprising result has generated much research interest in recent years. Here I show that dispersal does matter if there is a sex difference in dispersal rate, even when the expression of cooperation is not conditional upon the actor's dispersal status or sex. In particular, I show that cooperation among juveniles is relatively favoured when there is a small sex bias in adult dispersal in favour of the sex with the greatest variance in reproductive success, and is relatively disfavoured when this sex bias is large or in the opposite direction. This is because dispersal by individuals of each sex can have different consequences for the genetic structure of the population.     

A Critique of R.D. Alexander's Views on Group Selection

Group selection is increasingly being viewed as an important force in human evolution. This paper examines the views of R.D. Alexander, one of the most influential thinkers about human behavior from an evolutionary perspective, on the subject of group selection. Alexander's general conception of evolution is based on the gene-centered approach of G.C. Williams, but he has also emphasized a potential role for group selection in the evolution of individual genomes and in human evolution. Alexander's views are internally inconsistent and underestimate the importance of group selection. Specific themes that Alexander has developed in his account of human evolution are important but are best understood within the framework of multilevel selection theory. From this perspective, Alexander's views on moral systems are not the radical departure from conventional views that he claims, but remain radical in another way more compatible with conventional views.     

The evolution of costly displays,cooperation and religion: credibility enhancing displays and their implications for cultural evolution

This paper lays out an evolutionary theory for the cognitive foundations and cultural emergence of the extravagant displays (e.g., ritual mutilation, animal sacrifice and martyrdom) that have so tantalized social scientists, as well as more mundane actions that influence cultural learning and historical processes. In Part I, I use the logic of natural selection to build a theory for how and why seemingly costly displays influence the cognitive processes associated with cultural learning — why do “actions speak louder than words?” The core idea is that cultural learners can both avoid being manipulated by their models (those they are inclined to learn from) and more accurately assess their belief commitment by attending to displays or actions by the model that would seem costly to the model if he held beliefs different from those he expresses verbally. Part II examines the implications for cultural evolution of this learning bias in a simple evolutionary model. The model reveals the conditions under which this evolved bias can create stable sets of interlocking beliefs and practices, including quite costly practices. Part III explores how cultural evolution, driven by competition among groups or institutions stabilized at alternative sets of these interlocking belief-practice combinations, has led to the association of costly acts, often in the form of rituals, with deeper commitments to group beneficial ideologies, higher levels of cooperation within groups, and greater success in competition with other groups or institutions. I close by discussing the broader implications of these ideas for understanding various aspects of religious phenomena.     

Living with relatives: lessons from avian family systems*

Family-dwelling birds provide excellent opportunities for testing evolutionary predictions about social interactions among relatives. Their combination of behavioural complexity with cultural simplicity makes them ideal model systems in which to search for fundamental biological rules of social interaction. In this plenary, I provide a personalized overview of current thinking about both the evolution of families and the social dynamics to be expected among family members. Using an adaptationist/economic approach that uses fitness as its currency, I develop a set of 15 predictions about family formation, family stability, familial cooperation, familial competition and conflict resolution among kin. I argue that knowledge of four basic parameters, genetic relatedness, social dominance, the benefits of group living and the probable success of independent reproduction, can explain many aspects of family life in birds. I further suggest that this evolutionary perspective is generalizable across taxa and will provide new insights into understanding animal family systems in other species, including our own.     

Resource and competitive dynamics shape the benefits of public goods cooperation in a plant pathogen

Cooperative benefits depend on a variety of ecological factors. Many cooperative bacteria increase the population size of their groups by making a public good available. Increased local population size can alleviate the constraints of kin competition on the evolution of cooperation by enhancing the between-group fitness of cooperators. The cooperative pathogenesis of Agrobacterium tumefaciens causes infected plants to exude opines--resources that provide a nearly exclusive source of nutrient for the pathogen. We experimentally demonstrate that opines provide cooperative A. tumefaciens cells a within-group fitness advantage over saprophytic agrobacteria. Our results are congruent with a resource-consumer competition model, which predicts that cooperative, virulent agrobacteria are at a competitive disadvantage when opines are unavailable, but have an advantage when opines are available at sufficient levels. This model also predicts that freeloading agrobacteria that catabolize opines but cannot infect plants competitively displace the cooperative pathogen from all environments. However, we show that these cooperative public goods also promote increased local population size. A model built from the Price Equation shows that this effect on group size can contribute to the persistence of cooperative pathogenesis despite inherent kin competition for the benefits of pathogenesis.     

Demography and the tragedy of the commons

Individual success in group‐structured populations has two components. First, an individual gains by outcompeting its neighbours for local resources. Second, an individual's share of group success must be weighted by the total productivity of the group. The essence of sociality arises from the tension between selfish gains against neighbours and the associated loss that selfishness imposes by degrading the efficiency of the group. Without some force to modulate selfishness, the natural tendencies of self interest typically degrade group performance to the detriment of all. This is the tragedy of the commons. Kin selection provides the most widely discussed way in which the tragedy is overcome in biology. Kin selection arises from behavioural associations within groups caused either by genetical kinship or by other processes that correlate the behaviours of group members. Here, I emphasize demography as a second factor that may also modulate the tragedy of the commons and favour cooperative integration of groups. Each act of selfishness or cooperation in a group often influences group survival and fecundity over many subsequent generations. For example, a cooperative act early in the growth cycle of a colony may enhance the future size and survival of the colony. This time‐dependent benefit can greatly increase the degree of cooperation favoured by natural selection, providing another way in which to overcome the tragedy of the commons and enhance the integration of group behaviour. I conclude that analyses of sociality must account for both the behavioural associations of kin selection theory and the demographic consequences of life history theory.     

The history of Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution

This paper traces the historical origins of Friedrich A. Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution, and argues that Hayek’s evolutionary thought was significantly inspired by Alexander M. Carr-Saunders and Oxford zoology. While traditional Hayek scholarship emphasizes the influence of Carl Menger and the British eighteenth-century moral philosophers, I claim that these sources underdetermine what was most characteristic of Hayek’s theory, viz. the idea that cultural evolution is a matter of group selection, and the idea that natural selection operates on acquired as well as on inherited properties.     

The cancellation effect at the group level

Group selection models combine selection pressure at the individual level with selection pressure at the group level. Cooperation can be costly for individuals, but beneficial for the group, and therefore, if individuals are sufficiently much assorted, and cooperators find themselves in groups with disproportionately many other cooperators, cooperation can evolve. The existing literature on group selection generally assumes that competition between groups takes place in a well-mixed population of groups, where any group competes with any other group equally intensely. Competition between groups however might very well occur locally; groups may compete more intensely with nearby than with far-away groups. We show that if competition between groups is indeed local, then the evolution of cooperation can be hindered significantly by the fact that groups with many cooperators will mostly compete against neighboring groups that are also highly cooperative, and therefore harder to outcompete. The existing empirical method for determining how conducive a group structured population is to the evolution of cooperation also implicitly assumes global between-group competition, and therefore gives (possibly very) biased estimates.     

EVOLUTION OF HELPING AND HARMING IN HETEROGENEOUS GROUPS

Social groups are often composed of individuals who differ in many respects. Theoretical studies on the evolution of helping and harming behaviors have largely focused upon genetic differences between individuals. However, nongenetic variation between group members is widespread in natural populations, and may mediate differences in individuals’ social behavior. Here, we develop a framework to study how variation in individual quality mediates the evolution of unconditional and conditional social traits. We investigate the scope for the evolution of social traits that are conditional on the quality of the actor and/or recipients. We find that asymmetries in individual quality can lead to the evolution of plastic traits with different individuals expressing helping and harming traits within the same group. In this context, population viscosity can mediate the evolution of social traits, and local competition can promote both helping and harming behaviors. Furthermore, asymmetries in individual quality can lead to the evolution of competition‐like traits between clonal individuals. Overall, we highlight the importance of asymmetries in individual quality, including differences in reproductive value and the ability to engage in successful social interactions, in mediating the evolution of helping and harming behaviors.     

No unique effect of intergroup competition on cooperation: non-competitive thresholds are as effective as competitions between groups for increasing human cooperative behavior

Explaining cooperation remains a central topic for evolutionary theorists. Many have argued that group selection provides such an explanation: theoretical models show that intergroup competition could have given rise to cooperation that is costly for the individual. Whether group selection actually did play an important role in the evolution of human cooperation, however, is much debated. Recent experiments have shown that intergroup competitions do increase human cooperation, which has been taken as evidence for group selection as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Here we challenge this standard interpretation. Competitions change the payoff structure by creating a threshold effect whereby the group that contributes more earns an additional prize, which creates some incentive for individuals to cooperate. We present four studies that disentangle competition and thresholds, and strongly suggest that it is thresholds – rather than competitions per se – that increase cooperation. Thus, prior intergroup competition experiments provide no evidence of a unique or special role for intergroup competition in promoting human cooperation, and shed no light on whether group selection shaped human evolution.     

FEMALE-BIASED SEX RATIOS: INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP SELECTION?

The evolution of biased sex ratios in a randomly structured population stems from individual selection acting through local parental control (LPC) of the sex ratio and hence of the mating success of the sons and/or daughters. As a general rule, the sex ratio is biased away from the sex whose fitness is most affected by changes in the local sex ratio. This is the sex whose fitness is subject to the most effective parental control. The bias acts to increase the fitness of the rarer, controlled sex and to increase parental productivity. In the specific case of the evolution of the female-biased Hamiltonian ratios, LPC can affect the mating success of sons but has no effect on the success of daughters. It is argued here and elsewhere (Nunney, unpubl.) that group selection can only promote the spread of a genotype through the maintenance of a positive association of individuals of that genotype. The importance of positive association is well established in the special case of kin selection. Given such a definition, group selection plays no part in the evolution of the Hamiltonian sex ratios, although it is possible to conceive of circumstances under which group selection could favor an even more extreme sex ratio bias. In general, such circumstances involve kin selection. It is argued that the examination of differences in group productivity is not a useful way of looking at the process of natural selection, since (i) by dividing up almost any evolving population into random groups, some groups (those with the highest frequency of the fittest individuals) will be more productive than others; and (ii) in the specific case of the evolution of the Hamiltonian ratios, it is possible to develop models either with or without a group structure and get the same result. Hamilton (1967) originally suggested that a female-biased sex ratio arose in his model because of the advantage of reducing local mate competition (specifically, reducing competition between brothers for mates). This possibility was eliminated by developing a model in which competition between the brothers was prevented regardless of the sex ratio. It was found that the optimum sex-ratio strategy was unaffected. On the other hand, the idea of local parental control has, in each case examined, been able to account for the predicted optimum strategy.     

Kin selection and the Evolution of Mutualisms between Species

Hamilton's theory of kin selection has revolutionized and inspired fifty years of additional theories and experiments on social evolution. Whereas Hamilton's broader intent was to explain the evolutionary stability of cooperation, his focus on shared genetic history appears to have limited the application of his theory to populations within a single species rather than across interacting species. The evolutionary mechanisms for cooperation between species require both spatial and temporal correlations among interacting partners for the benefits to be not only predictable but of sufficient duration to be reliably delivered. As a consequence when the benefits returned by mutualistic partners are redirected to individuals other than the original donor, cooperation usually becomes unstable and parasitism may evolve. However, theoretically, such redirection of mutualistic benefits may actually reinforce, rather than undermine, mutualisms between species when the recipients of these redirected benefits are genetically related to the original donor. Here, I review the few mathematical models that have used Hamilton's theory of kin selection to predict the evolution of mutualisms between species. I go on to examine the applicability of these models to the most well‐studied case of mutualism, pollinating seed predators, where the role of kin selection may have been previously overlooked. Future detailed studies of the direct, and indirect, benefits of mutualism are likely to reveal additional possibilities for applying Hamilton's theory of kin selection to mutualisms between species.     

Cooperation and conflict: field experiments in Northern Ireland

The idea that cohesive groups, in which individuals help each other, have a competitive advantage over groups composed of selfish individuals has been widely suggested as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation in humans. Recent theoretical models propose the coevolution of parochial altruism and intergroup conflict, when in-group altruism and out-group hostility contribute to the group''s success in these conflicts. However, the few empirical attempts to test this hypothesis do not use natural groups and conflate measures of in-group and unbiased cooperative behaviour. We conducted field experiments based on naturalistic measures of cooperation (school/charity donations and lost letters'' returns) with two religious groups with an on-going history of conflict—Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Conflict was associated with reduced donations to out-group schools and the return of out-group letters, but we found no evidence that it influences in-group cooperation. Rather, socio-economic status was the major determinant of cooperative behaviour. Our study presents a challenge to dominant perspectives on the origins of human cooperation, and has implications for initiatives aiming to promote conflict resolution and social cohesion.     

THE ENFORCEMENT OF COOPERATION BY POLICING

Policing is regarded as an important mechanism for maintaining cooperation in human and animal social groups. A simple model providing a theoretical overview of the coevolution of policing and cooperation has been analyzed by Frank (1995, 1996b, 2003, 2009) , and this suggests that policing will evolve to fully suppress cheating within social groups when relatedness is low. Here, we relax some of the assumptions made by Frank, and investigate the consequences for policing and cooperation. First, we address the implicit assumption that the individual cost of investment into policing is reduced when selfishness dominates. We find that relaxing this assumption leads to policing being favored only at intermediate relatedness. Second, we address the assumption that policing fully recovers the loss of fitness incurred by the group owing to selfishness. We find that relaxing this assumption prohibits the evolution of full policing. Finally, we consider the impact of demography on the coevolution of policing and cooperation, in particular the role for kin competition to disfavor the evolution of policing, using both a heuristic “open” model and a “closed” island model. We find that large groups and increased kin competition disfavor policing, and that policing is maintained more readily than it invades. Policing may be harder to evolve than previously thought.     

Genetic and molecular analysis of repression in the P-M system of hybrid dysgenesis in Drosophila melanogaster.

Twelve inbred lines derived from an M' strain of Drosophila melanogaster were used to study the repression of P-element-mediated hybrid dysgenesis. Initial assessments indicated that the lines differed in the ability to repress gonadal dysgenesis, and that this ability was highly correlated with the ability to repress snw hypermutability. Later assessments indicated that most of the lines with low or intermediate repression potential evolved to a state of higher repression potential; however, Southern analyses failed to reveal significant changes in the array of genomic P elements that could account for this evolution. In addition, none of the lines possessed the incomplete P element known as KP, which has been proposed to explain repression in some D. melanogaster strains. One of the lines maintained intermediate repression potential throughout the period of study (52 generations), indicating that the intermediate condition was not intrinsically unstable. Genetic analyses demonstrated that in some of the lines, repression potential was influenced by factors that were inherited maternally through at least two generations; however, these factors were not as influential as those in a classic P cytotype strain. Additional tests with a dysgenesis-inducing X chromosome called T-5 indicated that repression itself was mediated by a combination of maternal effects and paternally inherited factors that were expressed after fertilization. These tests also suggested that in some circumstances, the P transposase, or its message, might be transmitted through the maternal cytoplasm.     

Demography,life history and the evolution of age‐dependent social behaviour

Since the inception of modern social evolution theory, a vast majority of studies have sought to explain cooperation using relatedness‐driven hypotheses. Natural populations, however, show a substantial amount of variation in social behaviour that is uncorrelated with relatedness. Age offers a major alternative explanation for variation in behaviour that remains unaccounted for. Most natural populations are structured into age‐classes, with ageing being a nearly universal feature of most major taxa, including eukaryotic and prokaryotic organisms. Despite this, the theoretical underpinnings of age‐dependent social behaviour remain limited. Here, I investigate how group age‐composition, demography and life history shape trajectories of age‐dependent behaviours that are expressed conditionally on an actor and recipient's age. I show that demography introduces novel age‐dependent selective pressures acting on social phenotypes. Furthermore, I find that life history traits influence the costs and benefits of cooperation directly, but also indirectly. Life history has a strong impact not only on the genetic structure of the population but also on the distribution of group age‐compositions, with both of these processes influencing the expression of age‐dependent cooperation. Age of peak reproductive performance, in particular, is of chief importance for the evolution of cooperation, as this will largely determine the age and relatedness of social partners. Moreover, my results suggest that later‐life reproductive senescence may occur because of demographic effects alone, which opens new vistas on the evolution of menopause and related phenomena.     

Asymmetry within social groups: division of labour and intergroup competition

Social animals vary in their ability to compete with group members over shared resources and also vary in their cooperative efforts to produce these resources. Competition among groups can promote within‐group cooperation, but many existing models of intergroup cooperation do not explicitly account for observations that group members invest differentially in cooperation and that there are often within‐group competitive or power asymmetries. We present a game theoretic model of intergroup competition that investigates how such asymmetries affect within‐group cooperation. In this model, group members adopt one of two roles, with relative competitive efficiency and the number of individuals varying between roles. Players in each role make simultaneous, coevolving decisions. The model predicts that although intergroup competition increases cooperative contributions to group resources by both roles, contributions are predominantly from individuals in the less competitively efficient role, whereas individuals in the more competitively efficient role generally gain the larger share of these resources. When asymmetry in relative competitive efficiency is greater, a group's per capita cooperation (averaged across both roles) is higher, due to increased cooperation from the competitively inferior individuals. For extreme asymmetry in relative competitive efficiency, per capita cooperation is highest in groups with a single competitively superior individual and many competitively inferior individuals, because the latter acquiesce and invest in cooperation rather than within‐group competition. These predictions are consistent with observed features of many societies, such as monogynous Hymenoptera with many workers and caste dimorphism.