An evolutionary computational theory of prefrontal executive function in decision-making

The prefrontal cortex subserves executive control and decision-making, that is, the coordination and selection of thoughts and actions in the service of adaptive behaviour. We present here a computational theory describing the evolution of the prefrontal cortex from rodents to humans as gradually adding new inferential Bayesian capabilities for dealing with a computationally intractable decision problem: exploring and learning new behavioural strategies versus exploiting and adjusting previously learned ones through reinforcement learning (RL). We provide a principled account identifying three inferential steps optimizing this arbitration through the emergence of (i) factual reactive inferences in paralimbic prefrontal regions in rodents; (ii) factual proactive inferences in lateral prefrontal regions in primates and (iii) counterfactual reactive and proactive inferences in human frontopolar regions. The theory clarifies the integration of model-free and model-based RL through the notion of strategy creation. The theory also shows that counterfactual inferences in humans yield to the notion of hypothesis testing, a critical reasoning ability for approximating optimal adaptive processes and presumably endowing humans with a qualitative evolutionary advantage in adaptive behaviour.     

Counterfactual Reasoning Deficits in Schizophrenia Patients

Background

Counterfactual thinking is a specific type of conditional reasoning that enables the generation of mental simulations of alternatives to past factual events. Although it has been broadly studied in the general population, research on schizophrenia is still scarce. The aim of the current study was to further examine counterfactual reasoning in this illness.

Methods

Forty schizophrenia patients and 40 controls completed a series of tests that assessed the influence of the “causal order effect” on counterfactual thinking, and the ability to generate counterfactual thoughts and counterfactually derive inferences from a hypothetical situation. Socio-demographic and clinical characteristics, as well as neurocognitive variables, were also examined.

Results

Compared to controls, the schizophrenia patients generated fewer counterfactual thoughts when faced with a simulated scenario. The pattern of response when assessing the causality effect of the order was also different between the groups, with the patients being more frequently unable to attribute any ordering of events than the control subjects. Additionally, the schizophrenia patients showed more difficulties when deriving normative counterfactual inferences from hypothetical social situations. None of the counterfactual reasoning measures was associated to any of the cognitive functions or clinical and socio-demographic variables assessed.

Conclusions

A global impairment in counterfactual thinking characterizes schizophrenia patients. Because of the potential impact of such deficits on psychosocial functioning, targeting counterfactual reasoning for improvement might be considered in future treatment approaches.     

A cognitive neuroscience framework for understanding causal reasoning and the law

Over the past couple of decades, there have been great developments in the fields of psychology and cognitive neuroscience that have allowed the advancement of our understanding of how people make judgements about causality in several domains. We provide a review of some of the contemporary psychological models of causal thinking that are directly relevant to legal reasoning. In addition, we cover some exciting new research using advanced neuroimaging techniques that have helped to uncover the underlying neural signatures of complex causal reasoning. Through the use of functional imaging, we provide a first-hand look at how the brain responds to evidence that is either consistent or inconsistent with one's beliefs and expectations. Based on the data covered in this review, we propose some ideas for how the effectiveness of causal reasoning, especially as it pertains to legal decision-making, may be facilitated.     

Counterfactual choice and learning in a neural network centered on human lateral frontopolar cortex

Decision making and learning in a real-world context require organisms to track not only the choices they make and the outcomes that follow but also other untaken, or counterfactual, choices and their outcomes. Although the neural system responsible for tracking the value of choices actually taken is increasingly well understood, whether a neural system tracks counterfactual information is currently unclear. Using a three-alternative decision-making task, a Bayesian reinforcement-learning algorithm, and fMRI, we investigated the coding of counterfactual choices and prediction errors in the human brain. Rather than representing evidence favoring multiple counterfactual choices, lateral frontal polar cortex (lFPC), dorsomedial frontal cortex (DMFC), and posteromedial cortex (PMC) encode the reward-based evidence favoring the best counterfactual option at future decisions. In addition to encoding counterfactual reward expectations, the network carries a signal for learning about counterfactual options when feedback is available-a counterfactual prediction error. Unlike other brain regions that have been associated with the processing of counterfactual outcomes, counterfactual prediction errors within the identified network cannot be related to regret theory. Furthermore, individual variation in counterfactual choice-related activity and prediction error-related activity, respectively, predicts variation in the propensity to switch to profitable choices in the future and the ability to learn from hypothetical feedback. Taken together, these data provide both neural and behavioral evidence to support the existence of a previously unidentified neural system responsible for tracking both counterfactual choice options and their outcomes.     

Darwinian functions and Freudian motivations

Badcock, and Nesse and Lloyd, have argued that there are important points of agreement between Freud's theory of the mind and a theory of mind suggested by adaptive reasoning. Buller, on the other hand, draws attention to the need to avoid confusing an adaptive rationale with an unconscious motivation. The present paper attempts to indicate what role adaptive reasoning might have to play in justifying psychoanalytic claims. First, it is argued that psychoanalytic claims cannot be justified by the clinical experience of psychoanalysts alone. It is urged that, to avoid interpretative proliferation, it is necessary to base interpretation on some theory which is external to psychoanalysis. Next, Buller's reservations about using adaptive reasoning to justify claims about a personal unconscious, are summarized. Then an argument for the existence of a personal unconscious, is offered, based on experimental evidence from Gur and Sackeim. Then it is argued that adaptive reasoning, though it cannot itself provide evidence for the existence of any psychological mechanism, can valuably guide the search for such evidence. It is argued that such an approach has borne fruit, both in biology generally and specifically in psychology. Finally, it is argued that psychoanalysis is important enough to justify such a research project.     

Vatted dreams: neurophilosophy and the politics of phenomenal internalism

Despite much social‐scientific work on the neurosciences, little ethnographic and historical attention has been paid to the field of neurophilosophy. Yet anthropologists studying brain research occasionally critique neurophilosophers for reducing the mind to the brain while affirmatively citing philosophers of mind who present the mind as emerging from interactions between brain, body, and environment. This article examines the ostracized camp of so‐called ‘phenomenal internalists’ – neurophilosophers who believe that consciousness can supervene on the brain alone. This ontological commitment is driven by certain existential and political experiences from false awakenings to disenchantment with the counterculture of the 1970s. But it also draws from neuroscientific research on the dreaming brain. The inquiry concludes with a plea to anthropologists to attend to relations of detachment, both social and neural, and to reconsider their own ontological commitment to externalism in the light of dream research.     

Sharing death and dying: advance directives, autonomy and the family

This paper critically examines the liberal model of decision making for the terminally ill and contrasts it with the familial model that can be found in some Asian cultures. The contrast between the two models shows that the liberal model is excessively patient-centered, and misconceives and marginalises the role of the family in the decision making process. The paper argues that the familial model is correct in conceiving the last journey of one's life as a sharing process rather than a process of exercising one's prior or counterfactual choice, and concludes by suggesting a policy framework for the practice of familialism that can answer the liberal challenge that familialism cannot safeguard the patient from abuse and neglect.     

Detecting agents

This paper reviews a recent set of behavioural studies that examine the scope and nature of the representational system underlying theory-of-mind development. Studies with typically developing infants, adults and children with autism all converge on the claim that there is a specialized input system that uses not only morphological cues, but also behavioural cues to categorize novel objects as agents. Evidence is reviewed in which 12- to 15-month-old infants treat certain non-human objects as if they have perceptual/attentional abilities, communicative abilities and goal-directed behaviour. They will follow the attentional orientation of an amorphously shaped novel object if it interacts contingently with them or with another person. They also seem to use a novel object's environmentally directed behaviour to determine its perceptual/attentional orientation and object-oriented goals. Results from adults and children with autism are strikingly similar, despite adults' contradictory beliefs about the objects in question and the failure of children with autism to ultimately develop more advanced theory-of-mind reasoning. The implications for a general theory-of-mind development are discussed.     

The perception of self-agency in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

The ability to distinguish actions and effects caused by oneself from events occurring in the external environment is a fundamental aspect of human cognition. Underlying such distinctions, self-monitoring processes are often assumed, in which predicted events accompanied by one's own volitional action are compared with actual events observed in the external environment. Although many studies have examined the absence or presence of a certain type of self-recognition (i.e. mirror self-recognition) in non-human animals, the underlying cognitive mechanisms remain unclear. Here, we provide, to our knowledge, the first behavioural evidence that chimpanzees can perform self/other distinction for external events on the basis of self-monitoring processes. Three chimpanzees were presented with two cursors on a computer display. One cursor was manipulated by a chimpanzee using a trackball, while the other displayed motion that had been produced previously by the same chimpanzee. Chimpanzees successfully identified which cursor they were able to control. A follow-up experiment revealed that their performance could not be explained by simple associative responses. A further experiment with one chimpanzee showed that the monitoring process occurred in both temporal and spatial dimensions. These findings indicate that chimpanzees and humans share the fundamental cognitive processes underlying the sense of being an independent agent.     

A novel task for the investigation of action acquisition

We present a behavioural task designed for the investigation of how novel instrumental actions are discovered and learnt. The task consists of free movement with a manipulandum, during which the full range of possible movements can be explored by the participant and recorded. A subset of these movements, the 'target', is set to trigger a reinforcing signal. The task is to discover what movements of the manipulandum evoke the reinforcement signal. Targets can be defined in spatial, temporal, or kinematic terms, can be a combination of these aspects, or can represent the concatenation of actions into a larger gesture. The task allows the study of how the specific elements of behaviour which cause the reinforcing signal are identified, refined and stored by the participant. The task provides a paradigm where the exploratory motive drives learning and as such we view it as in the tradition of Thorndike [1]. Most importantly it allows for repeated measures, since when a novel action is acquired the criterion for triggering reinforcement can be changed requiring a new action to be discovered. Here, we present data using both humans and rats as subjects, showing that our task is easily scalable in difficulty, adaptable across species, and produces a rich set of behavioural measures offering new and valuable insight into the action learning process.     

What Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic Game

This study investigates strategies in reasoning about mental states of others, a process that requires theory of mind. It is a first step in studying the cognitive basis of such reasoning, as strategies affect tradeoffs between cognitive resources. Participants were presented with a two-player game that required reasoning about the mental states of the opponent. Game theory literature discerns two candidate strategies that participants could use in this game: either forward reasoning or backward reasoning. Forward reasoning proceeds from the first decision point to the last, whereas backward reasoning proceeds in the opposite direction. Backward reasoning is the only optimal strategy, because the optimal outcome is known at each decision point. Nevertheless, we argue that participants prefer forward reasoning because it is similar to causal reasoning. Causal reasoning, in turn, is prevalent in human reasoning. Eye movements were measured to discern between forward and backward progressions of fixations. The observed fixation sequences corresponded best with forward reasoning. Early in games, the probability of observing a forward progression of fixations is higher than the probability of observing a backward progression. Later in games, the probabilities of forward and backward progressions are similar, which seems to imply that participants were either applying backward reasoning or jumping back to previous decision points while applying forward reasoning. Thus, the game-theoretical favorite strategy, backward reasoning, does seem to exist in human reasoning. However, participants preferred the more familiar, practiced, and prevalent strategy: forward reasoning.     

Multilevel structure in behaviour and in the brain: a model of Fuster's hierarchy

A basic question, intimately tied to the problem of action selection, is that of how actions are assembled into organized sequences. Theories of routine sequential behaviour have long acknowledged that it must rely not only on environmental cues but also on some internal representation of temporal or task context. It is assumed, in most theories, that such internal representations must be organized into a strict hierarchy, mirroring the hierarchical structure of naturalistic sequential behaviour. This article reviews an alternative computational account, which asserts that the representations underlying naturalistic sequential behaviour need not, and arguably cannot, assume a strictly hierarchical form. One apparent liability of this theory is that it seems to contradict neuroscientific evidence indicating that different levels of sequential structure in behaviour are represented at different levels in a hierarchy of cortical areas. New simulations, reported here, show not only that the original computational account can be reconciled with this alignment between behavioural and neural organization, but also that it gives rise to a novel explanation for how this alignment might develop through learning.     

Les thérapies comportementales et cognitives, l’épicurisme et le stoïcisme

This article aims to show that philosophy, particularly Epicureanism and Stoicism, had an essentially therapeutic role in antiquity — the various schools of philosophy dispensing specific teachings aimed at treating mental suffering, in a precise place (the scholé), with a master and a specified methodology. Of course, it may seem anachronistic to try and compare a modern, progressive and proven therapeutic method such as cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT, TCC in French) with a frequently dogmatic, 2000-year-old school of philosophy. And yet, the difference is not as clear-cut as we might think, since the two have much in common, such as similar kinds of suffering, a referent (or therapist), common methods (language, reasoning) and a common goal (peace of mind). We therefore intend to try and synthesise the meeting points and also the differences between two main schools of antique philosophy and CBT.     

The economic approach to 'theory of mind'

Theory of mind (ToM) is a great evolutionary achievement. It is a special intelligence that can assess not only one's own desires and beliefs, but also those of others. Whether it is uniquely human or not is controversial, but it is clear that humans are, at least, significantly better at ToM than any other animal. Economists and game theorists have developed sophisticated and powerful models of ToM and we provide a detailed summary of this here. This economic ToM entails a hierarchy of beliefs. I know my preferences, and I have beliefs (a probabilistic distribution) about your preferences, beliefs about your beliefs about my preferences, and so on. We then contrast this economic ToM with the theoretical approaches of neuroscience and with empirical data in general. Although this economic view provides a benchmark and makes useful suggestions about empirical tendencies, it does not always generate a close fit with the data. This provides an opportunity for a synergistic interdisciplinary production of a falsifiable theory of bounded rationality. In particular, a ToM that is founded on evolutionary biology might well be sufficiently structured to have predictive power, while remaining quite general. We sketch two papers that represent preliminary steps in this direction.     

Philosophy's loss, neurology's gain: the endeavor of John Hughlings-Jackson

The year 2011 marked the centenary of the death of one of the founders of British neurology, John Hughlings-Jackson (1835-1911). By common consent he was a great clinician. But he was more. He endeavored to use clinical observations to throw light on one of the great problems of the modern world, the problem of mind. Hughlings-Jackson's daily contact with mentalities warped by neurological disease caused him to ponder deeply the nature of the mind-brain relationship, nowadays often known simply as the "hard problem." In particular, he saw the danger of conflating mind and brain, a danger that has grown greater with the spectacular growth of neuroscientific knowledge during the last century. Although Hughlings-Jackson's neuroscientific thought is long outdated, his philosophic endeavors remain highly instructive.     

Comparative investigations of manual action representations: evidence that chimpanzees represent the costs of potential future actions involving tools

The ability to adjust one's ongoing actions in the anticipation of forthcoming task demands is considered as strong evidence for the existence of internal action representations. Studies of action selection in tool use reveal that the behaviours that we choose in the present moment differ depending on what we intend to do next. Further, they point to a specialized role for mechanisms within the human cerebellum and dominant left cerebral hemisphere in representing the likely sensory costs of intended future actions. Recently, the question of whether similar mechanisms exist in other primates has received growing, but still limited, attention. Here, we present data that bear on this issue from a species that is a natural user of tools, our nearest living relative, the chimpanzee. In experiment 1, a subset of chimpanzees showed a non-significant tendency for their grip preferences to be affected by anticipation of the demands associated with bringing a tool's baited end to their mouths. In experiment 2, chimpanzees' initial grip preferences were consistently affected by anticipation of the forthcoming movements in a task that involves using a tool to extract a food reward. The partial discrepancy between the results of these two studies is attributed to the ability to accurately represent differences between the motor costs associated with executing the two response alternatives available within each task. These findings suggest that chimpanzees are capable of accurately representing the costs of intended future actions, and using those predictions to select movements in the present even in the context of externally directed tool use.     

The power of possibility: causal learning, counterfactual reasoning, and pretend play

We argue for a theoretical link between the development of an extended period of immaturity in human evolution and the emergence of powerful and wide-ranging causal learning mechanisms, specifically the use of causal models and Bayesian learning. We suggest that exploratory childhood learning, childhood play in particular, and causal cognition are closely connected. We report an empirical study demonstrating one such connection--a link between pretend play and counterfactual causal reasoning. Preschool children given new information about a causal system made very similar inferences both when they considered counterfactuals about the system and when they engaged in pretend play about it. Counterfactual cognition and causally coherent pretence were also significantly correlated even when age, general cognitive development and executive function were controlled for. These findings link a distinctive human form of childhood play and an equally distinctive human form of causal inference. We speculate that, during human evolution, computations that were initially reserved for solving particularly important ecological problems came to be used much more widely and extensively during the long period of protected immaturity.     

Predicting decisions in human social interactions using real-time fMRI and pattern classification

Negotiation and trade typically require a mutual interaction while simultaneously resting in uncertainty which decision the partner ultimately will make at the end of the process. Assessing already during the negotiation in which direction one's counterpart tends would provide a tremendous advantage. Recently, neuroimaging techniques combined with multivariate pattern classification of the acquired data have made it possible to discriminate subjective states of mind on the basis of their neuronal activation signature. However, to enable an online-assessment of the participant's mind state both approaches need to be extended to a real-time technique. By combining real-time functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and online pattern classification techniques, we show that it is possible to predict human behavior during social interaction before the interacting partner communicates a specific decision. Average accuracy reached approximately 70% when we predicted online the decisions of volunteers playing the ultimatum game, a well-known paradigm in economic game theory. Our results demonstrate the successful online analysis of complex emotional and cognitive states using real-time fMRI, which will enable a major breakthrough for social fMRI by providing information about mental states of partners already during the mutual interaction. Interestingly, an additional whole brain classification across subjects confirmed the online results: anterior insula, ventral striatum, and lateral orbitofrontal cortex, known to act in emotional self-regulation and reward processing for adjustment of behavior, appeared to be strong determinants of later overt behavior in the ultimatum game. Using whole brain classification we were also able to discriminate between brain processes related to subjective emotional and motivational states and brain processes related to the evaluation of objective financial incentives.     

Context is key: A comment on Herczeg et al. 2019

In the last several years, there has been a surge in the number of studies addressing the causes and consequences of among‐individual variation in cognitive ability and behavioural plasticity. Here, we use a recent publication by Herczeg et al. (2019: 32(3), 218–226) to highlight three shortcomings common to this newly emerging field. In their study, Herczeg et al. attempted to link variation in cognitive ability and behavioural plasticity by testing whether selection lines of guppies (Poecilia reticulata) that differ in relative brain size also differ in behavioural plasticity, as might be expected if the costs to plasticity are predominantly derived from the cost of developing large brains. First, residual brain size may not be a suitable proxy for ‘cognitive ability’. Recent work has shown that intraspecific variation in cognitive ability can be better understood by considering variation in the specific brain areas responsible for the relevant behaviours as opposed to whole‐brain mass. Second, the measure of behavioural plasticity, habituation, is unlikely to fulfil the assumptions that plasticity is both adaptive and costly. Finally, we point out several misconceptions regarding animal personality that continue to contribute to the choice of traits that are not well aligned with study objectives. Elucidating the mechanisms underlying among‐individual variation in cognition and behavioural plasticity within populations requires integration between behavioural ecology and comparative cognition, and the study system developed by Herczeg et al. has the potential to provide important mechanistic insights. We hope that by articulating and critically appraising the underlying assumptions that are common in these traditionally separate disciplines, a strong foundation can emerge to allow for more fruitful integration of these fields.     

Action Processing and Mirror Neuron Function in Patients with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis: An fMRI Study

Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) is a highly debilitating and rapidly fatal neurodegenerative disease. It has been suggested that social cognition may be affected, such as impairment in theory of mind (ToM) ability. Despite these findings, research in this area is scarce and the investigation of neural mechanisms behind such impairment is absent. Nineteen patients with ALS and eighteen healthy controls participated in this study. Because the mirror neuron system (MNS) is thought to be involved in theory of mind, we first implemented a straightforward action-execution and observation task to assess basic MNS function. Second, we examined the social-cognitive ability to understand actions of others, which is a component of ToM. We used fMRI to assess BOLD activity differences between groups during both experiments. Theory of mind was also measured behaviorally using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (RME). ALS patients displayed greater BOLD activity during the action-execution and observation task, especially throughout right anterior cortical regions. These areas included the right inferior operculum, premotor and primary motor regions, and left inferior parietal lobe. A conjunction analysis showed significantly more co-activated voxels during both the observation and action-execution conditions in the patient group throughout MNS regions. These results support a compensatory response in the MNS during action processing. In the action understanding experiment, healthy controls performed better behaviorally and subsequently recruited greater regions of activity throughout the prefrontal cortex and middle temporal gyrus. Lastly, action understanding performance was able to cluster patients with ALS into high and lower performing groups, which then differentiated RME performance. Collectively, these data suggest that social cognition, particularly theory of mind, may be affected in a subset of patients with ALS. This impairment may be related to functioning of the MNS and other regions related to action processing and understanding. Implications for future research are discussed.