Biological auctions with multiple rewards

The competition for resources among cells, individuals or species is a fundamental characteristic of evolution. Biological all-pay auctions have been used to model situations where multiple individuals compete for a single resource. However, in many situations multiple resources with various values exist and single reward auctions are not applicable. We generalize the model to multiple rewards and study the evolution of strategies. In biological all-pay auctions the bid of an individual corresponds to its strategy and is equivalent to its payment in the auction. The decreasingly ordered rewards are distributed according to the decreasingly ordered bids of the participating individuals. The reproductive success of an individual is proportional to its fitness given by the sum of the rewards won minus its payments. Hence, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We find that the results for the multiple reward case are very different from the single reward case. While the mixed strategy equilibrium in the single reward case with more than two players consists of mostly low-bidding individuals, we show that the equilibrium can convert to many high-bidding individuals and a few low-bidding individuals in the multiple reward case. Some reward values lead to a specialization among the individuals where one subpopulation competes for the rewards and the other subpopulation largely avoids costly competitions. Whether the mixed strategy equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) depends on the specific values of the rewards.     

Evolutionary game auctions

The War of Attrition and the Scotch Auction are instances of a general type of evolutionary game, here referred to as an evolutionary auction. Evolutionary auctions are symmetric, without injury, settled by a single scalar variable (“the bid”), and subject to an overshoot cost function which depends on the difference between the bids. For what appears to be the general class of biologically tenable overshoot cast functions we show that (with the single pathological exception of the Scotch Auction) there is a unique ESS, whose density function is defined on an interval [0, b). Examples are given, and general methods of finding the ESS discussed. Implications for the evolution of animal display behaviour and morphological characters are discussed.     

Green Auctions and Reduction of Information Rents in Payments for Environmental Services: An Experimental Investigation in Sunan County,Northwestern China

Reducing information rents is an important task for government agencies wishing to purchase maximal environmental services with limited budgets. This paper reports on several green auction options for reducing information rents and improving the performance of the “Grain for Green” Payments for environmental services (PES) program implemented in northwestern China. In r experimental auctions and investigations, door-to-door interviews were conducted and bidding envelopes and survey questionnaires were used to determine the offers and the foregone profits of the participants. Three scenarios are analyzed in this paper: a uniform price auction, a discriminatory price auction, and an opportunity-cost system. The results show that compared to the uniform price auction system, the other auction systems can increase the cost-effectiveness of conservation contracting. Competitive bidding can reveal true opportunity costs and can reduce information rents extracted from the government by farmers using private information. The demographics and average bids of these auction types were also analyzed. “Perfect information” in the opportunity-cost offer system has the best performance but is very hard to implement in reality. The results of this research show that the auction is a valuable tool for purchasing conservation contracts in northwestern China, but that in the future, the performance of these auctions should be studied with relaxed model assumptions.     

Rationality, irrationality and escalating behavior in lowest unique bid auctions

Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online auctions--lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food, we find that agents adopt Lévy flight search strategies in their exploration of "bid space". The Lévy regime, which is characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude. We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets.     

Truthful online double auction based dynamic resource provisioning for multi-objective trade-offs in IaaS clouds

Auction designs have recently been adopted for static and dynamic resource provisioning in IaaS clouds, such as Microsoft Azure and Amazon EC2. However, the existing mechanisms are mostly restricted to simple auctions, single-objective, offline setting, one-sided interactions either among cloud users or cloud service providers (CSPs), and possible misreports of cloud user’s private information. This paper proposes a more realistic scenario of online auctioning for IaaS clouds, with the unique characteristics of elasticity for time-varying arrival of cloud user requests under the time-based server maintenance in cloud data centers. We propose an online truthful double auction technique for balancing the multi-objective trade-offs between energy, revenue, and performance in IaaS clouds, consisting of a weighted bipartite matching based winning-bid determination algorithm for resource allocation and a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) driven algorithm for payment calculation of winning bids. Through rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive trace-driven simulation studies exploiting Google cluster workload traces, we demonstrate that our mechanism significantly improves the performance while promising truthfulness, heterogeneity, economic efficiency, individual rationality, and has a polynomial-time computational complexity.

     

Efficient Nash Equilibrium Resource Allocation Based on Game Theory Mechanism in Cloud Computing by Using Auction

One of the most complex issues in the cloud computing environment is the problem of resource allocation so that, on one hand, the cloud provider expects the most profitability and, on the other hand, users also expect to have the best resources at their disposal considering the budget constraints and time. In most previous work conducted, heuristic and evolutionary approaches have been used to solve this problem. Nevertheless, since the nature of this environment is based on economic methods, using such methods can decrease response time and reducing the complexity of the problem. In this paper, an auction-based method is proposed which determines the auction winner by applying game theory mechanism and holding a repetitive game with incomplete information in a non-cooperative environment. In this method, users calculate suitable price bid with their objective function during several round and repetitions and send it to the auctioneer; and the auctioneer chooses the winning player based the suggested utility function. In the proposed method, the end point of the game is the Nash equilibrium point where players are no longer inclined to alter their bid for that resource and the final bid also satisfies the auctioneer’s utility function. To prove the response space convexity, the Lagrange method is used and the proposed model is simulated in the cloudsim and the results are compared with previous work. At the end, it is concluded that this method converges to a response in a shorter time, provides the lowest service level agreement violations and the most utility to the provider.     

Smarter than Others? Conjectures in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions

Research concerning various types of auctions, such as English auctions, Dutch auctions, highest-price sealed-bid auctions, and second-price sealed-bid auctions, is always a topic of considerable interest in interdisciplinary fields. The type of auction, known as a lowest unique bid auction (LUBA), has also attracted significant attention. Various models have been proposed, but they often fail to explain satisfactorily the real bid-distribution characteristics. This paper discusses LUBA bid-distribution characteristics, including the inverted-J shape and the exponential decrease in the upper region. The authors note that this type of distribution, which initially increases and later decreases, cannot be derived from the symmetric Nash equilibrium framework based on perfect information that has previously been used. A novel optimization model based on non-perfect information is presented. The kernel of this model is the premise that agents make decisions to achieve maximum profit based on imaginary information or assumptions regarding the behavior of others.     

Winner and loser effects in human competitions. Evidence from equally matched tennis players

Animals winning an agonistic encounter are more likely to win their next encounter while losers are less likely, even when controlling for motivation and physical size. Do these winner and loser effects exist in human competitions? Drawing on a large database of professional tennis matches, we were able to control for players' ability and thereby test for winner and loser effects. We narrowed the database to matches between players who on average did not differ significantly in rank, and further to matches in which the first set was fought to a long tie-break. These closely fought matches present a natural experiment because players are assigned to treatment conditions – winning or losing a set – despite similar ability and performance. We found that among men, the winner of a closely fought tie-break had an approximate 60% chance of winning the second set, the loser a 40% chance. These effects did not exist among women, a finding consistent with the hypothesis that androgens mediate winner and loser effects. Our results may help in the design of competitions in sport as well as in work environments, where it may prove useful to either encourage winner effects or to attenuate their occasional adverse consequences.     

Why do winners keep winning? Androgen mediation of winner but not loser effects in cichlid fish

Animal conflicts are influenced by social experience such that a previous winning experience increases the probability of winning the next agonistic interaction, whereas a previous losing experience has the opposite effect. Since androgens respond to social interactions, increasing in winners and decreasing in losers, we hypothesized that socially induced transient changes in androgen levels could be a causal mediator of winner/loser effects. To test this hypothesis, we staged fights between dyads of size-matched males of the Mozambique tilapia (Oreochromis mossambicus). After the first contest, winners were treated with the anti-androgen cyproterone acetate and losers were supplemented with 11-ketotestosterone. Two hours after the end of the first fight, two contests were staged simultaneously between the winner of the first fight and a naive male and between the loser of first fight and another naive male. The majority (88%) of control winners also won the second interaction, whereas the majority of control losers (87%) lost their second fight, thus confirming the presence of winner/loser effects in this species. As predicted, the success of anti-androgen-treated winners in the second fight decreased significantly to chance levels (44%), but the success of androgenized losers (19%) did not show a significant increase. In summary, the treatment with anti-androgen blocks the winner effect, whereas androgen administration fails to reverse the loser effect, suggesting an involvement of androgens on the winner but not on the loser effect.     

Persistence of Winner and Loser Effects Depends on the Behaviour Measured

Recent contest experience can influence an individual’s behaviour in subsequent contests. When the probability of winning a subsequent contest is used to quantify experience effects, a loser effect usually lasts longer than a winner effect. This conclusion, however, may be caused by this probability understating the persistence of the influence of a winning experience on contest decisions. Using Kryptolebias marmoratus, a mangrove killifish, as the study organism, we investigated whether different conclusions about the relative persistence of winning and losing experiences would be reached when different aspects of contest behaviour (probability of initiating attacks, probability of winning non‐escalated and escalated contests, escalation rate and contest duration) were measured. The results indicated that the apparent persistence of the effect of winning or losing experiences varied with the behaviour studied. When the likelihood to initiate attacks was used, no winner effect was detected while the loser effect lasted for <1 d. When escalation rate was used, the winner effect lasted for 2–4 d, while the loser effect lasted for 1–2 d. When the probability of winning non‐escalated contests was used, the winner effect was detectable for <1 d, while the loser effect lasted for 2–4 d. And, when contest duration was used, the winner effect was detectable for 2–4 d, but no loser effect was detectable. These results show that (1) the probability of winning a subsequent contest understated the persistence of the influence of a winning experience on the fish’s contest decisions, (2) the measures most effective at detecting winner effects are different from those most effective at detecting loser effects and (3) in K. marmoratus, both effects can be detected 2 d after the completion of experience training but both dissipate in 4 d.     

Duration of courtship effort as a costly signal

We consider a male and a female in a courtship encounter over continuous time. Both parties pay participation costs per unit time. The game ends when either one or other of the parties quits or the female accepts the male as a mate. We assume that there is a binary variable which determines whether the male is a “good” or “bad” type from the female's point of view, according to either his condition or his willingness to care for the young after mating. This variable is not directly observable by the female, but has fitness consequences for her: she gets a positive fitness payoff from mating with a “good” male but a negative fitness payoff from mating with a “bad” male. We assume also that a “good” male has a higher ratio of fitness benefit from mating to fitness cost per unit time of courtship than a “bad” male. We show that, under suitable assumptions, there are evolutionarily stable equilibrium behaviours in which time-extended courtship takes place. A “good” male is willing to court for longer than a “bad” male; in this way the duration of a male's courtship signals his type, and acts as a costly handicap. By not being willing to mate immediately the female achieves a degree of screening because the posterior probability that the male is “good”, conditional on his not having quit the game, increases with the duration of courtship.     

初始投标值数量和样本容量对双边界二分式CVM的影响

双边界二分式条件价值评估法是当前广泛应用于评估生态环境和自然资源价值的陈述偏好法。为了研究双边界二分式CVM中,不同分布中初始投标值数量及样本容量对WTP的影响,应用蒙特卡洛模拟和支付意愿函数模型相结合的方法,用概率分位数设计投标值,分别选择数据来源不同的Weibull分布和对数Logistic分布,动态模拟不同初始投标值数量和样本容量对WTP期望值产生的影响。模拟结果表明,对不同的WTP概率分布,初始投标值数量和样本容量对WTP的影响趋势是一致的,当初始投标值数量和样本容量分别大于5和500时,初始投标值数量和样本容量的增加,对WTP估计值的影响程度越来越小。研究结果表明,在二分式CVM研究中,当以WTP期望为代表值时,其初始投标值数量和样本容量至少为5和500。研究结论为二分式CVM问卷设计中投标值数量及样本容量的设定提供参考依据。     

Species differences in the winner effect disappear in response to post-victory testosterone manipulations

Evolutionary processes can interact with the mechanisms of steroid hormone action to drive interspecific variation in behavioural output, yet the exact nature of these interactions is poorly understood. To investigate this issue, we compare the endocrine machinery underlying the winner effect (an ability to increase winning behaviour in response to past victories) in two closely related species of Peromyscus mice. Typically, after winning a fight, California mice (Peromyscus californicus) experience a testosterone (T) surge that helps enhance their future winning behaviour, whereas white-footed mice (Peromyscus leucopus) experience neither a T surge nor a change in subsequent winning behaviour. However, our results indicate that when the post-victory T response of male white-footed mice is phenotypically engineered to resemble that of California mice, individuals are capable of developing a strong and lasting winner effect. Moreover, this 'induced' winner effect in white-footed mice qualitatively matches the winner effect that develops naturally in California mice. Taken together, these findings suggest that white-footed mice have the physiological machinery necessary to form a robust winner effect comparable to that formed by California mice, but are unable to endogenously activate this machinery after achieving winning experiences. We speculate that evolutionary processes, like selection, operate on the physiological substrates that govern post-victory T release to guide divergence in the winner effect between these two species.     

A Report of Two cases of Al-Awadi Raas-Rothschild Syndrome (AARRS) supporting that “Apparent” Phocomelia differentiates AARRS from Schinzel Phocomelia Syndrome (SPS)

Although there is a long list of syndromes with phocomelia, there are only two syndromes in which there is concurrent pelvic dysplasia and phocomelia: Al-Awadi–Raas-Rothschild syndrome (AARRS) and Schinzel phocomelia syndrome (SPS). Currently, there is a diagnostic confusion between the two syndromes and both have the same MIM entry (MIM 276820). We believe that the two syndromes are different entities and we also believe that the limb defect in SPS is a “true” phocomelia while the limb defect in AARRS is an “apparent” phocomelia. “Apparent” phocomelia describes the most severe form of ulnar ray deficiency in which there is absent ulna with radio-humeral synostosis. “Apparent” phocomelia is diagnosed radiologically by three radiological features: the apparently single bone occupying the arm/forearm appears relatively long, the area of radio-humeral synostosis will have thicker cortex with or without slight angulation, and the lower end of the bone resembles the lower end of a radius and not a humerus. In this paper, we present two new cases of AARRS from two different Saudi Arabian tribes: one case with R292C mutation of WNT7A with bilateral “apparent” phocomelia and a second case with a novel c.814G>T mutation of the WNT7A gene (resulting in wnt7a protein truncation at position 272) with unilateral “apparent” phocomelia. We reviewed previously reported cases of AARRS and SPS to further delineate the differences between these two syndromes. We make the argument that these two syndromes are two different entities and hence require two different MIM entries.     

Cooperative liner shipping network design by means of a combinatorial auction

Cooperation in the ocean liner shipping industry has always been important to improve liner shipping networks (LSN’s). As tight cooperations like alliances are challenged by antitrust laws, looser forms of cooperation among liner carriers might become a reasonable way to increase efficiency of LSN’s. Our goal is to facilitate a loose form of cooperation among liner carriers. Therefore, we introduce a coordination mechanism for designing a collaborative LSN based on a multi round combinatorial auction. Via the auction, carriers exchange demand triplets, i.e. orders which describe the transport of containers between ports. A standard network design problem which includes ship scheduling and cargo routing decisions is used as isolated network design problem of an individual carrier. A carrier has to solve this isolated problem repeatedly during the auction so that the carrier is able to decide which demand triplets to sell, on which demand triplets to bid, and what prices to charge. To solve these problems we propose a variable neighborhood search based matheuristic. The matheuristic addresses the isolated planning problem in four phases (construct ship cycles, modify cycles, determine container flow, and reallocate ships to cycles). Our computational experiments on a set of 56 synthetic test instances suggest that the introduced combinatorial auction increases profits on average compared to isolated planning significantly by 4%. The more diverse the original assignment of demand triplets and ships to carriers is, the higher the potential for collaboration; for 18 diverse instances, the profits increase on average by 10%.     

The ‘home advantage’ is necessary for a full winner effect and changes in post-encounter testosterone

Winning aggressive contests can both enhance future winning ability and change post-encounter hormones; however, it remains unclear if the context of a fight also influences such winner effects and hormone changes. We investigated this issue by using California mice (Peromyscus californicus) to test if the effect of residency status is necessary to improve future winning ability and alter post-encounter hormones. Male mice were subjected to an aggressive contest and their blood was collected 45 min after the fight. Upon contest initiation, focal mice had a ‘home advantage’ and three prior winning experiences, only one of these factors, or neither factor. Only individuals with a ‘home advantage’ and prior winning experience showed a full winner effect. Post-encounter changes in testosterone and progesterone resulted from an interaction between residency status and winning experience. These data indicate that in male California mice a ‘home advantage’ is necessary to produce the full winner effect and that residency status helps regulate inter-individual variation in the expression of post-encounter testosterone pulses and progesterone changes. Furthermore, these respective behavioral and physiological phenomena might be modulated in a context-specific manner, in part by the surrounding physical environment.     

Improvement of yield of Pleurotus eryngii var. eryngii by substrate supplementation and use of a casing overlay

Improved yield and biological efficiency (BE) of Pleurotus eryngii var. eryngii were achieved by supplementation of substrate with a commercial delayed-release nutrient and use of a casing overlay. Yield increases of 14% were achieved from cased substrates that were supplemented at time of casing with delayed-release nutrient (Remo’s). Use of a casing layer enhanced yield by 141% over non-cased substrates. When casing and substrate supplementation were combined, yield increased 179% over non-cased/non-supplemented substrates. Mushrooms harvested from cased substrates were darker in color and solids contents were lower compared to non-cased substrates. An additional break of mushrooms was harvested from non-cased “spent” substrate by fragmenting and re-supplementing the substrate prior to the application of a casing overlay. Three production methods were compared for their effect on mushroom yield: “standard”, “casing” and “casing after first break”. Casing of the substrate before first break (“casing” production method) resulted in the highest yield and biological efficiency.     

Expected utility violations evolve under status-based selection mechanisms

The expected utility theory of decision making under uncertainty, a cornerstone of modern economics, assumes that humans linearly weight “utilities” for different possible outcomes by the probabilities with which these outcomes occur. Despite the theory's intuitive appeal, both from normative and from evolutionary perspectives, many experiments demonstrate systematic, though poorly understood, patterns of deviation from EU predictions. This paper offers a novel theoretical account of such patterns of deviation by demonstrating that EU violations can emerge from evolutionary selection when individual “status” affects inclusive fitness. In humans, battles for resources and social standing involve high-stakes decision making, and assortative mating ensures that status matters for fitness outcomes. The paper therefore proposes grounding the study of decision making under uncertainty in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework.     

When should signals of submission be given?-A game theory model

During contests, losing animals often show signals communicating submission. From an evolutionary viewpoint, however, it is not so obvious why the losing individual gives such a signal instead of running away and why the winning individual accepts the signal instead of inflicting more severe damage. We investigated factors influencing the evolution of signals of submission using a numerical ESS model. The present analysis reveals that there is much space for the evolution of signals of submission, even when the winner of an escalated contest gets some extra benefit. In most cases, signals of submission are given by animals which are slightly or moderately weaker than the opponent. Signals of submission are expected to occur frequently (1) when the value of contested resource does not differ greatly from the cost of injury, (2) when the extra benefit of winning an escalated contest is small, (3) when the opportunity for safe retreat by the losing animal is small, and (4) when the estimation of the difference in the resource holding potential (RHP) between the combatants is accurate but not perfect.     

The sense of water in the blowfly Protophormia terraenovae

The gustatory system of the blowfly, Protophormia terraenovae, is a relatively simple biological model for studies on chemosensory input and behavioral output. It appears to have renewed interest as a model for studies on the role of water channels, namely aquaporins or aquaglyceroporins, in water detection. To this end, we investigated the presence of water channels, their role in “water” and “salt” cell responsiveness and the transduction mechanism involved. For the first time our electrophysiological results point to the presence of an aquaglyceroporin in the chemoreceptor membrane of the “water” cell in the blowfly taste chemosensilla whose transduction mechanism ultimately involves an intracellular calcium increase and consequently cell depolarization. This hypothesis is also supported by calcium imaging data following proper stimulation. This mechanism is triggered by “water” cell stimulation with hypotonic solutions and/or solutes such as glycerol which crosses the membrane by way of aquaglyceroporins. Behavioral output indicates that the “sense” of water in blowflies is definitely not dependent on the “water” cell only, but also on the “salt” cell sensitivity. These findings also hypothesize a new role for aquaglyceroporin in spiking cell excitability.