Newcastle Disease Virus-Vectored H7 and H5 Live Vaccines Protect Chickens from Challenge with H7N9 or H5N1 Avian Influenza Viruses

Sporadic human infections by a novel H7N9 virus occurred over a large geographic region in China. In this study, we show that Newcastle disease virus (NDV)-vectored H7 (NDV-H7) and NDV-H5 vaccines are able to induce antibodies with high hemagglutination inhibition (HI) titers and completely protect chickens from challenge with the novel H7N9 or highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses, respectively. Notably, a baculovirus-expressed H7 protein failed to protect chickens from H7N9 virus infection.     

一种新发现的流感病毒—H5N1

1997年 5月 ,香港首次分离到一种新的Ａ型流感病毒———Ｈ5Ｎ1[1,2 ] ,至该年底共有 18位患者确诊被Ｈ5Ｎ1感染 ,其中 6人死亡[3 ,4 ] 。这是对人类具强毒性的流感病毒新亚型首次被确定。在呼吸系统疾病的病毒中 ,流感病毒因其有抗原性变异而不同于其它病毒 ,特别是它的表面抗原如血凝素 (ｈｅｍａｇｇｌｕｔｉｎｉｎ ,ＨＡ)和神经氨酸酶 (ｎｅｕ ｒａｍｉｎｉｄａｓｅ ,ＮＡ)。主要有两种类型变异 :抗原性漂离(因编码基因点突变的累积导致少量氨基酸改变 )和抗原性转移 (由于不同Ａ型流感病毒亚型的抗原基因的重配引起表面抗原分子广泛的…     

人H7N9禽流感病毒、高致病H5N1禽流感病毒及H1N1流感病毒感染小鼠特征分析

目的对比分析人高致病H5N1禽流感病毒、H7N9禽流感病毒及H1N1流感病毒分别感染BALB/c小鼠后的机体反应特征。方法分别以H7N9病毒、H5N1病毒和H1N1病毒滴鼻感染BALB/c小鼠,观察小鼠存活率、体征变化及感染后肺组织病理损伤差异,检测小鼠感染流感病毒后肺组织增殖细胞核抗原(PCNA)表达并观察小鼠感染后修复状况。结果 H7N9病毒、H5N1病毒和H1N1病毒均感染BALB/c小鼠,小鼠存活率依次为H7N9H1N1H5N1,肺组织病理损伤严重程度依次为H5N1H1N1H7N9,PCNA表达水平依次为H7N9H1N1H5N1。结论 H7N9病毒感染后宿主炎症反应较小,感染后小鼠肺组织自我修复能力较强;H5N1病毒感染BALB/c小鼠后的机体反应最为强烈,感染后恢复能力差,致死率高。     

共表达H5N1、H7N1亚型AIV HA与鸡IL-18多价重组鸡痘病毒免疫保护性研究

用本实验室构建的重组鸡痘病毒rFPV-H5HA-IL18、rFPV-H5HA-H7HA-IL18和rFPV-H5HA,经翼蹼免疫1日龄SPF鸡和7日龄商品Leghorn蛋鸡,同时以H5亚型AIV全病毒灭活疫苗作为对照.免疫后测定HI抗体效价、淋巴细胞转化指标、重组疫苗对增重的影响、免疫后的攻毒保护效力、免疫后的抑制排毒情况.免疫后不同时间分别测定特异性抗体和淋巴细胞刺激指数.试验结果表明,3株重组鸡痘病毒株均能诱导鸡体产生血凝抑制抗体（HI）;共表达鸡IL-18的rFPV-H5HA-IL18和rFPV H5HA-H7HA-IL18诱导商品蛋鸡的细胞免疫水平明显高于非共表达鸡IL-18的rFPV-H5HA.重组鸡痘疫苗免疫SPF和商品蛋鸡后第21d进行攻毒实验,rFPV-H5HA-IL18和rFPV-H5HA-H7HA-IL18免疫攻毒保护率达10/10,rFPV-H5HA免疫攻毒保护率达9/10,与常规疫苗相当.免疫的商品蛋鸡于攻毒后7d采集泄殖腔棉试子样品,检测排毒情况.结果表明,rFPV-H5HA-IL18、rFPV-H5HA-H7HA-IL18免疫组在攻毒后第7d无排毒,其抑制免疫鸡排毒效果优于常规疫苗和单独表达HA的rFPV-H5HA重组鸡痘病毒.rFPV-H5HA-IL18和rFPV-H5HA-H7HA-IL18免疫组鸡,在14日龄时的体重明显高于rFPV-H5HA免疫组和常规疫苗对照免疫组,表明共表达的鸡IL-18能降低鸡痘病毒载体对雏鸡增重的影响.     

共表达H5N1、H7N1亚型AIV HA与鸡IL-18多价重组鸡痘病毒免疫保护性研究

用本实验室构建的重组鸡痘病毒rFPV-H5HA-IL18、rFPV-H5HA-H7HA-IL18和rFPV-H5HA,经翼蹼免疫1日龄SPF鸡和7日龄商品Leghorn蛋鸡,同时以H5亚型AIV全病毒灭活疫苗作为对照.免疫后测定HI抗体效价、淋巴细胞转化指标、重组疫苗对增重的影响、免疫后的攻毒保护效力、免疫后的抑制排毒情况.免疫后不同时间分别测定特异性抗体和淋巴细胞刺激指数.试验结果表明,3株重组鸡痘病毒株均能诱导鸡体产生血凝抑制抗体(HI);共表达鸡IL-18的rFPV-H5HA-IL18和rFPV H5HA-H7HA-IL18诱导商品蛋鸡的细胞免疫水平明显高于非共表达鸡IL-18的rFPV-H5HA.重组鸡痘疫苗免疫SPF和商品蛋鸡后第21d进行攻毒实验,rFPV-H5HA-IL18和rFPV-H5HA-H7HA-IL18免疫攻毒保护率达10/10,rFPV-H5HA免疫攻毒保护率达9/10,与常规疫苗相当.免疫的商品蛋鸡于攻毒后7d采集泄殖腔棉试子样品,检测排毒情况.结果表明,rFPV-H5HA-IL18、rFPV-H5HA-H7HA-IL18免疫组在攻毒后第7d无排毒,其抑制免疫鸡排毒效果优于常规疫苗和单独表达HA的rFPV-H5HA重组鸡痘病毒.rFPV-H5HA-IL18和rFPV-H5HA-H7HA-IL18免疫组鸡,在14日龄时的体重明显高于rFPV-H5HA免疫组和常规疫苗对照免疫组,表明共表达的鸡IL-18能降低鸡痘病毒载体对雏鸡增重的影响.     

Amino Acid Substitutions Improve the Immunogenicity of H7N7HA Protein and Protect Mice against Lethal H7N7 Viral Challenge

Avian influenza A H7N7/NL/219/03 virus creates a serious pandemic threat to human health because it can transmit directly from domestic poultry to humans and from human to human. Our previous vaccine study reported that mice when immunized intranasally (i.n) with live Bac-HA were protected from lethal H7N7/NL/219/03 challenge, whereas incomplete protection was obtained when administered subcutaneously (s.c) due to the fact that H7N7 is a poor inducer of neutralizing antibodies. Interestingly, our recent vaccine studies reported that mice when vaccinated subcutaneously with Bac-HA (H7N9) was protected against both H7N9 (A/Sh2/2013) and H7N7 virus challenge. HA1 region of both H7N7 and H7N9 viruses are differ at 15 amino acid positions. Among those, we selected three amino acid positions (T143, T198 and I211) in HA1 region of H7N7. These amino acids are located within or near the receptor binding site. Following the selection, we substituted the amino acid at these three positions with amino acids found on H7N9HA wild-type. In this study, we evaluate the impact of amino acid substitutions in the H7N7 HA-protein on the immunogenicity. We generated six mutant constructs from wild-type influenza H7N7HA cDNA by site directed mutagenesis, and individually expressed mutant HA protein on the surface of baculovirus (Bac-HA_m) and compared their protective efficacy of the vaccines with Bac-H7N7HA wild-type (Bac-HA) by lethal H7N7 viral challenge in a mouse model. We found that mice immunized subcutaneously with Bac-HA_m constructs T143A or T198A-I211V or I211V-T143A serum showed significantly higher hemagglutination inhibition and neutralization titer against H7N7 and H7N9 viruses when compared to Bac-HA vaccinated mice groups. We also observed low level of lung viral titer, negligible weight loss and complete protection against lethal H7N7 viral challenge. Our results indicated that amino acid substitution at position 143 or 211 improve immunogenicity of H7N7HA vaccine against H7N7/NL/219/03 virus.     

Evaluation of Live Attenuated H7N3 and H7N7 Vaccine Viruses for Their Receptor Binding Preferences,Immunogenicity in Ferrets and Cross Reactivity to the Novel H7N9 Virus

Live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) candidates of the H7 subtype, A/Netherlands/219/03 (H7N7, NL03 ca) and A/chicken/British Columbia/CN-6/2004 (H7N3, BC04 ca), were evaluated for their receptor binding specificity and immunogenicity in ferrets. The BC04 ca virus exhibited α2,3-SA and α2,6-SA dual receptor binding preference while the NL03 ca virus preferentially bound to α2,3-SA. Substitution of the Q226 and G228 (Q-G) by the L226 and S228 (L-S) residues in the HA improved binding to α2,6-SA for NL03 ca. The vaccine viruses with L-S retained the attenuation phenotype. NL03 L-S ca replicated more efficiently than the original NL03 ca virus in the upper respiratory tract of ferrets, and induced higher levels of humoral and cellular immune responses. Prior vaccination with seasonal LAIV reduced H7-specific antibody responses, but did not reduce the H7N7 vaccine mediated protection against a heterologous H7N3 BC04 wt virus infection in ferrets. In addition, the H7N3 and H7N7 vaccine immunized ferret sera cross reacted with the newly emerged H7N9 virus. These data, in combination with the safety data from previously conducted Phase 1 studies, suggest that these vaccines may have a role in responding to the threat posed by the H7N9 virus.     

Novel Genotypes of H9N2 Influenza A Viruses Isolated from Poultry in Pakistan Containing NS Genes Similar to Highly Pathogenic H7N3 and H5N1 Viruses

The impact of avian influenza caused by H9N2 viruses in Pakistan is now significantly more severe than in previous years. Since all gene segments contribute towards the virulence of avian influenza virus, it was imperative to investigate the molecular features and genetic relationships of H9N2 viruses prevalent in this region. Analysis of the gene sequences of all eight RNA segments from 12 viruses isolated between 2005 and 2008 was undertaken. The hemagglutinin (HA) sequences of all isolates were closely related to H9N2 viruses isolated from Iran between 2004 and 2007 and contained leucine instead of glutamine at position 226 in the receptor binding pocket, a recognised marker for the recognition of sialic acids linked α2–6 to galactose. The neuraminidase (NA) of two isolates contained a unique five residue deletion in the stalk (from residues 80 to 84), a possible indication of greater adaptation of these viruses to the chicken host. The HA, NA, nucleoprotein (NP), and matrix (M) genes showed close identity with H9N2 viruses isolated during 1999 in Pakistan and clustered in the A/Quail/Hong Kong/G1/97 virus lineage. In contrast, the polymerase genes clustered with H9N2 viruses from India, Iran and Dubai. The NS gene segment showed greater genetic diversity and shared a high level of similarity with NS genes from either H5 or H7 subtypes rather than with established H9N2 Eurasian lineages. These results indicate that during recent years the H9N2 viruses have undergone extensive genetic reassortment which has led to the generation of H9N2 viruses of novel genotypes in the Indian sub-continent. The novel genotypes of H9N2 viruses may play a role in the increased problems observed by H9N2 to poultry and reinforce the continued need to monitor H9N2 infections for their zoonotic potential.     

Exposure to a Low Pathogenic A/H7N2 Virus in Chickens Protects against Highly Pathogenic A/H7N1 Virus but Not against Subsequent Infection with A/H5N1

Recent evidences have demonstrated that the presence of low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIV) may play an important role in host ecology and transmission of avian influenza viruses (AIV). While some authors have clearly demonstrated that LPAIV can mutate to render highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV), others have shown that their presence could provide the host with enough immunological memory to resist re-infections with HPAIV. In order to experimentally study the role of pre-existing host immunity, chickens previously infected with H7N2 LPAIV were subsequently challenged with H7N1 HPAIV. Pre-infection of chickens with H7N2 LAPIV conferred protection against the lethal challenge with H7N1 HPAIV, dramatically reducing the viral shedding, the clinical signs and the pathological outcome. Correlating with the protection afforded, sera from chickens primed with H7N2 LPAIV reacted with the H7-AIV subtype in hemagglutination inhibition assay and specifically with the N2-neuraminidase antigen. Conversely, subsequent exposure to H5N1 HPAIV resulted in a two days-delay on the onset of disease but all chickens died by 7 days post-challenge. Lack of protection correlated with the absence of H5-hemagglutining inhibitory antibodies prior to H5N1 HPAIV challenge. Our data suggest that in naturally occurring outbreaks of HPAIV, birds with pre-existing immunity to LPAIV could survive lethal infections with HA-homologous HPAIV but not subsequent re-infections with HA-heterologous HPAIV. These results could be useful to better understand the dynamics of AIV in chickens and might help in future vaccine formulations.     

Evolution and control of H5N1

The evolutionary dynamics of the H5N1 virus present a challenge for conventional control measures. Efforts must consider the regional aspects of endemic H5N1.The H5N1 virus has spread across Asia, Europe and Africa, and has infected birds in several endemic areas, including China, Indonesia, Vietnam and Egypt. H5N1 outbreaks pose a massive threat for the poultry industry and, ultimately, for human health [1]. However, the rapid spread of the virus also offers the opportunity to study and learn from its dynamics in the wild. The insights gained should inform new public health policies and preventive actions against a possible pandemic.Progress in influenza research has been impressive. In particular, the application of reverse genetics has led to the identification of mutations and reassortment changes that determine virus virulence. Perhaps the most significant results come from the two now infamous studies, published in Nature and Science, about the generation of recombinant H5N1 viruses that are transmissible in ferrets [2,3]. These advances show that we are steadily elucidating influenza virus at the molecular level. By contrast, our understanding of the dynamics of highly pathogenic influenza virus in the environment remains limited [4,5].Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is an important poultry disease. The major reservoir of the virus is wild waterfowl, and infected birds are usually asymptomatic as a result of long-term evolutionary adaptation [1,6]. After transmission from wild waterfowl to poultry, however, avian influenza viruses occasionally become highly pathogenic and can cause mortalities of up to 100% within 48 h of infection. The standard method for controlling an HPAI outbreak is the testing and culling of all infected poultry, and the setting up of a concentric control area around the infected flock.The HPAI H5N1 virus, circulating in Eurasia and Africa, emerged in China around 1997 [1] but it only infected terrestrial birds at the time. Continuous transmission in poultry eventually allowed the virus to evolve, resulting in large outbreaks in China in 2005 with high mortality in wild waterfowl. The virus spread rapidly, probably though migratory birds, to Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Such ‘east to west'' movements of H5N1 viruses over comparably long distances have not since been recorded. Moreover, migrating wildfowl have begun to spread the virus intermittently between Asia and Siberia [7]. This H5N1 lineage is the longest-circulating HPAI virus that has been reported, and it has reached epizootic levels in both domestic and wild bird populations.…the challenge is to understand the evolution of H5N1 to better predict new strains that could become a serious threat for human healthOne of the striking characteristics of the H5N1 lineage, in contrast with other HPAI, is its infectivity toward mammals. H5N1 can be directly transmitted from birds to humans and cause severe disease, although it has a significantly lower transmissibility than seasonal influenza viruses [1]. So far, 608 cases of human H5N1 infections have been reported with 59% mortality [5]. Most human infections have resulted from close contact with H5N1-infected poultry or poultry products, and no sustained human–human transmission has as yet been documented. Nonetheless, a potential H5N1 pandemic remains a great concern for public health.The viruses that caused the five influenza pandemics since 1900 arose by two mechanisms: reassortment among avian, human and swine influenza viruses, and accumulation of mutations in an avian influenza virus [1,8]. Triple reassortment between avian H5N1, swine H3N1 and H1N1 viruses, and double reassortment between avian H5N1 and H9N2 viruses has already been reported in Asia, which raises concerns about new reassortment viruses that could infect humans [9,10]. Meanwhile, research has identified some 80 genetic mutations that could increase infectivity of avian influenza viruses in mammals, and thus potentially facilitate avian influenza evolution to generate a pandemic strain [8,11]. H5N1 strains with some of these mutations have often been found in bird populations [5] and in human H5N1 strains [12]. Indeed, specific mutations that could confer switching in receptor-binding specificity were reported in H5N1-infected patients in Thailand [13]. The two controversial studies published in Nature and Science also showed how a handful of mutations might enable the H5N1 virus to be transmitted between humans [2,3]. Pathogenic variants of the H5N1 virus with a higher pandemic potential could naturally evolve; the challenge is to understand the evolution of H5N1 to better predict new strains that could become a serious threat for human health.…continuous replication of H5N1 virus in Egypt has provided a valuable opportunity to study the impact of genetic evolution on phenotypic variation without reassortmentThe evolutionary dynamics of the Egyptian H5N1 strains provide clues to understanding the pandemic potential of H5N1. The virus was introduced only once in Egypt, in early 2006, and spread among a variety of bird species, including chickens, ducks, turkeys, geese and quail [14]. The virus rapidly evolved to form a phylogenetically distinct clade that has since diverged into multiple sublineages [15]. Thus, continuous replication of H5N1 virus in Egypt has provided a valuable opportunity to study the impact of genetic evolution on phenotypic variation without reassortment.After diversification in local bird populations, some new H5 sublineages have emerged in Egypt with a higher affinity for human-type receptors. Indeed, since their emergence in 2008, almost all human H5N1 strains in Egypt have been phylogenetically grouped into these new sublineages, which can be transmitted to humans with a higher efficacy than other avian influenza viruses. This might explain why, since 2009, Egypt has had the highest number of human cases of H5N1 infection, with more than 50% of the cases worldwide [5]. Fortunately, these Egyptian H5N1 sublineages still do not have binding affinity for receptors in the upper respiratory tract and, therefore, do not sustain transmission in humans. However, it increases the risk of H5N1 variants that are better adapted to humans after viral replication in infected patients.…Egypt is regarded as the country with the highest H5N1 pandemic potential worldwideThe Egyptian H5N1 sublineages are also diversifying antigenically in the field, as some are no longer crossreactive to other co-circulating sublineages [15]. Moreover, faint traces of species-specific evolutionary changes have been detected [16], implying a change in their host species. It shows that the H5N1 virus has undergone significant diversification in Egypt during the past seven years. Of greater concern, however, are Egyptian H5N1 strains that carry mammalian influenza virus type PB2 and have lost the N-linked 158 glycosylation site in the top region of haemagglutinin [15,17], both of which can potentially facilitate viral transmission to humans. The genetic diversification of H5N1 virus in Egypt represents an increasing pandemic potential, and Egypt is regarded as the country with the highest H5N1 pandemic potential worldwide [18].A similar situation exists in other geographical areas. Multiple clades and sublineages of H5N1 are co-circulating in Asia, occasionally enabling reassortment events within and beyond the viral subtypes in the field [19,20]. Several H5N1 strains with enhanced binding affinity to human-type receptors have been reported in Indonesia [12]. Similarly, avian and swine H5N1 strains with an altered receptor-binding preference have been isolated sporadically in Indonesia and Laos [21,22]. As in other areas, distinct groups of H5N1 viruses are circulating amongst themselves and with other avian influenza viruses, generating diverse viral phenotypes in nature. The evolutionary dynamics of H5N1 might even accelerate in the wild. H5N1 viruses diverge genetically in ducks [23]; they can transfer the virus over long distances by migration. Thus, the H5N1 virus has established a complex life cycle in nature with accelerated evolutionary dynamics. The pandemic threat of H5N1 remains a serious concern and might be increasing.Control measures based on isolating and culling are still the gold standard for controlling the early phase of an H5N1 outbreak, and worked against the H5N1 outbreaks in Hong Kong in 1997 and in Thailand in 2004 [4]. However, this measure failed in several countries and made H5N1 endemic. Cross-border circulation of H5N1 further complicates implementation of a classical control strategy based on culling in the infected area.In response, public health officials in several countries, including Egypt and Indonesia, advocate poultry vaccination as a preventive or adjunct control measure [1]. Although vaccination does not completely prevent infections, its proper use can help to control avian influenza outbreaks by reducing virus transmission from infected animals. However, it can also increase vaccine-driven evolution among avian influenza viruses. The endemic status of H5N1, which can cause devastating local epidemics, puts pressure on health officers to use a vaccine or a vaccination strategy that might eventually increase selective pressure and thereby accelerate H5N1 evolution. Given the high mutability and diversity of circulating viruses, it seems best to avoid using a vaccine based on a strain from a different geographical area because there would only be a partial antigen match; such a heterologous vaccine would only be effective in the short term compared with a homologous vaccine. During past control of H5N1 epidemics using imported vaccines, escape mutants have emerged within about a year of the start of vaccination, which made the epidemic even worse [14]. When a vaccination strategy is implemented in an endemic area, the vaccine seed strain should be selected from the same geographical area to try to get the longest possible protection. Vaccine seed virus selection must be periodically revised to produce well-matched and efficacious vaccines.Close communication and workshops hold the greatest potential for controlling the H5N1 virusIn most cases, H5 vaccine for an endemic area comes from a foreign supplier. It would be necessary to enable foreign manufacturers to produce customized H5 vaccines based on epidemic strains from different areas. The best approach might be a plasmid-based reverse genetics system to construct vaccine seed viruses [1]. In egg-based production, which is the basis of flu vaccine production, the seed virus needs to be adapted for high growth. This time-consuming step carries the risk of antigenic changes during vaccine production. Yet, advances in influenza reverse genetics have led to the development of cell culture systems to produce recombinant viruses, which would enable rapid genetic mutagenesis and reassortment. Once reverse genetics generates a virus genome that is well adapted to growth in cell culture, the haemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes can be easily interchanged with those of other influenza viruses. In addition, virus growth in cell culture can shorten production time, which increases the probability of selecting a seed virus antigenically appropriate for the upcoming flu season, and enables a rapid increase in production if necessary [24].A control strategy imposed without consideration of regional customs will not be successfulGiven the zoonotic risks of influenza viruses to both humans and animals, the establishment of a vaccine production system applicable to both human and animal infections is an urgent issue. The capacity of vaccine production needs to be flexible for seasonal, pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccines. Advances in genetic engineering facilitate in vitro control of human- and avian-type receptor expression on cultured cells, which should allow both human and avian influenza viruses to grow in the same system. As vaccine production capacity based on cell culture develops, commercial production of H5N1 vaccines tailored to each geographical area should become possible. In addition, emergency vaccination guidelines, such as pre-pandemic vaccine stockpiling, expanding and accelerating vaccine production and setting vaccination priorities, should be formulated in a business–government partnership, to ensure pandemic preparation. There is no guarantee that the H5N1 virus will be the next pandemic influenza strain. However, exploring options for versatile vaccine manufacturing is a key to controlling zoonotic influenza viruses, including H5N1.The complexity of H5N1 ecology also makes control of endemic H5N1 by vaccination a complex task. The problem is that antigenically different groups of viruses, which are not crossreactive, are often co-circulating in endemic areas. Circulation of viruses in each sublineage is not restricted in terms of geography or host species, which complicates efforts to use a vaccine produced against antigens from a single virus strain [15]. Of greater concern, H5N1 virus infects a variety of bird species [1], which means the vaccination targets have expanded. Bird species differ in their optimal vaccination protocol—for example, the single vaccination used routinely in chickens does not induce an adequate immune response in turkeys, which require multi-dose vaccination at an older age [25]. Furthermore, rearing many bird species and their hybrid breeds in uncontrolled confinement is common in H5N1 endemic countries, especially in rural areas. Therefore, the immunogenicity of existing vaccines is probably inadequate to protect all target species with a single vaccination scheme. Endemic H5N1 already forces public health officials to redefine vaccine development policy to improve both vaccine immunogenicity and vaccination regime.Unfortunately, it is unlikely that science will ever produce a clear answer as to when, where and how the next pandemic influenza virus will emergeToday, there are numerous techniques that could overcome these problems by increasing immunogenic potency and crossreactivity. Innovative vaccine formats—multivalent, universal, nasal and synthetic vaccines—possibly coupled with the use of adjuvants, could improve the global vaccine supply [24]. These new technologies should be applied as soon as possible. Nevertheless, no single technique can probably resolve the underlying complexity of H5N1 dynamics. Over-reliance on vaccination might therefore only worsen the situation. Vaccination can help control endemic H5N1 only when administered as part of an integrated control programme that includes surveillance, culling, restricting host movement and enhanced quarantine and biosecurity.The complex evolutionary dynamics of the H5N1 virus are challenging host species barriers and the ecology brings H5N1 into close proximity to humans [1]. The close link between the virus and humans is a multifaceted phenomenon that can affect health in myriad ways. Thus, we need to redefine control strategies to address the nature of H5N1 dynamics. Surveillance is the basis of infection control in the field. Wild birds and their predators should be included as surveillance targets, thereby expanding the H5N1 host species range. Another drawback is the fact that epidemiological studies focus mainly on virus genotyping. Although genetic data is informative, the diversity of H5N1 viruses makes characterization based only on genetic traits difficult. Characterization of viral phenotypes—antigenicity, receptor-binding preference, pathogenicity and transmissibility—is equally important for investigating the evolutionary dynamics of H5N1 viruses in nature. We would need techniques to determine easily viral phenotype, in particular new rapid diagnostic systems that can be used for timely epidemiological investigations and rapid infection control measures [1]. For example, portable kits that can determine virus receptor specificity would allow field testing of whether a particular avian influenza virus strain has adapted to human-type receptors, thereby adding a new dimension for characterizing and assessing H5N1 outbreaks.Our perception of H5N1 control should change from short-term hunting to long-term controlThe large-scale slaughter of all known and suspected infected birds in H5N1 endemic countries is hugely expensive in terms of execution costs and compensation for lost poultry. Financial assistance from international organizations might be needed to promote the thorough implementation of such a policy. However, H5N1 endemic countries are not all poor nations and some have already built a certain level of technology infrastructure. Thus, transfer of epidemiological skills and concepts to local health officers and scientists is a priority. Overseas collaborations between technologically developed countries and their institutions, and H5N1 endemic countries and their institutions, should be established at a functional level. Close communication and workshops hold the greatest potential for controlling the H5N1 virus. Such projects supported by governments and funding agencies would encourage establishment of bilateral and multilateral relationships between developed countries and the developing countries, which are the epicentres of H5N1 outbreaks. Sharing information about risk and risk management is one of the key methods for reducing the threat of future H5N1 epidemics.Globalization has had major benefits for international travel and trade, and sharing of information. The improvements in information technology have dramatically increased the speed and ease of data flow [26]. Intelligence networks facilitate instantaneous sharing of information and enable global warnings about potential hazards as well as problem-solving. Moreover, collaborative research centres, which have been established on reciprocal bases between scientifically advanced countries and institutes and overseas partner countries and institutes in Asia, Africa and Latin America, are important players in information networking—for instance the Institute Pasteur Network, the Mahidol Oxford Tropical Medicine Research Unit and Japan Initiative for Global Research Network on Infectious Diseases. Linking such laboratory-based networks should be the next step. This would have a profound synergistic effect by maximizing research capacity, human resources and geographic coverage to build a robust global-scale network for infection control.However, regional socio-cultural issues can be a significant concern for virus control wherever accepted values and scientific understanding might differ. Multiple local and regional factors—customs, religion, politics and economics—can affect H5N1 control in an area. Successful implementation of an H5N1 control strategy depends largely on mutual understanding and consideration of local idiosyncrasies.Some examples from Egypt show how regional identity can be closely linked with local public health initiatives. Egypt is an Islamic nation and bird meat is an important source of animal protein, and the only source in some rural areas [14]. A large proportion of Egyptian households in rural areas raise poultry. Although broiler and layer chickens are raised under modern hygienic controls on commercial farms, backyard birds are raised in open uncontrolled farms, leaving them free to interact with other birds (Fig 1A). The poultry meat trade depends mainly on live bird markets in traditional bazaars (Fig 1B), because of a preference for freshly slaughtered poultry. Pigeon towers are built on farms, backyards and roofs throughout villages to raise pigeons for eating. Generally, birds in Egypt are raised in proximity to humans (Fig 1C), which presents an increasing risk of human H5N1 infection in Egypt and establishment of endemic H5N1 in birds nationwide.Open in a separate windowFigure 1Socio-cultural traditions in rearing birds for food in Egypt. (A) Free rearing of backyard birds. (B) Live birds at a downtown market. (C) An example of the intertwined relationship between birds and humans.Such regional identity is inseparable from socio-cultural contexts, making fundamental change virtually impossible. Although there are many scenarios in which a local public health system could be improved by food safety standards and veterinary inspection or short-term closing of live bird markets for virus clearance, H5N1 control measures have to be implemented whilst respecting the intrinsic socio-cultural traditions in the region. A control strategy imposed without consideration of regional customs will not be successful. It is the local health officers and scientists who are best suited to address the enormous complexity and breadth of issues required for H5N1 control. They also experience H5N1 outbreaks in their area on a regular basis and have a great incentive to be involved in infection control. Therefore, it is important to include local expertise in planning and implementing a control strategy.Science in an area such as infectious disease research can no longer be viewed as independent of societal needs…Science is frequently looked at as if it can produce a ‘silver bullet'' to solve every problem. Early success in vaccine and antibiotic development also created a false sense of optimism that scientific methods could eliminate the risk of infection. However, the reality has turned out to be different—some infectious diseases remain uncontrollable and far from eradication. Given the mutable and diversifying nature of avian influenza viruses, there is a significant possibility that different avian influenza subtypes and strains do not follow a single evolutionary pathway. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that science will ever produce a clear answer as to when, where and how the next pandemic influenza virus will emerge. Our perception of H5N1 control should change from short-term hunting to long-term control. The ecology of H5N1 virus brings it into close proximity to humans. The most important strategy is to minimize contact between terrestrial poultry and wild waterfowl to segregate H5N1 in poultry, because H5N1 spread would be uncontrollable if it established a stable equilibrium in waterfowl. For example, H5N1 viruses in Siberia have not been consistently isolated each year from carcasses and faeces of wildfowl migrating from Asia [7]. This implies that H5N1 circulation in the wild still largely depends on occasional introduction from poultry. It is possible that trials to limit H5N1 infection in poultry would lead to a reduction in viral spread and a dwindling evolutionary path in nature. Infection control policy must abandon fixed strategies in favour of flexible ones to keep pace with the evolutionary dynamics of pathogens such as H5N1 (Fig 2).Open in a separate windowFigure 2Changing dynamics of H5N1 virus in the field. Endemic H5N1 virus diversifies in nature, making traditional control measures extremely difficult.Today''s infection control strategy is becoming largely dependent on the reliability and accuracy of information networking. However, the vast flood of scientific information can hide erroneous information and easily mislead the public [26]. Of greater concern, globalization has prompted the centralization of capital and resources, which can lead to an overemphasis on certain research topics. As a consequence, research projects are often short term, without consideration of effects that might have a long-term social impact [27]. This has led to a debate about whether to limit publication of certain types of research or keep scientific information completely accessible. There is probably no easy answer to this. Our global society needs a more mature approach to support research projects that are accurate reflections of societal needs in public health. At the same time, the increasing links between science and society put more pressure on science to play a greater role in society. This is a serious dilemma—how to use science to solve societal problems whilst maintaining its autonomy [27]. Science in an area such as infectious disease research can no longer be viewed as independent of societal needs; we need to establish a balance between the pursuit of independent basic research and its application for solving clinical problems and crises.? Open in a separate windowYohei WatanabeOpen in a separate windowKazuyoshi IkutaOpen in a separate windowMadiha S Ibrahim     

用反向遗传操作技术产生致弱的H5亚型重组流感病毒

选择一株鹅源H5N1亚型禽流感病毒 (AIV) ,缺失其HA基因裂解序列的 4个碱性氨基酸、使HA裂解模式由高致病性的PQRERRRKKR↓GL突变为低致病性的PQRESR↓GL ,将修饰的HA基因克隆入转录 表达载体pHW2 0 0 0、构建质粒pHW5 2 4_HA ,将该毒株和H9N2亚型毒株的NA全基因分别克隆入pHW2 0 0 0 ,构建质粒pHW5 0 6_NA和pHW2 0 6_NA。将pHW5 2 4_HA与pHW5 0 6_NA或pHW2 0 6_NA组合、均用A WSN 33(H1N1)提供 6个内部基因 ,两个组合的 8个质粒分别共转染COS_1细胞 ,产生了H5N1和H5N2两个亚型的基因重排病毒。通过在鸡胚中的连续传代和适应 ,2个重组病毒血凝价上升到 1∶2 9、表面基因稳定、对 6周龄SPF鸡不表现致病性 ,H5N2重组病毒对鸡胚的毒力低于H5N1病毒。这种尝试证明反向遗传操作技术是研究AIV致病性和构建疫苗候选株的有用工具     

Anti N1 Cross-Protecting Antibodies Against H5N1 Detected in H1N1 Infected People

The A(H5N1) influenza virus pandemic may be the result of avian H5N1 adapting to humans, leading to massive human to human transmission in a context of a lack of pre-existing immunity. As A(H1N1) and A(H5N1) share the same neuraminidase subtype, anti-N1 antibodies subsequent to H1N1 infections or vaccinations may confer some protection against A(H5N1). We analysed, by microneutralization assay, the A/Vietnam/1194/04 (H5N1) anti-N1 cross-protection acquired either during A/NewCaledonia/20/99 (H1N1) infection or vaccination. In cases with documented H1N1 infection, H5N1 cross-protection could be observed only in patients born between 1930 and 1950. No such protection was detected in the sera of vaccinated individuals.