Groups on Groups: Some Dynamics and Possible Resolution of the Units of Selection Debates in Evolutionary Biology

David Hull's analysis of conceptual change in science, as presentedin his book, Science as a Process (1988), provides a useful framework for understanding one of the scientific controversies in which he actively and constructively intervened, the units of selectiondebates in evolutionary biology. What follows is a brief overview ofthose debates and some reflections on them.     

Truth, Selection and Scientific Inquiry

In this paper I examine various ways in whichphilosophers have made connections between truth andnatural selection. I introduce several versions ofthe view that mechanisms of true belief generationarise as a result of natural selection and argue thatthey fail to establish a connection between truth andnatural selection. I then turn to scientific truthsand argue that evolutionary accounts of the origin ofscientific truth generation mechanisms also fail. Iintroduce David Hull's selectionist model ofscientific development and argue that his account ofscientific success does not rely on connecting truthand natural selection. I argue that Hull's model,which severs the connection between truth andselection, can account for some aspects of scientificchange, but it still leaves us plenty of questionsabout what aspects of our individual cognitive make-upcontribute to scientific change and how they do so. I introduce an evolutionary approach to scientificcognition that shows how some of these questions canbe answered without making an explanatory appeal toselection for true belief generating mechanisms.     

Does science have a “global goal?”: A critique of hull's view of conceptual progress

Hull's recent work in evolutionary epistemology is marred by a deep tension. While he maintains that conceptual and biological evolution are both driven by selection processes, he also claims that only the former is globally progressive. In this paper I formulate this tension and present four possible responses (including Hull's). I argue that Hull's position rests on the assumption that there is a goal which is sufficiently general to describe most scientific activity yet precise enough to guide research. Working from within Hull's framework, I argue that a non-progressionist stance is both preferable and more consistent with Hull's basic commitments.     

Exploring the Relationships among Epistemological Beliefs, Nature of Science, and Conceptual Change in the Learning of Evolutionary Theory

We explored the relationship between epistemological beliefs and nature of science in a college biology course. One hundred thirty-three college students participated in the research. Exploratory factor analysis with 29 Nature of Science (NOS) items yielded three aspects of NOS: empirical, tentative, and sociocultural nature of scientific knowledge. Pearson r correlations suggested that students who have immature epistemological beliefs are more likely to also have immature beliefs of nature of science. In addition, students’ epistemological beliefs significantly correlate with their conceptual change but their beliefs about nature of science did not. The research is significant in that it provides empirical evidence explaining the relationship between students’ epistemological beliefs and nature of science as well as the relationships between epistemological beliefs and conceptual change in evolution theory.     

Epistemology, necessity, and evolution: a critical review of Michael Ruse��s Philosophy After Darwin

Michael Ruse??s new anthology Philosophy After Darwin provides great history and background in the major impacts Darwinism has had on philosophy, especially in ethics and epistemology. This review focuses on epistemology understood through the lens of evolution by natural selection. I focus on one of Ruse??s own articles in the collection, which responds to two classic articles by Konrad Lorenz and David Hull on the two major forms of evolutionary epistemology. I side with Ruse against Lorenz??s account of the necessity we think our principles of reasoning have, though I disagree with Ruse??s particular example. I also argue that Ruse??s alternative explanation is lacking. Against Hull, I side with Ruse in his doubts that a sociobiological approach to science will prove fruitful, though I point out that it has certain advantages other approaches do not have. Although I side with Ruse on the issue, I conclude that the two views do not really come into direct conflict and so one needs not reject either. Finally, I discuss Ruse??s positive view and raise questions for his conception of evolutionary epistemology. I conclude that his arguments are insufficient to overcome opposing views and his view has at least as many unintuitive conclusions as the alternatives.     

More on the genetical theory of multilevel selection

In my article The genetical theory of multilevel selection, I provided a synthesis of the theory of multilevel selection (MLS) and the theory of natural selection in class‐structured populations. I framed this synthesis within Fisher's genetical paradigm, taking a strictly genetical approach to traits and fitness. I showed that this resolves a number of long‐standing conceptual problems that have plagued the MLS literature, including the issues of ‘aggregate’ vs. ‘emergent’ group traits, ‘collective fitness₁’ vs. ‘collective fitness₂’ and ‘MLS1’ vs. ‘MLS2 ‘. In his commentary, Goodnight suggests this theoretical and conceptual synthesis is flawed in several respects. Here, I show this is incorrect, by: reiterating the theoretical and conceptual goals of my synthesis; clarifying that my genetical approach to traits is necessary for a proper analysis of the action of MLS independently of non‐Darwinian factors; emphasizing that the Price–Hamilton approach to MLS provides a consistent, useful and conceptually superior theoretical framework; and explaining the role of reproductive value in the study of natural selection in class‐structured populations. I also show that Goodnight's contextual analysis treatment of MLS in a class‐structured population is mathematically, biologically and conceptually inadequate.     

Selection and Science: Critical notice of David Hull's Science as a Process

An examination of Hull's claims about the nature of interactors, replicators and selection, with special attention to how the genetic material realizes the first two types, and a critique of Hull's attempt to apply the theory of natural selection to the explanation of scientific change, and in particular the succession of theories. I conclude that difficulties attending the molecular instantiation of Hull's theory are vastly increased when it comes to be applied to memes.     

Anthropology and the social factory

Since its birth in the early 1960s, Italian operaismo (workerism) has provided an optimistic reading of working-class militancy, a theoretically stimulating account of capitalist transformation, and a set of highly productive conceptual categories. Despite a shared provenance, however, operaista-influenced movements and theorists have since taken these categories in quite varied directions. Given this conceptual heterogeneity, I consider herein one such category—the “social factory”—and its conceptual reworking by Antonio Negri, as he elaborates in his 2017 book, Marx and Foucault. I employ, as means to pursue this inquiry, an anthropological lens—drawing, to do so, on anthropological theory and ethnographic research. My aim is to build toward to a reconception of the social factory analytic for use in a contemporary anthropology of state formation.     

Fleck and the social constitution of scientific objectivity

Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought-styles has been hailed as a pioneer of constructivist science studies and sociology of scientific knowledge. But this consensus ignores an important feature of Fleck’s epistemology. At the core of his account is the ideal of ‘objective truth, clarity, and accuracy’. I begin with Fleck’s account of modern natural science, locating the ideal of scientific objectivity within his general social epistemology. I then draw on Fleck’s view of scientific objectivity to improve upon reflexive accounts of the origin and development of the theory of thought-styles, and reply to objections that Fleck’s epistemological stance is self-undermining or inconsistent. Explicating the role of scientific objectivity in Fleck’s epistemology reveals his view to be an internally consistent alternative to recent social accounts of scientific objectivity by Harding, Daston and Galison. I use these contrasts to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of Fleck’s innovative social epistemology, and propose modifications to address the latter. The result is a renewed version of Fleck’s social epistemology, which reconciles commitment to scientific objectivity with integrated sociology, history and philosophy of science.     

An evolutionary account of science: A response to Rosenberg's critical notice

In his critical notice, Rosenberg (1991) raises three objections to my evolutionary account of science: whether it is more than a week metaphor, the compatibility of my past objections to reduction and my current advocacy of viewing selection in terms of replication and interaction, and finally, the feasibility of identifying appropriate replicators and interactors in biological evolution, let alone conceptual evolution. I discuss each of these objections in turn.     

Comparative Epistemology: Contours of a Research Program

This article addresses the question whether and how literary documents can be used to further our understanding of a number of key issues on the agenda of the philosophy of biology such as “complexity” and “reductionism”. Kant already granted a certain respectability to aesthetical experiences of nature in his third Critique. Subsequently, the philosophical movement known as phenomenology often used literary sources and literary techniques to criticize and question mainstream laboratory science. The article discusses a number of literary documents, from Moby-Dick to Jurassic Park, that explicitly stage a confrontation between scientific and non-scientific ways of experiencing and understanding the natural world. Special attention is given to the work of Michael Crichton. Its relevance for the philosophy of biology is pointed out.     

Epistemology of living organisms in Aristotle’s philosophy

Summary For Aristotle, living entities are exemplars of substance being. This means that they show a unity of matter and form on the one hand and of potency and act on the other, in contrast to the duality shown in these respects by accidental beings, exemplified by artefacts. An animal, although composed of the same elements (arche) considered by presocratic philosophers, is defined as an individual unity, generated and maintained by an organisation which relates its parts in a hierarchical and functional way. Crucial to his understanding of the living is the hierarchy in which each part is defined by fitness to a function, as an instrument (organon), performing within the whole. The whole being is also an instrument (an organism) for a specific kind of life, which actualises an internal and specific principle (psuche). Both the regularity of appearance of each organism and its fitness to a specific function justify the introduction, in addition to the study of necessary causes, of an additional way of analysis in terms of hypothetical necessities, or necessary conditions for a goal to be attained. Fitness to a function and regularity of appearance make necessary the analysis not just of the elementary components, but of another principle (eidos, form) which defines a structure directed to a goal. While for accidental beings matter can survive their destruction, the corruption (pthora) of living entities causes the disruption of the entire unity of matter and form. Living entities, both as matter and form, show therefore a temporal limitation in being generated and corrupted, although they persist as specific forms since they generate offspring which regularly share their differential characteristics defined in their form. After reviewing recent interpretations of Aristotle’s biological writings, I will suggest the usefulness of this conceptual framework to analyse some problems approached by current developmental biology.     

Vygotsky's Crisis: Argument, context, relevance

Vygotsky’s The Historical Significance of the Crisis in Psychology (1926–1927) is an important text in the history and philosophy of psychology that has only become available to scholars in 1982 in Russian, and in 1997 in English. The goal of this paper is to introduce Vygotsky’s conception of psychology to a wider audience.I argue that Vygotsky’s argument about the “crisis” in psychology and its resolution can be fully understood only in the context of his social and political thinking. Vygotsky shared the enthusiasm, widespread among Russian leftist intelligentsia in the 1920s, that Soviet society had launched an unprecedented social experiment: The socialist revolution opened the way for establishing social conditions that would let the individual flourish. For Vygotsky, this meant that “a new man” of the future would become “the first and only species in biology that would create itself.” He envisioned psychology as a science that would serve this humanist teleology.I propose that The Crisis is relevant today insofar as it helps us define a fundamental problem: How can we systematically account for the development of knowledge in psychology? I evaluate how Vygotsky addresses this problem as a historian of the crisis.     

A dark business,full of shadows: Analogy and theology in William Harvey

In a short work called De conceptione appended to the end of his Exercitationes de generatione animalium (1651), William Harvey developed a rather strange analogy. To explain how such marvelous productions as living beings were generated from the rather inauspicious ingredients of animal reproduction, Harvey argued that conception in the womb was like conception in the brain. It was mostly rejected at the time; it now seems a ludicrous theory based upon homonymy. However, this analogy offers insight into the structure and function of analogies in early modern natural philosophy. In this essay I hope to not only describe the complex nature of Harvey’s analogy, but also offer a novel interpretation of his use of analogical reasoning, substantially revising the account offered by Guido Giglioni (1993). I discuss two points of conceptual change and negotiation in connection with Harvey’s analogy, understanding it as both a confrontation between the border of the natural and the supernatural, as well as a moment in the history of psychology. My interpretation touches upon a number of important aspects, including why the analogy was rejected, how Harvey systematically deployed analogies according to his notions of natural philosophical method, how the analogy fits into contemporary discussions of analogies in science, and finally, how the analogy must be seen in the context of changing Renaissance notions of the science of the soul, ultimately confronting the problem of how to understand final causality in Aristotelian science. In connection with the last, I conclude the essay by turning to how Harvey embeds the analogy within a natural theological cosmology.     

Individualism, Type Specimens, and the Scrutability of Species Membership

The view that species are individuals, as developed by Ghiselinand Hull, has been touted as explaining the role of type specimens intaxonomy. The kinship of this explanation with the Kripke-Putnam theoryof names has long been recognized. In light of this kinship, however,Hull's account of type specimens can be seen to entail two relatedinscrutability problems – unreasonable limits placed on the natureand extent of biological knowledge. An appreciation for these problemsinvites us to consider the proper relation between metaphysical andepistemological inquires in the philosophy of science.     

The discursive detachment of race from gentrification in Cartagena de Indias,Colombia

In this article, I provide an ethnographic account of the gentrification process and its relationship to race and racism in the community of Getsemaní in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia. I introduce Racial Attachment Processes as a conceptual framework for understanding how individuals reconcile Latin American discourses that suggest that race is not a primary stratifying principle with the material spatial realities of racial hierarchies that counter such discourses. Drawing on ethnographic participant observation and semi-structured interviews, including those employing photo-elicitation, I demonstrate how people discursively mobilize race in everyday life, yet selectively detach race in ways that allow them to interpret processes of gentrification as untethered to their racial underpinnings. This paper ultimately demonstrates how the discursive detachment of race from understandings of Colombian socio-spatial, political and economic relations obscures the relationship between racial domination and social inequality.     

Cultural evolution and the social sciences: a case of unification?

This paper addresses the question of how to understand the relationship between Cultural Evolutionary Science (CES) and the social sciences, given that they coexist and both study cultural change. I argue that CES is best understood as having a unificatory or integrative role between evolutionary biology and the social sciences, and that it is best characterized as a bridge field; I describe the concept of a bridge field and how it relates to other non-reductionist accounts of unification or integration used in the philosophy of science literature.     

Improving the performance of I/O-intensive applications on clusters of workstations

Load balancing in a workstation-based cluster system has been investigated extensively, mainly focusing on the effective usage of global CPU and memory resources. However, if a significant portion of applications running in the system is I/O-intensive, traditional load balancing policies can cause system performance to decrease substantially. In this paper, two I/O-aware load-balancing schemes, referred to as IOCM and WAL-PM, are presented to improve the overall performance of a cluster system with a general and practical workload including I/O activities. The proposed schemes dynamically detect I/O load imbalance of nodes in a cluster, and determine whether to migrate some I/O load from overloaded nodes to other less- or under-loaded nodes. The current running jobs are eligible to be migrated in WAL-PM only if overall performance improves. Besides balancing I/O load, the scheme judiciously takes into account both CPU and memory load sharing in the system, thereby maintaining the same level of performance as existing schemes when I/O load is low or well balanced. Extensive trace-driven simulations for both synthetic and real I/O-intensive applications show that: (1) Compared with existing schemes that only consider CPU and memory, the proposed schemes improve the performance with respect to mean slowdown by up to a factor of 20; (2) When compared to the existing approaches that only consider I/O with non-preemptive job migrations, the proposed schemes achieve improvements in mean slowdown by up to a factor of 10; (3) Under CPU-memory intensive workloads, our scheme improves the performance over the existing approaches that only consider I/O by up to 47.5%. Xiao Qin received the BSc and MSc degrees in computer science from Huazhong University of Science and Technology in 1992 and 1999, respectively. He received the PhD degree in computer science from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in 2004. Currently, he is an assistant professor in the department of computer science at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology. His research interests include parallel and distributed systems, storage systems, real-time computing, performance evaluation, and fault-tolerance. He served on program committees of international conferences like CLUSTER, ICPP, and IPCCC. During 2000–2001, he was on the editorial board of The IEEE Distributed System Online. He is a member of the IEEE. Hong Jiang received the B.Sc. degree in Computer Engineering in 1982 from Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China; the M.A.Sc. degree in Computer Engineering in 1987 from the University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada; and the PhD degree in Computer Science in 1991 from the Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, USA. Since August 1991 he has been at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, Nebraska, USA, where he is Associate Professor and Vice Chair in the Department of Computer Science and Engineering. His present research interests are computer architecture, parallel/distributed computing, computer storage systems and parallel I/O, performance evaluation, middleware, networking, and computational engineering. He has over 70 publications in major journals and international Conferences in these areas and his research has been supported by NSF, DOD and the State of Nebraska. Dr. Jiang is a Member of ACM, the IEEE Computer Society, and the ACM SIGARCH and ACM SIGCOMM. Yifeng Zhu received the B.E. degree in Electrical Engineering from Huazhong University of Science and Technology in 1998 and the M.S. degree in computer science from University of Nebraska Lincoln (UNL) in 2002. Currently he is working towards his Ph.D. degree in the department of computer science and engineering at UNL. His main fields of research interests are parallel I/O, networked storage, parallel scheduling, and cluster computing. He is a student member of IEEE. David Swanson received a Ph.D. in physical (computational) chemistry at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (UNL) in 1995, after which he worked as an NSF-NATO postdoctoral fellow at the Technical University of Wroclaw, Poland, in 1996, and subsequently as a National Research Council Research Associate at the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, DC, from 1997–1998. In early 1999 he returned to UNL where he has coordinated the Research Computing Facility and currently serves as an Assistant Research Professor in the Department of Computer Science and Engineering. The Office of Naval Research, the National Science Foundation, and the State of Nebraska have supported his research in areas such as large-scale parallel simulation and distributed systems.     

Sources for Imanishi Kinji’s views of sociality and evolutionary outcomes

Prior to the contribution of genetics or the modern evolutionary synthesis (MES) to natural selection theory, social ecologists searched for factors in addition to natural selection that could influence species change. The idea that sociality, not just biology, was important in determining evolutionary outcomes was prevalent in research in social ecology in the 1920s and 1930s. The influence of ‘tradition’ (or the transmission of learned behaviours between generations) and the view that animals are active in selecting their own environments, rather than passive organisms acted upon by chance, were given as much attention as natural selection theory in European ecology, while animal aggregation and cooperation studies were pursued in America. Imanishi Kinji’s personal library and his scientific notes and papers reveal that he was well aware of this literature and had been profoundly influenced by these earlier viewpoints prior to writing his view of nature in his first book, Seibutsu no Sekai (The World of Living Things, 1941). Evidence is presented to show that he developed his theories based partly on early western debates in social ecology while finding inspiration and a way to express his views in the writings of philosopher Nishida Kitarō and, perhaps, General J C Smuts. One of Imanishi’s lasting contributions is in the demonstrated results of over 40 years of subsequent ecological and ethological research by Imanishi and those trained by him that maintained the broader viewpoints on evolution that had been dropped from the western corpus of research by the 1950s. The current attempt to again get beyond natural selection theory is reflected in debates surrounding genetic and cultural evolution of cooperation, the biology of ‘traditions’ and the idea of ‘culture’ in animal societies. Imanishi Kinji is the Japanese name order, with family name first. Other Japanese names in the text are also written with family name first. A modified version of this paper appeared in Japanese in Seibutsu Kagaku, Vol. 57 No. 3, April 2006, pp 142–149.