Models and Myths of Science: Views of the Elephant

I discuss selected philosophies of science in terms of the roleof rationalism in science and the reality status of the productsof scientific reasoning. A model is then presented in whichI argue that creativity in science involves the mental manipulationof images which are later compared to the shared empirical experienceof the scientific community. The assimilation of a scientificconcept involves a re-creation of the concept through a similarmanipulation of images and empirical experience. The processof recreation can distort the original concept. The result ofthis process of creation and recreation is neither an objectivediscovery of truth nor a subjective invention of truth but aninteractive reality composed of the inquiring human mind andan objectively unknowable nature. Since the model or myth ofscience we accept influences many aspects of the science-societyinteraction, the model I present here as well as models presentedby others ought to be carefully evaluated through the studyof the history of science.     

Checks and balances: the welcomed tension between philosophy and science

There is a tension between science and philosophy, but this tension need not engender enmity or derision. Scientists and philosophers can work together, and we argue that working together is beneficial to both, even if it is sometimes uncomfortable. We offer examples of how philosophy can autonomously and effectively inform scientific practice. Science and philosophy share certain methodological concerns and practices; therefore, scientists who disregard philosophy are vulnerable to critical conceptual mistakes. If our arguments are correct, and if it can also be shown that science informs philosophy, then, while it is possible for both disciplines to operate autonomously, each should welcome the checks and balances that each provides for one another in the investigation and explanation of reality.     

Genes and generalizations: Darden's strategies and the question of context

In her recent book Lindley Darden has endeavored to reclaim for philosophy an active role in the elaboration of good science. She has done this, not by holding up some set of rational standards derived from outside of scientific practice, but rather by delving into the history of science and coming out with a set of scientific strategies. Unconcerned about whether any particular strategy wasin fact employed in a given historical case her project depends upon two claims, first that these strategiescould have been successfully deployed in the particular cases from which they were construed, and second and more importantly, that these strategies can be generalized beyond any particular context and be put to future use. It will be argued that Darden's conception of the possible context independence of scientific strategies is based upon an overly cognitivist misconstrual. An alternative account of the relationship of context dependent and context independent aspects of scientific theory formation will be offered as well as its implications for philosophy.     

Fleck and the social constitution of scientific objectivity

Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought-styles has been hailed as a pioneer of constructivist science studies and sociology of scientific knowledge. But this consensus ignores an important feature of Fleck’s epistemology. At the core of his account is the ideal of ‘objective truth, clarity, and accuracy’. I begin with Fleck’s account of modern natural science, locating the ideal of scientific objectivity within his general social epistemology. I then draw on Fleck’s view of scientific objectivity to improve upon reflexive accounts of the origin and development of the theory of thought-styles, and reply to objections that Fleck’s epistemological stance is self-undermining or inconsistent. Explicating the role of scientific objectivity in Fleck’s epistemology reveals his view to be an internally consistent alternative to recent social accounts of scientific objectivity by Harding, Daston and Galison. I use these contrasts to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of Fleck’s innovative social epistemology, and propose modifications to address the latter. The result is a renewed version of Fleck’s social epistemology, which reconciles commitment to scientific objectivity with integrated sociology, history and philosophy of science.     

The seeds and the worms: Ludwik Fleck and the early history of germ theories

The Polish microbiologist and philosopher of science, Ludwik Fleck (1896-1961), was a pioneer in constructivist history and philosophy of science. Based on studies in the history of syphilis, Fleck hypothesized that many established scientific facts are linked, in their development, to pre-scientific "proto-ideas." In 1935, Fleck proposed that the history of germ theories could be approached through his thesis on proto-ideas. His proposal, however, remained little more than a vague suggestion and was never developed in further detail. This paper introduces the concept of proto-ideas and discusses the central epistemological and historiographical implications of Fleck's thesis. The Fleckian approach offers an attractive alternative to positivist reconstructions of the early history of germ theories and provides a useful framework for a deeper understanding of the sociocultural background of the development of modern knowledge of infection.     

Ernst Mayr,naturalist: His contributions to systematics and evolution

Ernst Mayr's scientific career continues strongly 70 years after he published his first scientific paper in 1923. He is primarily a naturalist and ornithologist which has influenced his basic approach in science and later in philosophy and history of science. Mayr studied at the Natural History Museum in Berlin with Professor E. Stresemann, a leader in the most progressive school of avian systematics of the time. The contracts gained through Stresemann were central to Mayr's participation in a three year expedition to New Guinea and The Solomons, and the offer of a position in the Department of Ornithology, American Museum of Natural History, beginning in 1931. At the AMNH, Mayr was able to blend the best of the academic traditions of Europe with those of North America in developing a unified research program in biodiversity embracing systematics, biogeography and nomenclature. His tasks at the AMNH were to curate and study the huge collections amassed by the Whitney South Sea Expedition plus the just purchased Rothschild collection of birds. These studies provided Mayr with the empirical foundation essential for his 1942Systematics and the Origin of Species and his subsequent theoretical work in evolutionary biology as well as all his later work in the philosophy and history of science. Without a detailed understanding of Mayr's empirical systematic and biogeographic work, one cannot possibly comprehend fully his immense contributions to evolutionary biology and his later analyses in the philosophy and history of science.     

The interface of natural theology and science in the ethology of W. H. Thorpe

Conclusion It should be clear by now the extent to which many features of Thorpe's interpretation of animal behavior and of the animal mind rested, at bottom, not simply on conventional scientific proofs but on interpretive inferences, which in turn rested on a willingress to make extensions of human experience to animals. This, in turn, rested on his view of evolution and his view of reality. And these were governed by his natural theology, which was the fundamental stratum of his intellectual experience.Contrary to the scientific ethos, which restricts theory choice to scientific issues alone, Thorpe's career suggests that the actual reasons for theory choice among scientists often are not limited to science, but are multiple and may sometimes be difficult to discover. It is largely because Thorpe took a public part in the natural theology enterprise that we can know something about his religious beliefs and so can see their probable influence on his scientific decisions. Similar beliefs of other scientists are sometimes harder to get at. Most may be practically beyond discovery, for the ethos of science has discouraged public professions of personal belief in relation to scientific work.¹⁰¹ Yet does it seem plausible that, for example, the restriction of self-consciousness to humans by some scientists is a purely scientific decision?¹⁰² Surely not, any more than that the strong influence of natural theology on Thorpe's thought means that he was not a good scientist. His natural theology may have led him into incautious enthusiasms regarding the animal mind — such as the potential if unrealizable linguistic ability of chimpanzees — through a bias in favor of the continuity of emergents in a progressive evolutionary system, just as it led him to advocate animal consciousness long before the recent upsurge of interest, but the scientific integrity of his work overall is unimpeachable. And yet, that work is not comprehensible historically as science alone. Personal philosophy must not be discounted in writing the history of recent science. This somewhat obvious conclusion (obvious to historians of science) needs emphasis, for we are still prone to think that the sciences of our own time provide their own internal dynamic that is in itself sufficient to account for their content and development.     

Conceptual and ethical problems in the epistemology of genetic information

My thesis will be that the identification of genetic features and their medical interpretation follow at least partially from reductionist premises: “Genes are charging the gun, life(-style) will trigger it.” This simplistic metaphor illustrates a problem of genetic diagnosis: from the viewpoint of philosophy of science, concepts of the gene and the genome are vague and confused. Until now these concepts have not been defined satisfactorily. Partly on account of this there is an additional problem in applying genetic tests in medical diagnostics. The epistemic status of predictive genetic diagnosis in many cases can justifiably be called “opaque.” But a predictive genetic test is designed to reveal genetic knowledge of and for a client on the basis of scientific research. Methodologically the diagnosis of the scientific problem in genetics as a science is developed philosophically as an epistemological argument. The problem of genetics as applied science in medicine and society is the danger of irrationality due to reductionist premises of science. This problem is to be revealed by philosophical analysis. The major result of the argument is that the assessment of applications of basic research in genetics should include considerations from epistemology and philosophy of science. The epistemological status of scientific concepts and reasonableness of advice are interrelated. My thesis is that at the interface between theory of science in genetics and reasonableness of “genetic advice” is the responsibility of the researchers for concepts of their science.     

The tribunal of philosophy and its norms: history and philosophy in Georges Canguilhem’s historical epistemology

In this article I assess Georges Canguilhem’s historical epistemology with both theoretical and historical questions in mind. From a theoretical point of view, I am concerned with the relation between history and philosophy, and in particular with the philosophical assumptions and external norms that are involved in history writing. Moreover, I am concerned with the role that history can play in the understanding and evaluation of philosophical concepts. From a historical point of view, I regard historical epistemology, as developed by Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, as a conception and practice which came out of the project, elaborated in France from the 1920s to the 1940s, of combining history of science and philosophy. I analyse in particular Canguilhem’s epistemology in his theory and practice of history of science. What he called ‘normative history’ is the focus of my analysis. I evaluate the question of the nature and provenience of the norm employed in normative history, and I compare it with the norm as discussed by Canguilhem in Le normal et le pathologique. While I am critical of Canguilhem’s treatment of history, I conclude that his philosophical suggestion to analyse the formation of scientific concepts ‘from below’ represents a useful model for history and philosophy of science, and that it can be very profitably extended to philosophical concepts.     

Just truth? Carefully applying history,philosophy and sociology of science to the forensic use of CCTV images

Using as a case study the forensic comparison of images for purposes of identification, this essay considers how the history, philosophy and sociology of science might help courts to improve their responses to scientific and technical forms of expert opinion evidence in ways that are more consistent with legal system goals and values. It places an emphasis on the need for more sophisticated models of science and expertise that are capable of helping judges to identify sufficiently reliable types of expert evidence and to reflexively incorporate the weakness of trial safeguards and personnel into their admissibility decision making.     

Reports from the high table

David Sepkoski and Michael Ruse’s edited collection The Peolobiological Revolution covers the changes in paleontological science in the last half-century. The collection should be of interest to philosophers of science (particularly those interested in non-reductive unity) as well as historians. I give an overview of the content and major themes of the volume and draw some lessons for the philosophy of science along the way. In particular, I argue that the history of paleontology demands a new approach to philosophical delineation of sciences.     

Blushing and the philosophy of mind

The introduction, an imaginary dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist, is followed by a brief discussion of the interactions between science, philosophy, and religion. Next comes an analysis of the three most popular philosophies of mind: classical mind-body dualism, computerism, and psychoneural monism. It is argued that the latter, held by medical psychologists since Hippocrates, and formulated explicitly by Cajal and Hebb, is the philosophy of mind that underlies contemporary cognitive and affective neuroscience. The standard objections to psychoneural monism (or materialism) are examined. Evolutionary psychology, though promissory, is judged to be more fancy than fact at its present stage. The conclusion is that the philosophy of mind is still in a poor shape, but that it can advance if it learns more from the science of mind. It would also help if scientific psychologists were to replace such tacitly dualistic expressions as "organ N instantiates (or subserves) mental function M" with "organ N performs mental function M", just as we say "the legs walk" instead of "walking is subserved by legs," and "the lungs breathe" instead of "the lungs instantiate breathing."     

Towards disciplinary disintegration in biology

Interdisciplinary integration has fundamental limitations. This is not sufficiently realized in science and in philosophy. Concerning scientific theories there are many examples of pseudo-integration which should be unmasked by elementary philosophical analysis. For example, allegedly over-arching theories of stress which are meant to unite biology and psychology, upon analysis, turn out to represent terminological rather than substantive unity. They should be replaced by more specific, local theories. Theories of animal orientation, likewise, have been formulated in unduly general terms. A natural history approach is more suitable for the study of animal orientation. The tendency to formulate overgeneral theories is also present in evolutionary biology. Philosophy of biology can only deal with these matters if it takes a normative turn. Undue emphasis on interdisciplinary integration is a modern variant of the old unity of science ideal. The replacement of the ideal by a better one is an important challenge for the philosophy of science.     

Against reduction

In Molecular Models: Philosophical Papers on Molecular Biology, Sahotra Sarkar presents a historical and philosophical analysis of four important themes in philosophy of science that have been influenced by discoveries in molecular biology. These are: reduction, function, information and directed mutation. I argue that there is an important difference between the cases of function and information and the more complex case of scientific reduction. In the former cases it makes sense to taxonomise important variations in scientific and philosophical usage of the terms “function” and “information”. However, the variety of usage of “reduction” across scientific disciplines (and across philosophy of science) makes such taxonomy inappropriate. Sarkar presents reduction as a set of facts about the world that science has discovered, but the facts in question are remarkably disparate; variously semantic, epistemic and ontological. I argue that the more natural conclusion of Sarkar’s analysis is eliminativism about reduction as a scientific concept.     

Vienna-Chicago: the cultural transformation of the model system of the un-opposed molar

The discussion over the roles of genes and environment on the phenotypical specification of organisms has held a central role in science philosophy since the late 19(th) century and has re-emerged in today's debate over genetic determinism and developmental plasticity. In fin-de-siecle Vienna, this debate coincided with a philosophical debate over empiricism/materialism versus idealism/vitalism. Turn-of-the-century Vienna's highly interdisciplinary environment was also the birthplace for the model system of the un-opposed molar. The un-opposed molar system features new tissue formation at the roots of teeth and tooth drift once opposing teeth are lost. The un-opposed molar model system was revived by a group of Viennese scientists who left Vienna during the Nazi period to address Vienna's questions about evolution and heredity and about genes and environment in Chicago's post-WWII scientific exile community. Here we are using the colorful history of the un-opposed molar to investigate the role of culture and method in the scientific evolution of a model system.     

植物园与植物园学

随着全世界植物园数量的增加、功能和转变和我学科的综合,需要发展植物园学,以引导植物园的发展。植物园学主要包括10个方面的内容：1）植物园的性质、任务和功能;2）历史;3）规划设计;4）物种保护,尤其是迁地保护;5）活植物收集圃及其管理;6）引种驯化的理论与实践和新经济植物的发掘;7）植物展出的技术与方法;8）城市生物多样性保护和利用;9）环境教育和旅游;10）维护和管理。生物多样性是植物园的核心。美丽的外貌、科学的内涵和人与自然和谐共外的准则是植物园的基本要素。     

Taking evolution seriously in political science

In this essay, we explore the epistemological and ontological assumptions that have been made to make political science “scientific.” We show how political science has generally adopted an ontologically reductionist philosophy of science derived from Newtonian physics and mechanics. This mechanical framework has encountered problems and constraints on its explanatory power, because an emphasis on equilibrium analysis is ill-suited for the study of political change. We outline the primary differences between an evolutionary ontology of social science and the physics-based philosophy commonly employed. Finally, we show how evolutionary thinking adds insight into the study of political phenomena and research questions that are of central importance to the field, such as preference formation.     

The history of science and the introduction of plant genetics in Mexico

The emergence and development of 'national sciences' in Latin American countries were not, until very recently, part of the agenda of historians of science because the 'traditional' history of sciences was not interested in the scientific activity of peripheral areas. The history of science is a recent discipline in Mexican historiographic studies. The methodological interest in the history of science, the creation of schools and institutes that deal with it, the establishment of particular chairs, the organization of national societies, and the publication of books and periodicals are all very recent. It is important to carry out studies in the history of science that examine the development of Mexican science introducing the 'local' context, and study how this development has influenced the formation of scientific societies and the development of scientific disciplines in the country. We want to explore the introduction of genetics in Mexico as applied to agriculture between 1930 and 1960. This matter has not been investigated in Mexico and therefore this work would represent one of the first studies of this subject and one of the first studies in the general field of Mexican scientific history.     

The Role of History in Science

The case often made by scientists (and philosophers) against history and the history of science in particular is clear. Insofar as a field of study is historical as opposed to law-based, it is trivial. Insofar as a field attends to the past of science as opposed to current scientific issues, its efforts are derivative and, by diverting attention from acquiring new knowledge, deplorable. This case would be devastating if true, but it has almost everything almost exactly wrong. The study of history and the study of laws are not mutually exclusive, but unavoidably linked. Neither can be pursued without the other. Much the same can be said of the history of science. The history of science is neither a distraction from “real” science nor even merely a help to science. Rather, the history of science is an essential part of each science. Seeing that this is so requires a broader understanding of both history and science.