Bühler and Popper: Kantian therapies for the crisis in psychology

I analyze the historical background and philosophical considerations of Karl Bühler and his student Karl Popper regarding the crisis of psychology. They share certain Kantian questions and methods for reflection on the state of the art in psychology. Part 1 outlines Bühler's diagnosis and therapy for the crisis in psychology as he perceived it, leading to his famous theory of language. I also show how the Kantian features of Bühler's approach help to deal with objections to his crisis diagnosis and to aspects of his linguistic theory. Part 2 turns to Popper's dissertation, completed in 1928 under Bühler. I analyze Popper's disapproval of Schlick's physicalism in psychology, as well as Popper's attempt to extend Bühler's Kantian strategy to the domain of the psychology of thinking. In conclusion, I indicate how these approaches to the crisis in psychology differ from Thomas Kuhn's notions of crisis and revolution, which are still all too popular in current philosophical discussions of psychology.     

Vygotsky's Crisis: Argument, context, relevance

Vygotsky’s The Historical Significance of the Crisis in Psychology (1926–1927) is an important text in the history and philosophy of psychology that has only become available to scholars in 1982 in Russian, and in 1997 in English. The goal of this paper is to introduce Vygotsky’s conception of psychology to a wider audience.I argue that Vygotsky’s argument about the “crisis” in psychology and its resolution can be fully understood only in the context of his social and political thinking. Vygotsky shared the enthusiasm, widespread among Russian leftist intelligentsia in the 1920s, that Soviet society had launched an unprecedented social experiment: The socialist revolution opened the way for establishing social conditions that would let the individual flourish. For Vygotsky, this meant that “a new man” of the future would become “the first and only species in biology that would create itself.” He envisioned psychology as a science that would serve this humanist teleology.I propose that The Crisis is relevant today insofar as it helps us define a fundamental problem: How can we systematically account for the development of knowledge in psychology? I evaluate how Vygotsky addresses this problem as a historian of the crisis.     

Two faces of representation: on the neuroscience of folk psychology

Much work in contemporary philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy hinges on the concept of ‘representation,’ but that concept inherits a problematic ambiguity from neuroscience, where scientists may distinguish between cognitive and physiological levels of representation only tacitly. First, I explicate two potentially distinct senses of representation corresponding to these levels. I then argue that ambiguity about the nature of representation in philosophy of mind is problematic for at least one prominent philosophical project that aims to use neuroscientific work on representation to defend the existence or explanatory relevance of intentional mental states, namely Schroeder’s (2004) scientific explication of desire in terms of the neurobiology of reward. I argue that philosophical treatments of the relationship between cognitive and neural architecture must attend more carefully to the ambiguity in the concept of representation. I conclude by outlining a strategy for addressing the gap between levels of representation, one that privileges a local or narrow philosophical approach to interpreting scientific concepts and data over a global or general approach.     

Methodology in Aristotle’s Theory of Spontaneous Generation

Aristotle’s theory of spontaneous generation offers many puzzles to those who wish to understand his theory both within the context of his biology and within the context of his more general philosophy of nature. In this paper, I approach the difficult and vague elements of Aristotle’s account of spontaneous generation not as weaknesses, but as opportunities for an interesting glimpse into the thought of an early scientist struggling to reconcile evidence and theory. The paper has two goals: (1) to give as charitable and full an account as possible of what Aristotle’s theory of spontaneous generation was, and to examine some of its consequences; and (2) to reflect on Aristotle as a scientist, and what his comments reveal about how he approached a difficult problem. In particular, I propose that the well-recognized problem of the incompatibility between Aristotle’s concept of spontaneity and his theory of spontaneous generation presents an opportunity for insight into his scientific methodology when approaching ill-understood phenomena.     

Philosophy and tinkering

I characterize Wimsatt’s approach to philosophy of science as philosophy for science and then briefly consider a theme emerging from his work that informs just one of the many current developments in philosophy of biology that he inspired: scaffolding as a problem of mechanistic explanation for functionalists.     

Psychoanalysis as functionalist social science: the legacy of Freud's 'Project for a scientific psychology'

The paper links Freud's early work in the 'Project for a scientific psychology' with the psychoanalytic psychology of Kleinian object relations theory now current. Freud is often accused of introducing mechanism into his psychology and installing at its core an irreconcilable dichotomy of two disparate ways of explaining human behaviour. I suggest that Freud's early mechanistic thinking is an attempt at what he only partly achieves, a functional account of the 'mental apparatus'. I consider whether this way of conceptualising the mind in functional terms is methodologically relevant to psychoanalytic investigation or whether it is at best heuristically useful. From a brief consideration of Kleinian object relations theory, illustrated by case material, I conclude that there are grounds for accepting the first of these alternatives.     

Nietzsche's aesthetic critique of Darwin

Despite his position as one of the first philosophers to write in the "post-Darwinian" world, the critique of Darwin by Friedrich Nietzsche is often ignored for a host of unsatisfactory reasons. I argue that Nietzsche's critique of Darwin is important to the study of both Nietzsche's and Darwin's impact on philosophy. Further, I show that the central claims of Nietzsche's critique have been broadly misunderstood. I then present a new reading of Nietzsche's core criticism of Darwin. An important part of Nietzsche's response can best be understood as an aesthetic critique of Darwin, reacting to what he saw as Darwin having drained life of an essential component of objective aesthetic value. For Nietzsche, Darwin's theory is false because it is too intellectual, because it searches for rules, regulations, and uniformity in a realm where none of these are to be found - and, moreover, where they should not be found. Such a reading goes furthest toward making Nietzsche's criticism substantive and relevant. Finally, I attempt to relate this novel explanation of Nietzsche's critique to topics in contemporary philosophy of biology, particularly work on the evolutionary explanation of culture.     

The rediscovery of Mendelism in agricultural context: Erich von Tschermak as plant-breeder

Why was Mendelism rediscovered? One way in which historians have addressed this issue is to look at wider trends in research during the 1890s of which the rediscoverers were part. Quite a lot is known about one such research tradition, namely the attempts to resolve the question of evolutionary mechanism through the use of varietal crosses. But another relevant research tradition is still largely unknown: the work of commercial breeders, several of whom were using hybridisation by the 1890s. In this paper I begin by looking at Tschermak's initial career, the sequence of events by which he came upon Mendel's work, and why he was excited by what he read. Then I place Tschermak's early work in the context of commercial plant-breeding in German-speaking Europe toward the end of the 19th century. Finally I look again at the question of Tschermak's somewhat ambivalent relationship to Mendelism after 1900. I argue that his initial misunderstanding of the concept of segregation was due to the fact that he approached Mendel's work with the perspective of a breeder rather than that of a geneticist.     

The medium of signs: nominalism, language and the philosophy of mind in the early thought of Dugald Stewart

In 1792 Dugald Stewart published Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. In its section on abstraction he declared himself to be a nominalist. Although a few scholars have made brief reference to this position, no sustained attention has been given to the central role that it played within Stewart's early philosophy of mind. It is therefore the purpose of this essay to unpack Stewart's nominalism and the intellectual context that fostered it. In the first three sections I aver that his nominalism emanated from his belief that objects of the mind--qualities, ideas and words--were signs that bore no necessary relation to the external objects that they were meant to represent. More specifically, it was these signs that were arranged into systems of thought by the 'operations of the mind'. The next three sections suggest that his treatment of words as signs most probably originated in his views on language and medicine and that his nominalistic philosophy of mind could also be extended to systems that sought to classify the natural world. I conclude by suggesting several avenues of enquiry that could be pursued by future scholars interested in excavating Stewart's thought.     

Ernst Mayr,naturalist: His contributions to systematics and evolution

Ernst Mayr's scientific career continues strongly 70 years after he published his first scientific paper in 1923. He is primarily a naturalist and ornithologist which has influenced his basic approach in science and later in philosophy and history of science. Mayr studied at the Natural History Museum in Berlin with Professor E. Stresemann, a leader in the most progressive school of avian systematics of the time. The contracts gained through Stresemann were central to Mayr's participation in a three year expedition to New Guinea and The Solomons, and the offer of a position in the Department of Ornithology, American Museum of Natural History, beginning in 1931. At the AMNH, Mayr was able to blend the best of the academic traditions of Europe with those of North America in developing a unified research program in biodiversity embracing systematics, biogeography and nomenclature. His tasks at the AMNH were to curate and study the huge collections amassed by the Whitney South Sea Expedition plus the just purchased Rothschild collection of birds. These studies provided Mayr with the empirical foundation essential for his 1942Systematics and the Origin of Species and his subsequent theoretical work in evolutionary biology as well as all his later work in the philosophy and history of science. Without a detailed understanding of Mayr's empirical systematic and biogeographic work, one cannot possibly comprehend fully his immense contributions to evolutionary biology and his later analyses in the philosophy and history of science.     

Building a Science of Animal Minds: Lloyd Morgan,Experimentation, and Morgan’s Canon

Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1852–1936) is widely regarded as the father of modern comparative psychology. Yet, Morgan initially had significant doubts about whether a genuine science of comparative psychology was even possible, only later becoming more optimistic about our ability to make reliable inferences about the mental capacities of non-human animals. There has been a fair amount of disagreement amongst scholars of Morgan’s work about the nature, timing, and causes of this shift in Morgan’s thinking. We argue that Morgan underwent two quite different shifts of attitude towards the proper practice of comparative psychology. The first was a qualified acceptance of the Romanesian approach to comparative psychology that he had initially criticized. The second was a shift away from Romanes’ reliance on systematizing anecdotal evidence of animal intelligence towards an experimental approach, focused on studying the development of behaviour. We emphasize the role of Morgan’s evolving epistemological views in bringing about the first shift – in particular, his philosophy of science. We emphasize the role of an intriguing but overlooked figure in the history of comparative psychology in explaining the second shift, T. Mann Jones, whose correspondence with Morgan provided an important catalyst for Morgan’s experimental turn, particularly the special focus on development. We also shed light on the intended function of Morgan’s Canon, the methodological principle for which Morgan is now mostly known. The Canon can only be properly understood by seeing it in the context of Morgan’s own unique experimental vision for comparative psychology.     

Bayer revisited

Bayer accuses me of wrongly claiming that he holds a negative thesis about the role that the liberal emphasis on privacy rights has had on AIDS public health policy. In his reply to my review essay, he denies holding such a thesis and, moreover, makes the stronger claim that his position is sympathetic to liberalism, or at least to some versions of it. Although I appreciate Bayer's efforts to clarify his views about liberalism and a "culture of restraint and responsibility", it is clear to me that our differences are related not to a misunderstanding on my part, but to a fundamental disagreement concerning what liberalism as a political philosophy is, and what public policy implications it entails in the case of AIDS....     

The excluded philosophy of evo-devo? Revisiting C.H. Waddington's failed attempt to embed Alfred North Whitehead's "organicism" in evolutionary biology

Though a prominent British developmental biologist in his day, a close friend of Theodosius Dobzhansky, and a frequent correspondent with Ernst Mayr, C.H. Waddington did not enter the ranks of "architect" of the Modern Synthesis. By the end of his career, in fact, he recognized that other biologists reacted to his work "as though they feel obscurely uneasy"; and that the best that some philosophers of biology could say of his work was that he was not "wholly orthodox" (Waddington 1975c, 11). In this essay, I take Waddington's self-assessments at face value and explore three potential reasons why his work did not have more of a direct impact: Waddington's explicit support for the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead; a lack of institutional support; and Waddington's occasional marginalization from the core network of American neo-Darwinians. Though excluded from the Modern Synthesis in the mid-20th century, it now appears that Waddington's work does undergird the emerging evo-devo synthesis. Whether this indicates concomitant, if implicit, support for Whiteheadian philosophy is an interesting question not explored here.     

Scientific research at the Laboratoire Arago (Banyuls, France) in the twentieth Century: Edouard Chatton, the "master", and André Lwoff, the "pupil"

Edouard Chatton (1883–1947) began his scientific career in the Pasteur Institute, where he made several important discoveries regarding pathogenic protists (trypanosomids, Plasmodium, toxoplasms, Leishmania). In 1908 he married a "Banyulencque", Marie Herre; from 1920, he focused his research on marine protists. He finished his career as Professor at the Sorbonne (Paris) and director of the Laboratoire Arago in Banyuls-sur-mer, where he died in 1947. André Lwoff (1902–1994) lived several scientific lives in addition to his artistic and family life. But it is the study of protists that filled his first life after he encountered the exceptional Master who was Chatton. Lwoff's father was a psychiatrist and his mother an artist sculptor. He became a Doctor of Medicine in 1927 and then a Doctor of Sciences in 1932, his thesis dealing with biochemical aspects of protozoa nutrition. He met Chatton in 1921 and – until Chatton's death – their meetings, first in Roscoff and then in Banyuls-sur-mer, were numerous and their collaboration very close. Their monograph on apostome ciliates was one of the peaks of this collaboration. In 1938, Lwoff was made director of the Microbial Physiology Department at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, where he began a new life devoted to bacteria, and then to viruses, before pursuing his career as director of the Cancer Research Institute in Villejuif (France). Lwoff was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1965. He died in Banyuls in 1994. "Master" and "pupil" had in common perseverance in their scientific work, conception and observation, a critical sense and rigor but also a great artistic sensibility that painting and drawing in the exceptional surroundings of Banyuls-sur-mer had fulfilled. Electronic Publication     

Reminiscences of a journeyman scientist: studies of thermoregulation in non-human primates and humans

After graduating from Mount Holyoke College in 1948 where I majored in experimental psychology I worked at the College for 2 years with the Johns Hopkins Thermophysiological Unit. My graduate work later at the University of Wisconsin, centering on sensory psychology, culminated in my 1955 PhD thesis on human dark adaptation. I continued work in sensory psychology later with Neal Miller at Yale and then moved to the John B. Pierce Foundation--a Yale affiliate--where I began the studies of thermoregulation that constitute the center of my scientific career. Those studies were largely--later wholly--conducted using microwave energy as a thermal load and were thus published in Bioelectromagnetics even as I played an active role in the Bioelectromagnetics Society. In the beginning this work was centered on the responses of Squirrel Monkeys to thermal loads. Later, serving as Senior Scientist at the Air Force Research Laboratory at San Antonio, I completed an extensive analysis of thermal regulation in humans. I consider this work of special note inasmuch as the extraordinary human thermoregulatory ability was surely among the attributes that were paramount in initially separating humans from the other anthropoid primates.     

Problems in the Psychology of Development (Reading O. Mandel'shtam)

In August of this year, our regular author V.P. Zinchenko celebrated his sixtieth birthday. The editorial board asked him to give an interview about his view of the contemporary science of psychology. Vladimir Petrovich preferred a series of articles on the eternal problems of developmental psychology. We publish the first of these articles, written in the genre of an essay on scientific themes, in this journal issue. But the editorial board did not abandon its request, and hopes that his interview on the science of psychology will be published in the journal. The editorial board congratulates V.P. Zinchenko on his birthday and wishes him success in his scientific work.     

THE THREE G's Meeting the Invertebrate Cell Culture Pioneers: Goldschmidt, Gaw, and Grace

It was my good fortune to meet personally the three invertebrate cell culture pioneers,Richard Goldschmidt,Zan-Yin Gaw,and Thomas D.C.Grace (Fig.1).In 1951 I met Goldschmidt at a symposium in Cold Spring Harbor,but I only knew that he was a prominent geneticist.I had no idea about his insect cell culture work at Yale University and daily contacts with Ross G.Harrison.In 1959 Zan Yin Gaw in Wuhan successfully cultured monolayers of silkworm cells for more than one year.I reported his breakthrough achievement at the 11th International Congress of Entomology in Vienna in 1960,but his work was completely ignored outside China.In 1982 Gaw invited me to Wuhan where he told me that he studied in the United States in the 1930s,working as postdoctoral scientist at the Rockefeller Institute,where he was daily meeting William Trager,and later at Yale University in the Osborn Laboratory,where he was inspired by Harrison.T.D.C.Grace worked in my laboratory at Rockefeller University during 1957 and 1958,then returned to CSIRO in Canberra,Australia.     

DEFENDING THE DUTY TO RESEARCH?

In 2005, John Harris published a paper in the Journal of Medical Ethics in which he claimed that there was a duty to support scientific research. With Sarah Chan, he defended his claims against criticisms in this journal in 2008. In this paper I examine the defence, and claim that it is not powerful. Although he has established a slightly stronger position, it is not clear that the defence is sufficiently strong to show that there is a duty to support scientific research. Important questions about fairness, about rescue, and about the relationship between reasons and obligations to act can still be raised; and these questions are important enough to destabilize the defence.     

The Use and Abuse of Sir Karl Popper

Karl Popper has been one of the few philosophers of sciences who has influenced scientists. I evaluate Popper's influence on our understanding of evolutionary theory from his earliest publications to the present. Popper concluded that three sorts of statements in evolutionary biology are not genuine laws of nature. I take him to be right on this score. Popper's later distinction between evolutionary theory as a metaphysical research program and as a scientific theory led more than one scientist to misunderstand his position on evolutionary theory as a scientific theory. In his later work Popper also introduced what he took to be improvements of evolutionary theory. Thus far these improvements have had almost no influence on evolutionary biology. I conclude by examining the influence of Popper on the reception of cladistic analysis.