Possession, exorcism and psychoanalysis

This paper investigates the historiographical utility of psychoanalysis, focussing in particular on retrospective explanations of demonic possession and exorcism. It is argued that while ‘full-blown’ psychoanalytic explanations—those that impose Oedipus complexes, anal eroticism or other sophisticated theoretical structures on the historical actors—may be vulnerable to the charge of anachronism, a weaker form of retrospective psychoanalysis can be defended as a legitimate historical lens. The paper concludes, however, by urging historians to look at psychoanalysis as well as trying to look through it. Full-blown psychoanalysis is a bad historical lens but it may, in some cases, be an excellent explanatory template: a thorough understanding of how psychoanalytic therapy functions in the modern world is, for example, a good theoretical preparation for historians seeking to understand the sixteenth-century’s demonological universe.     

An Archetypal Mental Coding Process

This paper presents evidence for a psychological coding process that meets the criteria that define such processes in organic nature and culture. The recognition of these previously unknown encoding sequences is derived from the recent formulation of an adaptive mental module of the mind—the emotion processing mind—that has evolved to cope with traumatic events and the unique, language derived, explicit human awareness of personal mortality. The emergent awareness of death has served as a selection factor for the evolution of a two-system, emotion-processing mind, with conscious and unconscious components, an arrangement that allows for the invocation of conscious denial, which in turn has fostered the use of encoding when faced with death-related traumas. The paper offers several ways in which evolved mental adaptations have features that are shared with those that are biological. Many aspects of these mental adaptive efforts are comparable to attempts at defense that are carried out by the immune system. In addition, the adaptive approach has been the foundation for the discovery of laws of communication, and thus of the mind, that are on a parallel with those found through mathematical models drawn from Newtonian physics.     

Phenomenology of Psychoanalytic Data. A Biosemiotic Framework

In my continuing efforts to build a bridge between psychoanalytic findings and biosemiotics here, as in previous works, ‘biosemiotic’ refers to the hierarchy of meaning-forms (from biological to semiotic-organizations) underlying an updated psychoanalytic model of mind. Within this framework I present a broad range of bio-semiotic phenomena, processes, dynamics, defenses, and universal and unique internalized interpersonal patterns, that in psychoanalysis all commonly fall under the broad heading of the “Unconscious.” Reconceptualized as interpretive data within the purview of a psychoanalytic discourse-semantic this biosemiotic framework posits an epigenetic continuum of human meaning-organizations originating at basic organic levels, moving upward through biological, psycho-somatic and affective expression, proto-semiotic transmissions, represented forms, and finally to explicit linguistic signs and complex symbol systems. In addition to assuming an uninterrupted epigenetic continuum crystallizing in hierarchic organization, this framework accentuates the multilayered and increasingly condensed quality of higher more elaborate organizations of meaning in human communication, drawing attention to persisting biological undercurrents in implied sense, intent, and motivation, all of which impact on repressive/defensive mechanisms. Drawing from previous works (Aragno 1997, 2005, 2008a, b, Psychoanalytic Inquiry 29(1):30–47, 2009, Biosemiotics 3:57–77, 2010, 2011a, Signs 5:71–74, 2011b, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Centennial Paper, Special Centennial Issue 59(2):239–288, 2011b, Signs 5:29–70, 2011c) in which I labored to update and revise Freud’s first topographical theory of mind, this paper presents the phenomenology of unconscious ‘data’ for the purpose of introducing a diverse range of non-linguistic signifying forms from which psychoanalysts infer mental processes and ‘interpret’ meanings. An important underlying premise regarding psychoanalytic data and its relation to the basic biosemiotic ‘agenda’ is that until grounded in an updated developmental theory of mind inclusive of pre- and proto-semiotic-forms, that is evolutionarily plausible, epistemologically based, and correlates with contemporary neuroscience, the term “sign” is merely an abstract linguistic ‘label’ rather than a mental act with antecedent developmental stages manifesting meanings through different forms and modes of expression. Drawn from the yields of the psychoanalytic method and semantic this revised metatheoretical approach provides insights into the sensory-emotive, bodily origins of unconscious layers of non-linguistic signification thereby expanding our understanding of the formative stages of the ‘semiotic function’ in human evolution. This being the third in a series of papers integrating the yields of psychoanalytic methodology with the underlying premises of ‘Biosemiotics,’ some familiarity with the background knowledge provided in the previous two is strongly recommended.     

The Marriage of Psychoanalytic Methodology with the Biosemiotic Agenda

An overview of core phenomena and processes leading to Freud’s establishing his psycho-analytic method and early metatheoretical concepts is followed by the author’s revision of his topographical model into a seamless biosemiotic theory of mind and human communication. A careful methodological analysis of the semantic/referential scope; speech/listening processes, and semiotic features, of a dialogue designed to make the unconscious conscious, reveals an epistemological bridge between psychoanalytic methodology and the biosemiotic agenda within a unifying inter-penetrative paradigm.     

The revolution in psychiatric diagnosis: problems at the foundations

The third edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III; 1974) not only revolutionized psychiatric diagnosis, it transformed and dominated American psychiatry. The nosology of psychiatry had been conceptually confusing, difficult to apply, and bound to widely questioned theories. Psychiatry and clinical psychology had been struggling with their scientific status. DSM attempted to solve psychiatry's problems by making psychiatry more like its authors' perception of general medicine. It tried to avoid theory, especially psychoanalytic theories, by discussing only observable manifestations of disorders. But DSM is actually highly theory-bound. It implicitly and powerfully includes an exclusively "medical" model of psychological disturbance, while excluding other psychiatric ideas. Its authors tried to meet what they saw as "scientific standards." To a surprising extent, DSM reflects its creators' personal distaste for psychoanalysis. The result is that DSM rests on a narrow philosophical perspective. The consequences of its adoption are widespread: it has profoundly affected drug development and other therapeutic studies, psychiatric education, attitudes toward patients, the public perception of psychiatry, and administrative and legal decisions. This article explores how DSM's most problematic features arise from its history in psychiatric controversies of the 1960s and its underlying positivistic philosophy.     

Quelle scientificit�� pour la psychanalyse ?

From a strictly philosophical perspective, if one uses ??hard sciences?? as a standard to assess the scientificity of a theory, it will not be difficult to question the scientificity of psychoanalysis. But, rather than favouring such criticisms, I shall begin with the idea that different explanations may serve different explanatory goals while remaining valid, since to assess the validity of a theory, one must always consider the explanatory goals it has set. Hence, there is no such thing as an absolute, a historical and timeless criterion from which to judge the validity of a theoretical explanation. But the criteria and the epistemological constraints are normally relative to some set of explanatory goals. Therefore, the issue shifts towards the following question: what are the goals of psychoanalytic explanations and how (from which perspective) are we to judge the validity of its explanations according to the goals it aims at? I articulate together issues related to the object of psychoanalysis (what it theorises), to its explanatory goals (which dimension(s) of its object it seeks to explain) and to the epistemological constraints which are imposed on it. Which leads me to take into account the important role, in the psychoanalytic cure, of the rationalisation of pathological behaviours and of their reintegration into a story which ??makes sense??.     

A case reopened: teleology and its consequences for the units of selection discussion.

Darwinian explanations for teleology are often imprecise, and justify the occurrence of teleological features by referring to natural selection in a vague and unspecified sense. In this paper, the Darwinian account for teleology is further analyzed. It is argued that in theory only a specific form of teleology--teleology that is caused by and directed towards the preservation of the genetic program--can be explained in a naturalistic way by employing Darwin's theory of natural selection. This observation links teleology with the units of selection discussion, as for both discussions the end-direction of teleological processes and behavior is of elementary importance. According to Dawkins' analysis, the unit of selection is an active germ-like replicator with a sufficient degree of longevity-fecundity-copying fidelity. From the teleological point of view, the unit of selection should additionally incorporate the genetic program in order to naturalize teleology. It is shown that within sexually reproducing species these two requirements cannot be met. Dawkins' concept of genic selectionism cannot be maintained without violating the naturalistic claims on teleology, and none of the other frequently proposed unit of selection candidates can adequately meet the demands as developed by Dawkins and those developed in the light of teleology.     

Genetic therapy, identity and the person-regarding reasons

It has been argued that there can be no person-regarding reasons for practising genetic therapy, since it affects identity and causes to exist an individual who would not otherwise have existed. And there can be no such reasons for causing somebody to exist because existing cannot be better for an individual than never existing. In the present paper, both of these claims are denied. It is contended, first, that in practically all significant cases genetic therapy will not affect the identity of beings of our kind. This is so irrespective of whether, essentially, we are beings with minds or beings of a certain biological species, the human one. Second, it is contended that, even if genetic therapy were to affect our identity, there could be person-regarding reasons for conducting it, for existence can be better than non-existence for the individual.     

Autopoiesis, Life, Mind and Cognition: Bases for a Proper Naturalistic Continuity

The strong version of the life-mind continuity thesis claims that mind can be understood as an enriched version of the same functional and organizational properties of life. Contrary to this view, in this paper I argue that mental phenomena offer distinctive properties, such as intentionality or representational content, that have no counterpart in the phenomenon of life, and that must be explained by appealing to a different level of functional and organizational principles. As a strategy, and following Maturana’s autopoietic theory of cognition, I introduce a conceptual distinction between mind and cognition. I argue that cognition corresponds to the natural behaviour that every living being exhibits in the realization of its existence, and that, viewed in that way, cognition is a dynamic process of structural coupling that, unlike mental phenomena, involves no representational contents. On the basis of this distinction, I try to show that while life suffices for cognition, it does not suffice for mind. That is, that the strong continuity is not between life and mind but between life and cognition.     

Psychodrama and Psychoanalysis: Two Theaters for Mental Drama

A comparison of certain aspects of psychoanalysis and psychodrama shows that although there are indeed a number of radical differences between these traditions, they do have a certain similarity in content (i.e., not merely at the formal, organizational level). Since the days of Freud, psychoanalysis (and psychoanalytic theory) has acquired a distinctly "psychodramatic" dimension. And psychodrama, since the time of Moreno, has acquired marked "psychoanalytic" qualities. These two "therapeutic theaters" represent not only contiguous but also mutually penetrating traditions.     

A Two-Tiered Cognitive Architecture For Moral Reasoning

The view that moral cognition is subserved by a two-tieredarchitecture is defended: Moral reasoning is the result both ofspecialized, informationally encapsulated modules which automaticallyand effortlessly generate intuitions; and of general-purpose,cognitively penetrable mechanisms which enable moral judgment in thelight of the agent's general fund of knowledge. This view is contrastedwith rival architectures of social/moral cognition, such as Cosmidesand Tooby's view that the mind is wholly modular, and it is argued thata two-tiered architecture is more plausible.     

Psychoanalysis as functionalist social science: the legacy of Freud's 'Project for a scientific psychology'

The paper links Freud's early work in the 'Project for a scientific psychology' with the psychoanalytic psychology of Kleinian object relations theory now current. Freud is often accused of introducing mechanism into his psychology and installing at its core an irreconcilable dichotomy of two disparate ways of explaining human behaviour. I suggest that Freud's early mechanistic thinking is an attempt at what he only partly achieves, a functional account of the 'mental apparatus'. I consider whether this way of conceptualising the mind in functional terms is methodologically relevant to psychoanalytic investigation or whether it is at best heuristically useful. From a brief consideration of Kleinian object relations theory, illustrated by case material, I conclude that there are grounds for accepting the first of these alternatives.     

The clinician as ethnographer: A psychoanalytic perspective on the epistemology of fieldwork

Ethnography is a process yielding a particular kind of knowledge. From the psychoanalytic perspective this bears on the question: how may individual lives which report their own experience, but cannot directly apprehend the unconscious factors behind that experience, be related to social life which does not report itself but is observed and interpreted by others? The person of the ethnographer and ethnographer-informant relationships are considered in this respect. Clinicians' informants include people to whom they relate in the course of adaptation to the new community; those who are help-seeking (patients) with whom their relationship is both therapeutic and investigative; and clients in health-service (e.g., family planning) contexts who may be studied with tests and structured interviews. The clinician's status, role, helping and scientific values are examined as factors determining the nature of knowledge gained under these various circumstances. To the degree that the clinician is an intentional transformer, data emerge as the informant's consciousness changes in the therapeutic or research process. Research or therapy-aimed interventions based on psychoanalytic theory add their own epistemological problems to the process.     

Can ecosystems be healthy? Critical consideration of concepts

Health, it is argued, implies that a system has an optimum state that can be defended. For organisms and populations this can be understood objectively and generally in terms of neo-Darwinian principles. Similar reasoning cannot be applied to ecosystems. The possible advantages and difficulties of applying this concept of health to ecosystems are critically considered.     

How rational should bioethics be? The value of empirical approaches

Rational justification of claims with empirical content calls for empirical and not only normative philosophical investigation. Empirical approaches to bioethics are epistemically valuable, i.e., such methods may be necessary in providing and verifying basic knowledge about cultural values and norms. Our assumptions in moral reasoning can be verified or corrected using these methods. Moral arguments can be initiated or adjudicated by data drawn from empirical investigation. One may argue that individualistic informed consent, for example, is not compatible with the Asian communitarian orientation. But this normative claim uses an empirical assumption that may be contrary to the fact that some Asians do value and argue for informed consent. Is it necessary and factual to neatly characterize some cultures as individualistic and some as communitarian? Empirical investigation can provide a reasonable way to inform such generalizations. In a multi-cultural context, such as in the Philippines, there is a need to investigate the nature of the local ethos before making any appeal to authenticity. Otherwise we may succumb to the same ethical imperialism we are trying hard to resist. Normative claims that involve empirical premises cannot be reasonable verified or evaluated without utilizing empirical methods along with philosophical reflection. The integration of empirical methods to the standard normative approach to moral reasoning should be reasonably guided by the epistemic demands of claims arising from cross-cultural discourse in bioethics.     

Le psychothérapeute psychanalyste « à <Emphasis Type="Italic">l’école de la phénoménologie</Emphasis> »

The mixing of psychoanalysis and phenomenology fosters the development of psychotherapy, psychoanalysis drawing on phenomenology to offer a method of studying and understanding the human being; this creates a genuine form of “anthropology”. Phenomenology’s contributions to psychoanalysis revolve around the three notions of épochè, the understanding of others and transference. On the one hand, épochè (a suspension of natural states of mind, obviousness and knowledge; an eidetic reduction; and an opening to the world and others) ensures better comprehension (“to take with yourself”) of others and their existential projects. On the other hand, épochè prevents falling into the transference and countertransference traps and sets the distance necessary for the hermeneutic act, that is, the interpretation of what is no longer there, what is absent, yet said and indicated by language in psychoanalytic therapy. Through its humanist, anthropological perspective and its overall understanding of the human being, phenomenology leads the way to rethinking clinical psychotherapy to create a more unified discipline.     

Constructivist Models of Mind, Contemporary Psychoanalysis, and the Development of Culture Theory

Researchers in a number of fields, including contemporary psychoanalysis, are contributing to the development of a dynamic model of mind that acknowledges the contributions of biology and social experience to the construction of human consciousness and subjectivity. In this paper, I examine this emerging model of mind and I discuss its implications for the development of Culture theory. I argue that theories of culture must reflect the fluidity and complexity of the psychological states that underlie the culture process, and I suggest that even highly conventional models of action, thought, and feeling are rarely, if ever, internalized, appropriated, or reproduced without some degree of modification, refashioning, and personalization. I propose person-centered ethnography as one of the methods by which we can explore the complex relations among culture, mind, and behavior, [constructivist models of mind, contemporary psychoanalysis, culture theory, self and subjectivity, person-centered ethnography]     

Whatever Happened to the Id?

There has been a strong tendency in structural and symbolic anthropology to assume that sex and aggression are of no concern to cultural symbol systems. Even when cultural beliefs, myths, or rituals are explicitly and preponderantly sexual or aggressive in content, they are typically interpreted as metaphors for social structural themes. This thesis is illustrated with respect to aggression by an analysis of Lévi-Strauss' interpretation of a Bororo myth, after which the assumptions that structural theory makes concerning the place of aggression in cultural symbol systems are contrasted with the opposing assumptions of psychoanalytic theory. [structuralism, psychoanalysis, cultural symbol systems, myth]     

Genetic therapy, person-regarding reasons and the determination of identity

It has been argued for example by Ingmar Persson, that genetic therapy performed on a conceptus does not alter the identity of the person that develops from it, even if we are essentially persons. If this claim is true then there can be person-regarding reasons for performing genetic therapy on a conceptus. Here it is argued that such person-regarding reasons obtain only if we are not essentially persons but essentially animals. This conclusion requires the defeat of the origination theory, which says that personal identity is determined by the identity of the foetus from which one originates. It is argued that the origination theory is false in the special case relevant to performing genetic therapy on a conceptus for person-regarding reasons.