A Gradualist Theory of Discovery in Ecology

The distinction between the context ofdiscovery and the context of justificationrestricts philosophy of science to the rationalreconstruction of theories, and characterizesscientific discovery as rare, theoreticalupheavals that defy rational reconstruction. Kuhnian challenges to the two contextsdistinction show that non-rational elementspersist in the justification of theories, butgo no further to provide a positive account ofdiscovery. A gradualist theory of discoverydeveloped in this paper shows, with supportfrom ecological cases, that discoveries areroutinely made in ecology by extending modelsto new domains, or by making additions toearlier models. The logic of discovery isphilosophically accessible once it isappreciated that model truth is presumed, evenif counterfactually, in ecologists' applicationof models. A gradualist view shows thatmodels' heuristic power routinely leads todiscoveries.     

The Medawar Lecture 2004 the truth about science

The attitudes of scientists towards the philosophy of science is mixed and includes considerable indifference and some hostility. This may be due in part to unrealistic expectation and to misunderstanding. Philosophy is unlikely directly to improve scientific practices, but scientists may find the attempt to explain how science works and what it achieves of considerable interest nevertheless. The present state of the philosophy of science is illustrated by recent work on the 'truth hypothesis', according to which, science is generating increasingly accurate representations of a mind-independent and largely unobservable world. According to Karl Popper, although truth is the aim of science, it is impossible to justify the truth hypothesis. According to Thomas Kuhn, the truth hypothesis is false, because scientists can only describe a world that is partially constituted by their own theories and hence not mind-independent. The failure of past scientific theories has been used to argue against the truth hypothesis; the success of the best current theories has been used to argue for it. Neither argument is sound.     

What is truth – in science and beyond

Truth is threatened in our societies and one might wish that scientists should stand up for truth, but in order to do so, one needs to know what is truth and how it can be recognized. The oldest and most widely accepted concept of truth is the Correspondence Theory requesting a fit of propositions and reality. In the Coherence Theory truth is a consistent property of a whole system of propositions. In the Pragmatic Theory truth works in practical terms. Scientists have defined criteria to verify true statements by experiments and by the simplicity of theories. Aristotle proposed parsimony claiming the superiority of theories which derive from fewer hypotheses. David Hume suggested probability arguments to assess the force of evidence. Nicolai Hartmann elaborated a model based on the congruence of a priori logical arguments with a posteriori empirical observations. Karl Popper introduced the falsification of testable theories as a way to better theories. The analysis shows that scientific and medical research uses classical philosophical criteria of truth in their daily work. Humanities use different, hermeneutic criteria of truth. Finally, societies need for their coherence a dialectic approach to truth based on honest discussion of opposing views.     

Big dragons on small islands: generality and particularity in science

Angela Potochnik’s Idealization and the Aims of Science (Chicago) defends an ambitious and systematic account of scientific knowledge: ultimately science pursues human understanding rather than truth. Potochnik argues that idealization is rampant and unchecked in science. Further, given that idealizations involve departures from truth, this suggests science is not primarily about truth. I explore the relationship between truths about causal patterns and scientific understanding in light of this, and suggest that Potochnik underestimates the importance and power of highly particular narrative explanations.     

Coherence, correspondence, and the renaissance of morphology in phylogenetic systematics

The decline in morphological phylogenies has become a pronounced trend in contemporary systematics due to a disregard for theoretical, methodological, conceptual, and philosophical approaches. The role and meaning of morphology in phylogenetic reconstruction and classification have been undermined by the following: (i) the ambiguous delineation of morphological characters; (ii) the putative “objectivity” of molecular data; (iii) that morphology has not been included in data matrices; (iv) that morphology has been mapped onto molecular cladograms; and (v) a separation of a paradigmatic relationship among morphology, phylogeny, and classification. Historical/philosophical arguments including the synthesis of coherence (coherentism) and correspondence (foundationalism) theories—i.e. “foundherentism” as a theory of epistemic justification—provide support for a renaissance of morphology in phylogenetic systematics. In the language of systematics, coherence theory corresponds to the logical/operational congruence of character states translated into a hierarchical/relational system of homologues and monophyletic groups as natural kinds. Correspondence theory corresponds to the empirical/causal accommodation of homologues and monophyletic groups as natural kinds grounded in the concept of semaphoront, and in developmental biology, genetics, inheritance, ontogenesis, topology, and connectivity. The role and meaning of morphology are also discussed in the context of separate and combined analyses, palaeontology, natural kinds, character concepts, semaphoront, modularity, and taxonomy. Molecular systematics suffers from tension between coherence and correspondence theories, and fails to provide a pragmatic language for predicates in science and in everyday life. Finally, the renaissance of morphology is not only dependent on a scientific/philosophical perspective but also depends on political, economic, social, and educational reforms in contemporary systematics. © The Willi Hennig Society 2009.     

On the Neurobiology of Truth

The concept of truth arises from puzzling over distinctions between the real and the apparent, while the origin of these distinctions lies in the neurobiology of mammalian cerebral lateralization, that is, in the evolution of brains that can address the world both indicatively and subjunctively; brains that represent the world both categorically and hypothetically. After some 2,500 years of thinking about it, the Western philosophical tradition has come up with three major theories of truth: correspondence, coherence, and pragmatist. Traditional philosophy has nevertheless failed to arbitrate much among these views; certainly no clear winner has emerged. I argue, however, that contemporary neuroscience provides adequate theoretical grounds for a unified theory of truth. More specifically, I contend that the correspondence, the coherence, and the pragmatic utility of symbols are each biological features of our neurophysiological information processing systems—that is to say, our brains. On my view, the traditional trifurcation of philosophical accounts of the predicate, “is true”, stems from a trifurcation of focus on the information latent in sensory, motor, and somatosensory cortices of the human brain.     

Too much common sense,not enough critical thinking!

This paper explores two different views about common sense—those of Clifford Geertz and Antonio Gramsci. It examines their presuppositions, assesses their utility for archaeologists, and considers the implications of current common-sense explanations of the past. It points out that common sense is both historical. Yesterday’s common sense sometimes morphs into today’s good sense or scientific truth. Today’s common sense or scientific truth often becomes tomorrow’s false consciousness or folklore. Common sense is also relational. Groups with different positionalities in hierarchically organized societies may have widely divergent views about what is common sense. Finally, it raises the question of why particular “common sense” explanations of the present—buttressed with claims that they are rooted historically in a fixed, unchanging human nature and morality—are repeatedly resurrected by fundamentalists and conservatives in both hemispheres to justify political arguments and to reassert or impose or particular power relations.     

Simple minds: a qualified defence of associative learning

Using cooperation in chimpanzees as a case study, this article argues that research on animal minds needs to steer a course between 'association-blindness'-the failure to consider associative learning as a candidate explanation for complex behaviour-and 'simple-mindedness'-the assumption that associative explanations trump more cognitive hypotheses. Association-blindness is challenged by the evidence that associative learning occurs in a wide range of taxa and functional contexts, and is a major force guiding the development of complex human behaviour. Furthermore, contrary to a common view, association-blindness is not entailed by the rejection of behaviourism. Simple-mindedness is founded on Morgan's canon, a methodological principle recommending 'lower' over 'higher' explanations for animal behaviour. Studies in the history and philosophy of science show that Morgan failed to offer an adequate justification for his canon, and subsequent attempts to justify the canon using evolutionary arguments and appeals to simplicity have not been successful. The weaknesses of association-blindness and simple-mindedness imply that there are no short-cuts to finding out about animal minds. To decide between associative and yet more cognitive explanations for animal behaviour, we have to spell them out in sufficient detail to allow differential predictions, and to test these predictions through observation and experiment.     

Guidance and Justification in Particularistic Ethics

This paper argues that, contrary to a common line of criticism followed by scholars such as Helga Kuhse, a particularistic version of virtue ethics properly elaborated, can provide sound moral guidance and a satisfactory account for moral justification of our opinions regarding, for instance, health care practice. In the first part of the paper, three criteria for comparing normative theories with respect to action-guiding power are outlined, and it is argued that the presented particularistic version of virtue ethics actually can provide more guidance than the universalistic theories favoured by Kuhse and others. In the second part of the paper it is claimed that universalist normative theories have serious problems accounting for the role that moral principles are supposed to play in the justification, of moral opinions, whereas the present version of virtue ethics accommodates a plausible alternative idea of justification without invoking moral principles or eschewing objectivity.     

The implications of palaeontological evidence for theories of ecological communities and species richness

Abstract Palaeontological evidence raises several questions that relate to current explanations of ecological communities, to the classification of communities and to interpretations of species richness. The first question relates to the stability of species detected in the fossil record. Coupled with that is the issue of incidental association of species on the same trophic level through differential effects of climatic change on the different species. Such observations are seen to support the ‘individualistic’ concept of communities. Recent statements about this concept leave unresolved questions about the acquisition of adaptation, and about the place of adaptation theory in theories of ecological communities and interpretations of ‘regional species richness’. At issue is whether there is justification for continuing to classify communities as a basis for understanding them. There is good reason to reject this approach for one in which questions about communities and ‘local’ and ‘regional’ species richness are replaced by more specific and basic questions about the relationship between adaptation, distribution and abundance, and ecological interactions. Some recent efforts to incorporate species theory into community theory fail because their basis remains the flawed concept of ‘local community’.     

Presenting Scientific Theories Within Risk Assessments

We propose a structure for presenting risk assessments with the purpose of enhancing the transparency of the selection process of scientific theories and models derived from them. The structure has two stages, with 7 steps, where the stages involve two types of theories: core and auxiliary, which need to be identified in order to explain and evaluate observations and predictions. Core theories are those that are “fundamental” to the phenomena being observed, whereas auxiliary theories are those that describe or explain the actual observation process of the phenomena. The formulation of a scientific theory involves three constitutive components or types of judgments: explanative, evaluative, and regulative or aesthetic, driven by reason. Two perspectives guided us in developing the proposed structure: (1) In a risk assessment explanations based on notions of causality can be used as a tool for developing models and predictions of possible events outside the range of direct experience. The use of causality for development of models is based on judgments, reflecting regulative or aesthetic conceptualizations of different phenomena and how they (should) fit together in the world. (2) Weight of evidence evaluation should be based on falsification principles for excluding models, rather than validation or justification principles that select the best or nearly best-fitting models. Falsification entails discussion that identifies challenges to proposed models, and reconciles apparent inconsistencies between models and data. Based on the discussion of these perspectives the 7 steps of the structure are: the first stage for core theories, (A) scientific concepts, (B) causality network, and (C) mathematical model; and the second stage for auxiliary theories, (D) data interpretation, (E) statistical model, (F) evaluation (weight of evidence), and (G) reconciliation, which includes the actual decision formulation.     

Intention Seekers: Conspiracist Ideation and Biased Attributions of Intentionality

Conspiracist beliefs are widespread and potentially hazardous. A growing body of research suggests that cognitive biases may play a role in endorsement of conspiracy theories. The current research examines the novel hypothesis that individuals who are biased towards inferring intentional explanations for ambiguous actions are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories, which portray events as the exclusive product of intentional agency. Study 1 replicated a previously observed relationship between conspiracist ideation and individual differences in anthropomorphisation. Studies 2 and 3 report a relationship between conspiracism and inferences of intentionality for imagined ambiguous events. Additionally, Study 3 again found conspiracist ideation to be predicted by individual differences in anthropomorphism. Contrary to expectations, however, the relationship was not mediated by the intentionality bias. The findings are discussed in terms of a domain-general intentionality bias making conspiracy theories appear particularly plausible. Alternative explanations are suggested for the association between conspiracism and anthropomorphism.     

Explanation in morphology

Summary In biology, and particularly in morphology, various types of explanation are found,e.g. causal, teleological, historical, etc.In this article an attempt has been made to analyse the relations between the various explanations to strive for an encompassing explanatory theory.The general structure of the explanatory theories appeared to be very similar, but the terms defining the phenomena and the types of the relations within the theories differ. To obtain a unifying theory it is necessary to develop methods to connect or transform the different elements.An important aspect is that the definition of selected phenomena (terms) depends on the explanation pursued.Lecture presented for the Netherlands Society for Theoretical Biology, December, 1971.     

Intercentral EEG relationships in regressive and chronic post-traumatic Korsakoff syndrome.]

Dynamic EEG study of patients with posttraumatic Korsakoff's syndrome (KS) with the application of complex analysis methods revealed a complicated pathological structure of the intercentral relations of cortical electrical activity. The interhemispheric EEG coherence between symmetrical frontal cortical areas are sharply reduced, while the intrahemispheric coherence are increased in comparison with the normal values. The proposed technique of segregation of statistically homogeneous spectro-coherent characteristics made it possible to reveal the earlier intercentral EEG relations formed by stable and variable coherence spectra. The structure formed by the stable and variable coherence spectra in KS differs from that reflected in the mean coherence levels. During the KS regression, the EEG coherence between the right and left frontal areas increased to the normal level, and the variable spectra are revealed. In the chronic KS syndrome, the pathological intercentral relations persist, while the variable relations in the frontal areas are absent. A reduction of pathologically decreased intrahemispheric coherence selectively revealed in the right hemisphere during the KS regression and formation of variable relations in this hemisphere point to a leading role of the right hemisphere in development of compensatory processes in KS. The reciprocal relations between the intra- and interhemispheric coherence and coherence dynamics in the theta rhythm suggest that pathological activity in the basal diencephalic structures plays an important role in formation of the pathological EEG pattern in KS.     

The role of values in scientific theory selection and why it matters to medical education

In this paper, I argue that the role of values in theory selection is an important issue within medical education. I review the underdetermination argument, which is the idea within philosophy of science that the data serving as evidence for theories are by themselves not sufficient to support a theory to the exclusion of alternatives. There are always various explanations compatible with the data, and we ultimately appeal to certain values as our grounds for choosing one theory over another. I explore some of the ways contemporary feminist philosophers have chosen to grapple with the problem of underdetermination and proposed solutions to systematize how values might be incorporated into theory choice, drawing primarily from the work of Helen Longino and Elizabeth Anderson. I conclude by discussing how value‐laden inquiry should be incorporated within medical education to promote reflection towards medicine’s normative underpinnings.     

Same-Sex Avoidance Relations and What They Reveal about Male Competition

Avoidance relations between male kin are a pervasive social phenomenon, yet the subject has received comparatively little treatment in the anthropological literature. When anthropologists have addressed it, they have usually done so indirectly, or put forward theories better suited to explaining other social phenomena. The most common explanations one comes across in the anthropological literature to account for avoidance relationships between male kin, or what I also describe as same-sex avoidance relations in the paper, are the incest taboo and Radcliffe-Brown's theory of respect. In contrast to these explanations, I propose to demonstrate that the reason male kin avoid each other in certain types of settings is not just to maintain a sense of authority and precedence as Radcliffe-Brown's theory implies, or to avoid contravening incest prohibitions, which as Robert Lowie pointed out long ago is incorrect. Rather, because closely related male kin should not compete with each other, as this would contravene the ideology of descent which demands loyalty to one's kin.     

A parsimonious view of the parsimony principle in ecology and evolution

The idea that simplicity of explanation is important in science is as old as science itself. However, scientists often assume that parsimonious theories, hypothesis and models are more plausible than complex ones, forgetting that there is no empirical evidence to connect parsimony with credibility. The justification for the parsimony principle is strongly dependent on philosophical and statistical inference. Parsimony may have a true epistemic value in the evaluation of correlative and predictive models, as simpler models are less prone to overfitting. However, when natural mechanisms are explicitly modelled to represent the causes of biological phenomena, the application of the parsimony principle to judge the plausibility of mechanistic models would entail an unsupported belief that nature is simple. Here, we discuss the challenges we face in justifying, measuring, and assessing the trade‐off between simplicity and complexity in ecological and evolutionary studies. We conclude that invoking the parsimony principle in ecology and evolution is particularly important in model‐building programs in which models are viewed primarily as an operational tool to make predictions (an instrumentalist view) and in which data play a prominent role in deciding the structure of the model. However, theoretical advances in ecology and evolutionary biology may be derailed by the use of the parsimony principle to judge explanatory mechanistic models that are designed to understand complex natural phenomena. We advocate a parsimonious use of the parsimony principle.     

Structural Similarities between Brain and Linguistic Data Provide Evidence of Semantic Relations in the Brain

This paper presents a new method of analysis by which structural similarities between brain data and linguistic data can be assessed at the semantic level. It shows how to measure the strength of these structural similarities and so determine the relatively better fit of the brain data with one semantic model over another. The first model is derived from WordNet, a lexical database of English compiled by language experts. The second is given by the corpus-based statistical technique of latent semantic analysis (LSA), which detects relations between words that are latent or hidden in text. The brain data are drawn from experiments in which statements about the geography of Europe were presented auditorily to participants who were asked to determine their truth or falsity while electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings were made. The theoretical framework for the analysis of the brain and semantic data derives from axiomatizations of theories such as the theory of differences in utility preference. Using brain-data samples from individual trials time-locked to the presentation of each word, ordinal relations of similarity differences are computed for the brain data and for the linguistic data. In each case those relations that are invariant with respect to the brain and linguistic data, and are correlated with sufficient statistical strength, amount to structural similarities between the brain and linguistic data. Results show that many more statistically significant structural similarities can be found between the brain data and the WordNet-derived data than the LSA-derived data. The work reported here is placed within the context of other recent studies of semantics and the brain. The main contribution of this paper is the new method it presents for the study of semantics and the brain and the focus it permits on networks of relations detected in brain data and represented by a semantic model.     

Scientific progress and the prospects for culture-bound syndromes

This paper aims to show that the classification by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of a distinct listing of disorders known as Culture-Bound Syndromes (CBS) is misguided. I argue that the list of CBS (in Appendix I of the manual) comprises either (a) genuine disorders that should be included within the main body of the DSM; or (b) ersatz-disorders that serve a practical role for psychiatrists dealing with patients from certain cultures but will one day be eliminated or assimilated by bona fide DSM classifications. In support of these views I draw on claims from two key themes in the philosophy of science: (1) the claim that all folk (that is, non-scientific) explanations for phenomena are thoroughly theoretical and therefore fallible; and (2) the occurrence of theoretical elimination in the history of science. I contend that any ersatz-disorders located in the DSM that are judged to be radically false do not differ in kind from eliminated theories in the history of pre-science.