“Pensando Mucho” (“Thinking Too Much”): Embodied Distress Among Grandmothers in Nicaraguan Transnational Families

In this paper, I describe an embodied form of emotional distress expressed by Nicaraguan grandmothers caring for children of migrant mothers, “pensando mucho” (“thinking too much”). I draw on ethnographic fieldwork and semi-structured exploratory interviews about pensando mucho conducted with grandmother heads-of-household to show the cultural significance of this complaint within the context of women’s social roles as caregivers in transnational families. Adopting an interpretive and meaning-centered approach, I analyze the cultural significance of pensando mucho as expressed through women’s narratives about the impacts of mother outmigration on their personal and family lives. I show how women use pensando mucho to express the moral ambivalence of economic remittances and the uncertainty surrounding migration, particularly given cultural values for “unity” and “solidarity” in Nicaraguan family life. I also discuss the relationship between pensando mucho and dolor de cerebro (“brainache”) as a way of documenting the relationship between body/mind, emotional distress, and somatic suffering. The findings presented here suggest that further research on “thinking too much” is needed to assess whether this idiom is used by women of the grandmother generation in other cultural contexts to express embodied distress in relation to broader social transformations.     

Taking evolution seriously in political science

In this essay, we explore the epistemological and ontological assumptions that have been made to make political science “scientific.” We show how political science has generally adopted an ontologically reductionist philosophy of science derived from Newtonian physics and mechanics. This mechanical framework has encountered problems and constraints on its explanatory power, because an emphasis on equilibrium analysis is ill-suited for the study of political change. We outline the primary differences between an evolutionary ontology of social science and the physics-based philosophy commonly employed. Finally, we show how evolutionary thinking adds insight into the study of political phenomena and research questions that are of central importance to the field, such as preference formation.     

Doing Resilience with “Half a Brain:” Navigating Moral Sensibilities 35 Years After Hemispherectomy

This paper investigates experiences of resilience in the context of individuals suffering from disability as a result of severe intractable seizure disorder and consequent hemispherectomy, a surgical procedure in which part or all of either the left or right cerebral hemisphere is removed. Two adults who underwent childhood hemispherectomies—one left and one right—are the focus of this study. Previous research has extensively detailed the clinical outcomes of this neurological procedure, yet the actual day-to-day experiences of individuals living post-hemispherectomy remains unexplored. Utilizing open-ended, qualitative, and narrative techniques from a phenomenology of performativity perspective, the authors question how each individual’s experiences of daily living are invariably acts of resilience, involving several different strategies that are somewhat unique to each. Rather than working as an adjective or noun signifying certain environmental or individual attributes, this paper proposes that “resilience” is best conceptualized as the individualized intentional actions which disabled, distraught, or at risk individuals perform in contextually relevant and idiosyncratic ways as they navigate health and well-being within their local social and moral worlds.     

Psychological Theory and the Illusion of Scientific Prediction

The attempt of empiricist psychology to achieve scientific respectability through reliance on quantification is deeply flawed. Not only does it come at the expense of the phenomena, which, in the study of the mind, must reference subjectivity, but it is incommensurate with the basic scientific principles on which it claims to operate. Specifically, psychological theory typically cannot support prognostication beyond the binary opposition of “effect present/effect absent.” Accordingly, the “numbers” assigned to experimental results often amount to affixing names (e.g., more than, less than) to the members of an ordered sequence of outcomes. This, I contend, is one reason why psychologists find it difficult to discriminate between competing theories: without a well-specified theory capable of enabling precise and detailed quantitative prediction, inferring underlying mental mechanisms from experimental outcomes becomes a difficult, if not impossible, task.

     

Toward a Phenomenological Account of Embodied Subjectivity in Autism

Sensorimotor research is currently challenging the dominant understanding of autism as a deficit in the cognitive ability to ‘mindread’. This marks an emerging shift in autism research from a focus on the structure and processes of the mind to a focus on autistic behavior as grounded in the body. Contemporary researchers in sensorimotor differences in autism call for a reconciliation between the scientific understanding of autism and the first-person experience of autistic individuals. I argue that fulfilling this ambition requires a phenomenological understanding of the body as it presents itself in ordinary experience, namely as the subject of experience rather than a physical object. On this basis, I investigate how the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty can be employed as a frame of understanding for bodily experience in autism. Through a phenomenological analysis of Tito Mukhopadhyay’s autobiographical work, How can I talk if my lips don’t move (2009), I illustrate the relevance and potential of phenomenological philosophy in autism research, arguing that this approach enables a deeper understanding of bodily and subjective experiences related to autism.     

Communication and collective action: language and the evolution of human cooperation

All social species face various “collective action problems” (CAPs) or “social dilemmas,” meaning problems in achieving cooperating when the best move from a selfish point of view yields an inferior collective outcome. Compared to most other species, humans are very good at solving these challenges, suggesting that something rather peculiar about human sociality facilitates collective action. This article proposes that language — the uniquely human faculty of symbolic communication — fundamentally alters the possibilities for collective action. I explore these issues using simple game-theoretic models and empirical evidence (both ethnographic and experimental). I review several standard mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation — mutualism, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity and signaling — highlighting their limitations when it comes to explaining large-group cooperation, as well as the ways in which language helps overcome those limitations. Language facilitates complex coordination and is essential for establishing norms governing production efforts and distribution of collective goods that motivate people to cooperate voluntarily in large groups. Language also significantly lowers the cost of detecting and punishing “free riders,” thus greatly enhancing the scope and power of standard conditional reciprocity. In addition, symbolic communication encourages new forms of collectively beneficial displays and reputation management — what evolutionists often term “signaling” and “indirect reciprocity.” Thus, language reinforces existing forces that favor the evolution of cooperation, as well as creating new opportunities for collective action not available even to our closest primate relatives.     

Firewalking: Explanation and the Mind-Body Relationship1

With specific reference to the Anastenaria, a firewalking ritual performed in the North of Greece, this paper discusses the problem which phenomena such as firewalking poses for anthropological discussion. The relationship between the mind and the body and their existence in the social world is addressed, as I search for a way in which anthropological discourse can approach an explanation of an individual's ability to walk on burning coals unharmed. A brief look at the various explanations provided by different disciplines follows a more detailed review of scientific inquiry into this phenomenon. A critical discussion of the notions of trance, possession and altered states of consciousness introduces the subjective/objective dichotomy. The question is asked: How does the body exist in the world and to what extent does there remain a distinction between body, mind and object?     

An evolutionary perspective on physical attractiveness

Everyday experience suggests that physical attractiveness is important in personal—and especially sexual—relationships. This impression is confirmed by a large body of social psychological research.^1,2 Cross-cultural surveys and ethnographic accounts show that concern with the attractiveness of potential mates is also common in non-Western societies and in tribal and peasant cultures.³ However, social psychologists and anthropologists have often had a hard time explaining why attractiveness should count for so much, or why some features rather than others should seem particularly attractive. The theoretical difficulties in accounting for physical attraction are brought out in a Brazilian saying, “Beleza nâo pôe na mesa” (“Good looks don't put anything on the table”), which points to the absence of any evident practical advantage to choosing an attractive mate. Faced with these difficulties, a growing number of researchers in biology, psychology, and anthropology have turned to the modern theory of sexual selection, which has been highly successful in explaining nonhuman animals attractions to traits of no direct ecological utility. In this article, I survey recent efforts to apply the theory of sexual selection to human physical attraction.     

Vygotsky's Crisis: Argument, context, relevance

Vygotsky’s The Historical Significance of the Crisis in Psychology (1926–1927) is an important text in the history and philosophy of psychology that has only become available to scholars in 1982 in Russian, and in 1997 in English. The goal of this paper is to introduce Vygotsky’s conception of psychology to a wider audience.I argue that Vygotsky’s argument about the “crisis” in psychology and its resolution can be fully understood only in the context of his social and political thinking. Vygotsky shared the enthusiasm, widespread among Russian leftist intelligentsia in the 1920s, that Soviet society had launched an unprecedented social experiment: The socialist revolution opened the way for establishing social conditions that would let the individual flourish. For Vygotsky, this meant that “a new man” of the future would become “the first and only species in biology that would create itself.” He envisioned psychology as a science that would serve this humanist teleology.I propose that The Crisis is relevant today insofar as it helps us define a fundamental problem: How can we systematically account for the development of knowledge in psychology? I evaluate how Vygotsky addresses this problem as a historian of the crisis.     

A reanalysis of crossed-dimension “Who Said What?” paradigm studies,using a better error base-rate correction

Cognitive and evolutionarily-minded researchers have increasingly adopted the “Who Said What?” memory-confusion paradigm, a powerful and sensitive paradigm originating from social psychology which allows researchers to unobtrusively measure social categorization. The paradigm has been particularly important over the past two decades for arbitrating between different functionalist hypotheses about the evolved social mind. Bor (2018) has pointed out, however, that the simple arithmetic base-rate correction inherited from social psychology for this paradigm is problematic. This standard base-rate correction—in use since 1992 and in over a dozen studies—creates a mathematical artifact in which the calculated magnitude of categorization by one dimension can affect the calculated magnitude of categorization by a second, crossed dimension, even when the two dimensions are in fact fully independent from one another. No one had noticed this in 25?years. Worryingly, this means that all previously-reported “Who Said What?” studies featuring two crossed dimensions have reported potentially-biased estimates of the true magnitude of categorization. Here, a reanalysis of four large research projects is presented, involving 56 effect sizes across 31 between-subjects conditions (Pietraszewski, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2014; Pietraszewski & Schwartz, 2014; Pietraszewski, Curry, Petersen, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2015; Pietraszewski, 2016). In all cases, results from those papers hold or are even strengthened by the reanalysis. In particular, the previously-reported experimental reductions in racial categorization were in fact underestimates. This reanalysis also reveals that the most common artifact of the previously-used error correction was to artificially-inflate categorization by the weaker of the two dimensions—at least among the studies reported here. Finally, a succinct list of best practices for use of the “Who Said What?” paradigm in the future is presented, including but not limited to this new base-rate correction.     

Learning, evolvability and exploratory behaviour: extending the evolutionary reach of learning

Traditional accounts of the role of learning in evolution have concentrated upon its capacity as a source of fitness to individuals. In this paper I use a case study from invasive species biology—the role of conditioned taste aversion in mitigating the impact of cane toads on the native species of Northern Australia—to highlight a role for learning beyond this—as a source of evolvability to populations. This has two benefits. First, it highlights an otherwise under-appreciated role for learning in evolution that does not rely on social learning as an inheritance channel nor “special” evolutionary processes such as genetic accommodation (both of which many are skeptical about). Second, and more significantly, it makes clear important and interesting parallels between learning and exploratory behaviour in development. These parallels motivate the applicability of results from existing research into learning and learning evolution to our understanding the evolution of evolvability more generally.     

The Brain and the Mechanism of Psychosocial Phenomena

According to classic traditions, general psychology has always linked an intraindividual extrapsychic mechanism, the brain, with the intraindividual mental phenomena it examined. Social psychology, on the other hand, is handicapped by the fact that its world is that of interindividual mental phenomena, a disadvantage revealed by a compelling dilemma: this distinctive branch of psychology either fits into the classic tradition and presents the mechanism of interindividual phenomena in the brains of individuals (separately, if need be) or resigns itself to being unable to accommodate the mechanism level of its investigations to their phenomena level. All this is in spite of the fact that investigations focusing on the connection between the mind and the brain—whether they do so from the point of view of the specialized science or of philosophy—cannot begin to deal with the interindividual variety of spiritual phenomena.     

Global impacts of human mineral malnutrition

Malnutrition—in the form of insufficient energy intakes—affects millions of people worldwide and the negative impact of this kind of hunger is well acknowledged, not least by agronomists trying to increase yields to ensure a sufficient supply of food. This review focuses on another, more particular and “hidden” form of malnutrition, namely mineral malnutrition. It illustrates the burden of disease that is caused by mineral deficiencies and the social and economic consequences they bring about. Mineral malnutrition has a considerable negative impact on individual well-being, social welfare and economic productivity. Agricultural scientists should keep the nutritional qualities of food in mind and—next to optimizing the agricultural properties of crops that are paramount for their adoption by farmers—in particular try to increase the micronutrient content in major staple crops as one way to address vitamin and mineral malnutrition in humans; especially plant breeding approaches promise to be very cost-effective.     

Automatisme et volonté dans la thèse de Pierre Janet

Pierre Janet’s doctoral dissertation (1889), often narrowly discussed from a uniquely psychopathological perspective, is presented here within its context and intellectual framework. For Pierre Janet (1859–1947) automatism phenomena are due to a weakness in psychological synthesis, which leads to mental deterioration and a narrowing of the field of consciousness. Uncontrolled spontaneous acts pertain to previous psychic constructs that are stored on a subconscious level and expressed in various circumstances: somnambulism, distraction, suggestibility, catalepsy, etc. Instead of a hidden mechanism, Pierre Janet unfolds a dynamic function, assessing a Kantian theme-the unifying function of “I”—using experimental psychology, from which Emile Boutroux had drawn a theory of the qualitative and creative power of the mind, which partly inspired Bergson. The dynamic psychology of Pierre Janet served as a reference during the XX^th century for a French psychiatric movement led by Jean Delay, Henri Ey and Henri Baruk in the context of resistance to psychoanalysis. Here, we trace the reasoning behind this continuum, by detailing the meaning of the subconscious and questioning the epistemological notions of the young Pierre Janet.     

Diet, embodiment, and virtue in the mechanical philosophy

This paper considers the relationship between diet, embodiment, nature and virtue in several seventeenth-century natural philosophers, all of whom sought to overcome or to radically reform inherited ideas about the self as a hylomorphic compound of form and matter, but who nonetheless were not entirely ready to discard the notion that the self is intimately united with the body. One implication of this intimate union, for them, is that what one does with the body, including what one puts into it, is directly relevant to the supreme end of achieving a virtuous life. I thus consider food—its preparation and its consumption—as a link between natural and moral philosophy in the early modern period, showing in particular the parallels between the search for the diet that is ‘natural to man’, on the one hand, and the project of establishing rules of virtue on the other. Key to discerning these parallels, I argue, is an understanding of early modern ideas about diet and eating as rooted in the Stoic notion of oikeiôsis, which may be translated as ‘assimilation’ or ‘appropriation’, and which, as recent work by Lisa Shapiro has shown, played an important role in early modern ideas about a bodily contribution to the human good. The most general thesis is that dietary questions were far more important in early modern philosophy than has yet been recognized: nearly every prominent natural philosopher was preoccupied with them. A narrower thesis is that this parallelism between natural philosophy and moral philosophy is reflected in the conception of cooking as both a fundamental physiological process (‘coction’) as well as the most basic form of social existence.     

The evolution of theory of mind on welfare tradeoff ratios

People seem to attribute beliefs and desires to another person when interacting with them. Such a “theory of mind” capacity is essential for complex and uniquely human behavior such as language, but its evolutionary origin remains elusive. Using the formal tools of evolutionary game theory, we asked what environmental properties are necessary to select for a basic form of theory of mind—the ability to infer the prosociality, quantified by the welfare tradeoff ratio, of another person toward oneself. We found that none of the environments studied in classical or evolutionary game theory give an advantage to this form of theory of mind capacities; theory of mind is advantageous only in a new class of environments with stable opponents and variable payoff structures. In two behavioral experiments (n = 91) we verified that people can, and do use theory of mind in such an environment. These results suggest that some features of early humans’ social environment that were previously neglected in evolutionary game theory may be responsible for the evolution of people’s complex social capacities.     

Editorial Go faster,further — put some (unleaded) GaAs in your tank

For the privileged, one of the great mixed blessings of the late 20th Century is “cheap” personal transport — the car. I say mixed because while I like driving about when and where I please, my conscience is about as clear as the trail of exhaust fumes my car leaves behind. I, like an increasing number of motorists, am concerned about how much air and noise pollution the car causes and how many resources we are destroying in the process. Recent developments in automotive electronics (subject of a recent Elsevier Profile, incidentally) are hopefully going to ease my conscience. With these in mind, I was set to thinking as to how III–Vs might be likely to contribute to this progress over the next decade.     

Secondary invasion: When invasion success is contingent on other invaders altering the properties of recipient ecosystems

Positive interactions between exotic species may increase ecosystem‐level impacts and potentially facilitate the entry and spread of other exotic species. Invader‐facilitated invasion success—”secondary invasion”—is a key conceptual aspect of the well‐known invasional meltdown hypothesis, but remains poorly defined and empirically underexplored. Drawing from heuristic models and published empirical studies, we explore this form of “secondary invasion” and discuss the phenomenon within the recognized conceptual framework of the determinants of invasion success. The term “secondary invasion” has been used haphazardly in the literature to refer to multiple invasion phenomena, most of which have other more accepted titles. Our usage of the term secondary invasion is akin to “invader‐facilitated invasion,” which we define as the phenomenon in which the invasion success of one exotic species is contingent on the presence, influence, and impacts of one or more other exotic species. We present case studies of secondary invasion whereby primary invaders facilitate the entry or establishment of exotic species into communities where they were previously excluded from becoming invasive. Our synthesis, discussion, and conceptual framework of this type of secondary invasion provides a useful reference to better explain how invasive species can alter key properties of recipient ecosystems that can ultimately determine the invasion success of other species. This study increases our appreciation for complex interactions following invasion and highlights the impacts of invasive species themselves as possible determinants of invasion success. We anticipate that highlighting “secondary invasion” in this way will enable studies reporting similar phenomena to be identified and linked through consistent terminology.     

Scientific perspectivism: A philosopher of science's response to the challenge of big data biology

Big data biology—bioinformatics, computational biology, systems biology (including ‘omics’), and synthetic biology—raises a number of issues for the philosophy of science. This article deals with several such: Is data-intensive biology a new kind of science, presumably post-reductionistic? To what extent is big data biology data-driven? Can data ‘speak for themselves?’ I discuss these issues by way of a reflection on Carl Woese’s worry that “a society that permits biology to become an engineering discipline, that allows that science to slip into the role of changing the living world without trying to understand it, is a danger to itself.” And I argue that scientific perspectivism, a philosophical stance represented prominently by Giere, Van Fraassen, and Wimsatt, according to which science cannot as a matter of principle transcend our human perspective, provides the best resources currently at our disposal to tackle many of the philosophical issues implied in the modeling of complex, multilevel/multiscale phenomena.     

Women’s empowerment and rural revolution: rethinking “failed development”

One of the most frequently advanced explanations of the Maoists’ popularity in rural Nepal links dissatisfaction with the State to forms of consciousness and changes in expectations that are products and processes of development. Such theories often attribute popular support for the insurrection to frustrated desires stemming from “failed” or “incomplete” development. Against this, others suggest that it was the very “success” of empowerment programs which aimed to raise participants’ consciousness of oppression and its roots that inspired villagers to embrace revolutionary action. This paper argues that, despite their differences, both hypotheses reflect assumptions about gendered selfhood and political action that limit their recognition of what motivates Maoist sympathies. Extended research with women in Gorkha—a district where female support for the rebels is said to be especially strong—reveals that Gorkhali women’s support for the rebels is not inspired primarily by the desire for greater autonomy, choice or absolute liberation from social constraints, all of which ideals valorize a culturally specific vision of individual agency. Rather, women there report a sense of self that defines itself through social relations and commitments and which values the common good over individual self-interest, which they associate with an unjust state. The disjuncture between Gorkhali women’s own understandings of self and society and prevailing theories of what motivates people to rebel highlights the modernist assumptions that underlie—and potentially distort—otherwise diverse scholarly perspectives. Likewise, it implies that rebellions may be less about consciousness and more about morality than either “failed” or “successful” theories presume.