The ethics of managing affective and emotional states to improve informed consent: autonomy, comprehension, and voluntariness

Over the past several decades the 'affective revolution' in cognitive psychology has emphasized the critical role affect and emotion play in human decision-making. Drawing on this affective literature, various commentators have recently proposed strategies for managing therapeutic expectation that use contextual, symbolic, or emotive interventions in the consent process to convey information or enhance comprehension. In this paper, we examine whether affective consent interventions that target affect and emotion can be reconciled with widely accepted standards for autonomous action. More specifically, the ethics of affective consent interventions is assessed in terms of key elements of autonomy, comprehension and voluntariness. While there may appear to be a moral obligation to manage the affective environment to ensure valid informed consent, in circumstances where volunteers may be prone to problematic therapeutic expectancy, this moral obligation needs to be weighed against the potential risks of human instrumentalization. At this point in time we do not have enough information to be able to justify clearly the programmatic manipulation of human subjects' affective states. The lack of knowledge about affective interventions requires corresponding caution in its ethical justification.     

On Taylor's justification of medical informed consent

In contemporary Western biomedical ethics, informed consent practices are commonly justified in terms of the intrinsic value of patient autonomy. James Stacey Taylor maintains that this conception of the moral grounding of medical informed consent is mistaken. On the basis of his reasoning to that effect, Taylor argues that medical informed consent is justified by the instrumental value of personal autonomy. In this article, I examine whether Taylor's justification of medical informed consent is plausible.     

CULTURE AND VOLUNTARY INFORMED CONSENT IN AFRICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS

This paper discusses how to apply a collective decision model of the principle of voluntary informed consent in African communitarian culture, in a culturally sensitive way, in order to protect research candidates from potential exploitations and abuses. Dismissing cultural and ethical skepticism surrounding the global application of the principle of voluntary informed consent, the paper ultimately concludes that international collaboration on diagnostic and therapeutic medical research in Africa, especially HIV vaccine trials, is a moral imperative.     

‘VAGUE OVIEDO’: AUTONOMY,CULTURE AND THE CASE OF PREVIOUSLY COMPETENT PATIENTS

The paper examines the ethical and legal challenges of making decisions for previously competent patients and the role of advance directives and legal representatives in light of the Oviedo Convention. The paper identifies gaps in the Convention that result in conflicting instructions in cases of a disagreement between the expressed prior wishes of a patient, and the legal representative. The authors also examine the legal and moral status of informally expressed prior wishes of patients unable to consent. The authors argue that positivist legal reasoning is insufficient for a consistent interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Convention and argue that ethical argumentation is needed to provide guidance in such cases. Based on the ethical arguments, the authors propose a way of reconciling the apparent inconsistencies in the Oviedo Convention. They advance a culturally sensitive approach to the application of the Convention at the national level. This approach understands autonomy as a broader, relational consent and emphasizes the social and cultural embeddedness of the individual. Based on their approach, the authors argue that there exists a moral obligation to respect the prior wishes of the patient even in countries without advance directives. Yet it should be left to the national legislations to determine the extent of this obligation and its concrete forms.     

The Challenges of Research Informed Consent in Socio‐Economically Vulnerable Populations: A Viewpoint From the Democratic Republic of Congo

In medical research, the ethical principle of respect for persons is operationalized into the process of informed consent. The consent tools should be contextualized and adapted to the different socio‐cultural environment, especially when research crosses the traditional boundaries and reaches poor communities. We look at the challenges experienced in the malaria Quinact trial, conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and describe some lessons learned, related to the definition of acceptable representative, the role of independent witness and the impact of socio‐economic vulnerability. To ensure children's protection, consent is required by the parents or, in their absence, by a legally mandated representative. In our setting, children's responsibility is often entrusted permanently or temporarily to relatives or friends without a tribunal mandate. Hence, a notion of ‘culturally acceptable representative’ under supervision of the local Ethics Committee may be more suitable. To ensure protection of illiterate subjects, an independent witness is required to confirm that the consent was freely given. However, in low‐literacy contexts, potential witnesses often don't have any previous relationship with patient and there may be power‐unbalance in their relationship, rather than genuine dialogue. In poor communities, trial participation may be seen as an opportunity to secure access to healthcare. Poverty may also lead to ‘competition’ to access the research‐related benefits, with a risk of disturbance at societal or household level. Adjusting consent procedures to sociocultural and socioeconomic realities is essential for fulfilling the underlying ethical principles. This requires a collaborative dialogue between researchers, regulators and ethics committees.     

Family refusal of emergency medical treatment in China: An investigation from legal,empirical and ethical perspectives

This paper is an analysis of the limits of family authority to refuse life saving treatment for a family member (in the Chinese medical context). Family consent has long been praised and practiced in many non-Western cultural settings such as China and Japan. In contrast, the controversy of family refusal remains less examined despite its prevalence in low-income and middle-income countries. In this paper, we investigate family refusal in medical emergencies through a combination of legal, empirical and ethical approaches, which is highly relevant to the ongoing discussion about the place of informed consent in non-Western cultures. We first provide an overview of the Chinese legislation concerning informed consent to show the significance of family values in the context of medical decision-making and demonstrate the lack of legal support to override family refusal. Next, we present the findings of a vignette question that investigated how 11,771 medical professionals and 2,944 patients in China responded to the family refusal of emergency treatment for an unconscious patient. In our analysis of these results, we employ ethical reasoning to question the legitimacy of family refusal of life-sustaining emergency treatment for temporarily incompetent patients. Last, we examine some practical obstacles encountered by medical professionals wishing to override family refusal to give context to the discussion.     

Reflection on family consent: based on a pregnant death in a beijing hospital

The ‘family consent’ process has been placed at the centre of Chinese clinical practice. Although there has been critical analysis of how the process functions in relation to the autonomy and rights of patients, there has been little examination of the perceptions and attitude of patients and their families and the medical professionals, in relation to moral dilemmas that arise in real cases in the bioethical discourse. When faced with a consent form in an emergency situation, the family member's capacity to act is reduced, as he/she becomes enmeshed in the hospital structure of tacit, socially‐imposed rules. In a questionnaires based on a real death case in 2008, 70.9% of the surveyed medical professionals (n = 3,665) disagreed with performing surgery without the consent of the family even if the patient's life was in danger, while 36.6% of the surveyed patients (n = 1,198) hold the same position. This work demonstrates the weakness of the family consent process as a safeguard of patient's autonomy. Finally, I argue that saving the patient's life should be the overriding obligation rather than the respect for the surrogate's autonomous choice at such a decisive moment.     

AFRICAN AND WESTERN MORAL THEORIES IN A BIOETHICAL CONTEXT

The field of bioethics is replete with applications of moral theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism. For a given dilemma, even if it is not clear how one of these western philosophical principles of right (and wrong) action would resolve it, one can identify many of the considerations that each would conclude is relevant. The field is, in contrast, largely unaware of an African account of what all right (and wrong) actions have in common and of the sorts of factors that for it are germane to developing a sound response to a given bioethical problem. My aim is to help rectify this deficiency by first spelling out a moral theory grounded in the mores of many sub-Saharan peoples, and then applying it to some major bioethical issues, namely, the point of medical treatment, free and informed consent, standards of care and animal experimentation. For each of these four issues, I compare and contrast the implications of the African moral theory with utilitarianism and Kantianism, my overall purposes being to highlight respects in which the African moral theory is distinct and to demonstrate that the field should take it at least as seriously as it does the Western theories.     

How rational should bioethics be? The value of empirical approaches

Rational justification of claims with empirical content calls for empirical and not only normative philosophical investigation. Empirical approaches to bioethics are epistemically valuable, i.e., such methods may be necessary in providing and verifying basic knowledge about cultural values and norms. Our assumptions in moral reasoning can be verified or corrected using these methods. Moral arguments can be initiated or adjudicated by data drawn from empirical investigation. One may argue that individualistic informed consent, for example, is not compatible with the Asian communitarian orientation. But this normative claim uses an empirical assumption that may be contrary to the fact that some Asians do value and argue for informed consent. Is it necessary and factual to neatly characterize some cultures as individualistic and some as communitarian? Empirical investigation can provide a reasonable way to inform such generalizations. In a multi-cultural context, such as in the Philippines, there is a need to investigate the nature of the local ethos before making any appeal to authenticity. Otherwise we may succumb to the same ethical imperialism we are trying hard to resist. Normative claims that involve empirical premises cannot be reasonable verified or evaluated without utilizing empirical methods along with philosophical reflection. The integration of empirical methods to the standard normative approach to moral reasoning should be reasonably guided by the epistemic demands of claims arising from cross-cultural discourse in bioethics.     

A Confucian View of Personhood and Bioethics

This paper focuses on Confucian formulations of personhood and the implications they may have for bioethics and medical practice. We discuss how an appreciation of the Confucian concept of personhood can provide insights into the practice of informed consent and, in particular, the role of family members and physicians in medical decision-making in societies influenced by Confucian culture. We suggest that Western notions of informed consent appear ethically misguided when viewed from a Confucian perspective.     

Legal obligation of physicians to disclose information to patients.

Obtaining a patient''s consent is a routine daily process for physicians, although many are unaware of the scope of this legal obligation. In 1980 the Supreme Court of Canada changed the law relating to informed consent; promotion of patient autonomy shifted the focus from a standard of professional disclosure to one of a "reasonable patient." Physicians have a legal obligation to disclose to patients specific information, the scope of which is determined by a court on the basis of a reasonable patient''s expectation and the circumstances of the case. This gives rise to many controversies in the practice of clinical medicine. It is difficult for physicians to know which treatment risks require disclosure, since this is decided by a court in a retrospective analysis of the evidence. Will the court recognize exceptions to the duty of disclosing information? If several health care professionals are involved in a patient''s care who has the duty to disclose information? Can this duty be delegated? This paper provides physicians with guidelines that are consistent with the promotion of patient autonomy and comply with the doctrine of informed consent. In addition, it suggests ways of improving awareness of the doctrine and procedures to ease its application.     

Consenting to donation: an examination of current practices in informed consent for tissue donation in the US

Informed consent is the primary moral principle guiding the donation of human tissue for transplant purposes. When patients’ donation wishes are not known, family members making the decision about tissue donation should be provided with requisite information needed to make informed donation decisions. Using a unique dataset of 1,016 audiotaped requests for tissue obtained from 15 US tissue banking organizations, we examined whether the information provided to families considering tissue donation met current standards for informed consent. The results indicated that many elements of informed consent were missing from the donation discussions, including the timeframe for procurement, autopsy issues, the involvement of both for-profit and nonprofit organizations, and the processing, storage and distribution of donated tissue. A multiple linear regression analysis also revealed that nonwhites and family members of increased age received less information regarding tissue donation than did younger, white decision makers. Recommendations for improving the practice of obtaining consent to tissue donation are provided.     

Informed consent and nudging

In order to avoid patient abuse, under normal situations before performing a medical intervention on a patient, a physician must obtain informed consent from that patient, where to give genuine informed consent a patient must be competent, understand her condition, her options and their expected risks and benefits, and must expressly consent to one of those options. However, many patients refrain from the option that their physician believes to be best, and many physicians worry that their patients make irrational healthcare decisions, hindering their ability to provide efficient healthcare for their patients. Some philosophers have proposed a solution to this problem: they advocate that physicians nudge their patients to steer them towards their physician's preferred option. A nudge is any influence designed to predictably alter a person's behavior without limiting their options or giving them reasons to act. Proponents of nudging contend that nudges are consistent with obtaining informed consent. Here I argue that nudging is incompatible with genuine informed consent, as it violates a physician's obligation to tell their patients the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth during adequate disclosure.     

An Australian Based Study on the Readability of HIV/AIDS and Type 2 Diabetes Clinical Trial Informed Consent Documents

The aims of this study were to measure the readability of Australian based informed consent documents and determine whether informed consent readability guidelines have been established by Australian human research ethics committees (HRECs). A total of 20 informed consent documents, 10 HIV/AIDS and 10 type 2 diabetes, were measured for readability using the Simple Measure of Gobbledygook (SMOG) and Gunning Fog Index (Fog). Published guidelines and policy statements of the two local HREC who approved the 20 clinical trials under study where examined to identify whether they had any formal policies/guidelines on the readability of informed consent documents. The two HRECs were contacted via e-mail to also determine whether they utilised any informal readability standards or “rules of thumb” that may not have been mentioned in the published documents. The HIV/AIDS and type 2 diabetes informed consent documents were, on average, written at a grade 13 reading level. Formal readability standards had not been established by the two local HRECs, however, they did verify the use of informal rules for assessing readability of informed consent documents. Based on Australian literacy data, the majority of informed consent documents were written well beyond the reading ability of many Australians. Unreadable informed consent documents may result in patients rejecting trial participation altogether or conversely may result in their participating in a trial with inadequate consent. Therefore, a step toward reducing the complexity of informed consent documents may be to implement objective readability assessments into the human research ethics application and review process.     

Medical experimentation, informed consent and using people

In this paper we argue that the standard focus on problems of informed consent in debates about the ethics of human experimentation is inadequate because it fails to capture a more fundamental way in which such experiments may be wrong. Taking clinical trials as our case in point, we suggest that it is the moral offence of using people as mere means which better characterizes what is wrong with violations of personal autonomy in certain kinds of clinical trials. This account also helps bring out another important way in which the autonomy of the participants in clinical trials my be violated, even in cases where they have given informed consent to their involvement. Where relevant information about the trial is framed in such a way as to induce a patient's participation by appeal to their nonrational preferences, this is also a violation of their autonomy, and one which is distinct from a failure of informed consent. The underlying wrongness of both kinds of violations, we argue, is plausibly captured by the moral offence of using people as mere means.     

COERCION,AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION

The debate concerning whether to legalize and regulate the global market in human organs is hindered by a lack of adequate bioethical language. The author argues that the preferential option for the poor, a theological category, can provide the grounding for an inductive moral epistemology adequate for reforming the use of culturally Western bioethical language. He proposes that the traditional, Western concept of bioethical coercion ought to be modified and expanded because the conditions of the market system, as viewed from the perspective of organ vendors systemically deprived of access to sufficient resources, are sufficiently exploitative as to diminish the possibility of these vendors giving informed consent. Moreover, empirical studies conducted by professionals in medicine, sociology, psychiatry, economics, and medical anthropology continue to contribute support to the growing interdisciplinary consensus that functionally coercive structural factors exert the most significant influence upon a vendor's decision to sell an organ within any market, regardless of legality or degree of regulation. Therefore any proposal to legalize and regulate the organ market remains patently unethical because doing so would likely function to constrain further the agency of poor potential vendors.     

Educational pelvic exams on anesthetized women: Why consent matters

It is argued here that the practice of medical students performing pelvic exams on women who are under anesthetic and have not consented is immoral and indefensible. This argument begins by laying out the ethical justification for the practice of informed consent, which can be found in autonomy and basic rights. Foregoing the process of consent within medicine can result in violations of both autonomy and basic rights, as well as trust, forming the basis of the wrong of unauthorized pelvic examinations. Several objections to this argument are considered, all of which stem from the idea that this practice constitutes an exception to the general requirement of informed consent. These objections suggest that nonconsensual pelvic examinations on women under anesthetic are ethically acceptable on utilitarian grounds, in that they offer benefits either to the patient or to society, or on the grounds of triviality, in that consent is already presumed, or the practice is insignificant. Each of these objections is rejected and the practice is deemed indefensible.     

FURTHERING INJUSTICES AGAINST WOMEN: GENETIC INFORMATION, MORAL OBLIGATIONS, AND GENDER

The purpose of this paper is to show that a decontextualized approach to ethical issues is not just unhelpful for the decision making process of real, situated human beings, but dangerous. This is so, because by neglecting the context in which people make moral decisions we run the risk of reinforcing or furthering injustices against already disadvantaged groups. To show this, I evaluate three moral obligations that our ability to obtain genetic information has made salient: the duty to obtain genetic information about ourselves, the obligation to inform family members about genetic risks and the duty not to reproduce when we know that there is a high risk of transmitting a serious disease or defect. I will argue here that in ignoring the context in which these moral obligations are put into practice, and in particular the situation of women in our society, those who defend these moral duties might be furthering injustices against women.     

Trouble in the Gap: A Bioethical and Sociological Analysis of Informed Consent for High-Risk Medical Procedures

Concerns are frequently raised about the extent to which formal consent procedures actually lead to “informed” consent. As part of a study of consent to high-risk medical procedures, we analyzed in-depth interviews with 16 health care professionals working in bone-marrow transplantation in Sydney, Australia. We find that these professionals recognize and act on their responsibility to inform and educate patients and that they expect patients to reciprocate these efforts by demonstrably engaging in the education process. This expectation is largely implicit, however, and when it is not met, this can give rise to trouble that can have adverse consequences for patients, physicians, and relationships within the clinic. We revisit the concept of the sick role to formalize this new role expectation, and we argue that “informed” consent is a process that is usually incomplete, despite trappings and assumptions that help to create the illusion of completeness.