Mirror-Mark Tests Performed on Jackdaws Reveal Potential Methodological Problems in the Use of Stickers in Avian Mark-Test Studies

Some animals are capable of recognizing themselves in a mirror, which is considered to be demonstrated by passing the mark test. Mirror self-recognition capacity has been found in just a few mammals having very large brains and only in one bird, the magpie (Pica pica). The results obtained in magpies have enormous biological and cognitive implications because the fact that magpies were able to pass the mark test meant that this species is at the same cognitive level with great apes, that mirror self-recognition has evolved independently in the magpie and great apes (which diverged 300 million years ago), and that the neocortex (which is not present in the bird''s brains) is not a prerequisite for mirror self-recognition as previously believed. Here, we have replicated the experimental design used on magpies to determine whether jackdaws (Corvus monedula) are also capable of mirror self-recognition by passing the mark test. We found that our nine jackdaws showed a very high interest towards the mirror and exhibited self-contingent behavior as soon as mirrors were introduced. However, jackdaws were not able to pass the mark test: both sticker-directed actions and sticker removal were performed with a similar frequency in both the cardboard (control) and the mirror conditions. We conclude that our jackdaws'' behaviour raises non-trivial questions about the methodology used in the avian mark test. Our study suggests that the use of self-adhesive stickers on sensitive throat feathers may open the way to artefactual results because birds might perceive the stickers tactilely.     

Contingency checking and self-directed behaviors in giant manta rays: Do elasmobranchs have self-awareness?

Elaborate cognitive skills arose independently in different taxonomic groups. Self-recognition is conventionally identified by the understanding that one’s own mirror reflection does not represent another individual but oneself, which has never been proven in any elasmobranch species to date. Manta rays have a high encephalization quotient, similar to those species that have passed the mirror self-recognition test, and possess the largest brain of all fish species. In this study, mirror exposure experiments were conducted on two captive giant manta rays to document their response to their mirror image. The manta rays did not show signs of social interaction with their mirror image. However, frequent unusual and repetitive movements in front of the mirror suggested contingency checking; in addition, unusual self-directed behaviors could be identified when the manta rays were exposed to the mirror. The present study shows evidence for behavioral responses to a mirror that are prerequisite of self-awareness and which has been used to confirm self-recognition in apes.     

What mirror self-recognition in nonhumans can tell us about aspects of self

Research on mirror self-recognition where animals are observed for mirror-guided self-directed behaviour has predominated the empirical approach to self-awareness in nonhuman primates. The ability to direct behaviour to previously unseen parts of the body such as the inside of the mouth, or grooming the eye by aid of mirrors has been interpreted as recognition of self and evidence of a self-concept. Three decades of research has revealed that contrary to monkeys, most great apes (humans, common chimpanzees, pygmy chimpanzees and orangutans but not the gorilla) have convincingly displayed the capacity to recognize self by mirrors. The putative discontinuity in phylogeny of the ability suggests the existence of a so-called cognitive gap between great apes and the rest of the animal kingdom. However, methodological and theoretical inconsistencies regarding the empirical approach prevail. For instance, the observation of self-directed behaviour might not be as straightforward as it seems. In addition, the interpretation of mirror self-recognition as an index of self-awareness is challenged by alternative explanations, raising doubt about some assumptions behind mirror self-recognition. To evaluate the significance of the test in discussions of the concept of self this paper presents and analyses some major arguments raised on the mirror task.     

Mirror-mediated responses of California scrub jays (Aphelocoma californica) during a caching task and the mark test

Mirror self-recognition, as an index of self-awareness, has been proposed as a precursor for more complex social cognitive abilities, such as prosocial reasoning and cooperative decision-making. Indeed, evidence for mirror self-recognition has been shown for animals possessing complex social cognitive abilities such as great apes, dolphins, elephants and corvids. California scrub jays (Aphelocoma californica) have provided strong evidence that non-human animals are capable of mental state attribution. For instance, scrub jays are reported to use their experience stealing the food of others to infer that other birds may similarly intend to steal from them. If a concept of “self” is required for such complex social cognitive abilities, then scrub jays might be expected to show mirror self-recognition. Thus, we examined whether California scrub jays are capable of mirror self-recognition using two experimental contexts: a caching task and the mark test. During the caching task, we compared the extent to which scrub jays protected their food after caching alone, in the presence of a conspecific and in the presence of a mirror. The birds did not engage in more cache protection behaviours with a mirror present than when caching alone, suggesting scrub jays may have recognized their reflection and so did not expect cache theft. Alternative explanations for this behaviour are also discussed. During the mark test, the scrub jays were surreptitiously marked with a red or plumage-coloured control sticker. The scrub jays showed no evidence of mirror self-recognition during the mark test, as the birds did not preferentially attempt to remove the red mark in the presence of a mirror. Together, the results provide mixed evidence of the mirror self-recognition abilities of California scrub jays. We highlight the need to develop alternative approaches for evaluating mirror self-recognition in non-human animals to better understand its relationship with complex social cognition.     

Do rhesus monkeys recognize themselves in mirrors?

Self-recognition continues to attract attention because of the evidence of a striking difference between the great apes and humans, on the one hand, and all other primates; the former are capable of self recognition,whereas no compelling evidence exists for prosimians, monkeys, or lesser apes. This is inspite of numerous attempts to facilitate mirror self-recognition in other primates. Although all previous attempts to find self-recognition in rhesus macaques have failed, a recent article [Rajala et al., PLoS One9:e12865, 2010] claimed the opposite—that adult male rhesus monkeys did recognize their own image in a mirror. We critically examine this claim, and conclude that the article fails to provide acceptable evidence for self-recognition in rhesus monkeys.     

Monkeys,apes, mirrors and minds: The evolution of self-awareness in primates

Almost two decades of research on the self-recognition capacity of non-human primates has produced evidence of intriguing phylogenetic differences. Not a single species of monkey has demonstrated the ability to recognize its own reflection in a mirror, despite some claims to the contrary. To date, only humans, orangutans and chimpanzees have passed objective tests of mirror-recognition. This paper reviews the methodology and evidence for self-recognition in primates along with the assumption that this ability is an indicator of self-awareness. The failure of the gorilla to master the task is discussed in some detail, along with an evaluation of anecdotal evidence of self-recognition by at least one gorilla. Also, the evolutionary backdrop of the primates is considered with reference to this unique behavior. Evidence supporting alternate, non-cognitive interpretations of self-recognition is assessed.     

Failure to demonstrate self-recognition in gorillas

Two zoo-reared gorillas were each given nearly 400 h of mirror exposure. Extensive mirror gazing and social behaviors were exhibited, the frequency of which decreased gradually over the study period. Neither animal demonstrated the transition from other-directed to self-directed behavior characteristic of both chimpanzees and orangutans, and no evidence of self-recognition was found using the Gallup marking paradigm. These negative findings, after extensive mirror exposure, suggest that the gorilla may be the only great ape which lacks the conceptual ability necessary for self-recognition.     

Not all chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) show self-recognition

When a chimpanzee is presented with a mirror it initially responds with social behavior directed toward the reflection. After several hours of exposure to the mirror the social behavior decreases and the mirror is used to guide self-directed responses to previously unobservable parts of the body such as the face. When a distinctively colored mark is unobtrousively applied to the chimpanzee's face and the chimpanzee touches the mark while observing itself in the mirror, this behavior is said to indicate self-recognition. Such self-recognition has been considered to be a robust phenomenon in chimpanzees, with self-directed and mark-directed behaviors both appearing in all socially-housed adult chimpanzees tested. In our study 11 chimpanzees were given mirror exposure and tested with the mark test. Only one of the 11 chimpanzees touched the mark during test, although several showed self-directed behavior using the mirror to guide their movements. Such experimental factors as mirror size, position, or temporal spacing of the mirror exposure, and such subject variables as age, sex, previous social experience, and subspecies were insufficient to explain the difference between the present and previous findings. We suggest that there are individual differences in mirror recognition behavior in chimpanzees, and that further consideration of the factors contributing to this phenomenon, including the development of additional tests for self-recognition, is needed.     

Ontogeny of mirror behavior in two species of great apes

Mirror image reactions of two infant apes, a female chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and a male orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus), born at the Zoo de Vincennes and the Jardin des Plantes of Paris, France, respectively, were studied and compared with those of children. Self-recognition was also tested following 46.5 hours of mirror exposure by application of red marks on parts of the body invisible to the animal without the aid of the mirror. Results indicated that the behavior of the two young apes followed a developmental trend similar to that of human babies. At the end of the study, the female chimpanzee (11 months of age) expressed social behavior, searched for the image behind the mirror, and showed interest in imaged movement. The orangutan (2 years and 5 months old) had begun to test movement synchronism and to display self-directed behaviors. The tests of self-recognition yielded negative results in both animals.     

Further evidence for the capacity of mirror self-recognition in cleaner fish and the significance of ecologically relevant marks

An animal that tries to remove a mark from its body that is only visible when looking into a mirror displays the capacity for mirror self-recognition (MSR), which has been interpreted as evidence for self-awareness. Conservative interpretations of existing data conclude that convincing evidence for MSR is currently restricted to great apes. Here, we address proposed shortcomings of a previous study on MSR in the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus, by varying preexposure to mirrors and by marking individuals with different colors. We found that (1) 14/14 new individuals scraped their throat when a brown mark had been provisioned, but only in the presence of a mirror; (2) blue and green color marks did not elicit scraping; (3) intentionally injecting the mark deeper beneath the skin reliably elicited spontaneous scraping in the absence of a mirror; (4) mirror-naive individuals injected with a brown mark scraped their throat with lower probability and/or lower frequency compared to mirror-experienced individuals; (5) in contrast to the mirror images, seeing another fish with the same marking did not induce throat scraping; and (6) moving the mirror to another location did not elicit renewed aggression in mirror-experienced individuals. Taken together, these results increase our confidence that cleaner fish indeed pass the mark test, although only if it is presented in ecologically relevant contexts. Therefore, we reiterate the conclusion of the previous study that either self-awareness in animals or the validity of the mirror test needs to be revised.

When animal tries to remove a mark from its body that is only visible when looking into a mirror (the "mark test"), it displays the capacity for mirror self-recognition, often interpreted as evidence for self-awareness. This follow-up to a previous PLOS Biology study increases confidence that cleaner fish indeed pass the mark test, but only if it is presented in ecologically relevant contexts.     

A developmental approach to the origins of self-recognition in great apes

In this paper I present an hypothesis to explain the presence of mirror self-recognition (MSR) in great apes and human infants, and the absence of MSR in monkeys. This hypothesis is based on the following elements: 1) review of Gallupian studies of MSR in monkeys and apes; 2) review of Lewis & Brooks-Gunn's study for self-recognition in human infants; 3) application of the human model to comparative data on MSR in nonhuman primates; 4) discussion of cognitive correlates of MSR in human infants; 5) analysis of the cognitive correlates of MSR absence in monkeys, and MSR presence in apes; 6) comparative analysis of the modalities of occurrence of imitation and understanding of causality in monkeys and apes; and 7) a cladistic reconstruction of the evolution of MSR.     

Self-awareness and the emergence of mind in primates

To date humans, chimpanzees, and orangutans are the only species which have been shown capable of recognizing themselves in mirrors. Several species of macaques have now been provided with years of continuous exposure to mirrors, but they still persist in reacting to their reflection as if they were seeing other monkeys. Even gibbons (apes) and gorillas (great apes) seem incapable of learning that their behavior is the source of the behavior depicted in the image. Most primates, therefore, appear to lack a cognitive category for processing mirrored information about themselves. The implications of these data for traditional views of consciousness are considered briefly, and a recent attempt to develop an operant analog to self-recognition is critically evaluated. Finally, an attempt is made to show that self-awareness, consciousness, and mind are not mutually exclusive cognitive categories and that the emergence of self-awareness may be equivalent to the emergence of mind. Several indices of “mind” which can be applied to nonhuman species are discussed in the context of an attempt to develop a comparative psychology of mind.     

The responses of bonobos (Pan paniscus) to their mirror images: Evidence of selfrecognition

This research examined the responses of bonobos (Pan paniscus) to their mirror images. Nine bonobos were presented alternately with the reflective and non-reflective sides of a mirror. The apes exhibited considerable interest in the mirror, and immature animals exhibited higher frequencies of contingent action and inactive looking than did adults. four animals used the mirror to inspect parts of their bodies that were otherwise not visible to them, indicating that bonobos are capable of self-recognition.     

Social responding to mirrors in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta): Effects of changing mirror location

Two rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) with a lifetime of continuous exposure to mirrors showed a dramatic and reliable reinstatement of social behavior directed toward the mirror when it was simply moved to a new location. These data are discussed in the context of repeated failures to find self-recognition in monkeys and several recent claims that a cessation of social behavior directed toward mirrors can be used as evidence for the beginning of self-recognition in nonhuman primates.     

Mirror-image reactions in a tool-using,adult male Macaca tonkeana

This study examined reactions to mirror-image stimulation in a wild- reared adult male monkey (Macaca tonkeana) which had spontaneously developed a form of tool-use, namely the use of plant stems to reach mucus inside the nose. Initial intense social responsiveness to the mirror was followed by habituation, although some social responding persisted. Mirror- induced social facilitation of drinking was demonstrated, the first record of such an effect in a nonhuman primate. Rather than enhancing the subject's tool-using activity, the presence of the mirror disrupted tool-use. Finally, an objective test for the presence of self-recognition failed to obtain any evidence of self-recognition in the subject, lending support to the view that the capacity for self-recognition may be lacking in monkeys.     

What do fish make of mirror images?

Fish act aggressively towards their mirror image suggesting that they consider it another individual, whereas in some mammals behavioural response to mirrors may be an evidence of self-recognition. Since fish cannot self-recognize, we asked whether they could distinguish between fighting a mirror image and fighting a real fish. We compared molecular, physiological and behavioural responses in each condition and found large differences in brain gene expression levels. Although neither levels of aggressive behaviour nor circulating androgens differed between these conditions, males fighting a mirror image had higher immediate early gene (IEG) expression in brain areas homologous to the amygdala and hippocampus than controls. Since amygdalar responses are associated with fear and fear conditioning in other species, higher levels of brain activation when fighting a mirror suggest fish experience fear in response to fights with a mirror image. Clearly, the fish recognize something unusual about the mirror image and the differential brain response may reflect a cognitive distinction.     

Mirror responses in a Japanese macaque troop (Arashiyama West)

Behavior toward two mirrors in the field was observed in the Arashiyama West troop ofMacaca fuscata. Counts of visits to the mirrors, plus scan and focal animal sampling were used. Some animals were marked with fluorescent paint to test informally for self-recognition. A relatively high mean frequency of visits to the reflecting side of both mirrors by all age classes, ranks, and sexes was recorded. There was no age difference in frequency of mirror visits per sample but adults spent more time per visit than subadults who in turn spent more time than juveniles. There was no indication of self-recognition by paint-marked animals. Mirrors appeared to be used to monitor the reflected scene and to look at the self-image. Social behavior in the mirror zone that was not directed toward the mirror was common to all age classes. Species-typical behavior directed toward the mirror was seen in younger animals but very seldom in adults. No threat displays by any animal were observed. We suggest that for adults the mirror image was not seen simply as another monkey.     

Mirror inspection varies with age and tool-using ability in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

We examined mirror inspection in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Capuchins were presented with a non-reflective surface for 30 minutes and then a mirror for 3 hours. Inspection of the non-reflective surface did not vary significantly as a function of tool-using ability, age, or sex. Mirror inspection was lowest in older animals, and was greater in animals that used tools than in animals that did not use tools. Mirror-aided self-inspection was not observed. These results indicate that mirror inspection varies with age and tool-using ability in tufted capuchin monkeys. We hypothesize that psychological capacities associated with mirror inspection correspond with those related to the use of tools, and that these capacities facilitate the emergence of self-recognition in some primate species.     

The influence of AVPR1A genotype on individual differences in behaviors during a mirror self‐recognition task in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

The mark/rouge test has been used to assess mirror self‐recognition (MSR) in many species. Despite consistent evidence of MSR in great apes, genetic or non‐genetic factors may account for the individual differences in behavioral responses that have been reported. We examined whether vasopressin receptor gene (AVPR1A) polymorphisms are associated with MSR‐related behaviors in chimpanzees since vasopressin has been implicated in the development and evolution of complex social relations and cognition and chimpanzees are polymorphic for the presence of the RS3‐containing DupB region. We compared a sample of DupB+/? and DupB?/? chimpanzees on a mark test to assess its role on social behavior toward a mirror. Chimpanzees were administered two, 10‐min sessions where frequencies of mirror‐guided self‐directed behaviors, contingent actions and other social behaviors were recorded. Approximately one‐third showed evidence of MSR and these individuals exhibited more mirror‐guided self‐exploratory behaviors and mouth contingent actions than chimpanzees not classified as passers. Moreover, DupB+/? males exhibited more scratching and agonistic behaviors than other male and female cohorts. Our findings support previous studies demonstrating individual differences in MSR abilities in chimpanzees and suggest that AVPR1A partly explains individual differences in MSR by influencing the behavioral reactions of chimpanzees in front of a mirror.     

Grey parrots use inferential reasoning based on acoustic cues alone

Our ability to make logical inferences is considered as one of the cornerstones of human intelligence, fuelling investigations of reasoning abilities in non-human animals. Yet, the evidence to date is equivocal, with apes as the prime candidates to possess these skills. For instance, in a two-choice task, apes can identify the location of hidden food if it is indicated by a rattling noise caused by the shaking of a baited container. More importantly, they also use the absence of noise during the shaking of the empty container to infer that this container is not baited. However, since the inaugural report of apes solving this task, to the best of our knowledge, no comparable evidence could be found in any other tested species such as monkeys and dogs. Here, we report the first successful and instantaneous solution of the shaking task through logical inference by a non-ape species, the African grey parrot. Surprisingly, the performance of the birds was sensitive to the shaking movement: they were successful with containers shaken horizontally, but not with vertical shaking resembling parrot head-bobbing. Thus, grey parrots seem to possess ape-like cross-modal reasoning skills, but their reliance on these abilities is influenced by low-level interferences.