Pandemic policy and planning considerations for universities: findings from a tabletop exercise

The potential for a novel influenza virus to cause a pandemic represents a significant threat to global health. Planning for pandemic flu, as compared to planning for other types of hazards, presents some unique challenges to businesses, communities, and education institutions. To identify and address the challenges that may be faced by major metropolitan universities during a flu pandemic, a tabletop exercise was developed, offered, and evaluated. Its purpose was to assess existing University of Washington (UW) plans and policies for responding to an influenza pandemic. On May 31, 2006, more than 50 participants, including UW administrators and unit leaders and a number of key external partners, participated in a tabletop exercise designed to simulate all phases of an influenza pandemic. This exercise revealed existing gaps in university pandemic influenza plans and policies, including issues related to isolation and quarantine, continuity of operations, disaster mental health services, integration of volunteers into a disaster response, tracking travel of university students and personnel, communication problems, and ways to meet the needs of resident and foreign students and faculty during an outbreak. Policy and planning recommendations are offered that address each of these challenges faced by UW as well as other major research universities and colleges.     

Corporate preparedness for pandemic influenza: a survey of pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies in Montgomery County, Maryland

Objectives: We conducted a survey of corporate preparedness for pandemic influenza among biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies in Montgomery County, Maryland, to determine the level of preparedness for this industry and geographic region. Methods: The survey, based on the HHS Business Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist, established whether a company had a preparedness plan specific to pandemic influenza, the contents of its plan, or its reasons for a lack of a plan. Results: A total of 50 companies participated in the survey. Of these, 40 did not have any type of preparedness plan, 3 were drafting plans, 6 had general preparedness plans that could be applied to an influenza pandemic, and only 1 company had a preparedness plan specifically designed to address pandemic influenza. Conclusions: Biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies in this geographic region are currently not well prepared for pandemic influenza. Public health officials should offer more help, possibly in the form of a model small business preparedness plan, and collaboration between companies should be encouraged to foster sharing of preparedness plans.     

Sentinel Surveillance of Influenza-Like Illness in Two Hospitals in Maracay,Venezuela: 2006–2010

Background

Limited information exists on the epidemiology of acute febrile respiratory illnesses in tropical South American countries such as Venezuela. The objective of the present study was to examine the epidemiology of influenza-like illness (ILI) in two hospitals in Maracay, Venezuela.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We performed a prospective surveillance study of persons with ILI who presented for care at two hospitals in Maracay, Venezuela, from October 2006 to December 2010. A respiratory specimen and clinical information were obtained from each participant. Viral isolation and identification with immunofluorescent antibodies and molecular methods were employed to detect respiratory viruses such as adenovirus, influenza A and B, parainfluenza, and respiratory sincytial virus, among others. There were 916 participants in the study (median age: 17 years; range: 1 month – 86 years). Viruses were identified in 143 (15.6%) subjects, and one participant was found to have a co-infection with more than one virus. Influenza viruses, including pandemic H1N1 2009, were the most frequently detected pathogens, accounting for 67.4% (97/144) of the viruses detected. Adenovirus (15/144), parainfluenza virus (13/144), and respiratory syncytial virus (11/144) were also important causes of ILI in this study. Pandemic H1N1 2009 virus became the most commonly isolated influenza virus during its initial appearance in 2009. Two waves of the pandemic were observed: the first which peaked in August 2009 and the second - higher than the preceding - that peaked in October 2009. In 2010, influenza A/H3N2 re-emerged as the most predominant respiratory virus detected.

Conclusions/Significance

Influenza viruses were the most commonly detected viral organisms among patients with acute febrile respiratory illnesses presenting at two hospitals in Maracay, Venezuela. Pandemic H1N1 2009 influenza virus did not completely replace other circulating influenza viruses during its initial appearance in 2009. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 was the most common influenza virus in the post-pandemic phase.     

Improving the evidence base for decision making during a pandemic: the example of 2009 influenza A/H1N1

This article synthesizes and extends discussions held during an international meeting on "Surveillance for Decision Making: The Example of 2009 Pandemic Influenza A/H1N1," held at the Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics (CCDD), Harvard School of Public Health, on June 14 and 15, 2010. The meeting involved local, national, and global health authorities and academics representing 7 countries on 4 continents. We define the needs for surveillance in terms of the key decisions that must be made in response to a pandemic: how large a response to mount and which control measures to implement, for whom, and when. In doing so, we specify the quantitative evidence required to make informed decisions. We then describe the sources of surveillance and other population-based data that can presently--or in the future--form the basis for such evidence, and the interpretive tools needed to process raw surveillance data. We describe other inputs to decision making besides epidemiologic and surveillance data, and we conclude with key lessons of the 2009 pandemic for designing and planning surveillance in the future.     

The genesis of a pandemic influenza virus

Pandemic influenza viruses pose a significant threat to public health worldwide. In a recent Nature paper, Taubenberger et al. (2005) now report remarkable similarities between the polymerase genes of the influenza virus that caused the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic and those of avian influenza viruses. Meanwhile, Tumpey et al. (2005) reporting in Science show that the reconstructed 1918 Spanish influenza virus kills mice faster than any other influenza virus so far tested.     

Navigating the storm: report and recommendations from the Atlantic Storm exercise

Atlantic Storm was a tabletop exercise simulating a series of bioterrorism attacks on the transatlantic community. The exercise occurred on January 14, 2005, in Washington, DC, and was organized and convened by the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC, the Center for Transatlantic Relations of Johns Hopkins University, and the Transatlantic Biosecurity Network. Atlantic Storm portrayed a summit meeting of presidents, prime ministers, and other international leaders from both sides of the Atlantic Ocean in which they responded to a campaign of bioterrorist attacks in several countries. The summit principals, who were all current or former senior government leaders, were challenged to address issues such as attaining situational awareness in the wake of a bioattack, coping with scarcity of critical medical resources such as vaccine, deciding how to manage the movement of people across borders, and communicating with their publics. Atlantic Storm illustrated that much might be done in advance to minimize the illness and death, as well as the social, economic, and political disruption, that could be caused by an international epidemic, be it natural or the result of a bioterrorist attack. These lessons are especially timely given the growing concerns over the possibility of an avian influenza pandemic that would require an international response. However, international leaders cannot create the necessary response systems in the midst of a crisis. Medical, public health, and diplomatic response systems and critical medical resources (e.g., medicines and vaccines) must be in place before a bioattack occurs or a pandemic emerges.     

A cross-sectional study of pandemic influenza health literacy and the effect of a public health campaign

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: To ascertain the understanding of 2009 pandemic (H1N1) influenza and relevant infection control measures in an emergency department population and to assess the effectiveness of education campaigns in informing the public about the pandemic. METHODS: Questionnaires were administered to patients, visitors, non-clinical staff and volunteers. Data were collected on knowledge, preventative measures, information sources, attitudes to government and media reporting, perceived seriousness, behaviour change and intended compliance with future measures. Results were used to construct an overall knowledge score. RESULTS: There were 252 participants. Traditional forms of mass media (138 [55%]) remained the principal information source. Approximately 70% (176) accurately described mode of transmission and recommended precautions and 68% (175) reported behaviour change because of the pandemic. Gaps in knowledge included failure to identify certain high risk groups. Recall of government campaigns was significantly associated with a higher knowledge score. 60% (151) thought that authorities and media had exaggerated the threat; only 40% (101) would comply with recommended measures in a future pandemic. CONCLUSIONS: The knowledge regarding pandemic influenza was high in this population and positively affected by official campaigns. Pandemic planning should address knowledge gaps and the impression that authorities had exaggerated the public-health threat.     

The evolutionary emergence of pandemic influenza

Pandemic influenza remains a serious public health threat and the processes involved in the evolutionary emergence of pandemic influenza strains remain incompletely understood. Here, we develop a stochastic model for the evolutionary emergence of pandemic influenza, and use it to address three main questions. (i) What is the minimum annual number of avian influenza virus infections required in humans to explain the historical rate of pandemic emergence? (ii) Are such avian influenza infections in humans more likely to give rise to pandemic strains if they are driven by repeated cross-species introductions, or by low-level transmission of avian influenza viruses between humans? (iii) What are the most effective interventions for reducing the probability that an influenza strain with pandemic potential will evolve? Our results suggest that if evolutionary emergence of past pandemics has occurred primarily through viral reassortment in humans, then thousands of avian influenza virus infections in humans must have occurred each year for the past 250 years. Analyses also show that if there is epidemiologically significant variation among avian influenza virus genotypes, then avian virus outbreaks stemming from repeated cross-species transmission events result in a greater likelihood of a pandemic strain evolving than those caused by low-level transmission between humans. Finally, public health interventions aimed at reducing the duration of avian virus infections in humans give the greatest reduction in the probability that a pandemic strain will evolve.     

Dynamic patterns of circulating seasonal and pandemic A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza viruses from 2007-2010 in and around Delhi, India

Influenza surveillance was carried out in a subset of patients with influenza-like illness (ILI) presenting at an Employee Health Clinic (EHS) at All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), New Delhi (urban) and pediatric out patients department of civil hospital at Ballabhgarh (peri-urban), under the Comprehensive Rural Health Services Project (CRHSP) of AIIMS, in Delhi region from January 2007 to December 2010. Of the 3264 samples tested, 541 (17%) were positive for influenza viruses, of which 221 (41%) were pandemic Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, 168 (31%) were seasonal influenza A, and 152 (28%) were influenza B. While the Influenza viruses were detected year-round, their types/subtypes varied remarkably. While there was an equal distribution of seasonal A(H1N1) and influenza B in 2007, predominance of influenza B was observed in 2008. At the beginning of 2009, circulation of influenza A(H3N2) viruses was observed, followed later by emergence of Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 with co-circulation of influenza B viruses. Influenza B was dominant subtype in early 2010, with second wave of Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in August-September, 2010. With the exception of pandemic H1N1 emergence in 2009, the peaks of influenza activity coincided primarily with monsoon season, followed by minor peak in winter at both urban and rural sites. Age group analysis of influenza positivity revealed that the percent positivity of Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza virus was highest in >5–18 years age groups (OR 2.5; CI = 1.2–5.0; p = 0.009) when compared to seasonal influenza. Phylogenetic analysis of Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 from urban and rural sites did not reveal any major divergence from other Indian strains or viruses circulating worldwide. Continued surveillance globally will help define regional differences in influenza seasonality, as well as, to determine optimal periods to implement influenza vaccination programs among priority populations.     

Chronic alcohol consumption increases the severity of murine influenza virus infections

Respiratory infections with both seasonal as well as potential pandemic Influenza viruses represent a significant burden on human health. Furthermore, viruses such as Influenza are increasingly recognized as important etiologic agents in community acquired pneumonia. Within the U.S. alone, approximately 12.9 million people are heavy drinkers and chronic abuse of alcohol is known to increase the risk and severity of community acquired pneumonia. Given the lack of knowledge regarding Influenza disease in this population, we determined the effects of chronic alcohol consumption on Influenza virus infection. Herein, we report that mice exposed to chronic ethanol have sharp increases in morbidity, mortality, and pulmonary virus titers relative to controls. These increases in influenza severity correspond with inhibited pulmonary influenza-specific CD8 T cell responses. Further, chronic ethanol consumption results in an enhanced pulmonary lesion severity, similar to that recently described for pandemic influenzas. Together, our results suggest that chronic alcohol consumption may increase the risk for severe influenza virus infections by altering the pulmonary inflammatory environment and CD8 T cell response.     

Pandemic influenza: overview of vaccines and antiviral drugs

Pandemic influenza has become a high priority item for all public health authorities. An influenza pandemic is believed to be imminent, and scientists agree that it will be a matter of when, where, and what will be the causative agent. Recently, most attention has been directed to human cases of avian influenza caused by a H5N1 avian influenza virus. An effective vaccine will be needed to substantially reduce the impact of an influenza pandemic. Current influenza vaccine manufacturing technology is not adequate to support vaccine production in the event of an avian influenza outbreak, and it has now become clear that new innovative production technology is required. Antiviral drugs, on the other hand, can play a very important role in slowing the disease spread but are in short supply and resistance has been a major issue. Here, we provide an update on the status of pandemic vaccine development and antiviral drugs. Finally, we conclude with some proposed areas of focus in pandemic vaccine preparedness.     

Scientific barriers to developing vaccines against avian influenza viruses

The increasing number of reports of direct transmission of avian influenza viruses to humans underscores the need for control strategies to prevent an influenza pandemic. Vaccination is the key strategy to prevent severe illness and death from pandemic influenza. Despite long-term experience with vaccines against human influenza viruses, researchers face several additional challenges in developing human vaccines against avian influenza viruses. In this Review, we discuss the features of avian influenza viruses, the gaps in our understanding of infections caused by these viruses in humans and of the immune response to them that distinguishes them from human influenza viruses, and the current status of vaccine development.     

Virological surveillance of human influenza in Indonesia, October 2008-March 2010

Despite the high prevalence of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza A viruses in Indonesia, epidemiology information on seasonal human influenza is lacking. The present authors, therefore, conducted virologic surveillance in Surabaya, East Java from October 2008 to March 2010. Influenza viruses, including pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses, were isolated from 71 of 635 individuals tested. Seasonal influenza peaked in the rainy season. Compared with seasonal influenza viruses, pandemic 2009 viruses were isolated from younger patients with milder symptoms. Given the high prevalence of H5N1 infections in humans, continued influenza surveillance is essential for pandemic preparedness.     

Microarray for diagnostics of human pathogenic influenza A viruses subtypes

An oligonucleotide microchip was developed for diagnostics of human pathogenic Influenza A viruses subtypes. It contains discriminating probes for H1-, H2-, H3-, H5-, H7- and H9-subtypes of hemagglutinin and for N1-, N2-, and N7-subtypes of neuraminidase. The additional set of probes was used for M-gene of Influenza A viruses definition. Microchip was tested on samples pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza viruses, pandemic H1N1 swine influenza viruses and seasonal H1N1 and H3N2 influenza viruses. The microchip can be used for the analysis of both cultured strains and clinical specimens.     

A cell-based backup to speed up pandemic influenza vaccine production

Influenza vaccines are currently produced through egg-based methods, with one drawback being that this system is slow to respond to the surging global demand during an influenza pandemic. Alternative influenza vaccine production strategies, such as using a cell-based strategy, should be considered in pandemic situations.     

Explaining rapid reinfections in multiple-wave influenza outbreaks: Tristan da Cunha 1971 epidemic as a case study

Influenza usually spreads through the human population in multiple-wave outbreaks. Successive reinfection of individuals over a short time interval has been explicitly reported during past pandemics. However, the causes of rapid reinfection and the role of reinfection in driving multiple-wave outbreaks remain poorly understood. To investigate these issues, we focus on a two-wave influenza A/H3N2 epidemic that occurred on the remote island of Tristan da Cunha in 1971. Over 59 days, 273 (96%) of 284 islanders experienced at least one attack and 92 (32%) experienced two attacks. We formulate six mathematical models invoking a variety of antigenic and immunological reinfection mechanisms. Using a maximum-likelihood analysis to confront model predictions with the reported incidence time series, we demonstrate that only two mechanisms can be retained: some hosts with either a delayed or deficient humoral immune response to the primary influenza infection were reinfected by the same strain, thus initiating the second epidemic wave. Both mechanisms are supported by previous empirical studies and may arise from a combination of genetic and ecological causes. We advocate that a better understanding and account of heterogeneity in the human immune response are essential to analysis of multiple-wave influenza outbreaks and pandemic planning.     

Bioterrorism with zoonotic disease: public health preparedness lessons from a multiagency exercise

Responding to agricultural bioterrorism with pathogenic agents that are communicable from animals to humans (zoonotic diseases) requires effective coordination of many organizations, both inside and outside of government. Action must be simultaneously taken to address public health concerns, respond to the agricultural dimensions of the event, and carry out the necessary law enforcement investigation. As part of a project focused on examining public health preparedness in Georgia, an exercise was carried out in July 2005 examining the intentional introduction of avian influenza (H5N1) in commercial poultry operations. The attack scenario, which was written to occur during an already severe human influenza season, enabled exploration of a range of issues associated with public health preparedness for major disease outbreaks including pandemic influenza, coordination of a multiagency response operation at multiple levels of government, and effective management of interdisciplinary response activities. The exercise is described and broader policy lessons regarding preparedness planning are discussed.     

Comparative analyses of pandemic H1N1 and seasonal H1N1, H3N2, and influenza B infections depict distinct clinical pictures in ferrets

Influenza A and B infections are a worldwide health concern to both humans and animals. High genetic evolution rates of the influenza virus allow the constant emergence of new strains and cause illness variation. Since human influenza infections are often complicated by secondary factors such as age and underlying medical conditions, strain or subtype specific clinical features are difficult to assess. Here we infected ferrets with 13 currently circulating influenza strains (including strains of pandemic 2009 H1N1 [H1N1pdm] and seasonal A/H1N1, A/H3N2, and B viruses). The clinical parameters were measured daily for 14 days in stable environmental conditions to compare clinical characteristics. We found that H1N1pdm strains had a more severe physiological impact than all season strains where pandemic A/California/07/2009 was the most clinically pathogenic pandemic strain. The most serious illness among seasonal A/H1N1 and A/H3N2 groups was caused by A/Solomon Islands/03/2006 and A/Perth/16/2009, respectively. Among the 13 studied strains, B/Hubei-Wujiagang/158/2009 presented the mildest clinical symptoms. We have also discovered that disease severity (by clinical illness and histopathology) correlated with influenza specific antibody response but not viral replication in the upper respiratory tract. H1N1pdm induced the highest and most rapid antibody response followed by seasonal A/H3N2, seasonal A/H1N1 and seasonal influenza B (with B/Hubei-Wujiagang/158/2009 inducing the weakest response). Our study is the first to compare the clinical features of multiple circulating influenza strains in ferrets. These findings will help to characterize the clinical pictures of specific influenza strains as well as give insights into the development and administration of appropriate influenza therapeutics.