Social structure of primate interaction networks facilitates the emergence of cooperation

Animal cooperation has puzzled biologists for a long time as its existence seems to contravene the basic notion of evolutionary biology that natural selection favours ‘selfish’ genes that promote only their own well-being. Evolutionary game theory has shown that cooperators can prosper in populations of selfish individuals if they occur in clusters, interacting more frequently with each other than with the selfish. Here we show that social networks of primates possess the necessary social structure to promote the emergence of cooperation. By simulating evolutionary dynamics of cooperative behaviour on interaction networks of 70 primate groups, we found that for most groups network reciprocity augmented the fixation probability for cooperation. The variation in the strength of this effect can be partly explained by the groups’ community modularity—a network measure for the groups’ heterogeneity. Thus, given selective update and partner choice mechanisms, network reciprocity has the potential to explain socially learned forms of cooperation in primate societies.     

Reproductive bribing and policing as evolutionary mechanisms for the suppression of within-group selfishness

We show that a new, simple, and robust general mechanism for the social suppression of within-group selfishness follows from Hamilton's rule applied in a multilevel selection approach to asymmetrical, two-person groups: If it pays a group member to behave selfishly (i.e., increase its share of the group's reproduction, at the expense of group productivity), then its partner will virtually always be favored to provide a reproductive "bribe" sufficient to remove the incentive for the selfish behavior. The magnitude of the bribe will vary directly with the number of offspring (or other close kin) potentially gained by the selfish individual and inversely with both the relatedness r between the interactants and the loss in group productivity because of selfishness. This bribe principle greatly extends the scope for cooperation within groups. Reproductive bribing is more likely to be favored over social policing for dominants rather than subordinates and as intragroup relatedness increases. Finally, analysis of the difference between the group optimum for an individual's behavior and the individual's inclusive fitness optimum reveals a paradoxical feedback loop by which bribing and policing, while nullifying particular selfish acts, automatically widen the separation of individual and group optima for other behaviors (i.e., resolution of one conflict intensifies others).     

Evolution of cooperation: cooperation defeats defection in the cornfield model

"Cooperation" defines any behavior that enhances the fitness of a group (e.g. a community or species), but which, by its nature, can be exploited by selfish individuals, meaning, firstly, that selfish individuals derive an advantage from exploitation which is greater than the average advantage that accrues to unselfish individuals. Secondly, exploitation has no intrinsic fitness value except in the presence of the "cooperative behavior". The mathematics is described by the simple Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). It has previously been shown that koinophilia (the avoidance of sexual mates displaying unusual or atypical phenotypic features, such as mutations) stabilizes any inherited strategy in the simple or iterated PDG, meaning that it cannot be displaced by rare forms of alternative behavior which arise through mutation or occasional migration. In the present model equal numbers of cooperators and defectors (in the simple PDG) were randomly spread in a two-dimensional "cornfield" with uniformly distributed resources. Every individual was koinophilic, and interacted (sexually and in the PDG tournaments) only with individuals from within its immediate neighborhood. This model therefore tested whether cooperation can outcompete defection or selfishness in a straight, initially equally matched, evolutionary battle. The results show that in the absence of koinophilia cooperation was rapidly driven to extinction. With koinophilia there was a very rapid loss of cooperators in the first few generations, but thereafter cooperation slowly spread, ultimately eliminating defection completely. This result was critically dependent on sampling effects of neighborhoods. Small samples (resulting from low population densities or small neighborhood sizes) increase the probability that a chance neighborhood comes to consist predominantly of cooperators. A sexual preference for the most common phenotype in the neighborhood then makes that phenotype more common still. Once this occurs cooperation's spread becomes almost inevitable.     

Parent-offspring conflict that is not limited by degree of kinship

Models are presented showing that, under certain conditions, when multiple offspring are reared simultaneously, the magnitude of offspring selfishness is independent of offspring-offspring genetic relatedness. When the cost (θ) of the selfish offspring's behavior approaches zero, alleles causing offspring selfishness spread as long as $\text{c}\text{b}$ is positive.In general, simultaneous offspring are predicted to behave more selfishly than sequential offspring.Stable equilibria between alleles for selfish and non-selfish behavior are predicted for certain selfish alleles.     

Sociable Weavers Increase Cooperative Nest Construction after Suffering Aggression

The major transitions in evolution rely on the formation of stable groups that are composed of previously independent units, and the stability of these groups requires both cooperation and reduced conflict. Conflict over group resources may be common, as suggested by work in both cichlids and humans that has investigated how societies resolve conflict regarding investment in group resources, i.e. public goods. We investigated whether sociable weavers (Philetairus socius) use aggressive behaviors to modulate the cooperative behavior of group mates. We find that the individuals that build the communal thatch of the nest, i.e. the individuals most at risk of exploitation, are the most aggressive individuals. We show that individuals that invest in interior chamber maintenance, possibly a more selfish behavior, suffer relatively more aggression. After suffering aggression individuals significantly increase cooperative construction of the communal nest thatch. We show that cooperative individuals target aggression towards selfish individuals, and the individuals suffering aggression perform cooperative behaviors subsequent to suffering aggression. In addition to other evolutionary mechanisms, these results suggest that aggression, possibly via the pay-to-stay mechanism, is possibly being used to maintain a public good.     

Low relationship quality predicts scratch contagion during tense situations in orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus)

Primates show various forms of behavioral contagion that are stronger between kin and friends. As a result, behavioral contagion is thought to promote group coordination, social cohesion, and possibly state matching. Aside from contagious yawning, little is known about the contagious effect of other behaviors. Scratching is commonly observed during arousal and as such may play a role within group dynamics. While the Bornean orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus) is commonly considered the least social great ape, orangutans do engage in social interactions. Therefore, their social organization makes them a suitable case for studying the social function of behavioral contagion. Through behavioral observations of captive orangutans, we recorded all yawn and scratch events together with the corresponding behavior of all bystander group-members. As yawning was rarely observed, no conclusions could be drawn regarding this behavior. Scratching was contagious and occurred within 90 s after the triggering scratch. Specifically, orangutans showed increased scratch contagion when they had seen a weakly bonded individual scratch during tense contexts. When the orangutan had not seen the triggering scratch, the contagiousness of scratching was not affected by context or relationship quality. Our results indicate that behavioral contagion is not simply higher between individuals with stronger social relationships, but that the contagiousness of behaviors may vary based on the context and on social factors. We discuss these findings in light of an adaptive function that may reduce aggression.     

Dog’s Discrimination of Human Selfish and Generous Attitudes: The Role of Individual Recognition,Experience, and Experimenters’ Gender

Discrimination of and memory for others’ generous and selfish behaviors could be adaptive abilities in social animals. Dogs have seemingly expressed such skills in both direct and indirect interactions with humans. However, recent studies suggest that their capacity may rely on cues other than people’s individual characteristics, such as the place where the person stands. Thus, the conditions under which dogs recognize individual humans when solving cooperative tasks still remains unclear. With the aim of contributing to this problem, we made dogs interact with two human experimenters, one generous (pointed towards the food, gave ostensive cues, and allowed the dog to eat it) and the other selfish (pointed towards the food, but ate it before the dog could have it). Then subjects could choose between them (studies 1-3). In study 1, dogs took several training trials to learn the discrimination between the generous and the selfish experimenters when both were of the same gender. In study 2, the discrimination was learned faster when the experimenters were of different gender as evidenced both by dogs’ latencies to approach the bowl in training trials as well as by their choices in preference tests. Nevertheless, dogs did not get confused by gender when the experimenters were changed in between the training and the choice phase in study 3. We conclude that dogs spontaneously used human gender as a cue to discriminate between more and less cooperative experimenters. They also relied on some other personal feature which let them avoid being confused by gender when demonstrators were changed. We discuss these results in terms of dogs’ ability to recognize individuals and the potential advantage of this skill for their lives in human environments.     

Dynamics of Complex Systems Built as Coupled Physical,Communication and Decision Layers

This paper proposes a simple model to capture the complexity of multilayer systems where their constituent layers affect, and are affected by, each other. The physical layer is a circuit composed by a power source and resistors in parallel. Every individual agent aims at maximizing its own delivered power by adding, removing or keeping the resistors it has; the delivered power is in turn a non-linear function that depends on the other agents’ behavior, its own internal state, its global state perception, the information received from its neighbors via the communication network and a randomized selfishness. We develop an agent-based simulation to analyze the effects of number of agents (system size), communication network topology, communication errors and the minimum power gain that triggers a behavioral change on the system dynamic. Our results show that a wave-like behavior at macro-level (caused by individual changes in the decision layer) can only emerge for a specific system size. The ratio between cooperators and defectors depends on the minimum gain assumed—lower minimal gains lead to less cooperation, and vice-versa. Different communication network topologies imply different levels of power utilization and fairness at the physical layer, and a certain level of error in the communication layer induces more cooperation.     

Observing others give & take: A computational account of bystanders’ feelings and actions

Social interactions influence people’s feelings and behavior. Here, we propose that a person’s well-being is influenced not only by interactions they experience themselves, but also by those they observe. In particular, we test and quantify the influence of observed selfishness and observed inequality on a bystanders’ feelings and non-costly punishment decisions. We developed computational models that relate others’ (un)selfish acts to observers’ emotional reactions and punishment decisions. These characterize the rules by which others’ interactions are transformed into bystanders’ reactions, and successfully predict those reactions in out-of-sample participants. The models highlight the impact of two social values—‘selfishness aversion’ and ‘inequality aversion’. As for the latter we find that even small violations from perfect equality have a disproportionately large impact on feelings and punishment. In this age of internet and social media we constantly observe others’ online interactions, in addition to in-person interactions. Quantifying the consequences of such observations is important for predicting their impact on society.     

Coevolution of Quantum and Classical Strategies on Evolving Random Networks

We study the coevolution of quantum and classical strategies on weighted and directed random networks in the realm of the prisoner’s dilemma game. During the evolution, agents can break and rewire their links with the aim of maximizing payoffs, and they can also adjust the weights to indicate preferences, either positive or negative, towards their neighbors. The network structure itself is thus also subject to evolution. Importantly, the directionality of links does not affect the accumulation of payoffs nor the strategy transfers, but serves only to designate the owner of each particular link and with it the right to adjust the link as needed. We show that quantum strategies outperform classical strategies, and that the critical temptation to defect at which cooperative behavior can be maintained rises, if the network structure is updated frequently. Punishing neighbors by reducing the weights of their links also plays an important role in maintaining cooperation under adverse conditions. We find that the self-organization of the initially random network structure, driven by the evolutionary competition between quantum and classical strategies, leads to the spontaneous emergence of small average path length and a large clustering coefficient.     

Chimpanzees Show a Developmental Increase in Susceptibility to Contagious Yawning: A Test of the Effect of Ontogeny and Emotional Closeness on Yawn Contagion

Contagious yawning has been reported for humans, dogs and several non-human primate species, and associated with empathy in humans and other primates. Still, the function, development and underlying mechanisms of contagious yawning remain unclear. Humans and dogs show a developmental increase in susceptibility to yawn contagion, with children showing an increase around the age of four, when also empathy-related behaviours and accurate identification of others’ emotions begin to clearly evince. Explicit tests of yawn contagion in non-human apes have only involved adult individuals and examined the existence of conspecific yawn contagion. Here we report the first study of heterospecific contagious yawning in primates, and the ontogeny of susceptibility thereto in chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes verus. We examined whether emotional closeness, defined as attachment history with the yawning model, affected the strength of contagion, and compared the contagiousness of yawning to nose-wiping. Thirty-three orphaned chimpanzees observed an unfamiliar and familiar human (their surrogate human mother) yawn, gape and nose-wipe. Yawning, but not nose-wiping, was contagious for juvenile chimpanzees, while infants were immune to contagion. Like humans and dogs, chimpanzees are subject to a developmental trend in susceptibility to contagious yawning, and respond to heterospecific yawn stimuli. Emotional closeness with the model did not affect contagion. The familiarity-biased social modulatory effect on yawn contagion previously found among some adult primates, seem to only emerge later in development, or be limited to interactions with conspecifics. The influence of the ‘chameleon effect’, targeted vs. generalised empathy, perspective-taking and visual attention on contagious yawning is discussed.     

Cooperation and contagion in web-based, networked public goods experiments

A longstanding idea in the literature on human cooperation is that cooperation should be reinforced when conditional cooperators are more likely to interact. In the context of social networks, this idea implies that cooperation should fare better in highly clustered networks such as cliques than in networks with low clustering such as random networks. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a series of web-based experiments, in which 24 individuals played a local public goods game arranged on one of five network topologies that varied between disconnected cliques and a random regular graph. In contrast with previous theoretical work, we found that network topology had no significant effect on average contributions. This result implies either that individuals are not conditional cooperators, or else that cooperation does not benefit from positive reinforcement between connected neighbors. We then tested both of these possibilities in two subsequent series of experiments in which artificial seed players were introduced, making either full or zero contributions. First, we found that although players did generally behave like conditional cooperators, they were as likely to decrease their contributions in response to low contributing neighbors as they were to increase their contributions in response to high contributing neighbors. Second, we found that positive effects of cooperation were contagious only to direct neighbors in the network. In total we report on 113 human subjects experiments, highlighting the speed, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness of web-based experiments over those conducted in physical labs.     

Relational Diversity Promotes Cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma Games

Relational diversity can be characterized by heterogeneous distributions of tie strengths in social networks and this diversity is present not only among humans, but throughout the animal world. We account for this observation by analyzing two network datasets from Facebook. We measure the strength of a tie by calculating the extent of overlap of friends between the two individuals. Based on the previous findings in human experiments, we argue that it is very unlikely that players will allocate their investments equally to their neighbors. There is a tendency that players prefer to donate more to their intimate friends. We find that if players preferentially allocate their investments to their good friends, cooperation will be promoted in PDG. We proved that the facilitation of the cooperative strategy relies mostly on the cooperative allies between best friends, resulting in the formation of cooperative clusters which are able to prevail against the defectors even when there is a large cost to cooperate. Moreover, we discover that the effect of relational diversity cannot be analyzed by adopting classical complex networks models, because neither of the artificial networks is able to produce networks with diverse distributions of tie strengths. It is of vital importance to introduce real social networks to study the influence of diverse relations especially when it comes to humans. This research proposes a brand new perspective to understand the influence of social relations on the emergence of cooperation in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games.     

Natural selection of cooperation and degree hierarchy in heterogeneous populations

One of the current theoretical challenges to the explanatory powers of Evolutionary Theory is the understanding of the observed evolutionary survival of cooperative behavior when selfish actions provide higher fitness (reproductive success). In unstructured populations natural selection drives cooperation to extinction. However, when individuals are allowed to interact only with their neighbors, specified by a graph of social contacts, cooperation-promoting mechanisms (known as lattice reciprocity) offer to cooperation the opportunity of evolutionary survival. Recent numerical works on the evolution of Prisoner's Dilemma in complex network settings have revealed that graph heterogeneity dramatically enhances the lattice reciprocity. Here we show that in highly heterogeneous populations, under the graph analog of replicator dynamics, the fixation of a strategy in the whole population is in general an impossible event, for there is an asymptotic partition of the population in three subsets, two in which fixation of cooperation or defection has been reached and a third one which experiences cycles of invasion by the competing strategies. We show how the dynamical partition correlates with connectivity classes and characterize the temporal fluctuations of the fluctuating set, unveiling the mechanisms stabilizing cooperation in macroscopic scale-free structures.     

Demography and the tragedy of the commons

Individual success in group‐structured populations has two components. First, an individual gains by outcompeting its neighbours for local resources. Second, an individual's share of group success must be weighted by the total productivity of the group. The essence of sociality arises from the tension between selfish gains against neighbours and the associated loss that selfishness imposes by degrading the efficiency of the group. Without some force to modulate selfishness, the natural tendencies of self interest typically degrade group performance to the detriment of all. This is the tragedy of the commons. Kin selection provides the most widely discussed way in which the tragedy is overcome in biology. Kin selection arises from behavioural associations within groups caused either by genetical kinship or by other processes that correlate the behaviours of group members. Here, I emphasize demography as a second factor that may also modulate the tragedy of the commons and favour cooperative integration of groups. Each act of selfishness or cooperation in a group often influences group survival and fecundity over many subsequent generations. For example, a cooperative act early in the growth cycle of a colony may enhance the future size and survival of the colony. This time‐dependent benefit can greatly increase the degree of cooperation favoured by natural selection, providing another way in which to overcome the tragedy of the commons and enhance the integration of group behaviour. I conclude that analyses of sociality must account for both the behavioural associations of kin selection theory and the demographic consequences of life history theory.     

Distinctions among reciprocal altruism,kin selection,and cooperation and a model for the initial evolution of beneficent behavior

Reciprocal altruism is usually regarded as distinct from kin selection. However, because reciprocators are likely to establish long-term relations and to deliver most of their aid to other individuals genetically predisposed to reciprocation, most acts of reciprocal altruism should involve indirect increments to inclusive fitness, at least as regards alleles for reciprocation. Thus, as usually defined, reciprocal altruism is not clearly distinct from kin selection because both involve indirect increments to inclusive fitness. We propose a new definition for reciprocal altruism that makes the phenomenon distinct from kin selection and allows for reciprocation between nonrelatives in which current costs exceed future benefits returned to the reciprocal altruist. Cooperation and reciprocal altruism are often considered synonymous or different only in the timing of donating and receiving aid. We show, however, that there are other critical differences between reciprocal altruism and other forms of cooperation, most importantly, the latter often involve no clearly identifiable aid. We propose a four-category system to encompass the range of cooperative and beneficent behaviors that occur in nature (reciprocal altruism, pseudoreciprocity, simultaneous cooperation and by-product beneficence). Reciprocal altruism must involve aid that is returned to an original donor as a result of behavior that has a net cost to an original recipient. Our simplest category of cooperative/beneficent behavior, “by-product beneficence,” occurs when a selfish act also benefits another individual and requires no prior or subsequent interactions between the individuals involved. By-product beneficence may be the primitive state from which more complicated types of cooperative/beneficent behavior evolved. We show via simple models that by-product beneficence can allow for the initial increase of helping behavior in a completely unstructured population although the individuals showing such behavior pay all the costs while sharing the benefits with other individuals. Previous models that attempted to explain the initial increase of cooperative/beneficent behavior were much more complex and were based on the prisoner's dilemma, which does not accurately reflect most forms of cooperation and beneficence that occur in nature.     

Coveting thy neighbors fitness as a means to resolve social dilemmas

In spatial evolutionary games the fitness of each individual is traditionally determined by the payoffs it obtains upon playing the game with its neighbors. Since defection yields the highest individual benefits, the outlook for cooperators is gloomy. While network reciprocity promotes collaborative efforts, chances of averting the impending social decline are slim if the temptation to defect is strong. It is, therefore, of interest to identify viable mechanisms that provide additional support for the evolution of cooperation. Inspired by the fact that the environment may be just as important as inheritance for individual development, we introduce a simple switch that allows a player to either keep its original payoff or use the average payoff of all its neighbors. Depending on which payoff is higher, the influence of either option can be tuned by means of a single parameter. We show that, in general, taking into account the environment promotes cooperation. Yet coveting the fitness of one's neighbors too strongly is not optimal. In fact, cooperation thrives best only if the influence of payoffs obtained in the traditional way is equal to that of the average payoff of the neighborhood. We present results for the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game, for different levels of uncertainty governing the strategy adoption process, and for different neighborhood sizes. Our approach outlines a viable route to increased levels of cooperative behavior in structured populations, but one that requires a thoughtful implementation.     

Behavior pattern (innate action) of individuals in fish schools generating efficient collective evasion from predation

The schooling of fishes is one typical animal social behavior. One primary function of fish school is to protect members when attacked by predators. One main way that the school reduces the predator's chance of making a successful kill is to confuse the predator as it makes its strike. This may be accomplished by collective evasion behaviors organized through integration of motions of individual fish made based on their innate actions (behavior patterns). In order to investigate what kind of behavior pattern of individuals can generate the efficient collective evasion of a school, we present a model of evasion behavior pattern which consists of three component behavior patterns, schooling, cooperative escape, and selfish escape behavior patterns and the rule for choice of one among them with proper timing. Each fish determines its movement direction taking into account simultaneously three kinds of elemental motions, mimicking its neighbors, avoiding collisions with its nearest neighbors, and escaping from an approaching predator. The weights of three elemental motions are changed depending on which component behavior pattern the fish carries out. The values of the weights for three component behavior patterns can be definitively determined under the condition that the collective evasion of the school becomes the most efficient, that is, the probability that any member is eaten by the predator becomes minimum.     

Reinforcement Learning Explains Conditional Cooperation and Its Moody Cousin

Direct reciprocity, or repeated interaction, is a main mechanism to sustain cooperation under social dilemmas involving two individuals. For larger groups and networks, which are probably more relevant to understanding and engineering our society, experiments employing repeated multiplayer social dilemma games have suggested that humans often show conditional cooperation behavior and its moody variant. Mechanisms underlying these behaviors largely remain unclear. Here we provide a proximate account for this behavior by showing that individuals adopting a type of reinforcement learning, called aspiration learning, phenomenologically behave as conditional cooperator. By definition, individuals are satisfied if and only if the obtained payoff is larger than a fixed aspiration level. They reinforce actions that have resulted in satisfactory outcomes and anti-reinforce those yielding unsatisfactory outcomes. The results obtained in the present study are general in that they explain extant experimental results obtained for both so-called moody and non-moody conditional cooperation, prisoner’s dilemma and public goods games, and well-mixed groups and networks. Different from the previous theory, individuals are assumed to have no access to information about what other individuals are doing such that they cannot explicitly use conditional cooperation rules. In this sense, myopic aspiration learning in which the unconditional propensity of cooperation is modulated in every discrete time step explains conditional behavior of humans. Aspiration learners showing (moody) conditional cooperation obeyed a noisy GRIM-like strategy. This is different from the Pavlov, a reinforcement learning strategy promoting mutual cooperation in two-player situations.