The neural systems that mediate human perceptual decision making

Perceptual decision making is the act of choosing one option or course of action from a set of alternatives on the basis of available sensory evidence. Thus, when we make such decisions, sensory information must be interpreted and translated into behaviour. Neurophysiological work in monkeys performing sensory discriminations, combined with computational modelling, has paved the way for neuroimaging studies that are aimed at understanding decision-related processes in the human brain. Here we review findings from human neuroimaging studies in conjunction with data analysis methods that can directly link decisions and signals in the human brain on a trial-by-trial basis. This leads to a new view about the neural basis of human perceptual decision-making processes.     

Paradoxical Interaction between Ocular Activity,Perception, and Decision Confidence at the Threshold of Vision

In humans and some other species perceptual decision-making is complemented by the ability to make confidence judgements about the certainty of sensory evidence. While both forms of decision process have been studied empirically, the precise relationship between them remains poorly understood. We performed an experiment that combined a perceptual decision-making task (identifying the category of a faint visual stimulus) with a confidence-judgement task (wagering on the accuracy of each perceptual decision). The visual stimulation paradigm required steady fixation, so we used eye-tracking to control for stray eye movements. Our data analyses revealed an unexpected and counterintuitive interaction between the steadiness of fixation (prior to and during stimulation), perceptual decision making, and post-decision wagering: greater variability in gaze direction during fixation was associated with significantly increased visual-perceptual sensitivity, but significantly decreased reliability of confidence judgements. The latter effect could not be explained by a simple change in overall confidence (i.e. a criterion artifact), but rather was tied to a change in the degree to which high wagers predicted correct decisions (i.e. the sensitivity of the confidence judgement). We found no evidence of a differential change in pupil diameter that could account for the effect and thus our results are consistent with fixational eye movements being the relevant covariate. However, we note that small changes in pupil diameter can sometimes cause artefactual fluctuations in measured gaze direction and this possibility could not be fully ruled out. In either case, our results suggest that perceptual decisions and confidence judgements can be processed independently and point toward a new avenue of research into the relationship between them.     

Involving the motor system in decision making

The control of behaviour is usually understood in terms of three distinct components: sensory processing, decision making and movement control. Recently, this view has been questioned on the basis of physiological and behavioural data, blurring the distinction between these three stages. This raises the question to what extent the motor system itself can contribute to the interpretation of behavioural situations. To investigate this question we use a neural model of sensory motor integration applied to a behaving mobile robot performing a navigation task. We show that the population response of the motor system provides a substrate for the categorization of behavioural situations. This categorization allows for the assessment of the complexity of a behavioural situation and regulates whether higher-level decision making is required to resolve behavioural conflicts. Our model lends credence to an emerging reconceptualization of behavioural control where the motor system can be considered as part of a high-level perceptual system.     

Sensorimotor Learning Biases Choice Behavior: A Learning Neural Field Model for Decision Making

According to a prominent view of sensorimotor processing in primates, selection and specification of possible actions are not sequential operations. Rather, a decision for an action emerges from competition between different movement plans, which are specified and selected in parallel. For action choices which are based on ambiguous sensory input, the frontoparietal sensorimotor areas are considered part of the common underlying neural substrate for selection and specification of action. These areas have been shown capable of encoding alternative spatial motor goals in parallel during movement planning, and show signatures of competitive value-based selection among these goals. Since the same network is also involved in learning sensorimotor associations, competitive action selection (decision making) should not only be driven by the sensory evidence and expected reward in favor of either action, but also by the subject''s learning history of different sensorimotor associations. Previous computational models of competitive neural decision making used predefined associations between sensory input and corresponding motor output. Such hard-wiring does not allow modeling of how decisions are influenced by sensorimotor learning or by changing reward contingencies. We present a dynamic neural field model which learns arbitrary sensorimotor associations with a reward-driven Hebbian learning algorithm. We show that the model accurately simulates the dynamics of action selection with different reward contingencies, as observed in monkey cortical recordings, and that it correctly predicted the pattern of choice errors in a control experiment. With our adaptive model we demonstrate how network plasticity, which is required for association learning and adaptation to new reward contingencies, can influence choice behavior. The field model provides an integrated and dynamic account for the operations of sensorimotor integration, working memory and action selection required for decision making in ambiguous choice situations.     

Human Decision Making Based on Variations in Internal Noise: An EEG Study

Perceptual decision making is prone to errors, especially near threshold. Physiological, behavioural and modeling studies suggest this is due to the intrinsic or ‘internal’ noise in neural systems, which derives from a mixture of bottom-up and top-down sources. We show here that internal noise can form the basis of perceptual decision making when the external signal lacks the required information for the decision. We recorded electroencephalographic (EEG) activity in listeners attempting to discriminate between identical tones. Since the acoustic signal was constant, bottom-up and top-down influences were under experimental control. We found that early cortical responses to the identical stimuli varied in global field power and topography according to the perceptual decision made, and activity preceding stimulus presentation could predict both later activity and behavioural decision. Our results suggest that activity variations induced by internal noise of both sensory and cognitive origin are sufficient to drive discrimination judgments.     

Probabilistic decision making by slow reverberation in cortical circuits

Recent physiological studies of alert primates have revealed cortical neural correlates of key steps in a perceptual decision-making process. To elucidate synaptic mechanisms of decision making, I investigated a biophysically realistic cortical network model for a visual discrimination experiment. In the model, slow recurrent excitation and feedback inhibition produce attractor dynamics that amplify the difference between conflicting inputs and generates a binary choice. The model is shown to account for salient characteristics of the observed decision-correlated neural activity, as well as the animal's psychometric function and reaction times. These results suggest that recurrent excitation mediated by NMDA receptors provides a candidate cellular mechanism for the slow time integration of sensory stimuli and the formation of categorical choices in a decision-making neocortical network.     

Encoding of Naturalistic Stimuli by Local Field Potential Spectra in Networks of Excitatory and Inhibitory Neurons

Recordings of local field potentials (LFPs) reveal that the sensory cortex displays rhythmic activity and fluctuations over a wide range of frequencies and amplitudes. Yet, the role of this kind of activity in encoding sensory information remains largely unknown. To understand the rules of translation between the structure of sensory stimuli and the fluctuations of cortical responses, we simulated a sparsely connected network of excitatory and inhibitory neurons modeling a local cortical population, and we determined how the LFPs generated by the network encode information about input stimuli. We first considered simple static and periodic stimuli and then naturalistic input stimuli based on electrophysiological recordings from the thalamus of anesthetized monkeys watching natural movie scenes. We found that the simulated network produced stimulus-related LFP changes that were in striking agreement with the LFPs obtained from the primary visual cortex. Moreover, our results demonstrate that the network encoded static input spike rates into gamma-range oscillations generated by inhibitory–excitatory neural interactions and encoded slow dynamic features of the input into slow LFP fluctuations mediated by stimulus–neural interactions. The model cortical network processed dynamic stimuli with naturalistic temporal structure by using low and high response frequencies as independent communication channels, again in agreement with recent reports from visual cortex responses to naturalistic movies. One potential function of this frequency decomposition into independent information channels operated by the cortical network may be that of enhancing the capacity of the cortical column to encode our complex sensory environment.     

Variability of perceptual multistability: from brain state to individual trait

Few phenomena are as suitable as perceptual multistability to demonstrate that the brain constructively interprets sensory input. Several studies have outlined the neural circuitry involved in generating perceptual inference but only more recently has the individual variability of this inferential process been appreciated. Studies of the interaction of evoked and ongoing neural activity show that inference itself is not merely a stimulus-triggered process but is related to the context of the current brain state into which the processing of external stimulation is embedded. As brain states fluctuate, so does perception of a given sensory input. In multistability, perceptual fluctuation rates are consistent for a given individual but vary considerably between individuals. There has been some evidence for a genetic basis for these individual differences and recent morphometric studies of parietal lobe regions have identified neuroanatomical substrates for individual variability in spontaneous switching behaviour. Moreover, disrupting the function of these latter regions by transcranial magnetic stimulation yields systematic interference effects on switching behaviour, further arguing for a causal role of these regions in perceptual inference. Together, these studies have advanced our understanding of the biological mechanisms by which the brain constructs the contents of consciousness from sensory input.     

Causal role of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in human perceptual decision making

The way that we interpret and interact with the world entails making decisions on the basis of available sensory evidence. Recent primate neurophysiology [1-6], human neuroimaging [7-13], and modeling experiments [14-19] have demonstrated that perceptual decisions are based on an integrative process in which sensory evidence accumulates over time until an internal decision bound is reached. Here we used repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to provide causal support for the role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in this integrative process. Specifically, we used a speeded perceptual categorization task designed to induce a time-dependent accumulation of sensory evidence through rapidly updating dynamic stimuli and found that disruption of the left DLPFC with low-frequency rTMS reduced accuracy and increased response times relative to a sham condition. Importantly, using the drift-diffusion model, we show that these behavioral effects correspond to a decrease in drift rate, a parameter describing the rate and thereby the efficiency of the sensory evidence integration in the decision process. These results provide causal evidence linking the DLPFC to the mechanism of evidence accumulation during perceptual decision making.     

大脑中的抉择神经元

近年来神经科学领域的进展表明,大脑中不仅存在如位置神经元之类的特异性编码感觉信息的神经元,也存在能够特异性地反映动物思考过程的神经元。在一系列以侧内顶叶(LIP)为目标的猕猴电生理实验中,人们发现LIP神经元的动作电位发放率可以反映抉择思考的过程。抉择的研究为我们打开了一个研究大脑高级认知功能的窗口。抉择神经元的发现表明了大脑的高级认知功能是基于与感觉信息处理类似的神经计算原理。     

Temporal integration of olfactory perceptual evidence in human orbitofrontal cortex

Given a noisy sensory world, the nervous system integrates perceptual evidence over time to optimize decision-making. Neurophysiological accumulation of sensory information is well-documented in the animal visual system, but how such mechanisms are instantiated in the human brain remains poorly understood. Here we combined psychophysical techniques, drift-diffusion modeling, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to establish that odor evidence integration in the human olfactory system enhances discrimination on a two-alternative forced-choice task. Model-based measures of fMRI brain activity highlighted a ramp-like increase in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) that peaked at the time of decision, conforming to predictions derived from an integrator model. Combined behavioral and fMRI data further suggest that decision bounds are not fixed but collapse over time, facilitating choice behavior in the presence of low-quality evidence. These data highlight a key role for the orbitofrontal cortex in resolving sensory uncertainty and provide substantiation for accumulator models of human perceptual decision-making.     

Predictive Coding or Evidence Accumulation? False Inference and Neuronal Fluctuations

Perceptual decisions can be made when sensory input affords an inference about what generated that input. Here, we report findings from two independent perceptual experiments conducted during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with a sparse event-related design. The first experiment, in the visual modality, involved forced-choice discrimination of coherence in random dot kinematograms that contained either subliminal or periliminal motion coherence. The second experiment, in the auditory domain, involved free response detection of (non-semantic) near-threshold acoustic stimuli. We analysed fluctuations in ongoing neural activity, as indexed by fMRI, and found that neuronal activity in sensory areas (extrastriate visual and early auditory cortex) biases perceptual decisions towards correct inference and not towards a specific percept. Hits (detection of near-threshold stimuli) were preceded by significantly higher activity than both misses of identical stimuli or false alarms, in which percepts arise in the absence of appropriate sensory input. In accord with predictive coding models and the free-energy principle, this observation suggests that cortical activity in sensory brain areas reflects the precision of prediction errors and not just the sensory evidence or prediction errors per se.     

A decision-making model based on a spiking neural circuit and synaptic plasticity

To adapt to the environment and survive, most animals can control their behaviors by making decisions. The process of decision-making and responding according to cues in the environment is stable, sustainable, and learnable. Understanding how behaviors are regulated by neural circuits and the encoding and decoding mechanisms from stimuli to responses are important goals in neuroscience. From results observed in Drosophila experiments, the underlying decision-making process is discussed, and a neural circuit that implements a two-choice decision-making model is proposed to explain and reproduce the observations. Compared with previous two-choice decision making models, our model uses synaptic plasticity to explain changes in decision output given the same environment. Moreover, biological meanings of parameters of our decision-making model are discussed. In this paper, we explain at the micro-level (i.e., neurons and synapses) how observable decision-making behavior at the macro-level is acquired and achieved.     

On the Number of Neurons and Time Scale of Integration Underlying the Formation of Percepts in the Brain

All of our perceptual experiences arise from the activity of neural populations. Here we study the formation of such percepts under the assumption that they emerge from a linear readout, i.e., a weighted sum of the neurons’ firing rates. We show that this assumption constrains the trial-to-trial covariance structure of neural activities and animal behavior. The predicted covariance structure depends on the readout parameters, and in particular on the temporal integration window w and typical number of neurons K used in the formation of the percept. Using these predictions, we show how to infer the readout parameters from joint measurements of a subject’s behavior and neural activities. We consider three such scenarios: (1) recordings from the complete neural population, (2) recordings of neuronal sub-ensembles whose size exceeds K, and (3) recordings of neuronal sub-ensembles that are smaller than K. Using theoretical arguments and artificially generated data, we show that the first two scenarios allow us to recover the typical spatial and temporal scales of the readout. In the third scenario, we show that the readout parameters can only be recovered by making additional assumptions about the structure of the full population activity. Our work provides the first thorough interpretation of (feed-forward) percept formation from a population of sensory neurons. We discuss applications to experimental recordings in classic sensory decision-making tasks, which will hopefully provide new insights into the nature of perceptual integration.     

Bistable Perception Modeled as Competing Stochastic Integrations at Two Levels

We propose a novel explanation for bistable perception, namely, the collective dynamics of multiple neural populations that are individually meta-stable. Distributed representations of sensory input and of perceptual state build gradually through noise-driven transitions in these populations, until the competition between alternative representations is resolved by a threshold mechanism. The perpetual repetition of this collective race to threshold renders perception bistable. This collective dynamics – which is largely uncoupled from the time-scales that govern individual populations or neurons – explains many hitherto puzzling observations about bistable perception: the wide range of mean alternation rates exhibited by bistable phenomena, the consistent variability of successive dominance periods, and the stabilizing effect of past perceptual states. It also predicts a number of previously unsuspected relationships between observable quantities characterizing bistable perception. We conclude that bistable perception reflects the collective nature of neural decision making rather than properties of individual populations or neurons.     

Cortical Components of Reaction-Time during Perceptual Decisions in Humans

The mechanisms of perceptual decision-making are frequently studied through measurements of reaction time (RT). Classical sequential-sampling models (SSMs) of decision-making posit RT as the sum of non-overlapping sensory, evidence accumulation, and motor delays. In contrast, recent empirical evidence hints at a continuous-flow paradigm in which multiple motor plans evolve concurrently with the accumulation of sensory evidence. Here we employ a trial-to-trial reliability-based component analysis of encephalographic data acquired during a random-dot motion task to directly image continuous flow in the human brain. We identify three topographically distinct neural sources whose dynamics exhibit contemporaneous ramping to time-of-response, with the rate and duration of ramping discriminating fast and slow responses. Only one of these sources, a parietal component, exhibits dependence on strength-of-evidence. The remaining two components possess topographies consistent with origins in the motor system, and their covariation with RT overlaps in time with the evidence accumulation process. After fitting the behavioral data to a popular SSM, we find that the model decision variable is more closely matched to the combined activity of the three components than to their individual activity. Our results emphasize the role of motor variability in shaping RT distributions on perceptual decision tasks, suggesting that physiologically plausible computational accounts of perceptual decision-making must model the concurrent nature of evidence accumulation and motor planning.     

Decision, sensation, and habituation: a multi-layer dynamic field model for Inhibition of Return

Inhibition of Return (IOR) is one of the most consistent and widely studied effects in experimental psychology. The effect refers to a delayed response to visual stimuli in a cued location after initial priming at that location. This article presents a dynamic field model for IOR. The model describes the evolution of three coupled activation fields. The decision field, inspired by the intermediate layer of the superior colliculus, receives endogenous input and input from a sensory field. The sensory field, inspired by earlier sensory processing, receives exogenous input. Habituation of the sensory field is implemented by a reciprocal coupling with a third field, the habituation field. The model generates IOR because, due to the habituation of the sensory field, the decision field receives a reduced target-induced input in cue-target-compatible situations. The model is consistent with single-unit recordings of neurons of monkeys that perform IOR tasks. Such recordings have revealed that IOR phenomena parallel the activity of neurons in the intermediate layer of the superior colliculus and that neurons in this layer receive reduced input in cue-target-compatible situations. The model is also consistent with behavioral data concerning temporal expectancy effects. In a discussion, the multi-layer dynamic field account of IOR is used to illustrate the broader view that behavior consists of a tuning of the organism to the environment that continuously and concurrently takes place at different spatiotemporal scales.     

Accumulation of continuously time-varying sensory evidence constrains neural and behavioral responses in human collision threat detection

Evidence accumulation models provide a dominant account of human decision-making, and have been particularly successful at explaining behavioral and neural data in laboratory paradigms using abstract, stationary stimuli. It has been proposed, but with limited in-depth investigation so far, that similar decision-making mechanisms are involved in tasks of a more embodied nature, such as movement and locomotion, by directly accumulating externally measurable sensory quantities of which the precise, typically continuously time-varying, magnitudes are important for successful behavior. Here, we leverage collision threat detection as a task which is ecologically relevant in this sense, but which can also be rigorously observed and modelled in a laboratory setting. Conventionally, it is assumed that humans are limited in this task by a perceptual threshold on the optical expansion rate–the visual looming–of the obstacle. Using concurrent recordings of EEG and behavioral responses, we disprove this conventional assumption, and instead provide strong evidence that humans detect collision threats by accumulating the continuously time-varying visual looming signal. Generalizing existing accumulator model assumptions from stationary to time-varying sensory evidence, we show that our model accounts for previously unexplained empirical observations and full distributions of detection response. We replicate a pre-response centroparietal positivity (CPP) in scalp potentials, which has previously been found to correlate with accumulated decision evidence. In contrast with these existing findings, we show that our model is capable of predicting the onset of the CPP signature rather than its buildup, suggesting that neural evidence accumulation is implemented differently, possibly in distinct brain regions, in collision detection compared to previously studied paradigms.     

Neural processing as causal inference

Perception is about making sense, that is, understanding what events in the outside world caused the sensory observations. Consistent with this intuition, many aspects of human behavior confronting noise and ambiguity are well explained by principles of causal inference. Extending these insights, recent studies have applied the same powerful set of tools to perceptual processing at the neural level. According to these approaches, microscopic neural structures solve elementary probabilistic tasks and can be combined to construct hierarchical predictive models of the sensory input. This framework suggests that variability in neural responses reflects the inherent uncertainty associated with sensory interpretations and that sensory neurons are active predictors rather than passive filters of their inputs. Causal inference can account parsimoniously and quantitatively for non-linear dynamical properties in single synapses, single neurons and sensory receptive fields.