Mechanisms of madness: evolutionary psychiatry without evolutionary psychology

Delusions are currently characterised as false beliefs produced by incorrect inference about external reality (DSM IV). This inferential conception has proved hard to link to explanations pitched at the level of neurobiology and neuroanatomy. This paper provides that link via a neurocomputational theory, based on evolutionary considerations, of the role of the prefrontal cortex in regulating offline cognition. When pathologically neuromodulated the prefrontal cortex produces hypersalient experiences which monopolise offline cognition. The result is characteristic psychotic experiences and patterns of thought. This bottom-up account uses neural network theory to integrate recent theories of the role of dopamine in delusion with the insights of inferential accounts. It also provides a general model for evolutionary psychiatry which avoids theoretical problems imported from evolutionary psychology.     

Julius Wagner-Jauregg and the Legacy of Malarial Therapy for the Treatment of General Paresis of the Insane

Julius Wagner-Jauregg, a preeminent Austrian psychiatrist was awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 1927 for the development of malaria therapy for the treatment of neurosyphilis, or general paresis of the insane. Despite being only one of three psychiatrists to win a Nobel Prize, he has faded from public consciousness and his name recognition pales in comparison to his contemporary and fellow Austrian, Sigmund Freud. This paper explores his contributions to the field of biological psychiatry and also touches upon reasons, such as the growing bioethics movement, his controversial affiliation with the Nazi Party, and the evolution of neurosyphilis, that explain why Wagner-Jauregg is not more widely celebrated for his contributions to the field of psychiatry, even though his malarial treatment could be considered the earliest triumph of biological psychiatry over psychoanalysis.     

Disturbance regimes and life-history evolution

Disturbance regimes are ecologically important, but many of their evolutionary consequences are poorly understood. A model is developed here that combines the within- and among-season dynamics of disturbances with evolutionary life-history theory. "Disturbance regime" is defined in terms of disturbance timing, frequency, predictability, and severity. The model predicts the optimal body size and time at which organisms should abandon a disturbance-prone growth habitat by maturing and moving to a disturbance-free, nongrowth habitat. The effects of both coarse-grained (those affecting the entire population synchronously) and fine-grained disturbances (those occurring in a patch dynamics setting) are explored. Several predictions are congruent with previous theory. Infrequent or temporally unpredictable disturbances should have little effect on the evolution of life-history strategies, even though they may cause high mortality. Similar to seasonal time constraints on reproduction, disturbance regimes can synchronize metamorphosis within a population, resulting in a seasonal decline in body size at maturity. Other model predictions are novel. When disturbances cause high mortality, coarse-grained disturbances have a much stronger effect on life-history strategies than fine-grained disturbances, suggesting that population structure (relative to the scale of disturbance) plays a critical evolutionary role when disturbances are severe. When within-population variance in juvenile body size is high, two consecutive seasonal declines in body size at maturity can occur, the first associated with disturbance regime and the second associated with seasonal time constraints.     

On Otto Warburg,Nazi Bureaucracy and the difficulties of moral judgment

Twentieth-century photosynthesis research had strong roots in Germany, with the cell physiologist Otto H. Warburg being among its most influential figures. He was also one of the few scientists of Jewish ancestry who kept his post as a director of a research institution throughout the Nazi period. Based on archival sources, the paper investigates Warburg’s fate during these years at selected episodes. He neither collaborated with the regime nor actively resisted; he was harrassed by bureaucracy and denunciated to the secret police, but saved by powerful figures in economy, politics, and science. Warburg reciprocated this favour with problematic testimonies of political integrity after 1945. Warburg’s case, thus, defies wellestablished notions of how scientists in Germany lived and worked during the Nazi regime, and, therefore, helps provide a more nuanced perspective on this theme.     

Genetics of susceptibility to tuberculosis: Mengele's experiments in Auschwitz

Great experiments will always be remembered. I highlight an experiment that was conducted during the Nazi regime in Germany. Not only did the experiment fail, it was also linked to fraud and crimes against humanity. This failed experiment will never be forgotten.     

Watching the ‘Eugenic Experiment’ Unfold: The Mixed Views of British Eugenicists Toward Nazi Germany in the Early 1930s

Historians of the eugenics movement have long been ambivalent in their examination of the links between British hereditary researchers and Nazi Germany. While there is now a clear consensus that American eugenics provided significant material and ideological support for the Germans, the evidence remains less clear in the British case where comparatively few figures openly supported the Nazi regime and the left-wing critique of eugenics remained particularly strong. After the Second World War British eugenicists had to push back against the accusation that their science was intrinsically dictatorial or totalitarian and, as a result, many of their early perceptions of the Nazis were ignored or rationalised away. Further, historians in recent years have focused more directly on the social reformist elements of eugenics, discussing the links between hereditary science and the birth control and feminist movements in addition to others. While undoubtedly making valuable contributions to the scholarly understanding of the eugenic milieu in the interwar years, these studies have neglected to recontextualize the sentiments of British eugenicists who did indeed view the Nazi government positively in the early years of the 1930s. This article argues that there was a significant, though not numerically sizable, faction in the British eugenics movement, though mostly outside the Eugenics Society itself, in the early 1930s that viewed the Nazi Germany as an admirable state for its implementation of eugenic principles. One of these figures was later interned by his own government for being too closely aligned with the German regime, though he argued that this affinity was driven by the quest for scientific truth rather than politics. Eugenics in Britain thus contained a greater diversity of views toward Germany than scholars have previously assumed, warranting more research into the individuals and organizations harbouring these views.     

Transcultural Psychiatry: Cultural Difference,Universalism and Social Psychiatry in the Age of Decolonisation

In the mid-twentieth century, in the aftermath of WWII and the Nazi atrocities and in the midst of decolonisation, a new discipline of transcultural psychiatry was being established and institutionalised. This was part and parcel of a global political project in the course of which Western psychiatry attempted to leave behind its colonial legacies and entanglements, and lay the foundation for a more inclusive, egalitarian communication between Western and non-Western concepts of mental illness and healing. In this period, the infrastructure of post-colonial global and transcultural psychiatry was set up, and leading psychiatric figures across the world embarked on identifying, debating and sometimes critiquing the universal psychological characteristics and psychopathological mechanisms supposedly shared among all cultures and civilisations. The article will explore how this psychiatric, social and cultural search for a new definition of ‘common humanity’ was influenced and shaped by the concurrent global rise of social psychiatry. In the early phases of transcultural psychiatry, a large number of psychiatrists were very keen to determine how cultural and social environments shaped the basic traits of human psychology, and ‘psy’ practitioners and anthropologist from all over the world sought to re-define the relationship between culture, race and individual psyche. Most of them worked within the universalist framework, which posited that cultural differences merely formed a veneer of symptoms and expressions while the universal core of mental illness remained the same across all cultures. The article will argue that, even in this context, which explicitly challenged the hierarchical and racist paradigms of colonial psychiatry, the founding generations of transcultural psychiatrists from Western Europe and North America tended to conceive of broader environmental determinants of mental health and pathology in the decolonising world in fairly reductionist terms—focusing almost exclusively on ‘cultural difference’ and cultural, racial and ethnic ‘traditions’, essentialising and reifying them in the process, and failing to establish some common sociological or economic categories of analysis of Western and non-Western ‘mentalities’. On the other hand, it was African and Asian psychiatrists as well as Marxist psychiatrists from Eastern Europe who insisted on applying those broader social psychiatry concepts—such as social class, occupation, socio-economic change, political and group pressures and relations etc.—which were quickly becoming central to mental health research in the West but were largely missing from Western psychiatrists’ engagement with the decolonising world. In this way, some of the leading non-Western psychiatrists relied on social psychiatry to establish the limits of psychiatric universalism, and challenge some of its Eurocentric and essentialising tendencies. Even though they still subscribed to the predominant universalist framework, these practitioners invoked social psychiatry to draw attention to universalism’s internal incoherence, and sought to revise the lingering evolutionary thinking in transcultural psychiatry. They also contributed to re-imagining cross-cultural encounters and exchanges as potentially creative and progressive (whereas early Western transcultural psychiatry primarily viewed the cross-cultural through the prism of pathogenic and traumatic ‘cultural clash’). Therefore, the article will explore the complex politics of the shifting and overlapping definitions of ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ factors in mid-twentieth century transcultural psychiatry, and aims to recover the revolutionary voices of non-Western psychiatrists and their contributions to the global re-drawing of the boundaries of humanity in the second half of the twentieth century.

     

The Use and Abuse of Sir Karl Popper

Karl Popper has been one of the few philosophers of sciences who has influenced scientists. I evaluate Popper's influence on our understanding of evolutionary theory from his earliest publications to the present. Popper concluded that three sorts of statements in evolutionary biology are not genuine laws of nature. I take him to be right on this score. Popper's later distinction between evolutionary theory as a metaphysical research program and as a scientific theory led more than one scientist to misunderstand his position on evolutionary theory as a scientific theory. In his later work Popper also introduced what he took to be improvements of evolutionary theory. Thus far these improvements have had almost no influence on evolutionary biology. I conclude by examining the influence of Popper on the reception of cladistic analysis.     

Evolutionary psychiatry: foundations,progress and challenges

Evolutionary biology provides a crucial foundation for medicine and behavioral science that has been missing from psychiatry. Its absence helps to explain slow progress; its advent promises major advances. Instead of offering a new kind of treatment, evolutionary psychiatry provides a scientific foundation useful for all kinds of treatment. It expands the search for causes from mechanistic explanations for disease in some individuals to evolutionary explanations for traits that make all members of a species vulnerable to disease. For instance, capacities for symptoms such as pain, cough, anxiety and low mood are universal because they are useful in certain situations. Failing to recognize the utility of anxiety and low mood is at the root of many problems in psychiatry. Determining if an emotion is normal and if it is useful requires understanding an individual's life situation. Conducting a review of social systems, parallel to the review of systems in the rest of medicine, can help achieve that understanding. Coping with substance abuse is advanced by acknowledging how substances available in modern environments hijack chemically mediated learning mechanisms. Understanding why eating spirals out of control in modern environments is aided by recognizing the motivations for caloric restriction and how it arouses famine protection mechanisms that induce binge eating. Finally, explaining the persistence of alleles that cause serious mental disorders requires evolutionary explanations of why some systems are intrinsically vulnerable to failure. The thrill of finding functions for apparent diseases is evolutionary psychiatry's greatest strength and weakness. Recognizing bad feelings as evolved adaptations corrects psychiatry's pervasive mistake of viewing all symptoms as if they were disease manifestations. However, viewing diseases such as panic disorder, melancholia and schizophrenia as if they are adaptations is an equally serious mistake in evolutionary psychiatry. Progress will come from framing and testing specific hypotheses about why natural selection left us vulnerable to mental disorders. The efforts of many people over many years will be needed before we will know if evolutionary biology can provide a new paradigm for understanding and treating mental disorders.     

The philosophical "mind-body problem" and its relevance for the relationship between psychiatry and the neurosciences

Parallel to psychiatry, "philosophy of mind" investigates the relationship between mind (mental domain) and body/brain (physical domain). Unlike older forms of philosophy of mind, contemporary analytical philosophy is not exclusively based on introspection and conceptual analysis, but also draws upon the empirical methods and findings of the sciences. This article outlines the conceptual framework of the "mind-body problem" as formulated in contemporary analytical philosophy and argues that this philosophical debate has potentially far-reaching implications for psychiatry as a clinical-scientific discipline, especially for its own autonomy and its relationship to neurology/neuroscience. This point is illustrated by a conceptual analysis of the five principles formulated in Kandel's 1998 article "A New Intellectual Framework for Psychiatry." Kandel's position in the philosophical mind-body debate is ambiguous, ranging from reductive physicalism (psychophysical identity theory) to non-reductive physicalism (in which the mental "supervenes" on the physical) to epiphenomenalist dualism or even emergent dualism. We illustrate how these diverging interpretations result in radically different views on the identity of psychiatry and its relationship with the rapidly expanding domain of neurology/neuroscience.     

The revolution in psychiatric diagnosis: problems at the foundations

The third edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III; 1974) not only revolutionized psychiatric diagnosis, it transformed and dominated American psychiatry. The nosology of psychiatry had been conceptually confusing, difficult to apply, and bound to widely questioned theories. Psychiatry and clinical psychology had been struggling with their scientific status. DSM attempted to solve psychiatry's problems by making psychiatry more like its authors' perception of general medicine. It tried to avoid theory, especially psychoanalytic theories, by discussing only observable manifestations of disorders. But DSM is actually highly theory-bound. It implicitly and powerfully includes an exclusively "medical" model of psychological disturbance, while excluding other psychiatric ideas. Its authors tried to meet what they saw as "scientific standards." To a surprising extent, DSM reflects its creators' personal distaste for psychoanalysis. The result is that DSM rests on a narrow philosophical perspective. The consequences of its adoption are widespread: it has profoundly affected drug development and other therapeutic studies, psychiatric education, attitudes toward patients, the public perception of psychiatry, and administrative and legal decisions. This article explores how DSM's most problematic features arise from its history in psychiatric controversies of the 1960s and its underlying positivistic philosophy.     

Politics of heredity--Germany 1900-1940, a brief overview

The paper gives a brief overview of the main stages of development of eugenics and race hygiene in Germany between 1900 and 1940. Two main stages can be differentiated: one, the formation of the eugenics movement and its development parallel to quantitative population policy before and after World War I, and the second beginning toward the end of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) when the financial crisis of the public health system favored eugenic schemes implemented by an authoritarian government, such as the Nazi regime.     

Can Evolution Explain Insanity?

I distinguish three evolutionary explanations of mental illness: first, breakdowns in evolved computational systems; second, evolved systems performing their evolutionary function in a novel environment; third, evolved personality structures. I concentrate on the second and third explanations, as these are distinctive of an evolutionary psychopathology, with progressively less credulity in the light of the empirical evidence. General morals are drawn for evolutionary psychiatry.     

De la « théorie sexuelle » à l’anthropopsychiatrie

The creation of scientific psychiatry, which was modelled after the medical classification of diseases, was brought into question by the tenets of Sigmund Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis. We draw on Leopold Szondi’s method of developing an analytically inspired psychiatry in our effort to interpret Freud’s work from an anthropological perspective, removing psychiatry from the naturalistic medical model and giving it a genuinely human bearing. Szondi’s drive system ranges from the analysis of constitution (as in the animal biomedical model) to the analysis of destiny (as in Schicksalsanalyse). Within this system, the human is considered a driven being, existing in a psychological dimension from the outset, outside animal, sexual instincts. This distinction between mankind and animals accounts for the specificities of mental disorders and illnesses and paves the way to a purely anthropological psychiatry we can call cultural psychiatry. In this kind of psychiatry, any pathology is considered inherent in the destiny of a human being, a part of a person’s development. Its analysis, called pathoanalysis, deals with the human suffering at the heart of mankind’s place in the world.     

From molecules to the biosphere: Nikolai V. Timoféeff-Ressovsky’s (1900–1981) research program within a totalitarian landscape

Nikolai Vladimirovich Timoféeff-Ressovsky was one of the key figures in the Synthetic Theory of Evolution. Living and researching under what was arguably the two most powerful and cruel totalitarian regimes in human history, the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, Timoféeff-Ressovsky succeeded in developing an ambitious research program aiming to explain evolution on all major levels, from the molecular-genetic, the populational, and the biogeocenotic to the level of the entire Biosphere. Yet his scientific biography remains largely unwritten and his role under totalitarianism, especially in Nazi Germany, remains highly controversial. Here we approach the problem of his hypothetical cooperation with Nazi authorities examining both the crucial episodes of his biography and summarizing the development of his research program. We conclude that the key decisions he made reflected the specificity of his research program that was focused on the fundamental questions of evolutionary biology.     

The Nazi cosmetic: Medicine in the service of beauty

This paper examines how aesthetic ideals shaped the practice of Nazi medicine. It proposes that Nazi eugenics relied on the conflation of norms of health with norms of beauty determined and performed by Nazi cultures of action. Though theories of biological holism served as vehicles of Nazi ideology, they did so contingently. The anti-totalitarian thinking of biological holist Kurt Goldstein shows that the use of biological holism to promote Nazi ideology was not inevitable. This examination of aesthetic influences on Nazi medicine shows that traditionally speaking 'non-rational' factors shaped the Nazi biomedical program's aims and methods.     

Deconstructing Darwin: Evolutionary theory in context

The topic of this paper is external versus internal explanations, first, of the genesis of evolutionary theory and, second, its reception. Victorian England was highly competitive and individualistic. So was the view of society promulgated by Malthus and the theory of evolution set out by Charles Darwin and A.R. Wallace. The fact that Darwin and Wallace independently produced a theory of evolution that was just as competitive and individualistic as the society in which they lived is taken as evidence for the impact that society has on science. The same conclusion is reached with respect to the reception of evolutionary theory. Because Darwins contemporaries lived in such a competitive and individualistic society, they were prone to accept a theory that exhibited these same characteristics. The trouble is that Darwin and Wallace did not live in anything like the same society and did not formulate the same theory. Although the character of Victorian society may have influenced the acceptance of evolutionary theory, it was not the competitive, individualistic theory that Darwin and Wallace set out but a warmer, more comforting theory.     

How a Kantian Can Accept Evolutionary Metaethics

Contrary to widely held assumptions, an evolutionary metaethics need not be non-cognitivist. I define evolutionary metaethics as the claim that certain phenotypic traits expressing certain genes are both necessary and sufficient for explanation of all other phenotypic traits we consider morally significant. A review of the influential cognitivist Immanuel Kants metaethics shows that much of his ethical theory is independent of the anti-naturalist metaphysics of transcendental idealism which itself is incompatible with evolutionary metaethics. By matching those independent aspects to an evolutionary metaethics a cognitivist Kantian evolutionary metaethical theory is a possibility for researchers to consider.     

The concept of developmental reprogramming and the quest for an inclusive theory of evolutionary mechanisms

SUMMARY Evolutionary developmental biology has already made a major contribution to our understanding of evolutionary patterns, notably homology. However, while it has the potential to make an equally important contribution to our understanding of evolutionary mechanisms, and indeed to the integration of mechanism and pattern, it has not yet done so. This paper explores how this potential may be realized. In particular, I focus on the limitations of present-day neo-Darwinian theory, and indicate how a combination of the neo-Darwinian and "evo-devo" approaches provides a more inclusive view of evolutionary mechanisms with greater explanatory power. There is a particular focus on developmental reprogramming, which lies logically between mutation and selection, yet has been neglected in mainstream evolutionary theory. The inclusion of developmental reprogramming in the list of evolutionary mechanisms leads to a view that the direction of evolutionary change is determined by a combination of internal and external factors, rather than being controlled entirely by the environment.     

The neutral theory of molecular evolution and the world view of the neutralists

The main tenet of the neutral theory is that the great majority of evolutionary changes at the molecular level are caused not by Darwinian selection but by random fixation of selectively neutral (or very nearly neutral) alleles through random sampling drift under continued mutation pressure. The theory also asserts that the majority of protein and DNA polymorphisms are selectively neutral, and that they are maintained in the species by mutational input balanced by random extinction rather than by "balancing selection." The neutral theory is based on simple assumptions. This enabled us to develop mathematical theories (using the diffusion equation method) that can treat these phenomena in quantitative terms and that permit theory to be tested against actual observations. Although the neutral theory has been severely criticized by the neo-Darwinian establishment, supporting evidence has accumulated over the last 20 years. In particular, the recent burst of DNA sequence data helped to strengthen the theory a great deal. I believe that the neutral theory triggered reexamination of the traditional "synthetic theory of evolution." In this paper, I review the present status of the neutral theory, including discussions of such topics as "molecular evolutionary clock," very high evolutionary rates observed in RNA viruses, a deviant coding system found in Mycoplasm together with the concept of mutation-driven neutral evolution, and the origin of life. I also present a worldview based on the conception of what I call "survival of the luckiest."