India's E‐Waste Rules and Their Impact on E‐Waste Management Practices: A Case Study

India, like many other developed and developing countries, has adopted an extended producer responsibility (EPR) approach for electronic waste (e‐waste) management under its E‐waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 2011. Under these rules, producers have been made responsible for setting up collection centers of e‐waste and financing and organizing a system for environmentally sound management of e‐waste. In this article, we use the implementation of these rules in Ahmedabad in western India as a case study to conduct a critical analysis of the implementation of India's Rules. Interviews of main stakeholder groups, including a sample of regulated commercial establishments, regulatory agencies enforcing the Rules, informal actors involved in waste collection and handling, as well as publicly available information on the implementation constitute data for our case study. Our results indicate that while there has been an increase in the formal waste processing capacity after the implementation of the Rules, only 5% to 15% of the total waste generated is likely channeled through formal processing facilities. While the EPR regulation forced the producers to take action on a few relatively inexpensive aspects of the Rules, the collection and recycling system has not been made convenient for the consumers to deposit e‐waste in formal collection and recycling centers. Based on our findings, we argue that Indian EPR regulation should go beyond simple take‐back mandates and consider implementing other policy instruments such as a deposit‐refund system. An important implication for developing countries is the need for careful attention to instrument choice and design within EPR regulations.     

Implementing Individual Producer Responsibility for Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment through Improved Financing

Under the European Union (EU) Waste Electrical and Electronics Equipment (WEEE) Directive, producers are responsible for financing the recycling of their products at end of life. A key intention of such extended producer responsibility (EPR) legislation is to provide economic incentives for producers to develop products that are easier to treat and recycle at end of life. Recent research has shown, however, that the implementation of EPR for WEEE has so far failed in this respect. Current WEEE systems calculate their prices according to simple mass‐based allocation of costs to producers, based on broad collection categories containing a mixture of different product types and brands. This article outlines two alternative approaches, which instead calculate charges for products sold by producers by classifying them according to their eventual end‐of‐life treatment requirements and cost. Worked examples indicate that these methods provide both effective and efficient frameworks for financing WEEE, potentially delivering financial incentives to producers substantial enough to affect their potential profitability and, as a likely consequence, the decisions relating to the design of their products. In particular they fulfill three important criteria required by the WEEE Directive: they can financially reward improved design, allocate costs of historic waste proportionately (on the basis of tonnes of new products sold), and provide sufficient financial guarantees against future waste costs and liabilities. They are also relatively practical for implementation because they are based solely on cost allocation and financing. Further research and investigation would be worthwhile to test and verify this approach using real‐world data and under various scenarios.     

Implementing Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation

The goal of this article is to contribute to the understanding of how the multiple, and sometimes conflicting, stakeholder perspectives and prevailing conditions (economic, geographic, etc.) in the implementation locality shape extended producer responsibility (EPR) “on the ground.” We provide an in‐depth examination of the implementation dimension of EPR in a specific case study by examining concrete activities at the operational front of the collection and recycling system, and probing the varying stakeholder preferences that have driven a specific system to its status quo. To this end, we conduct a detailed case study of the Washington State EPR implementation for electronic waste. We provide an overview of various stakeholder perspectives and their implications for the attainment of EPR policy objectives in practice. These findings shed light on the intrinsic complexity of EPR implementation. We conclude with recommendations on how to achieve effective and efficient EPR implementation, including improving design incentives, incorporating reuse and refurbishing, expanding product scope, managing downstream material flows, and promoting operational efficiency via fair cost allocation design.     

Strategic, Financial, and Design Implications of Extended Producer Responsibility in Europe: A Producer Case Study

Extended producer responsibility (EPR) legislation, making producers responsible for financing and organizing take-back and recycling of waste batteries, packaging, end-of-life vehicles (ELVs), and waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), has been or is currently in the process of being implemented in 29 different countries in Europe following introduction of European Union directives. This article reviews the potential impacts of EPR for waste batteries, packaging, and WEEE on producers distributing products in Europe through a case study of Sony Computer Entertainment Europe (SCEE)—responsible for marketing and distribution of PlayStation products.
There are presently more than 250 producer responsibility organizations (PROs) established to meet EPR obligations in Europe, which contrasts to the single national recycling schemes founded in the late 1990s. SCEE estimates it avoided anetcostof €408,000 in 2005 by introducing competitive review of PRO services (against a total net take-back cost of €401,000).To meet increasingly extensive compliance obligations, SCEE has initiated new activities, with considerable implications for the company's legal, sales data administration, procurement, accounting, and product and packaging approval practices.
Considering the ultimate aim of EPR to establish economic incentives for improved product design, several significant political and practical obstacles are described from SCEE's case and industry situation. Although the principle of EPR is indeed interesting, its practical application in Europe may require refinement. Producers, given adequate support by policy makers, still have opportunities to develop new processes under the WEEE Directive to facilitate design for the environment.     

From Legal Transplants to Sustainable Transition

Extended producer responsibility (EPR), which assigns significant responsibility to producers to take back their end‐of‐life products to create incentives for redesign of products with lower life cycle environmental impacts, has come to a crossroad facing a trade‐off between the original innovation‐oriented regime design and the cost‐efficiency challenges in practice. This is particularly true in its implementation in non‐Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries as they are trying to transplant the “best practices” from OECD countries, for there is increasing skepticism as to whether EPR is suitable for developing countries at all. As an important producer of electronic products and destination of electronic waste (e‐waste) flows in the world, China has been expected to play a vital role in the evolution of global governance based on the idea of EPR, either to create new ways for producers to perform their end‐of‐life strategies, or to reshape the mode of production and consumption with its fast‐growing market. However, the establishment of EPR in China has been long and full of difficulties. This article reviews the status and trends in the establishment of an EPR system for waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) management in China. We use the framework of a multilevel perspective of transition theory in our analysis to characterize the complex interactions among various agents in the evolution of the Chinese system from initial innovation‐oriented design to the current efficiency‐oriented version. An ongoing research framework for evaluation of the EPR program in China is outlined as the research agenda in coming years.     

Business‐to‐Business Information Technology User Practices at End of Life in the United Kingdom,Germany, and France

Business‐to‐business (B2B) electronics account for a significant volume of the electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) put on the market. Very little B2B waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) is reported as collected in the European Union (EU) in compliance with the WEEE Directive, which uses the policy principle of extended producer responsibility (EPR) to ensure that WEEE is managed correctly. This presents a barrier to parties looking for access to the waste. Company practice dictates the channels into which B2B WEEE flows following primary use. This article presents a study that engaged with company actors directly to get a better understanding of business information technology (IT) EEE asset management. Data were collected to determine the barriers current practice could present to the collection of B2B IT EEE at end of life and the implications of these for the development of policies and strategies for EPR. A questionnaire was developed and data were gathered from organizations in three EU countries—the United Kingdom, Germany, and France—stratified by size. Some notable findings were that there are several routes by which end‐of‐life B2B WEEE can flow. The recycling and refurbishment of B2B IT units at end of use was shown to be commonplace, but it is likely that these units enter streams where they are not reported. The actors disposing of their units did not have information on the management or disposition of these streams. It is concluded that to achieve the goals of EPR for B2B IT WEEE, the networks and the operational practices of these streams need to be better understood when developing strategies and policies.     

Charging up Battery Recycling Policies: Extended Producer Responsibility for Single‐Use Batteries in the European Union,Canada, and the United States

Extended producer responsibility (EPR) policies have proven effective at raising consumer awareness, expanding waste collection infrastructure, and shifting costs of end‐of‐life (EOL) management from municipalities to stewardship organizations. Yet, such policies have been less successful in advancing waste management programs that ensure a net environmental benefit. This article analyzes how EPR policies for single‐use batteries in the European Union (EU), Canada, and the United States address the environmental costs and benefits of EOL management. Considering these EPR policies is instructive, because single‐use batteries have high collection costs and are of relatively low economic value for waste processors. Without deliberate planning, the environmental burdens of collecting and recycling such batteries may exceed the benefits. This article considers how EPR policies for single‐use batteries integrate performance requirements such as collection rates, recycling efficiencies, and best available techniques. It argues that for such policies to be effective, they need to be extended to address waste collection practices, the life cycle consequences of EOL management, and the quality of recovered materials. Such strategies are relevant to EPR policies for other products with marginal secondary value, including some textiles, plastics, and other types of electronic waste.     

Assessing the Greenhouse Gas Savings Potential of Extended Producer Responsibility for Mattresses and Boxsprings in the United States

Extended producer responsibility (EPR) legislation in the United States, which currently only exists on the state level, now includes three mattress EPR acts, which intend to shift the financial and operational burden of mattress end‐of‐life (EOL) management away from local and state government. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the original objective behind EPR is to reduce the environmental life cycle impacts of products. This article therefore quantifies the greenhouse gas (GHG) savings potential of mattress and boxspring recycling and reuse in the United States and also discusses labor implications and mattress design issues. We find that all three acts are unlikely to generate redesign incentives, but are expected to dramatically increase mattress collection and recycling. The collection and recycling of all 35 million EOL mattress and boxspring units estimated to reach the end of their lives in the United States every year would generate in the order of 10,000 jobs and GHG savings between 1 and 1.5 million metric tonnes.     

A Statistical Analysis of Prices of Electrical and Electronic Equipment after the Introduction of the WEEE Directive

In January 2003, the European Union (EU) issued a directive on e‐waste (waste from electrical and electronic equipment; WEEE) to deal with increasing quantities and the included hazardous components. The WEEE Directive is based on the principle of extended producer responsibility, which shifts the responsibility for end of life of products away from municipalities toward producers. This led some researchers to state that, in theory, the costs of waste treatment are passed on to consumers in terms of higher prices. This work addresses two fundamental questions: (1) Did the introduction of the WEEE Directive increase consumer prices of electrical and electronic equipment (EEE)? and (2) how much is this price increase? We carry out, for the first time in the literature, a quantitative research on price variation of the vast majority of EEE sold in the EU after the introduction of producers’ financial responsibility. The panel data include 972 price level indices, namely, six categories of EEE for 27 member states for six years. The main result is that the average variation of the prices for each category of EEE investigated actually increased and the variation was between 0.71% and 3.88%, depending on the specific category of EEE. The average increase of 2.19% is in line with the previous studies that estimated the impact of the WEEE Directive up to a 3% increase of the product price. The t‐test performed on the data shows a good statistical significance, which strengthens the relevance of the results. Finally, future directions for research are included.     

Extended Producer Responsibility in the United States

Extended producer responsibility (EPR) is a policy approach that requires manufacturers to finance the costs of recycling or safely disposing of products consumers no longer want. This article describes the evolution of EPR policies in the United States, focusing on the role of states as policy actors. For their part, federal lawmakers have not embraced EPR policies except to remove some barriers to state‐level initiatives. In the two‐decade period from 1991 to 2011, U.S. states enacted more than 70 EPR laws. In addition, manufacturers have implemented voluntary programs to collect and recycle products, but those efforts have proven largely ineffective in capturing significant quantities of waste products. With the help of new coalitions of diverse interest groups, recently states have renewed efforts to establish effective EPR programs, enacting 40 laws in the period 2008–2011. Several state initiatives suggest a more promising future for EPR.     

Differences in Perception of Extended Producer Responsibility and Product Stewardship among Stakeholders: An International Questionnaire Survey and Statistical Analysis

Different perceptions of the concept of extended producer responsibility and product stewardship (EPR/PS) have tended to lead to prolonged policy disputes and have likely affected the design of EPR/PS policies. We therefore surveyed stakeholders’ perceptions of the concept of EPR/PS, including its aims, application, and rationales, and analyzed 376 responses with regression analysis and cluster analysis. The results clearly demonstrated the diversity in stakeholders’ perceptions and identified/confirmed several patterns between stakeholders’ perceptions and attributes. Concerning aims, our analysis showed that stakeholders from middle‐/low‐income countries placed more importance on proper treatment and waste reduction in EPR/PS policy, while those from Europe, North America, Japan, and the rest of Asia had different perceptions on seven aims of EPR/PS, especially for increasing collection and shifting responsibility to producers, and paid varying attention to upstream and downstream improvement (e.g., better product design and recycling, respectively). Our analysis also confirmed that respondents perceiving lack of capability of local governments regarding waste management advocated EPR/PS more and respondents positive about information acquisition put more importance on physical responsibility. The largest contributing variables to the perception of EPR/PS were 14 specific EPR/PS mechanisms/issues, suggesting that discussion about specific mechanisms of EPR/PS policy is a key if common and better understandings of the EPR/PS concept are to develop. The dominant rationale of EPR/PS agreed upon by the respondents was producers’ capability, but the concept of beneficiary bears was also supported by 58% of respondents, especially by national governments and North Americans. Finally, implications of the results for EPR/PS policy development were discussed.     

Comparative Analysis of Extended Producer Responsibility Policy in the United States and Canada

This article analyzes the policy choices and programmatic elements of extended producer responsibility (EPR) as implemented in the United States and Canada. The article traces the historical development of EPR in each country and defines common features of EPR in each nation. The U.S. states and the Canadian provinces have assumed the primary role, rather than the federal governments, for enacting producer responsibility requirements in their respective countries. However, the paths taken demonstrate several fundamental differences, including the prevalence of individual versus collective responsibility and the financing mechanisms implemented for EPR. Given the deepening experience with EPR and the breadth of its application to a widening array of products in the United States, the Canadian model for EPR is starting to receive more examination from policy makers in the United States, indicating that the policy and programmatic differences between the two nations may eventually be narrowing. The comparative policy analysis is illustrated through the lens of EPR regulatory efforts for waste electronics, with particular profiles of the programs in the State of Minnesota and Province of Ontario. Both approaches broadly reflect many of the policy considerations and governance and programmatic themes that dominate EPR programs in each country. Finally, the article offers recommendations for collaborative work between the United States and Canada to explore consistency between programs and other complementary strategies to support producer responsibility activities.     

With a Little Help from EPR?: Technological Change and Innovation in the Norwegian Plastic Packaging and Electronics Sectors

In this article we discuss the interplay between extended producer responsibility (EPR) and technological change and innovation (TCI) in Norway. We ask whether Norwegian EPR policy has an effect on TCI and, if so, whether it makes any difference how the EPR policies are designed. By carrying out a comparative study between the plastic packaging (PP) sector and electrical and electronic (EE) sector in Norway, we conclude that there is a correlation between Norwegian EPR policy and TCI, but the causality is rather weak. EPR has an effect on downstream activities through increased recycling and indirectly through institutional innovation and learning. It does not, however, make a significant difference how the policies are designed, because they are considered similar by a majority of actors contributing financially to the EPR schemes. As for technological change and innovation upstream, the role of Norwegian EPR policies in the observed trends is not significant. Other factors such as the EPR-based Restriction on Hazardous Substances (RoHS) Directive promulgated by the European Union (EE sector) and the need for competitiveness (PP sector) seem far more important. In order to make collective EPR policies more powerful in inducing technological change and innovation, decision-makers should consider more specific measures that directly address the core businesses of the producers.     

A Case Discussion on Market‐Based Extended Producer Responsibility: The Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act

In this article, we analyze the Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act to explore the benefits and potential drawbacks of a market‐based extended producer responsibility (EPR) legislation implementation with operational flexibility for manufacturers. Based on publicly available reports and stakeholder interviews, we find that the Minnesota Act attains two key goals of market‐based EPR (i.e., higher cost efficiencies and substantial landfill diversion); however, this may come at the expense of selective collection and recycling, an increased burden on local governments, and a loss of balance in contractual power between stakeholders. We observe that these concerns arise because of specific flexibility provisions afforded to manufacturers that allow them to operationalize their EPR compliance with a cost‐efficiency focus. Thus, we conclude that EPR goals must be carefully translated into operating rules in order to achieve goals while avoiding unintended consequences.     

From Cradle to Grave: Extended Producer Responsibility for Household Hazardous Wastes in British Columbia

Household hazardous wastes (HHWs), the discarded pesticides, solvents, paints, lubricating oil, and similar products common to residences throughout the industrial world, create problems for governments charged with managing solid waste. When disposed of improperly in landfills or incinerators or if dumped illegally, HHW may contribute to soil and water contamination. A most common management tool for HHW is a special collection effort that segregates HHW from normal trash and disposes of it in an approved manner, all at a higher cost to the governmental jurisdiction. The Canadian province of British Columbia (BC) has undertaken a different approach, based on the use of extended producer responsibility (EPR). BC's efforts began in 1992 with adoption of a regulation on used lubricating oil (lube oil). More than 40 million liters (L) of used lube oil have been collected annually through the EPR system established under this regulation. A regulation establishing producer responsibility for postconsumer paints followed in 1994. BC enacted an additional regulation establishing EPR in 1997 for solvents/flammable liquids, domestic pesticides, gasoline, and pharmaceuticals. As a result of the application of EPR to HHW, local government costs for managing HHW and the amount of HHW identified in municipal waste have declined. Although the regulations appear to have mixed success in prompting consumers to avoid products that result in HHW, there are indications that they may be more effective than conventional management efforts. Based on BC's experience with EPR, key factors for successful implementation include maintaining flexibility in program design, creating viable funding alternatives, aggressive enforcement to provide a level playing field, and adopting policies that maximize diversion of HHW from landfills, while minimizing waste generation, setting targets for reuse and recycling, promoting consumer awareness and convenience, involving local government jurisdictions, and monitoring outcomes.     

Extended Producer Responsibility for Waste Electronics: An Example of Printer Recycling in the United Kingdom

In February 2003, European Union (EU) policy makers implemented a Directive that will make producers responsible for waste electrical and electronic equipment at end-of-life (known as the "WEEE" Directive). Under this new legislation, producers are required to organize and finance the take-back, treatment, and recycling of WEEE and achieve mass-based recycling and recovery targets. This legislation is part of a growing trend of extended producer responsibility for waste, which has the potential to shift the world's economies toward more circular patterns of resource use and recycling. This study uses life-cycle assessment and costing to investigate the possible environmental effects of the WEEE Directive, based on an example of printer recycling in the United Kingdom.
For a total of four waste management scenarios and nine environmental impact categories investigated in this study, results varied, with no scenario emerging as best or worst overall compared to landfilling. The level of environmental impact depended on the type of material and waste management processes involved. Additionally, under the broad mass-based targets of the WEEE Directive, the pattern of relationships between recycling rates, environmental impacts, and treatment and recycling costs may lead to unplanned and unwanted results. Contrary to original EU assumptions, the use of mass-based targets may not ensure that producers adapt the design of their products as intended under producer responsibility.
It is concluded that the EU should revise the scope of consideration of the WEEE Directive to ensure its life-cycle impacts are addressed. In particular, specific environmental objectives and operating standards for treatment and recycling processes should be investigated as an alternative to mass-based recycling and recovery targets.     

Operational Perspectives on Extended Producer Responsibility

We revisit three important assumptions about extended producer responsibility (EPR) that originate from academia, policy, or practice: (1) A central objective of EPR should be to induce product designs for the environment; (2) collective EPR implementations mute incentives to design for the environment; and (3) more stringent EPR policy parameters will generate better environmental outcomes. We discuss the potential shortcomings of these assumptions from an operations perspective and their implications for academic and policy research.     

An Input‐Output Model of Extended Producer Responsibility

Under an extended producer responsibility (EPR) system, when a producer delivers a product to the market it must also pay a takeback fee, which is used to cover the costs of end‐of‐life disposal. EPR systems are currently used in Europe and beyond to manage a variety of products, including packaging and used tires. In this article we develop an input‐output (IO) model that is able to assess the impacts of an EPR system, and is based on the waste IO (WIO) model. The WIO model is itself a hybrid‐unit model extension of the Leontief model that is able to capture the substitution effect between recycled/recovered material/energy from waste treatment and their non‐waste cognates. The resulting EPRIO model, besides the conventional direct and indirect effects of the Leontief model and the substitution effects of the WIO model, is able to capture the opportunity costs of financing the EPR system, and additionally requires the specification of an alternative waste management policy, with its own opportunity costs. The impact of an EPR policy is thus the difference between the impacts of the reference EPR and the alternative waste treament policies. The resulting model is illustrated with a simple example of a used tire management EPR system.     

Extended Producer Responsibility in Thailand

Waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) sheds light on the dimmer side of production and consumption patterns in modern societies. The rapid increase in its quantity and complexity contribute to the challenges it poses to solid waste management systems. Several members of the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) have relied on the principle of extended producer responsibility (EPR) to tackle the issue, with varying degrees of success. Several non‐OECD countries, including Thailand, are now developing WEEE programs and are looking for lessons from these first movers. This case study aims to provide an understanding both of this context and of the EPR program for WEEE proposed for Thailand. It finds that EPR mechanisms in general, and the proposed buy‐back system financed by product fees in Thailand in particular, have a strong potential to consolidate WEEE collection for the formal recycling sector by offering end users monetary incentives. On the negative side, this is an expensive combination of policy instruments, and the institutional design of the governmental fund is rigid. The policy proposal also contains no mechanism for product redesign—one of the objectives in the national WEEE strategy. This article suggests that the effectiveness of the policy might benefit from more flexibility at the compliance scheme level, in order to lessen the monopoly of the governmental fund, as well as the introduction of differentiated fees to promote environmentally friendly products.     

End‐of‐life product management as a resilience driver for developing countries: A policy experiment for used tires in Ecuador

Over the last decades, a number of new environmental policies have been designed to improve waste management. Among them, extended producer responsibility (EPR) has introduced a mechanism to shift the environmental and financial burden of end‐of‐life products from public management to producers. Recently, EPR has been adopted by a growing number of developing countries, but this policy often struggles in being effectively implemented in such contexts, missing the opportunity of using waste management as a sustainability driver. By discussing the EPR for end‐of‐life tires (ELTs) in Ecuador, this paper proposes a different approach in designing and implementing EPR schemes in developing countries: it recommends consideration of social sustainability, rather than merely copying foreign management frameworks. To address this point, two case studies on socially directed ELT applications were designed and carried out. The case studies aimed at improving resilience of vulnerable populations to natural disasters by increasing the resistance of housing and settlements against catastrophic events using civil engineering applications. The analysis of the case studies’ outcomes brings to light possible policy adjustments, in which social sustainability goals are taken into account within the national EPR scheme. The Ecuadorian case also highlights the benefit of employing an adaptive governance approach when dealing with challenging urban management topics, such as informality (a widespread phenomenon in developing countries) and resilience.