Coevolution of honest signaling and cooperative norms by cultural group selection

Evolution of cooperative norms is studied in a population where individual and group level selection are both in operation. Individuals play indirect reciprocity game within their group and follow second order norms. Individuals are norm-followers, and imitate their successful group mates. Aside from direct observation individuals can be informed about the previous actions and reputations by information transferred by others. A potential donor estimates the reputation of a potential receiver either by her own observation or by the opinion of the majority of others (indirect observation). Following a previous study (Scheuring, 2009) we assume that norms determine only the probabilities of actions, and mutants can differ in these probabilities. Similarly, we assume that individuals follow a stochastic information transfer strategy. The central question is whether cooperative norm and honest social information transfer can emerge in a population where initially only non-cooperative norms were present, and the transferred information was not sufficiently honest.It is shown that evolution can lead to a cooperative state where information transferred in a reliable manner, where generous cooperative strategies are dominant. This cooperative state emerges along a sharp transition of norms. We studied the characteristics of actions and strategies in this transition by classifying the stochastic norms, and found that a series of more and more judging strategies invade each other before the stabilization of the so-called generous judging strategy. Numerical experiments on the coevolution of social parameters (e.g. probability of direct observation and the number of indirect observers) reveal that it is advantageous to lean on indirect observation even if information transfer is much noisier than for direct observation, which is because to follow the majorities’ opinion suppresses information noise meaningfully.     

The continuous Prisoner's dilemma: II. Linear reactive strategies with noise.

We present a general model for the Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma and study the effect of errors. We find that cooperative strategies that can resist invasion by defectors are optimistic (make high initial offers), generous (always offer more cooperation than the partner did in the previous round) and uncompromising (offer full cooperation only if the partner does). A necessary condition for the emergence of cooperation in the continuous Prisoner's Dilemma with noise is b (1-p)>c, where b and c denote, respectively, the benefit and cost of cooperation, while p is the error rate. This relation can be reformulated as an error threshold: cooperation can only emerge if the probability of making a mistake is below a critical value. We note, however, that cooperation in the continuous Prisoner's Dilemma with noise does not seem to be evolutionarily stable: while it is possible to find cooperative strategies that resist invasion by defectors, such cooperators are generally invaded by more cooperative strategies which eventually yield to defectors. Thus, the long-term evolution of the continuous Prisoner's Dilemma is either characterized by unending cycles or by stable polymorphisms of cooperators and defectors.     

Evolution of Cooperation in Spatially Structured Populations

Using a spatial lattice model of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma we studied the evolution of cooperation within the strategy space of all stochastic strategies with a memory of one round. Comparing the spatial model with a randomly mixed model showed that (1) there is more cooperative behaviour in a spatially structured population, (2) PAVLOV and generous variants of it are very successful strategies in the spatial context and (3) in spatially structured populations evolution is much less chaotic than in unstructured populations. In spatially structured populations, generous variants of PAVLOV are found to be very successful strategies in playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The main weakness of PAVLOV is that it is exploitable by defective strategies. In a spatial context this disadvantage is much less important than the good error correction of PAVLOV, and especially of generous PAVLOV, because in a spatially structured population successful strategies always build clusters.     

The joker effect: cooperation driven by destructive agents

Understanding the emergence of cooperation is a central issue in evolutionary game theory. The hardest setup for the attainment of cooperation in a population of individuals is the Public Goods game in which cooperative agents generate a common good at their own expenses, while defectors “free-ride” this good. Eventually this causes the exhaustion of the good, a situation which is bad for everybody. Previous results have shown that introducing reputation, allowing for volunteer participation, punishing defectors, rewarding cooperators or structuring agents, can enhance cooperation. Here we present a model which shows how the introduction of rare, malicious agents - that we term jokers - performing just destructive actions on the other agents induce bursts of cooperation. The appearance of jokers promotes a rock-paper-scissors dynamics, where jokers outbeat defectors and cooperators outperform jokers, which are subsequently invaded by defectors. Thus, paradoxically, the existence of destructive agents acting indiscriminately promotes cooperation.     

Discrete Clutch Sizes, Local Mate Competition, and the Evolution of Precise Sex Allocation

Optimal sex allocation under a population structure with local mate competition has been studied mainly in deterministic models that are based on the assumption of continuous clutch sizes; Hamilton's (1967) model is the classic example. When clutch sizes are small, however, this assumption is not appropriate. When taking the discrete nature of eggs into account it becomes critically important whether females control only the mean sex ratio (“binomial” females) or the variance as well (“precise” females). As both types of sex ratio control have been found, it is of interest to investigate their evolutionary stability. In particular, it may be questioned whether perfect control of the sex ratio is always favoured by natural selection when mating groups are small. Models based on discrete clutch sizes are developed to determine evolutionarily stable (ES) sex ratios. It is predicted that when all females are of the binomial type they should produce a lower proportion of daughters than predicted by Hamilton's model, especially when clutch size and foundress number are small. When all females are of the precise type, the ES number of sons should generally be either a stable mixed strategy or a pure strategy, but there are special cases (for two foundresses and particular clutch sizes) where the ES number of sons lies in a trajectory of neutrally stable mixed strategies; the predicted mean sex ratios can be either higher or lower than predicted by Hamilton's model. The existence of ES mixed strategies implies that individual females do not necessarily have to produce sex ratios with perfect precision; some level of imperfection can be tolerated (i.e., will not be selected against). When the population consists of both binomial and precise females, the latter always have a selective advantage. This advantage of precision does not disappear when precision approaches fixation in the population. The latter result contradicts the conclusions of Taylor and Sauer (1980) which is due to their way of expressing selective advantage; they define selective advantage as the between-generation increase per allele, which will always become vanishingly small when an allele reaches fixation, irrespective of fitness differences.     

Beyond dual-lattice models: Incorporating plant strategies when modeling the interplay between facilitation and competition along environmental severity gradients

We introduce a spatially explicit model that evaluates how the trade-offs between the life strategies of two interacting plant species affect the outcome of their interaction along environmental severity gradients. In our model, we represent the landscape as a two-dimensional lattice, with environmental severity increasing from left to right. Two species with different strategies, a competitor and a stress-tolerant, interact in the lattice. We find that facilitation expands the realized niche of the competitor into harsh environments by suppressing the stress-tolerant species. Most of their coexisting range is dominated by a positive effect of one species on another, with a reciprocal negative effect from the species receiving the benefits on its benefactor (“+, −”), whereas mutualistic (“+, +”) interactions are only found in the harshest part of the environmental gradient. Contrarily as assumed by models commonly used in facilitation research (e.g. dual-lattice models), our results indicate that “+, +” interactions are not dominant, and that their differences with “+, −” interactions along environmental severity gradients depend on the strategies of the interacting species. By integrating the trade-off between competitive ability and stress tolerance, our model provides a new framework to investigate the interplay of facilitative and competitive interactions along environmental gradients and their impacts on processes such as population dynamics and community organization.     

Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails

The standard model for direct reciprocity is the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, where in each round players choose between cooperation and defection. Here we extend the standard framework to include costly punishment. Now players have a choice between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. We study the set of all reactive strategies, where the behavior depends on what the other player has done in the previous round. We find all cooperative strategies that are Nash equilibria. If the cost of cooperation is greater than the cost of punishment, then the only cooperative Nash equilibrium is generous-tit-for-tat (GTFT), which does not use costly punishment. If the cost of cooperation is less than the cost of punishment, then there are infinitely many cooperative Nash equilibria and the response to defection can include costly punishment. We also perform computer simulations of evolutionary dynamics in populations of finite size. These simulations show that in the context of direct reciprocity, (i) natural selection prefers generous tit-for-tat over strategies that use costly punishment, and (ii) that costly punishment does not promote the evolution of cooperation. We find quantitative agreement between our simulation results and data from experimental observations.     

Coexistence of individual and social learners during range expansion

Individual learning and social learning are two primary abilities supporting cultural evolution. Conditions for their evolution have mostly been studied by investigating gene frequency dynamics, which essentially implies constant population size. Predictions from such “static” models may only be of partial relevance to the evolution of advanced individual learning in modern humans, because modern humans have experienced rapid population growth and range expansion during “out-of-Africa.” Here we model the spatial population dynamics of individual and social learners by a reaction–diffusion system. One feature of our model is the inclusion of the possibility that social learners may fail to find an exemplar to copy in regions where the population density is low. Due to this attenuation effect, the invasion speed of social learners is diminished, and various kinds of invasion dynamics are observed. Our primary findings are: (1) individual learners can persist indefinitely when invading environmentally homogeneous infinite space; (2) the occurrence of individual learners at the front may inhibit the spread of social learners. These results suggest that “out-of-Africa” may have driven the evolution of advanced individual learning ability in modern humans.     

The distribution of the coalescence time and the number of pairwise nucleotide differences in a model of population divergence or speciation with an initial period of gene flow

This paper is concerned with a model of “isolation with an initial period of migration”, where a panmictic ancestral population split into n descendant populations which exchanged migrants symmetrically at a constant rate for a period of time and subsequently became completely isolated. In the limit as the population split occurred an infinitely long time ago, the model becomes an “isolation after migration” model, describing completely isolated descendant populations which arose from a subdivided ancestral population. The probability density function of the coalescence time of a pair of genes and the probability distribution of the number of pairwise nucleotide differences are derived for both models. Whilst these are theoretical results of interest in their own right, they also give an exact analytical expression for the likelihood, for data consisting of the numbers of nucleotide differences between pairs of DNA sequences where each pair is at a different, independent locus. The behaviour of the distribution of the number of pairwise nucleotide differences under these models is illustrated and compared to the corresponding distributions under the “isolation with migration” and “complete isolation” models. It is shown that the distribution of the number of nucleotide differences between a pair of DNA sequences from different descendant populations in the model of “isolation with an initial period of migration” can be quite different from that under the “isolation with migration model”, even if the average migration rate over time (and hence the total number of migrants) is the same in both scenarios. It is also illustrated how the results can be extended to other demographic scenarios that can be described by a combination of isolated panmictic populations and “symmetric island” models.     

A model for the coordinated stepping of cytoplasmic dynein

Cytoplasmic dynein play an important role in transporting various intracellular cargos by coupling their ATP hydrolysis cycle with their conformational changes. Recent experimental results showed that the cytoplasmic dynein had a highly variable stepping pattern including “hand-over-hand”, “inchworm” and “nonalternating-inchworm”. Here, we developed a model to describe the coordinated stepping patterns of cytoplasmic dynein, based on its working cycle, construction and the interaction between its leading head and tailing head. The kinetic model showed how change in the distance between the two heads influences the rate of cytoplasmic dynein under different stepping patterns. Numerical simulations of the distribution of step size and striding rate are in good quantitative agreement with experimental observations. Hence, our coordinated stepping model for cytoplasmic dynein successfully explained its diverse stepping patterns as a molecular motor. The cooperative mechanism carried out by the two heads of cytoplasmic dynein shed light on the strategies adopted by the cytoplasmic dynein in executing various functions.     

The option to leave: Conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation

Conditional dissociation, i.e. the option to leave an interacting partner in response to his behaviour, is a mechanism that has been shown to promote cooperation in several settings, but the fundamental features that make conditional dissociation work in this way are not yet fully understood. This paper identifies some of the key conditions that make conditional dissociation lead to high levels of cooperation, explains how this mechanism can support the evolutionary coexistence of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour typically observed in nature, and provides an analytical formula to estimate the expected degree of cooperation thus achieved. Our model involves a population of individuals who are paired to play an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. All individuals share the same capacity to react to the action previously chosen by their partner and, without any other a priori constraint or exclusion, they may use any behavioural rule that is compatible with this capacity. The dynamic evolution of the population eventually enters either a non-cooperative or a partially cooperative regime, depending mainly on the expected lifetime of individuals. Whenever the partially cooperative regime materializes, the cornerstone of its long-run stability is the coexistence of defectors and “Out-for-Tat” strategists, the latter being those who start cooperating and respond to defection by merely leaving. We find, therefore, that conditional dissociation is the essential disciplinary device supporting cooperation, whilst other conditional strategies (such as Tit-for-Tat) remain present only in small population shares. These conclusions are obtained both by extensive numerical simulations and through analytical mean-field methods that approximate the stochastic simulation dynamics and deliver accurate predictions for general parameter configurations.     

Le Moustérien de Grèce à la lumière des récentes recherches

Thanks to recent research and the re-evaluation of the archaeological material coming from older research, the Mousterian of Greece has started to become better known. Aside the surface findings, which testify the presence of Mousterian throughout the entire continental Greece, only five Middle Paleolithic sites have been excavated. Almost every remnant has been dated to the last ice age. All lithics belong to the “typical” Mousterian, while the Quina Mousterian has not been certainly testified. The Levallois method is almost always present, more or less frequent, but always dominated by non-Levallois methods. The recurrent variations, mostly centripetal, have been more frequently used. The “Micromousterian” of Asprochaliko is the only lithic assemblage from which the Levallois method is absent.     

The Art of War: Beyond Memory-one Strategies in Population Games

We show that the history of play in a population game contains exploitable information that can be successfully used by sophisticated strategies to defeat memory-one opponents, including zero determinant strategies. The history allows a player to label opponents by their strategies, enabling a player to determine the population distribution and to act differentially based on the opponent’s strategy in each pairwise interaction. For the Prisoner’s Dilemma, these advantages lead to the natural formation of cooperative coalitions among similarly behaving players and eventually to unilateral defection against opposing player types. We show analytically and empirically that optimal play in population games depends strongly on the population distribution. For example, the optimal strategy for a minority player type against a resident TFT population is ALLC, while for a majority player type the optimal strategy versus TFT players is ALLD. Such behaviors are not accessible to memory-one strategies. Drawing inspiration from Sun Tzu’s the Art of War, we implemented a non-memory-one strategy for population games based on techniques from machine learning and statistical inference that can exploit the history of play in this manner. Via simulation we find that this strategy is essentially uninvadable and can successfully invade (significantly more likely than a neutral mutant) essentially all known memory-one strategies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, including ALLC (always cooperate), ALLD (always defect), tit-for-tat (TFT), win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS), and zero determinant (ZD) strategies, including extortionate and generous strategies.     

Probing the perils of dichotomous binning: how categorizing female dogs as spayed or intact can misinform our assumptions about the lifelong health consequences of ovariohysterectomy

In 2009, we reported findings from the first study evaluating the relationship between canine longevity and number of years of lifetime ovary exposure. All previous studies examining gonadal influences on canine longevity relied upon categorizing females as “intact” or “spayed” based on gonadal status at the time of death. Our study of Rottweilers generated a novel result: Keeping ovaries longer was associated with living longer. This result challenged previous assumptions that spayed females live longer. In the present investigation, we explored a methodological explanation for the apparent contradiction between our results and those of others, so we might better understand the impact that timing of spaying has on longevity. We hypothesized that naming female dogs as “spayed” or “intact” based upon gonadal status at time of death – a method we refer to as dichotomous binning – inadequately represents important biological differences in lifetime ovary exposure among bitches spayed at different ages. This hypothesis predicts that a strong relationship between years of lifetime ovary exposure and longevity in a population could be obscured by categorizing females as spayed or intact. Herein, we provide support for this hypothesis by reanalyzing longevity data from 183 female Rottweilers. In this study population, there was a three-fold increased likelihood of exceptional longevity (living ≥13 yr) associated with the longest duration of ovary exposure. However, categorizing females in this population as spayed or intact yielded the spurious, contradictory assertion that spayed females (presumed to have the least ovary exposure) are more likely to reach exceptional longevity than those that are intact. Thus, by ignoring the timing of spaying in each bitch, the inference from these data was distorted. It follows from this new understanding that dichotomous binning—naming females as spayed or intact—is inadequate for representing lifetime ovary exposure, introducing misclassification bias that can generate misleading assumptions regarding the lifelong health consequences of ovariohysterectomy.     

Evolutionary dynamics of biological auctions

Many scenarios in the living world, where individual organisms compete for winning positions (or resources), have properties of auctions. Here we study the evolution of bids in biological auctions. For each auction, n individuals are drawn at random from a population of size N. Each individual makes a bid which entails a cost. The winner obtains a benefit of a certain value. Costs and benefits are translated into reproductive success (fitness). Therefore, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We compare two types of auctions. In “biological all-pay auctions”, the costs are the bid for every participating individual. In “biological second price all-pay auctions”, the cost for everyone other than the winner is the bid, but the cost for the winner is the second highest bid. Second price all-pay auctions are generalizations of the “war of attrition” introduced by Maynard Smith. We study evolutionary dynamics in both types of auctions. We calculate pairwise invasion plots and evolutionarily stable distributions over the continuous strategy space. We find that the average bid in second price all-pay auctions is higher than in all-pay auctions, but the average cost for the winner is similar in both auctions. In both cases, the average bid is a declining function of the number of participants, n. The more individuals participate in an auction the smaller is the chance of winning, and thus expensive bids must be avoided.     

Amino-terminal domain interactions of lambda integrase on arm-type DNA

In contrast to the other tyrosine recombinase family members, integrase protein (Int) of bacteriophage λ has an additional amino-terminal domain that binds to “arm-type” DNA sequences distant from those involved in strand exchange. The homomeric interaction between neighboring amino-terminal domains of Int is contributed by R30-D71 salt-bridge in a non-equivalent manner on Holliday-junction intermediates. In this report, R30 and D71 residues were investigated in regard to Int’s cooperative binding to “arm-type” DNA and the attenuating function of “arm-type” DNA. The results suggest the electrostatic interaction between residues 30 and 71 is dependent on “arm-type” DNA and contributes the “selective” inhibition of catalytic activity of λ Int by “arm-type” DNA.     

Exploitation or cooperation? Evolution of a host (ciliate)-benefiting alga in a long-term experimental microcosm culture

Controversy persists as to whether the acquisition of beneficial metabolic functions via endosymbiosis can occur suddenly on an evolutionary time scale. In this study, an early stage of endosymbiotic associations, which evolved from previously unassociated auto (photo)- and heterotrophic unicellular organisms was analyzed using an experimental ecosystem model, called CET microcosm. This ecosystem model was composed of a green alga (Micractinium sp.; formerly described as Chlorella vulgaris), a bacterium (Escherichia coli), and a ciliate (Tetrahymena thermophila). Our previous study using a CET microcosm that was cultured 3–5 years revealed that fitness of the ciliate increased by harboring algal cells within its own cells. This fact suggested three possibilities: (i) the ciliate evolved the ability to exploit intracellular algal cells (“exploiter ciliate hypothesis”), (ii) the alga evolved the ability to benefit the host ciliate by providing photosynthates (“cooperator alga hypothesis”), and (iii) a combination of (i) and (ii). To test these hypotheses, two-by-two co-cultures were conducted between the ancestral or derived ciliate and the ancestral or derived alga. The experimental results demonstrated that a cooperative alga evolved in the microcosm, although the possibility remains that an exploitative genotype of the ciliate might also exist in the population as a polymorphism. Remarkably, an algal isolate prolonged the longevity of not only the isolated ciliate, but also the ancestral ciliate. This result suggests that once a cooperative algal genotype evolves in a local population, it can then be transmitted to other individuals of the prospective host species and spread rapidly beyond the local range due to its positive effect on the host fitness. Such transmission suggests the possibility of a sudden acquisition of beneficial autotrophic function by the pre-associated host.     

Social learning in cooperative dilemmas

Helping is a cornerstone of social organization and commonplace in human societies. A major challenge for the evolutionary sciences is to explain how cooperation is maintained in large populations with high levels of migration, conditions under which cooperators can be exploited by selfish individuals. Cultural group selection models posit that such large-scale cooperation evolves via selection acting on populations among which behavioural variation is maintained by the cultural transmission of cooperative norms. These models assume that individuals acquire cooperative strategies via social learning. This assumption remains empirically untested. Here, I test this by investigating whether individuals employ conformist or payoff-biased learning in public goods games conducted in 14 villages of a forager–horticulturist society, the Pahari Korwa of India. Individuals did not show a clear tendency to conform or to be payoff-biased and are highly variable in their use of social learning. This variation is partly explained by both individual and village characteristics. The tendency to conform decreases and to be payoff-biased increases as the value of the modal contribution increases. These findings suggest that the use of social learning in cooperative dilemmas is contingent on individuals'' circumstances and environments, and question the existence of stably transmitted cultural norms of cooperation.     

Can dogs (Canis familiaris) detect human deception?

In a series of experiments, dogs were allowed to choose between two containers, one of which contained a food reward. In Experiments 1 and 2, a cooperative human tester pointed to the baited container on half the trials, and a deceptive human tester pointed to the empty container on the other half of the trials. Dogs learned to approach the cooperator more often than the deceiver. Inanimate cues (black and white boxes) were used as the “cooperator” and “deceiver” in Experiment 3. As was the case in Experiments 1 and 2, the dogs learned to approach the “cooperator” box more often than the “deceiver” box. Thus, the experiments indicate that dogs are sensitive to the correlation between cues and their outcomes but offer no support for the idea that dogs understand human intentionality.     

Lattice Structure of Cytoplasmic Microtubules in a Cultured Mammalian Cell

Tubulin can polymerize in two distinct arrangements: “B-lattices,” in which the α-tubulins of one protofilament lie next to α-tubulins in the neighboring protofilaments, or the “A” configuration, where α-tubulins lie beside β-tubulins. Microtubules (MTs) in flagellar axonemes and those assembled from pure tubulin in vitro display only B-lattices, but recent work shows that A-lattices are found when tubulin co-polymerizes in vitro with an allele of end-binding protein 1 that lacks C-terminal sequences. This observation suggests that cytoplasmic MTs, which form in the presence of this “tip-associating protein,” may have A-lattices. To test this hypothesis, we have decorated interphase MTs in 3T3 cells with monomeric motor domains from the kinesin-like protein Eg5. These MTs show only B-lattices, as confirmed by visual inspection of electron cryo-tomograms and power spectra of single projection views, imaged at higher electron dose. This result is significant because 13 protofilament MTs with B-lattices must include a “seam,” one lateral domain where adjacent dimers are in the A-configuration. It follows that cytoplasmic MTs are not cylindrically symmetric; they have two distinct faces, which may influence the binding patterns of functionally significant MT-interacting proteins.