Reforming the NHS reforms.

Rather than improving efficiency, the reforms imposed on the NHS have increased bureaucracy, reduced patient choice, limited the range of core services, and led to inequity of treatment. In this paper I examine how the medical profession might help to solve these problems. Priorities must be set for health care since no government can afford all the possibilities offered by medical science. It is essential to forge a consensus of patients, carers, professionals, the public, and government if a system of priorities is to be equitable and just. We also need to be able to measure quality of outcome in health care. This requires consensus on what is the desired outcome and the development of appropriate guidelines, audit, and performance review. This is primarily a task for the health professions supported by management and by adequate investment. Basically, the government must reinstate the three traditional values of the NHS--equity, consensus, and regard for representative professional advice.     

OxDONS syndrome: the inevitable disease of the NHS reforms.

The financial demise of Oxford''s department of neurosurgery (OxDONS) was precipitated by the financial rules of the reformed NHS. In particular it was produced by the failure of "resources to follow patients"; the requirement that "prices have to follow costs"; and the use of private income for revenue expenditure, not capital expenditure. This process will eventually affect all hospital departments, but it affected the unit in Oxford sooner as it started as "efficient"--that is, underresourced--and has depended on income from extracontractual referrals and private work. Current NHS accounting rules act as a disincentive to private income being generated in NHS hospitals, and consultants should be aware of this.     

Can the NHS cope in future?

Four potential pressures are likely to determine whether the NHS will be able to cope in future: the change in population structure, changes in level of morbidity, introduction of new technologies, and increasing expectations of patients and NHS providers. New technology and changes in expectations are likely to have the biggest effect and are also the most difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, these pressures are to some extent amenable to control. If the growth in funding continues as it has in the past there is no convincing evidence that the NHS will not continue to cope.     

Institutions, incentives and the future of fisheries

Fisheries around the world are managed with a broad range of institutional structures. Some of these have been quite disastrous, whereas others have proven both biologically and economically successful. Unsuccessful systems have generally involved either open access, attempts at top-down control with poor ability to monitor and implement regulations, or reliance on consensus. Successful systems range from local cooperatives to strong governmental control, to various forms of property rights, but usually involve institutional systems that provide incentives to individual operators that lead to behaviour consistent with conservation.     

Impact of the NHS reforms on English hospital productivity: an analysis of the first three years.

OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the effect of purchaser mix, market competition, and trust status on hospital productivity within the NHS internal market. METHODS: Hospital cost and activity data were taken from routinely collected data for acute NHS hospitals in England for 1991-2 to 1993-4. Cross sectional and longitudinal regression methods were used to estimate the effect of trust status, competition, and purchaser mix on average hospital costs per inpatient, after adjusting for outpatient activity levels, casemix, teaching activity, regional salary variation, hospital size, scale of activity, and scope of cases treated. RESULTS: Real productivity gains were apparent across the study period for NHS hospitals on average. Casemix adjustment drastically improved cross sectional comparisons between hospitals. Gaining trust status and increasing host district purchaser share were associated with productivity increases after adjustment for casemix, regional salary differences, and hospital size and scope. Hospitals that became trusts during the study period were on average less productive at the beginning of the period than those that did not, and there were no significant productivity differences between trust waves at the end of the period in 1993-4. Market concentration was not associated with productivity differences. CONCLUSION: Further analysis is needed to determine whether overall and trust associated productivity gains are transient effects, one off shifts, or self perpetuating reorientations of organisational behaviour. Hospitals may have chosen to become trusts because they anticipated being able to increase productivity. Increases in the proportions of small purchasers were associated with increasing costs. Importantly, this study could not adjust for changes in the quality of care.