共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Rational desires and the limitation of life-sustaining treatment 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Savulescu J 《Bioethics》1994,8(3):191-222
It is accepted that treatment of previously competent, now incompetent patients can be limited if that is what the patient would desire, if she were now competent. Expressed past preferences or an advance directive are often taken to constitute sufficient evidence of what a patient would now desire. I distinguish between desires and rational desires. I argue that for a desire to be an expression of a person's autonomy, it must be or satisfy that person's rational desires. A person rationally desires a course of action if that person desires it while being in possession of all available relevant facts, without committing relevant error of logic, and "vividly imagining" what its consequences would be like for her. I argue that some competent, expressed desires obstruct autonomy. I show that several psychological mechanisms operate to prevent a person rationally evaluating what future life in a disabled state would be like. Rational evaluation is difficult. However, treatment limitation, if it is to respect autonomy, must be in accord with a patient's rational desires, and not merely her expressed desires. I illustrate the implications of these arguments for the use of advance directives and for the treatment of competent patients. 相似文献
2.
Constable C 《Bioethics》2012,26(3):157-163
In the United States, the decision of whether to withdraw or continue to provide artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) for patients in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) is placed largely in the hands of surrogate decision-makers, such as spouses and immediate family members. This practice would seem to be consistent with a strong national emphasis on autonomy and patient-centered healthcare. When there is ambiguity as to the patient's advanced wishes, the presumption has been that decisions should weigh in favor of maintaining life, and therefore, that it is the withdrawal rather than the continuation of ANH that requires particular justification. I will argue that this default position should be reversed. Instead, I will argue that the burden of justification lies with those who would continue artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH), and in the absence of knowledge as to the patient's advanced wishes, it is better to discontinue ANH. In particular, I will argue that among patients in PVS, there is not a compelling interest in being kept alive; that in general, we commit a worse violation of autonomy by continuing ANH when the patient's wishes are unknown; and that more likely than not, the maintenance of ANH as a bridge to a theoretical future time of recovery goes against the best interests of the patient. 相似文献
3.
Liberal rationalism and medical decision-making 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Savulescu J 《Bioethics》1997,11(2):115-129
I contrast Robert Veatch's recent liberal vision of medical decision-making with a more rationalist liberal model. According to Veatch, physicians are biased in their determination of what is in their patient's overall interests in favour of their medical interests. Because of the extent of this bias, we should abandon the practice of physicians offering what they guess to be the best treatment option. Patients should buddy up with physicians who share the same values —'deep value pairing'. The goal of choice is maximal promotion of patient values. I argue that if subjectivism about value and valuing is true, this move is plausible. However, if objectivism about value is true — that there really are states which are good for people regardless of whether they desire to be in them — then we should accept a more rationalist liberal alternative. According to this alternative, what is required to decide which course is best is rational dialogue between physicians and patients, both about the patient's circumstances and her values, and not the seeking out of people, physicians or others, who share the same values. Rational discussion requires that physicians be reasonable and empathic. I describe one possible account of a reasonable physician. 相似文献
4.
This paper argues against the continued practice of Confucian familism, even in its moderate form, in East Asian hospitals. According to moderate familism, a physician acting in concert with the patient's family may withhold diagnostic information from the patient, and may give it to the patient's family members without her prior approval. There are two main approaches to defend moderate familism: one argues that it can uphold patient's autonomy and protect her best interests; the other appeals to cultural relativism by construing the principle of 'family autonomy' to be incommensurable with that of individual autonomy. We respond to the first approach by explaining how the familist arguments either depend on some unreasonable assumptions or simply fail to articulate. The critique of the second approach is based on our recent survey showing that there is no dichotomy of relevant values between the East and the West: we believe that the result can effectively block the familist's reliance on certain traditional or cultural values to explain their resistance to the incorporation of pluralist values. Despite our disagreement with familism, we consider the Eastern emphasis on the family to be conducive to the communication between patient, family members and medical personnel, which is indispensible to the patient's well being and autonomy. We conclude that respect for patient autonomy is perfectly consistent with the involvement of the family in making medical decision as long as the family plays a merely consultant role. 相似文献
5.
Purvis TE 《The Yale journal of biology and medicine》2012,85(2):271-284
In 1994, Oregon passed the Oregon Death With Dignity Act, becoming the first state in the nation to allow physician-assisted suicide (PAS). This paper compares the public discussion that occurred in 1994 and during the Act's implementation in 1997 and examines these debates in relation to health care reform under the Obama administration. I argue that the 1994 and 1997 Oregon PAS campaigns and the ensuing public debate represent the culmination of a growing lack of deference to medical authority, concerns with the doctor-patient relationship, and a desire for increased patient autonomy over decisions during death. The public debate over PAS in Oregon underscored the conflicts among competing religious, political, and personal interests. More visible and widespread than any other American debate on PAS, the conflict in Oregon marked the beginning of the now nationwide problem of determining if and when a terminally ill person can choose to die. 相似文献
6.
Illingworth PM 《Bioethics》1988,2(1):22-36
A model of the physician patient relationship based on friendship is evaluated in terms of how it serves the interests of patients. The author maintains that this model violates the autonomy of patients who do not want to be friends with their physicians and also diminishes the autonomy of those who seek friendship with their physicians because such a desire is based on "psychological oppression," that is, the "internalization of intimations of inferiority." Ilingworth concludes that an autonomy enhancing model would be one that is open-ended, that accommodates individual patient preferences, and that embraces patient participation. 相似文献
7.
Wicclair MR 《Bioethics》1991,5(2):91-104
Although certain requisites of patient decision-making competency are generally agreed upon, there is no universally recognized standard. Wicclair, of the University of West Virginia Department of Philosophy, offers two reasons why a single standard should not be determined. First, competency is variable according to the decision at hand, i.e., task-related. Second, arguments in support of risk-related criteria fail. Wicclair challenges claims that a risk-related standard is legally the most feasible, is supported by the doctrine of informed consent, is consistent with everyday competence judgments, and achieves the best compromise between patient autonomy and concern for patient well-being. He argues that where risk is high, such a standard threatens unattainable requirements for competency; and where it is low, offers no set minimum, resulting in overly weak competency standards. Wicclair concludes that the standard of decision-making capacity should not vary by risk perceived. 相似文献
8.
9.
SARA GOERING 《Bioethics》2009,23(1):9-19
New parents suddenly come face to face with myriad issues that demand careful attention but appear in a context unlikely to provide opportunities for extended or clear-headed critical reflection, whether at home with a new baby or in the neonatal intensive care unit. As such, their capacity for autonomy may be compromised. Attending to new parental autonomy as an extension of reproductive autonomy, and as a complicated phenomenon in its own right rather than simply as a matter to be balanced against other autonomy rights, can help us to see how new parents might be aided in their quest for competency and good decision making. In this paper I show how a relational view of autonomy – attentive to the coercive effects of oppressive social norms and to the importance of developing autonomy competency, especially as related to self-trust – can improve our understanding of the situation of new parents and signal ways to cultivate and to better respect their autonomy. 相似文献
10.
There are three lines of argument in defence of coercive treatment of patients with mental disorders: arguments regarding (1) societal interests to protect others, (2) the patients' own health interests, and (3) patient autonomy. In this paper, we analyse these arguments in relation to an idealized case, where a person with a mental disorder claims not to want medical treatment for religious reasons. We also discuss who should decide what in situations where patients with mental disorders deny treatment on seemingly rational grounds. We conclude that, in principle, coercive treatment cannot be defended for the sake of protecting others. While coercive actions can be acceptable in order to protect close family and others, medical treatment is not justified for such reasons but should be given only in the interest of patients. Coercive treatment may be required in order to promote the patient's health interests, but health interests have to waive if they go against the autonomous interests of the patient. We argue that non-autonomous patients can have reasons, rooted in their deeply-set values, to renounce compulsory institutional treatment, and that such reasons should be respected unless it can be assumed that their new predicaments have caused them to change their views. 相似文献
11.
JILLIAN CRAIGIE 《Bioethics》2011,25(6):326-333
According to the principle of patient autonomy, patients have the right to be self‐determining in decisions about their own medical care, which includes the right to refuse treatment. However, a treatment refusal may legitimately be overridden in cases where the decision is judged to be incompetent. It has recently been proposed that in assessments of competence, attention should be paid to the evaluative judgments that guide patients' treatment decisions. In this paper I examine this claim in light of theories of practical rationality, focusing on the difficult case of an anorexic person who is judged to be competent and refuses treatment, thereby putting themselves at risk of serious harm. I argue that the standard criteria for competence assess whether a treatment decision satisfies the goals of practical decision‐making, and that this same criterion can be applied to a patient's decision‐guiding commitments. As a consequence I propose that a particular understanding of practical rationality offers a theoretical framework for justifying involuntary treatment in the anorexia case. 相似文献
12.
Shaw D 《Bioethics》2012,26(5):267-274
Advance directives (ADs), which are also sometimes referred to as 'living wills', are statements made by a person that indicate what treatment she should not be given in the event that she is not competent to consent or refuse at the future moment in question. As such, ADs provide a way for patients to make decisions in advance about what treatments they do not want to receive, without doctors having to find proxy decision-makers or having recourse to the doctrine of necessity. While patients can request particular treatments in an AD, only refusals are binding. This paper will examine whether ADs safeguard the autonomy and best interests of the incompetent patient, and whether legislating for the use of ADs is justified, using the specific context of the legal situation in the United Kingdom to illustrate the debate. The issue of whether the law should permit ADs is itself dependent on the issue of whether ADs are ethically justified; thus we must answer a normative question in order to answer the legislative one. It emerges that ADs suffer from two major problems, one related to autonomy and one to consent. First, ADs' emphasis on precedent autonomy effectively sentences some people who want to live to death. Second, many ADs might not meet the standard criteria for informed refusal of treatment, because they fail on the crucial criterion of sufficient information. Ultimately, it transpires that ADs are typically only appropriate for patients who temporarily lose physical or mental capacity. 相似文献
13.
ALAN WERTHEIMER 《Bioethics》2013,27(2):105-116
What I call ‘the standard view’ claims that IRBs should not regard financial payment as a benefit to subjects for the purpose of risk/benefit assessment. Although the standard view is universally accepted, there is little defense of that view in the canonical documents of research ethics or the scholarly literature. This paper claims that insofar as IRBs should be concerned with the interests and autonomy of research subjects, they should reject the standard view and adopt ‘the incorporation view.’ The incorporation view is more consistent with the underlying soft‐paternalist justification for risk‐benefit assessment and demonstrates respect for the autonomy of prospective subjects. Adoption of the standard view precludes protocols that advance the interests of subjects, investigators, and society. After considering several objections to the argument, I consider several arguments for the standard view that do not appeal to the interests and autonomy of research subjects. 相似文献
14.
Patient autonomy, as exercised in the informed consent process, is a central concern in bioethics. The typical bioethicist's analysis of autonomy centers on decisional capacity--finding the line between autonomy and its absence. This approach leaves unexplored the structure of reasoning behind patient treatment decisions. To counter that approach, we present a microeconomic theory of patient decision-making regarding the acceptable level of medical treatment from the patient's perspective. We show that a rational patient's desired treatment level typically departs from the level yielding an absence of symptoms, the level we call ideal. This microeconomic theory demonstrates why patients have good reason not to pursue treatment to the point of absence of physical symptoms. We defend our view against possible objections that it is unrealistic and that it fails to adequately consider harm a patient may suffer by curtailing treatment. Our analysis is fruitful in various ways. It shows why decisions often considered unreasonable might be fully reasonable. It offers a theoretical account of how physician misinformation may adversely affect a patient's decision. It shows how billing costs influence patient decision-making. It indicates that health care professionals' beliefs about the 'unreasonable' attitudes of patients might often be wrong. It provides a better understanding of patient rationality that should help to ensure fuller information as well as increased respect for patient decision-making. 相似文献
15.
Andrea Rodríguez-Prat Cristina Monforte-Royo Josep Porta-Sales Xavier Escribano Albert Balaguer 《PloS one》2016,11(3)
Background
Research in the end-of-life context has explored the sense of dignity experienced by patients with advanced disease, examining the factors associated with it. Whereas certain perspectives regard dignity as an intrinsic quality, independent of external factors, in the clinical setting it is generally equated with the person’s sense of autonomy and control, and it appears to be related to patients’ quality of life. This study aims to explore the relationship between perceived dignity, autonomy and sense of control in patients at the end of life.Methods
We conducted a systematic review and meta-ethnography using reciprocal translation and line-of-argument synthesis. The search strategy used MeSH terms in combination with free-text searching of the Pubmed, Web of Science, CINAHL, PsycINFO and Cochrane databases, from their inception until 2015. This identified 186 articles, after excluding duplicates. The inclusion criterion was primary qualitative studies in which dignity, autonomy and control at the end of life were explored. Studies were evaluated using the CASP guidelines.Results
Twenty-one studies recording the experiences of 400 participants were identified. Three themes emerged: a) dignity mediated by the loss of functionality, linked to the loss of control; b) dignity as identity; and c) autonomy as a determining factor of perceived dignity, understood as the desire for control over the dying process and the desire for self-determination. We propose an explanatory model which highlights that those patients with an intrinsic sense of dignity maintained a positive view of themselves in the face of their illness.Conclusion
This synthesis illustrates how dignity and autonomy are intertwined and can be perceived as a multidimensional concept, one that is close to the notion of personal identity. The ability to regard dignity as an intrinsic quality has a positive impact on patients, and the design of care strategies should take this into account. 相似文献16.
Lethal injection,autonomy and the proper ends of medicine 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Silver D 《Bioethics》2003,17(2):205-211
Gerald Dworkin has argued that it is inconsistent with the proper ends of medicine for a physician to participate in an execution by lethal injection. He does this by proposing a principle by which we are to judge whether an action is consistent with the proper ends of medicine. I argue: (a) that this principle, if valid, does not show that it is inconsistent with the proper ends of medicine for a physician to participate in an execution by lethal injection; and (b) that this principle is not valid, and this is because it mistakenly views the promotion of patient autonomy as one of the proper ends of medicine. Rather, I propose, we should view respect for a patient's autonomy as a constraint on the pursuit of the proper ends of medicine, rather than as one of the proper ends itself. With this revised understanding of the proper ends of medicine, we can conclude that it is inconsistent with the proper ends of medicine for a physician to participate in an execution by lethal injection. 相似文献
17.
Davis JK 《Bioethics》2002,16(2):114-133
Does respect for autonomy imply respect for precedent autonomy? The principle of respect for autonomy requires us to respect a competent patient’s treatment preference, but not everyone agrees that it requires us to respect preferences formed earlier by a now‐incapacitated patient, such as those expressed in an advance directive. The concept of precedent autonomy, which concerns just such preferences, is problematic because it is not clear that we can still attribute to a now‐incapacitated patient a preference which that patient never disaffirmed but can no longer understand. If we cannot make that attribution, then perhaps we should not respect precedent autonomy – after all, how can you respect patient autonomy by giving patients what they no longer want, even if they never disaffirmed those wants? I argue that whether an earlier preference can still be attributed to a now‐incapacitated patient depends on the reasons behind the preference, for a preference includes (and is not merely supported by) the reasons behind it. When the considerations that served as reasons no longer exist, neither does the preference which included those reasons. In particular, if the considerations that served as reasons for the patient exist only under conditions where the patient retains full mental capacity, then once that capacity is lost, so are those reasons and the preference based upon them. I use this analysis of precedent autonomy to ascertain the merits of various approaches to advance medical decisionmaking, including Nancy Rhoden’s approach, approaches based on a Parfitian personal identity analysis, approaches based on soft paternalism, and approaches based on the stability and longevity of preferences. Despite the apparent absurdity of respecting patient autonomy by giving patients what they no longer prefer but have never disaffirmed, I conclude with some programmatic remarks on when and why respect for (precedent) autonomy nonetheless requires us to respect former preferences. 相似文献
18.
Choosing to refuse: patients' rights and psychotropic medication 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Radden J 《Bioethics》1988,2(2):83-102
The author discusses the position of the plaintiffs in Rogers v. Okin, a legal case in which it was argued that involuntarily committed mental patients have the right to refuse psychotropic medication. She expresses reservations about paternalistic justifications for forced medication that are based on authority, on loss of autonomy by the mentally ill, on overriding autonomy for the patient's good, on the 'self paternalism' of the psychiatric will, and on intervention as restoring autonomy. Radden argues that the patient's right to choose is supported by an extension of the concept of competence to include competence to judge an issue. She asserts that neither patients nor physicians have sufficient knowledge of the side effects of psychotropic drugs to make rational decisions. Since neither possesses proper competence, the patient should choose. 相似文献
19.
D S Fischer 《The Yale journal of biology and medicine》1992,65(2):105-120
Progress in medical diagnosis and therapy has raised new problems with far-reaching ethical implications. Medicine must remain a profession and not become a business. Textbooks must address ethical problems in the context of health care decisions and not restrict themselves to pathophysiology and practical therapeutics alone. The relative roles of the principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice must be balanced and appropriately applied to individual situations in biomedical ethics. When therapy becomes futile and the suffering of the patient does not justify any anticipated benefit, the patient (and/or patient surrogate) may request withholding or even withdrawing life-prolonging interventions. In the persistent vegetative state, even nutritional support by an unnatural (tube) route may ethically be denied at the patient's (or surrogate's) informed decision. New areas of ethical evaluation have been raised by the desire of some individuals to prolongation of their lives at high expense to the society such that other individuals are denied services because of limitation of available resources. There has been a long-standing conflict of interest between the acceptance by physicians and/or medical institutions of money or gifts from pharmaceutical companies whose drugs they prescribe, stock, or sell. This practice increases the cost of the drugs and is, in effect, a "sick tax," which is morally wrong. 相似文献
20.
Ben Saunders 《Bioethics》2021,35(1):90-97
Douglas Diekema influentially argues that interference with parental decisions is not in fact guided by the child’s best interests, but rather by a more permissive standard, which he calls the harm principle. This article first seeks to clarify this alternative position and defend it against certain existing criticisms, before offering a new criticism and alternative. This ‘harm principle’ has been criticized for (i) lack of adequate moral grounding, and (ii) being as indeterminate as the best interest standard that it seeks to replace. I argue that these are not serious problems. I take Diekema’s negative point to be right—our actual standard for intervention is not literally the best interests of the child—but I disagree with his proposed replacement. First, Diekema’s proposed harm threshold should be more carefully distinguished from Mill’s harm principle. Second, there is no reason to assume that the standard for permissible intervention coincides with the threshold for harm (or serious harm). Thus, I propose that the best alternative to the best interests standard is not a harm principle, but rather a sufficiency threshold between adequate (or ‘good enough’) and inadequate (or ‘substandard’) parenting. 相似文献