Diagnosing Invasive Mold Infections: What Is Next

Purpose of Review

Currently, microbiological diagnosis of invasive mold infections is based largely on culture, direct microscopy, PCR, or antigen (such as β-D-glucan or galactomannan)-based tests. In this review, we look at novel and experimental diagnostic tests for invasive mold infections.

Recent Findings

Several new techniques have been proposed, and are in different stages of development. The JF5-antibody-based lateral flow device has recently been commercialized, and is closest to uptake in routine care. Other tests, such as the MAb476-antibody-based urine lateral flow device, gliotoxin or bis(methylthio)gliotoxin, mold-specific T cells, exhaled breath analysis, siderophores, mass spectrometry serum disaccharide, or cytokine analysis, are at an earlier stage of development.

Summary

Most proposed diagnostic tests for invasive mold infections are in the experimental stage and are not ready for routine clinical use. They still require further characterization and analytical and clinical validation by independent research groups.

     

Sumatran Orangutans and a Yellow-Cheeked Crested Gibbon Know What Is Where

In their natural habitats orangutans and gibbons have to solve spatial problems to find enough food, which is distributed over large areas and available at different times of the year. Therefore both species should evolve spatial memory skills to remember spatial locations and their content. We conducted 2 studies in a 1900-m² naturalistic outdoor enclosure. In the 1st study, we hid kiwi pieces in 10 different locations and placed kiwi pieces in a visible location. Individuals of both species approached significantly more food locations in the test condition than in the control condition in which no food was hidden. In the 2nd study, we hid 2 types of food in 10 different locations so that individuals had to remember which food type was where. We hid bananas on trees (banana condition) and grapes under bamboo shrubs (grape condition). We also placed oranges in full view (control condition) to rule out the possibility that finding food may automatically trigger an indiscriminate search. Individuals approached the banana locations more often in the banana than in the other 2 conditions. Some orangutans, but not the gibbon, also approached the grape locations more often in the grape than in the other 2 conditions. Individuals often returned to locations in which they previously found food and rarely revisited locations in the same session. We detected little influence of the food quantity and no influence of the distance to each location on the subjects' foraging behavior.     

How Sound Symbolism Is Processed in the Brain: A Study on Japanese Mimetic Words

Sound symbolism is the systematic and non-arbitrary link between word and meaning. Although a number of behavioral studies demonstrate that both children and adults are universally sensitive to sound symbolism in mimetic words, the neural mechanisms underlying this phenomenon have not yet been extensively investigated. The present study used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate how Japanese mimetic words are processed in the brain. In Experiment 1, we compared processing for motion mimetic words with that for non-sound symbolic motion verbs and adverbs. Mimetic words uniquely activated the right posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS). In Experiment 2, we further examined the generalizability of the findings from Experiment 1 by testing another domain: shape mimetics. Our results show that the right posterior STS was active when subjects processed both motion and shape mimetic words, thus suggesting that this area may be the primary structure for processing sound symbolism. Increased activity in the right posterior STS may also reflect how sound symbolic words function as both linguistic and non-linguistic iconic symbols.     

What We Expect Is Not Always What We Get: Evidence for Both the Direction-of-Change and the Specific-Stimulus Hypotheses of Auditory Attentional Capture

Participants were requested to respond to a sequence of visual targets while listening to a well-known lullaby. One of the notes in the lullaby was occasionally exchanged with a pattern deviant. Experiment 1 found that deviants capture attention as a function of the pitch difference between the deviant and the replaced/expected tone. However, when the pitch difference between the expected tone and the deviant tone is held constant, a violation to the direction-of-pitch change across tones can also capture attention (Experiment 2). Moreover, in more complex auditory environments, wherein it is difficult to build a coherent neural model of the sound environment from which expectations are formed, deviations can capture attention but it appears to matter less whether this is a violation from a specific stimulus or a violation of the current direction-of-change (Experiment 3). The results support the expectation violation account of auditory distraction and suggest that there are at least two different expectations that can be violated: One appears to be bound to a specific stimulus and the other would seem to be bound to a more global cross-stimulus rule such as the direction-of-change based on a sequence of preceding sound events. Factors like base-rate probability of tones within the sound environment might become the driving mechanism of attentional capture—rather than violated expectations—in complex sound environments.     

On What It is to Fly Can Tell Us Something About What It is to Live

The plurality of definitions of life is often perceived as an unsatisfying situation stemming from still incomplete knowledge about ‘what it is to live’ as well as from the existence of a variety of methods for reaching a definition. For many, such plurality is to be remedied and the search for a unique and fully satisfactory definition of life pursued. In this contribution on the contrary, it is argued that the existence of such a variety of definitions of life undermines the very feasibility of ever reaching a unique unambiguous definition. It is argued that focusing on the definitions of specific types of ‘living systems’—somehow in the same way that one can define specific types of ‘flying systems’—could be more fruitful from a heuristic point of view than looking for ‘the’ right definition of life, and probably more accurate in terms of carving Nature at its joints.     

Dynamics of Type IV Pili Is Controlled by Switching Between Multiple States

Type IV pili are major bacterial virulence factors supporting adhesion, surface motility, and gene transfer. The polymeric pilus fiber is a highly dynamic molecular machine that switches between elongation and retraction. We used laser tweezers to investigate the dynamics of individual pili of Neisseria gonorrheae at clamped forces between 8 pN and 100 pN and at varying concentration of the retraction ATPase PilT. The elongation probability of individual pili increased with increasing mechanical force. Directional switching occurred on two distinct timescales, and regular stepping was absent on a scale > 3 nm. We found that the retraction velocity is bimodal and that the bimodality depends on force and on the concentration of PilT proteins. We conclude that the pilus motor is a multistate system with at least one polymerization mode and two depolymerization modes with the dynamics fine-tuned by force and PilT concentration.     

What We Observe Is Biased by What Other People Tell Us: Beliefs about the Reliability of Gaze Behavior Modulate Attentional Orienting to Gaze Cues

For effective social interactions with other people, information about the physical environment must be integrated with information about the interaction partner. In order to achieve this, processing of social information is guided by two components: a bottom-up mechanism reflexively triggered by stimulus-related information in the social scene and a top-down mechanism activated by task-related context information. In the present study, we investigated whether these components interact during attentional orienting to gaze direction. In particular, we examined whether the spatial specificity of gaze cueing is modulated by expectations about the reliability of gaze behavior. Expectations were either induced by instruction or could be derived from experience with displayed gaze behavior. Spatially specific cueing effects were observed with highly predictive gaze cues, but also when participants merely believed that actually non-predictive cues were highly predictive. Conversely, cueing effects for the whole gazed-at hemifield were observed with non-predictive gaze cues, and spatially specific cueing effects were attenuated when actually predictive gaze cues were believed to be non-predictive. This pattern indicates that (i) information about cue predictivity gained from sampling gaze behavior across social episodes can be incorporated in the attentional orienting to social cues, and that (ii) beliefs about gaze behavior modulate attentional orienting to gaze direction even when they contradict information available from social episodes.     

I See What You Mean: How Attentional Selection Is Shaped by Ascribing Intentions to Others

The ability to understand and predict others’ behavior is essential for successful interactions. When making predictions about what other humans will do, we treat them as intentional systems and adopt the intentional stance, i.e., refer to their mental states such as desires and intentions. In the present experiments, we investigated whether the mere belief that the observed agent is an intentional system influences basic social attention mechanisms. We presented pictures of a human and a robot face in a gaze cuing paradigm and manipulated the likelihood of adopting the intentional stance by instruction: in some conditions, participants were told that they were observing a human or a robot, in others, that they were observing a human-like mannequin or a robot whose eyes were controlled by a human. In conditions in which participants were made to believe they were observing human behavior (intentional stance likely) gaze cuing effects were significantly larger as compared to conditions when adopting the intentional stance was less likely. This effect was independent of whether a human or a robot face was presented. Therefore, we conclude that adopting the intentional stance when observing others’ behavior fundamentally influences basic mechanisms of social attention. The present results provide striking evidence that high-level cognitive processes, such as beliefs, modulate bottom-up mechanisms of attentional selection in a top-down manner.