Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game

Understanding the mechanisms that can lead to the evolution of cooperation through natural selection is a core problem in biology. Among the various attempts at constructing a theory of cooperation, game theory has played a central role. Here, we review models of cooperation that are based on two simple games: the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the Snowdrift game. Both games are two‐person games with two strategies, to cooperate and to defect, and both games are social dilemmas. In social dilemmas, cooperation is prone to exploitation by defectors, and the average payoff in populations at evolutionary equilibrium is lower than it would be in populations consisting of only cooperators. The difference between the games is that cooperation is not maintained in the Prisoner's Dilemma, but persists in the Snowdrift game at an intermediate frequency. As a consequence, insights gained from studying extensions of the two games differ substantially. We review the most salient results obtained from extensions such as iteration, spatial structure, continuously variable cooperative investments, and multi‐person interactions. Bridging the gap between theoretical and empirical research is one of the main challenges for future studies of cooperation, and we conclude by pointing out a number of promising natural systems in which the theory can be tested experimentally.     

Unpredictability induced by unfocused games in evolutionary game dynamics

Evolutionary game theory is a basis of replicator systems and has applications ranging from animal behavior and human language to ecosystems and other hierarchical network systems. Most studies in evolutionary game dynamics have focused on a single game, but, in many situations, we see that many games are played simultaneously. We construct a replicator equation with plural games by assuming that a reward of a player is a simple summation of the reward of each game. Even if the numbers of the strategies of the games are different, its dynamics can be described in one replicator equation. We here show that when players play several games at the same time, the fate of a single game cannot be determined without knowing the structures of the whole other games. The most absorbing fact is that even if a single game has a ESS (evolutionary stable strategy), the relative frequencies of strategies in the game does not always converge to the ESS point when other games are played simultaneously.     

医学科研资源管理中的博弈问题探讨

医学科研资源管理是医学科研的调控手段,涉及医学科研团队和医科管理部门之间的利益损益。基于利益差异的行为冲突就成为了制约医学科研顺利进行的主要因素之一。博弈理论的思想和方法适用于分析存在的互动关系的行为人决策过程及其规律,为解释医学科研进程中的利益冲突、分析医科管理缺陷的形成机理提供了很好的思路和方法。     

Spatial effects in social dilemmas

Social dilemmas and the evolutionary conundrum of cooperation are traditionally studied through various kinds of game theoretical models such as the prisoner's dilemma, public goods games, snowdrift games or by-product mutualism. All of them exemplify situations which are characterized by different degrees of conflicting interests between the individuals and the community. In groups of interacting individuals, cooperators produce a common good benefitting the entire group at some cost to themselves, whereas defectors attempt to exploit the resource by avoiding the costly contributions. Based on synergistic or discounted accumulation of cooperative benefits a unifying theoretical framework was recently introduced that encompasses all games that have traditionally been studied separately (Hauert, Michor, Nowak, Doebeli, 2005. Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas. J. Theor. Biol., in press.). Within this framework we investigate the effects of spatial structure with limited local interactions on the evolutionary fate of cooperators and defectors. The quantitative effects of space turn out to be quite sensitive to the underlying microscopic update mechanisms but, more general, we demonstrate that in prisoner's dilemma type interactions spatial structure benefits cooperation-although the parameter range is quite limited-whereas in snowdrift type interactions spatial structure may be beneficial too, but often turns out to be detrimental to cooperation.     

Focus: Addiction: Video Game Use in the Treatment of Amblyopia: Weighing the Risks of Addiction

Video games have surged in popularity due to their entertainment factor and, with recent innovation, their use in health care. This review explores the dual facets of video games in treating vision impairment in amblyopia as well as their potential for overuse and addiction. Specifically, this review examines video game addiction from a biopsychosocial perspective and relates the addictive qualities of video games with their use as a therapeutic treatment for amblyopia. Current literature supports both the identification of video game addiction as a disease, as well as the therapeutic potential of video games in clinical trials. We show the need for clinicians to be aware of the dangers associated with video game overuse and the need for future studies to examine the risks associated with their health care benefits.     

Social games between bonobos and humans: evidence for shared intentionality?

Triadic social games are interesting from a cognitive perspective because they require a high degree of mutual social awareness. They consist of two agents incorporating an object in turn-taking sequences and require individuals to coordinate their attention to the task, the object, and to one another. Social games are observed commonly in domesticated dogs interacting with humans, but they have received only little empirical attention in nonhuman primates. Here, we report observations of bonobos (Pan paniscus) engaging in social games with a human playmate. Our behavioral analyses revealed that the bonobos behaved in many ways similar to human children during these games. They were interested in the joint activity, rather than the play objects themselves, and used communicative gestures to encourage reluctant partners to perform their role, suggesting rudimentary understanding of others' intentions. Our observations thus may imply that shared intentionality, the ability to understand and shares intention with other individuals, has emerged in the primate lineage before the origins of hominids.     

Natural selection and veridical perceptions

Does natural selection favor veridical perceptions, those that more accurately depict the objective environment? Students of perception often claim that it does. But this claim, though influential, has not been adequately tested. Here we formalize the claim and a few alternatives. To test them, we introduce “interface games,” a class of evolutionary games in which perceptual strategies compete. We explore, in closed-form solutions and Monte Carlo simulations, some simpler games that assume frequency-dependent selection and complete mixing in infinite populations. We find that veridical perceptions can be driven to extinction by non-veridical strategies that are tuned to utility rather than objective reality. This suggests that natural selection need not favor veridical perceptions, and that the effects of selection on sensory perception deserve further study.     

Serious Games for Home Based Rehabilitation: Inertial Sensor Energy Consumption

Background

Serious games have recently immerged as a good tool for physical rehabilitation. This new technology can be used at home, to complement a traditional, clinic based, rehabilitation program. To implement a serious game at home, we need to use multiple sensors to record patients' data. Many serious games use visual motion capture techniques, like the Kinect camera, due to their low price and high portability. On the other hand, some other systems use inertial sensors to collect data at a higher degree of accuracy. In previous works, we showed that a serious gaming system could benefit from combining data from different sensors. However, the use of inertial sensors, in a home-based setting, remains a challenge since they need to be supplied by an independent battery source, which could influence the acceptability of such systems.

Paradoxical persistence through mixed-system dynamics: towards a unified perspective of reversal behaviours in evolutionary ecology

Counterintuitive dynamics of various biological phenomena occur when composite system dynamics differ qualitatively from that of their component systems. Such composite systems typically arise when modelling situations with time-varying biotic or abiotic conditions, and examples range from metapopulation dynamics to population genetic models. These biological, and related physical, phenomena can often be modelled as simple financial games, wherein capital is gained and lost through gambling. Such games have been developed and used as heuristic devices to elucidate the processes at work in generating seemingly paradoxical outcomes across a spectrum of disciplines, albeit in a field-specific, ad hoc fashion. Here, we propose that studying these simple games can provide a much deeper understanding of the fundamental principles governing paradoxical behaviours in models from a diversity of topics in evolution and ecology in which fluctuating environmental effects, whether deterministic or stochastic, are an essential aspect of the phenomenon of interest. Of particular note, we find that, for a broad class of models, the ecological concept of equilibrium reactivity provides an intuitive necessary condition that must be satisfied in order for environmental variability to promote population persistence. We contend that further investigations along these lines promise to unify aspects of the study of a range of topics, bringing questions from genetics, species persistence and coexistence and the evolution of bet-hedging strategies, under a common theoretical purview.     

Combining small-sided soccer games and running-based methods: A systematic review

Small-sided games (SSGs) are often used in soccer to produce acute physiological and physical responses, while a tactical/technical stimulus is also employed. However, due to some limitations of SSGs, researchers have been testing this method combined with running-based training methods. This systematic review was conducted to assess the effects of combined SSG and running-based methods on soccer players’ acute responses and adaptations after training interventions. A systematic review of Web of Science, PubMed, Cochrane Library, Scopus, and SPORTDiscus databases was performed according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. The database search initially identified 782 titles. From those, five articles were deemed eligible for the systematic review. The five included studies presented data from training load, reporting inconsistent greater values in combined SSG and running-based methods when compared to SSG-only formats. Considering the adaptations, studies comparing combined SSG and running-based methods with SSG-only methods revealed inconsistent differences in terms of the effects on aerobic performance and sprinting. Combining SSG and running-based methods can increase the acute mechanical load and high-intense running stimuli in players when compared to interventions that use only SSGs. However, the adaptations promoted by both methods are similar, and the differences are unclear. The order of combination (SSG and running-based method) does not seem to impact players’ adaptations; however, the frequency of sessions did have a meaningful impact.     

Invasion and expansion of cooperators in lattice populations: Prisoner's dilemma vs. snowdrift games

The evolution of cooperation is an enduring conundrum in biology and the social sciences. Two social dilemmas, the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game have emerged as the most promising mathematical metaphors to study cooperation. Spatial structure with limited local interactions has long been identified as a potent promoter of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma but in the spatial snowdrift game, space may actually enhance or inhibit cooperation. Here we investigate and link the microscopic interaction between individuals to the characteristics of the emerging macroscopic patterns generated by the spatial invasion process of cooperators in a world of defectors. In our simulations, individuals are located on a square lattice with Moore neighborhood and update their strategies by probabilistically imitating the strategies of better performing neighbors. Under sufficiently benign conditions, cooperators can survive in both games. After rapid local equilibration, cooperators expand quadratically until global saturation is reached. Under favorable conditions, cooperators expand as a large contiguous cluster in both games with minor differences concerning the shape of embedded defectors. Under less favorable conditions, however, distinct differences arise. In the prisoner's dilemma, cooperators break up into isolated, compact clusters. The compact clustering reduces exploitation and leads to positive assortment, such that cooperators interact more frequently with other cooperators than with defectors. In contrast, in the snowdrift game, cooperators form small, dendritic clusters, which results in negative assortment and cooperators interact more frequently with defectors than with other cooperators. In order to characterize and quantify the emerging spatial patterns, we introduce a measure for the cluster shape and demonstrate that the macroscopic patterns can be used to determine the characteristics of the underlying microscopic interactions.     

Dynamic-persistence of cooperation in public good games when group size is dynamic

The evolution of cooperation is possible with a simple model of a population of agents that can move between groups. The agents play public good games within their group. The relative fitness of individuals within the whole population affects their number of offspring. Groups of cooperators evolve but over time are invaded by defectors which eventually results in the group's extinction. However, for small levels of migration and mutation, high levels of cooperation evolve at the population level. Thus, evolution of cooperation based on individual fitness without kin selection, indirect or direct reciprocity is possible. We provide an analysis of the parameters that affect cooperation, and describe the dynamics and distribution of population sizes over time.     

How reinforcer type affects choice in economic games

Behavioral economists stress that experiments on judgment and decision-making using economic games should be played with real money if the results are to have generality. Behavior analysts have sometimes disputed this contention and have reported results in which hypothetical rewards and real money have produced comparable outcomes. We review studies that have compared hypothetical and real money and discuss the results of two relevant experiments. In the first, using the Sharing Game developed in our laboratory, subjects' choices differed markedly depending on whether the rewards were real or hypothetical. In the second, using the Ultimatum and Dictator Games, we again found sharp differences between real and hypothetical rewards. However, this study also showed that time off from a tedious task could serve as a reinforcer every bit as potent as money. In addition to their empirical and theoretical contributions, these studies make the methodological point that meaningful studies may be conducted with economic games without spending money: time off from a tedious task can serve as a powerful reward.     

Electronic Games and Environmental Factors Associated with Childhood Obesity in Switzerland

Objective: Environmental factors and behaviors associated with obesity have not been well described in children living in Europe. Although television watching has been repeatedly associated with obesity, it is unclear whether other sedentary activities, such as use of electronic games, are independently associated with obesity in children. The hypothesis was that various types of sedentary activities are associated with obesity in children living in Switzerland. Research Methods and Procedures: This was a cross‐sectional study of children (grades one to three) from four communities in the Greater Zurich Area (Switzerland). Obesity was defined as a combination of overweight (BMI) and overfat (skinfold thicknesses). Environmental factors were assessed by questionnaire. The children's physical activity was estimated by their teacher (scale 0 to 10). Results: Of 922 eligible subjects, 872 (94.6%) took part in the study. Use of electronic games [odds ratio (OR) = 2.03 per hour per day, 95% confidence interval (CI): 1.57 to 2.61, p < 0.001], television (OR = 2.83 per hour per day, 95% CI: 2.08 to 3.86, p < 0.001), physical activity (OR = 0.80 per unit, 95% CI: 0.72 to 0.88, p < 0.001), maternal work (OR = 1.93, 95% CI: 1.13 to 3.29, p = 0.02), and paternal smoking (OR = 1.78, 95% CI: 1.07 to 2.96, p = 0.03) were independently associated with obesity. Further adjustment for socioeconomic status, when available, did not change these results. Discussion: In this sample of children living in Switzerland, the use of electronic games was significantly associated with obesity, independently of confounding factors. The association of obesity with television use and lack of physical activity confirms results from other populations and points to potential strategies for obesity prevention.     

Variability of internal and external loads and technical/tactical outcomes during small-sided soccer games: a systematic review

Small-sided games (SSGs) are widely used in soccer training. However, some of the typical outcomes related to human responses during these games (namely internal and external load) may vary between sessions for similar practice conditions. Thus, the study of intra- and inter-bout variability in response to SSGs is progressively growing. This systematic review aimed to (1) identify studies that have examined the intra- and inter-session bouts’ variability levels regarding the internal and external load and technical/tactical outcomes during SSGs and (2) summarize the main evidence. A systematic review of PubMed, SPORTDiscus, Cochrane, and Web of Science databases was performed according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. From the 486 studies initially identified, 24 were fully reviewed, and their outcome measures were extracted and analyzed. Sixteen studies analyzed internal load, 13 studies analyzed external load variables, six studies analyzed technical execution, and two studies analyzed tactical behavior. All studies included SSGs with a range number of players between 2 to 14 (1 vs. 1 to 7 vs. 7 SSGs). Internal load and low-speed external load variables presented a low variability, while high variations were reported regarding the technical execution and high-speed external loads.     

How to reach linguistic consensus: a proof of convergence for the naming game

In this paper we introduce a mathematical model of naming games. Naming games have been widely used within research on the origins and evolution of language. Despite the many interesting empirical results these studies have produced, most of this research lacks a formal elucidating theory. In this paper we show how a population of agents can reach linguistic consensus, i.e. learn to use one common language to communicate with one another. Our approach differs from existing formal work in two important ways: one, we relax the too strong assumption that an agent samples infinitely often during each time interval. This assumption is usually made to guarantee convergence of an empirical learning process to a deterministic dynamical system. Two, we provide a proof that under these new realistic conditions, our model converges to a common language for the entire population of agents. Finally the model is experimentally validated.     

An Application of Evolutionary Game Theory to Social Dilemmas: The Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination Game

The Traveler''s Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler''s Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.     

Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium

We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two evolutionarily stable strategies: the efficient one in which the population is in a state with a maximal payoff and the risk-dominant one where players are averse to risk. We show that for a large range of parameters of our dynamics, even if the initial conditions in both habitats are in the basin of attraction of the risk-dominant equilibrium (with respect to the standard replication dynamics without migration), in the long run most individuals play the efficient strategy.     

Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics for n-person games

This note contains a generalization of the definition of an evolutionary stable strategy and of the corresponding game dynamics from 2-person to n-person games. This broader framework also allows modelling of several interacting populations or of populations containing different types of individuals, for example males and females.     

TV viewing, computer game playing and nightmares in school children.

Often the question arises whether TV viewing or playing computer games, especially those of violent and aggressive content, has negative effects on children's sleep patterns and dreaming. Empirical data on this topic, however, are scarce. Two hundred fifty-two schoolchildren (range: 9 to 13 years) completed a questionnaire about media use and nightmares. The findings indicates that interindividual differences in nightmare frequency were not explained by interindividual differences in TV viewing or computer game playing habits. In addition, no effect of the TV films the evening before completing the questionnaire on the dreams the subsequent night could be demonstrated. Since the approach could not rule out an effect of media use habits on nightmares, the next step will be a longitudinal study eliciting the media use habits and the occurrence of nightmares by applying self-rated scales as well as information obtained by parents. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)