Self-serving punishment of a common enemy creates a public good in reef fishes

A key challenge for evolutionary biologists is to determine conditions under which individuals benefit from a contribution to public goods [1, 2]. For humans, it has been observed that punishment of free riders may promote contributions [3,?4], but the conditions that lead to stable cooperation based on punishment remain hotly debated [5-8]. Here we present empirical evidence that public goods may emerge as a by-product of self-serving punishment in interactions between coral reef fishes and parasitic saber-tooth blennies that stealthily attack their fish victims from behind to take a bite [9]. We first show that chasing the blenny functions as punishment [10], because it decreases the probability of future attacks. We then provide evidence that in female scalefin anthias, a shoaling species, punishment creates a public good because it increases the probability that the parasite switches to another species for the next attack. A final experiment suggests that punishment is nevertheless self-serving because blennies appear to be able to discriminate between look-alike punishers and nonpunishers. Thus, individuals that do contribute to the public good may risk being identified by the parasite as easy targets for future attacks.     

Interactions Between Sabre‐Tooth Blennies and Their Reef Fish Victims: Effects Of Enforced Repeated Game Structure and Local Abundance on Victim Aggression

The conditions under which humans benefit from contributing to a public good have attracted great interest; in particular the potential role of punishment of cheaters is hotly debated. In contrast, similar studies on other animals are lacking. In this study, we describe for the first time how the course of interactions between parasitic sabre‐tooth blennies (the cheaters) and their reef fish victims can be used to study both punishment and the emergence of public goods. Sabre tooth blennies (Plagiotremus sp.) sneak up from behind to bite off small pieces of scales and/or mucus from other fish. Victims regularly show spontaneous aggression as well as aggressive responses to blenny attacks. In a between species comparison, we tested how the probability of chasing a blenny is affected by (1) the option of avoiding interactions with a blenny by avoiding its small territory, and (2) variation in local abundance of conspecifics. We found that resident victim species are more aggressive towards blennies than visiting species. This difference persisted when we controlled for victim size and territoriality, suggesting that it is the enforced repeated game structure that causes residents to chase blennies. In residents, we also found a negative correlation between aggression towards blennies and local abundance, which suggests that the benefits of chasing are diluted with increasing local abundance. We discuss the implication of these results for future studies.     

Individual Differences in Foraging Strategies of Parasitic Sabre-Tooth Blennies

Originally, evolutionary game theory typically predicted that optimal behaviour in a given situation is uniform or bimodal. However, the growing evidence that animals behave more variably while individuals may differ consistently in their behaviour, has led to the development of models that predict a distribution of strategies. Here we support the importance of such models in a study on a coral reef fish host–parasite system. Parasitic blennies (Plagiotremus sp.) regularly attack other fishes to bite off scales and mucus. Individuals of some victim species react to being bitten with punishing the parasite through aggressive chasing. Our field observations and laboratory experiments show that individual blennies differ markedly in how they incorporate being punished into their foraging decisions. We discuss how these differences may affect the payoff structure and hence the net effect of punishment on punishers and on the appearance of a public good for look-alikes.     

Multiscale habitat associations of detrivorous blennies (Blenniidae: Salariini)

The distribution and habitat associations of detrivorous blennies on a tropical coral reef were investigated at several spatial scales and compared with other fish that feed on the epilithic algal matrix to assess density and biomass contributions of small detrivorous fishes to these assemblages. At broad spatial scales total blenny abundance and biomass were highest on the tops of reefs exposed to prevailing winds. On the finer scale of microhabitat use, all species showed a preference for non-living corals, although the type of coral utilised differed between species. The high abundance of blennies on reef tops and non-living corals may be partially related to the quality and availability of detritus in these habitats. Comparisons of total blenny abundance and biomass with other territorial detrivores found that blennies accounted for approximately 60% of this functional group's density and 21% of their biomass on exposed reef tops. Overall, territorial detrivores were found to constitute approximately 37% of the density and 26% of the biomass of the detrivorous/herbivorous fish assemblage on exposed reef tops. Small detrivorous fish therefore represent a substantial proportion of fish assemblages that feed on epilithic algae and associated detritus on coral reefs.     

A general model of the public goods dilemma

An individually costly act that benefits all group members is a public good. Natural selection favours individual contribution to public goods only when some benefit to the individual offsets the cost of contribution. Problems of sex ratio, parasite virulence, microbial metabolism, punishment of noncooperators, and nearly all aspects of sociality have been analysed as public goods shaped by kin and group selection. Here, I develop two general aspects of the public goods problem that have received relatively little attention. First, variation in individual resources favours selfish individuals to vary their allocation to public goods. Those individuals better endowed contribute their excess resources to public benefit, whereas those individuals with fewer resources contribute less to the public good. Thus, purely selfish behaviour causes individuals to stratify into upper classes that contribute greatly to public benefit and social cohesion and to lower classes that contribute little to the public good. Second, if group success absolutely requires production of the public good, then the pressure favouring production is relatively high. By contrast, if group success depends weakly on the public good, then the pressure favouring production is relatively weak. Stated in this way, it is obvious that the role of baseline success is important. However, discussions of public goods problems sometimes fail to emphasize this point sufficiently. The models here suggest simple tests for the roles of resource variation and baseline success. Given the widespread importance of public goods, better models and tests would greatly deepen our understanding of many processes in biology and sociality.     

When Punishment Pays

Explaining cooperation in groups remains a key problem because reciprocity breaks down between more than two. Punishing individuals who contribute little provides a potential answer but changes the dilemma to why pay the costs of punishing which, like cooperation itself, provides a public good. Nevertheless, people are observed to punish others in behavioural economic games, posing a problem for existing theory which highlights the difficulty in explaining the spread and persistence of punishment. Here, I consider the apparent mismatch between theory and evidence and show by means of instructive analysis and simulation how much of the experimental evidence for punishment comes from scenarios in which punishers may expect to obtain a net benefit from punishing free-riders. In repeated games within groups, punishment works by imposing costs on defectors so that it pays them to switch to cooperating. Both punishers and non-punishers then benefit from the resulting increase in cooperation, hence investing in punishment can constitute a social dilemma. However, I show the conditions in which the benefits of increased cooperation are so great that they more than offset the costs of punishing, thereby removing the temptation to free-ride on others'' investments and making punishment explicable in terms of direct self-interest. Crucially, this is because of the leveraging effect imposed in typical studies whereby people can pay a small cost to inflict a heavy loss on a punished individual. In contrast to previous models suggesting punishment is disadvantaged when rare, I show it can invade until it comes into a producer-scrounger equilibrium with non-punishers. I conclude that adding punishment to an iterated public goods game can solve the problem of achieving cooperation by removing the social dilemma.     

Aggressive mimicry of the cleaner wrasse by Aspidontus taeniatus functions mainly for small blennies

The mimic blenny Aspidontus taeniatus Quoy & Gaimard is well known for its resemblance to the juvenile and adult cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus (Valenciennes) in colour and shape. As various reef fishes including piscivores actively approach the cleaner wrasse to solicit cleaning by posing, two types of benefits have been suggested for this resemblance, that is, protective mimicry and aggressive mimicry. In aggressive mimicry, the mimic blenny is supposed to have considerable opportunities to bite the fin of deceived fishes when they pose, but some studies have confirmed that fin biting does not seem to be the main feeding tactic in the blenny in nature. Here, we examined the feeding tactics including fin biting by the mimic blenny in relation to its body size in a field observational survey in the coral reefs of Sesoko Island, Okinawa, Japan. The blenny was observed feeding mainly on four food items: the tentacles of Christmas tree worms, the mantle edges of boring clams, the demersal eggs in damselfishes’ nests and the fins of fishes. The feeding frequency by fin biting significantly decreased with body size, while that by egg predation significantly increased with body size of the blenny. When predating on eggs, the blenny was vigorously attacked by egg‐guarding fish, but often succeeded in raiding their nests by forming a feeding group. When feeding by fin biting, the blenny attacked prey fish without performing any cleaning. The ratio of fin biting was considerably higher in small‐sized blennies, suggesting reliance on this feeding tactic because of a difficulty in conducting a risky egg predation. Thus, our results suggest that the mimic blenny utilizes aggressive mimicry only when it is small as an alternative feeding tactic.     

Eco‐evolutionary feedbacks between private and public goods: evidence from toxic algal blooms

The importance of ‘eco‐evolutionary feedbacks’ in natural systems is currently unclear. Here, we advance a general hypothesis for a particular class of eco‐evolutionary feedbacks with potentially large, long‐lasting impacts in complex ecosystems. These eco‐evolutionary feedbacks involve traits that mediate important interactions with abiotic and biotic features of the environment and a self‐driven reversal of selection as the ecological impact of the trait varies between private (small scale) and public (large scale). Toxic algal blooms may involve such eco‐evolutionary feedbacks due to the emergence of public goods. We review evidence that toxin production by microalgae may yield ‘privatised’ benefits for individual cells or colonies under pre‐ and early‐bloom conditions; however, the large‐scale, ecosystem‐level effects of toxicity associated with bloom states yield benefits that are necessarily ‘public’. Theory predicts that the replacement of private with public goods may reverse selection for toxicity in the absence of higher level selection. Indeed, blooms often harbor significant genetic and functional diversity: bloom populations may undergo genetic differentiation over a scale of days, and even genetically similar lineages may vary widely in toxic potential. Intriguingly, these observations find parallels in terrestrial communities, suggesting that toxic blooms may serve as useful models for eco‐evolutionary dynamics in nature. Eco‐evolutionary feedbacks involving the emergence of a public good may shed new light on the potential for interactions between ecology and evolution to influence the structure and function of entire ecosystems.     

Recruitment in the redlip blenny Ophioblennius atlanticus: is space limiting?

This study investigates pre-and post-recruitment characteristics of a population of the redlip blenny (Ophioblennius atlanticus) on a fringing reef in Barbados, W.I. Recruits were observed in 6 of the 8 months of the study, but 90% of all recruitment occurred within a single month. Monthly recruitment rate was not correlated with the monthly mortality of residents, suggesting that the rate at which space becomes available on the reef does not control the timing of blenny recruitment. Most recruitment occurred when adult blenny density was low, i.e. when most total space was available on the reef. Postrecruitment territory size of resident blennies was half that of pre-recruitment territory size, and was better predicted by fish size than it was before recruitment. Aggression by resident blennies increased with blenny density, and was primarily directed at recruiting conspecifics. These results suggest increased competition for territorial space after recruitment. Following the major recruitment pulse, the monthly percentage of recruits dying was correlated with density. This may indicate density-dependent mortality, but could result from the covariance of density with age. We suggest that whether reef fish populations are space-limited or recruitment-limited may vary between species and within species between locations.     

Are the oral teeth of combtooth bennies (Salariini: Teleostei) merely combs?

Careful analysis of gut contents has resulted in the reclassification of several species of grazing fish as detritivores, shifting the trophodynamic assignment of many prominent reef grazers. Combtoothed blennies, which are among the most numerous grazing fish of the Great Barrier Reef, have been shown to target the detrital component of the epilithic algal matrix (EAM). It has been suggested that blennies have specialized dental morphology that allows them to comb through fronds of algae, collecting detritus, while leaving the algal component intact. In this study, we analysed the capability of a common reef flat blenny, Salarias fasciatus, to remove algae by (i) examining oral morphology for evidence of wear and adaptations for abrasion, and (ii) a short-term EAM feeding experiment. Examination of S. fasciatus teeth with scanning electron microscopy (SEM) showed evidence of macrowear (changes in tooth height or shape), microwear (surface chips and striae), and tooth replacement that suggests abrasion on the substrate. Energy Dispersive X-ray Spectrometry (EDS) revealed that oral teeth incorporate mineral iron. When fed artificial substrata with a developed EAM layer S. fasciatus removed 57% of photosynthetic material and 38.5% of organic biomass. Although studies have found that blenny gut contents consist predominantly of detritus, blennies are still likely to contribute to the removal of algae on coral reefs.     

Vertical Distribution, Size Structure, and Habitat Associations of Four Blenniidae Species on Gas Platforms in the Northcentral Gulf of Mexico

We counted individuals of the family Blenniidae and estimated their sizes on gas platforms southeast of Dauphin Island, Alabama. We observed species abundance decreasing as depth increased. Fish sizes also decreased with depth. The most abundant species was molly miller, Scartella cristata, followed by plumed blenny, Hypleurochilus multifilis, tessellated blenny, Hypsoblennius invemar, and seaweed blenny, Parablennius marmoreus. Total blenny abundance was positively related to the barnacle, Megabalanus antillensis, and dissolved oxygen concentrations, and inversely related to Anthozoa. Individually, S. cristata was correlated with M. antillensis, and inversely related to salinity, while the other blenny species showed more complex correlations to invertebrates. As a community, blennies showed a clear separation based on depth independent of offshore/inshore sites and sample date based on multidimensional scaling analyses. Our study suggests that attached invertebrates, particularly M. antillensis, provided a predation refuge, allowing these blenny species to exist in an otherwise unsuitable habitat, i.e. open shallow waters of the northern Gulf of Mexico.     

Public goods games with reward in finite populations

Public goods games paraphrase the problem of cooperation in game theoretical terms. Cooperators contribute to a public good and thereby increase the welfare of others at a cost to themselves. Defectors consume the public good but do not pay its cost and therefore outperform cooperators. Hence, according to genetic or cultural evolution, defectors should be favored and the public good disappear – despite the fact that groups of cooperators are better off than groups of defectors. The maximization of short term individual profits causes the demise of the common resource to the detriment of all. This outcome can be averted by introducing incentives to cooperate. Negative incentives based on the punishment of defectors efficiently stabilize cooperation once established but cannot initiate cooperation. Here we consider the complementary case of positive incentives created by allowing individuals to reward those that contribute to the public good. The finite-population stochastic dynamics of the public goods game with reward demonstrate that reward initiates cooperation by providing an escape hatch out of states of mutual defection. However, in contrast to punishment, reward is unable to stabilize cooperation but, instead, gives rise to a persistent minority of cooperators.     

Social immunity of the family: parental contributions to a public good modulated by brood size

Social immunity refers to any immune defence that benefits others, besides the individual that mounts the response. Since contributions to social immunity are known to be personally costly, they are contributions to a public good. However, individuals vary in their contributions to this public good and it is unclear why. Here we investigate whether they are responding to contributions made by others with experiments on burying beetle (Nicrophorus vespilloides) families. In this species, females, males and larvae each contribute to social immunity through the application of antimicrobial exudates upon the carrion breeding resource. We show experimentally that mothers reduce their contributions to social immunity when raising large broods, and test two contrasting hypotheses to explain why. Either mothers are treating social immunity as a public good, investing less in social immunity when their offspring collectively contribute more, or mothers are trading off investment in social immunity with investment in parental care. Overall, our experiments yield no evidence to support the existence of a trade-off between social immunity and other parental care traits: we found no evidence of a trade-off in terms of time allocated to each activity, nor did the relationship between social immunity and brood size change with female condition. Instead, and consistent with predictions from models of public goods games, we found that higher quality mothers contributed more to social immunity. Therefore our results suggest that mothers are playing a public goods game with their offspring to determine their personal contribution to the defence of the carrion breeding resource.     

Spatial effects in social dilemmas

Social dilemmas and the evolutionary conundrum of cooperation are traditionally studied through various kinds of game theoretical models such as the prisoner's dilemma, public goods games, snowdrift games or by-product mutualism. All of them exemplify situations which are characterized by different degrees of conflicting interests between the individuals and the community. In groups of interacting individuals, cooperators produce a common good benefitting the entire group at some cost to themselves, whereas defectors attempt to exploit the resource by avoiding the costly contributions. Based on synergistic or discounted accumulation of cooperative benefits a unifying theoretical framework was recently introduced that encompasses all games that have traditionally been studied separately (Hauert, Michor, Nowak, Doebeli, 2005. Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas. J. Theor. Biol., in press.). Within this framework we investigate the effects of spatial structure with limited local interactions on the evolutionary fate of cooperators and defectors. The quantitative effects of space turn out to be quite sensitive to the underlying microscopic update mechanisms but, more general, we demonstrate that in prisoner's dilemma type interactions spatial structure benefits cooperation-although the parameter range is quite limited-whereas in snowdrift type interactions spatial structure may be beneficial too, but often turns out to be detrimental to cooperation.     

No effect of intraspecific relatedness on public goods cooperation in a complex community

Many organisms—notably microbes—are embedded within complex communities where cooperative behaviors in the form of excreted public goods can benefit other species. Under such circumstances, intraspecific interactions are likely to be less important in driving the evolution of cooperation. We first illustrate this idea with a simple theoretical model, showing that relatedness—the extent to which individuals with the same cooperative alleles interact with each other—has a reduced impact on the evolution of cooperation when public goods are shared between species. We test this empirically using strain of Pseudomonas aeruginosa that vary in their production of metal‐chelating siderophores in copper contaminated compost (an interspecific public good). We show that nonsiderophore producers grow poorly relative to producers under high relatedness, but this cost can be alleviated by the presence of the isogenic producer (low relatedness) and/or the compost microbial community. Hence, relatedness can become unimportant when public goods provide interspecific benefits.     

The thermoregulatory benefits of the communal nest of sociable weavers Philetairus socius are spatially structured within nests

Structures built by animals, such as nests, mounds and burrows, are often the product of cooperative investment by more than one individual. Such structures may be viewed as a public good, since all individuals that occupy them share the benefits they provide. However, access to the benefits generated by the structure may vary among individuals and is likely to be an important determinant of social organisation. Here we use the massive, communal nests of sociable weavers Philetairus socius, to investigate whether their thermoregulatory function varies in relation to the size of communal nests, and the position of individual nest chambers within the communal structure. We then examine whether this spatial variation in thermoregulatory function predicts the social organisation of colonies. First, we show that the sociable weavers’ communal nests buffer variation in ambient temperature, and reduce temperature variability within nest chambers. The extent of this buffering effect depends significantly on the position of nest chambers within the communal structure, and on the depth to which chambers are embedded within the nest mass. We detected no effect of nest volume on thermoregulatory benefits, suggesting that there are likely to be additional, non‐thermoregulatory benefits leading to communal nests. Finally, our results indicate that there may be competition for access to the benefits of the public good, since older birds occupied the chambers with the highest thermoregulatory benefits, where breeding activity was also more common. We discuss how the spatial structure of the benefits of the public good might influence social organisation in the unique communal lifestyle of sociable weavers.     

Individual and Group Personalities Characterise Consensus Decision‐Making in an Ant

Non‐human animals can exhibit idiosyncratic behaviour across individuals in much in the same way as humans. Animals with specific personalities may have advantages in some environments, and this idiosyncrasy may thus be of considerable ecological and evolutionary importance. In group‐living organisms, personality can occur at the level of the group as well as that of the individual. However, at present, we have very little understanding of the possible benefits of group‐level personality, and how this is linked with individual personality. In this study, I examine the influence of individual and group personality during the process of colony migration in the Japanese ant, Myrmecina nipponica. These ants use a consensus decision process to decide among alternatives when searching for a new home. Individuals contribute to this process by scouting for new nest sites, recruiting nestmates by laying pheromone trails, and carrying brood to the new site, although whether these roles are consistent among individuals and how roles are distributed within and between colonies remain unclear. Individual contributions to the nest‐site selection process were quantified over five repeated relocations in five colonies. Results demonstrate that contributions to the relocation effort were highly skewed within the colonies and that individuals were consistent in their contributions over repeated relocation events. Furthermore, the distribution of effort differed between colonies, indicating that intercolony differences in composition of behavioural types resulted in colony‐level personality. While these differences did not lead to any detectable difference in relocation performance between colonies in the simple experimental arrangement used, colony personality could influence decision outcomes in more complex environments.     

Evolutionary dynamics of strategic behavior in a collective-risk dilemma

A collective-risk social dilemma arises when a group must cooperate to reach a common target in order to avoid the risk of collective loss while each individual is tempted to free-ride on the contributions of others. In contrast to the prisoners' dilemma or public goods games, the collective-risk dilemma encompasses the risk that all individuals lose everything. These characteristics have potential relevance for dangerous climate change and other risky social dilemmas. Cooperation is costly to the individual and it only benefits all individuals if the common target is reached. An individual thus invests without guarantee that the investment is worthwhile for anyone. If there are several subsequent stages of investment, it is not clear when individuals should contribute. For example, they could invest early, thereby signaling their willingness to cooperate in the future, constantly invest their fair share, or wait and compensate missing contributions. To investigate the strategic behavior in such situations, we have simulated the evolutionary dynamics of such collective-risk dilemmas in a finite population. Contributions depend individually on the stage of the game and on the sum of contributions made so far. Every individual takes part in many games and successful behaviors spread in the population. It turns out that constant contributors, such as constant fair sharers, quickly lose out against those who initially do not contribute, but compensate this in later stages of the game. In particular for high risks, such late contributors are favored.     

Cooperative investment in public goods is kin directed in communal nests of social birds

The tragedy of the commons predicts social collapse when public goods are jointly exploited by individuals attempting to maximize their fitness at the expense of other social group members. However, animal societies have evolved many times despite this vulnerability to exploitation by selfish individuals. Kin selection offers a solution to this social dilemma, but in large social groups mean relatedness is often low. Sociable weavers (Philetairus socius) live in large colonies that share the benefits of a massive communal nest, which requires individual investment for construction and maintenance. Here, we show that despite low mean kinship within colonies, relatives are spatially and socially clustered and that nest‐building males have higher local relatedness to other colony members than do non‐building males. Alternative hypotheses received little support, so we conclude that the benefits of the public good are shared with kin and that cooperative investment is, despite the large size and low relatedness of these communities, kin directed.     

Coexistence of cooperation and defection in public goods games

The production of public goods by the contribution of individual volunteers is a social dilemma because an individual that does not volunteer can benefit from the public good produced by the contributions of others. Therefore it is generally believed that public goods can be produced only in the presence of repeated interactions (which allow reciprocation, reputation effects and punishment) or relatedness (kin selection). Cooperation, however, often occurs in the absence of iterations and relatedness. We show that when the production of a public good is a Volunteer's Dilemma, in which a fixed number of cooperators is necessary to produce the public good, cooperators and defectors persist in a mixed equilibrium, without iterations and without relatedness. This mixed equilibrium is absent in the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the public good is a linear function of the individual contributions. We also show that the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Volunteer's Dilemma are the two opposite extremes of a general public goods game, and that all intermediate cases can have a mixed equilibrium like the Volunteer's Dilemma. The coexistence of cooperators and defectors, therefore, is a typical outcome of most social dilemmas, which requires neither relatedness nor iterations.