What initially brought about communications?

This paper reports an intelligent agent equipped with two-layer finite state machines (FSMs) that can communicate by turning lighting on and off, leading to social cooperation that solves the dilemma situation, modeled by a one-shot 2x2 game. This communication between two gaming agents can be observed in hero- and leader-type dilemma games, where alternating reciprocity, repeating cooperation (C)-defeat (D) after D-C, is the equal pareto optimum instead of a sequence of mutual cooperation that is the equal pareto optimum for a prisoner's dilemma (PD) game.     

Synthesis, radiolabeling and receptor binding of [3H][(1S,2R)ACPC2]endomorphin-2

Previously, we have shown that substitution of Pro² for cis-2-aminocyclopentanecarboxylic acid, ACPC in endomorphin-2 results in an analogue with greatly augmented proteolytic stability, high μ-opioid receptor affinity and selectivity. We now report the synthesis and biochemical characterization of [³H][(1S,2R)ACPC²]endomorphin-2 with a specific activity of 1.41 TBq/mmol (38.17 Ci/mmol). Specific binding of [³H][(1S,2R)ACPC²]endomorphin-2 was saturable and of high affinity with an equilibrium dissociation constant, K_d = 1.80 ± 0.21 nM and receptor density, B_max = 345 ± 27 fmol × mg protein⁻¹ at 25 °C in rat brain membranes. Similar affinity values were obtained in kinetic and displacement assays. Both Na⁺ and Gpp(NH)p decreased the affinity proving the agonist character of the radioligand. [³H][(1S,2R)ACPC²]endomorphin-2 retained the μ-specificity of the parent peptide. The new radioligand will be a useful tool to map the topographical requirements of μ-opioid peptide binding due to its high affinity, selectivity and enzymatic stability.     

Direct Reciprocity in Spatial Populations Enhances R-Reciprocity As Well As ST-Reciprocity

As is well-known, spatial reciprocity plays an important role in facilitating the emergence of cooperative traits, and the effect of direct reciprocity is also obvious for explaining the cooperation dynamics. However, how the combination of these two scenarios influences cooperation is still unclear. In the present work, we study the evolution of cooperation in 2×2 games via considering both spatial structured populations and direct reciprocity driven by the strategy with 1-memory length. Our results show that cooperation can be significantly facilitated on the whole parameter plane. For prisoner''s dilemma game, cooperation dominates the system even at strong dilemma, where maximal social payoff is still realized. In this sense, R-reciprocity forms and it is robust to the extremely strong dilemma. Interestingly, when turning to chicken game, we find that ST-reciprocity is also guaranteed, through which social average payoff and cooperation is greatly enhanced. This reciprocity mechanism is supported by mean-field analysis and different interaction topologies. Thus, our study indicates that direct reciprocity in structured populations can be regarded as a more powerful factor for the sustainability of cooperation.     

A simple scaling of the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in donor-recipient games by various reciprocity mechanisms

In donor-recipient games (DRG), one of the sub-classes of Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), it is well-known that a game structure is described by two parameters benefit (b) and cost (c) of cooperation. By means of a series of numerical experiments, we proved that the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in DRG by various reciprocity mechanisms can be expressed in a single game structural parameter, b/c. This also implies that the dilemma strength in various donor-recipient games with various reciprocity mechanisms can be evaluated only by b/c, which is consistent with the previous novel finding by Nowak. It was also discussed whether this kind of parameterization idea can be extended to general games in PD game class.     

Clustering in large networks does not promote upstream reciprocity

Upstream reciprocity (also called generalized reciprocity) is a putative mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations with which players help others when they are helped by somebody else. It is a type of indirect reciprocity. Although upstream reciprocity is often observed in experiments, most theories suggest that it is operative only when players form short cycles such as triangles, implying a small population size, or when it is combined with other mechanisms that promote cooperation on their own. An expectation is that real social networks, which are known to be full of triangles and other short cycles, may accommodate upstream reciprocity. In this study, I extend the upstream reciprocity game proposed for a directed cycle by Boyd and Richerson to the case of general networks. The model is not evolutionary and concerns the conditions under which the unanimity of cooperative players is a Nash equilibrium. I show that an abundance of triangles or other short cycles in a network does little to promote upstream reciprocity. Cooperation is less likely for a larger population size even if triangles are abundant in the network. In addition, in contrast to the results for evolutionary social dilemma games on networks, scale-free networks lead to less cooperation than networks with a homogeneous degree distribution.     

Chaos, oscillation and the evolution of indirect reciprocity in n-person games

Evolution of cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals has been of considerable concern in various fields such as biology, economics, and psychology. The evolution of cooperation is often explained by reciprocity. Under reciprocity, cooperation can prevail in a society because a donor of cooperation receives reciprocation from the recipient of the cooperation, called direct reciprocity, or from someone else in the community, called indirect reciprocity. Nowak and Sigmund [1993. Chaos and the evolution of cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 90, 5091-5094] have demonstrated that directly reciprocal cooperation in two-person prisoner's dilemma games with mutation of strategies can be maintained dynamically as periodic or chaotic oscillation. Furthermore, Eriksson and Lindgren [2005. Cooperation driven by mutations in multi-person Prisoner's Dilemma. J. Theor. Biol. 232, 399-409] have reported that directly reciprocal cooperation in n-person prisoner's dilemma games (n>2) can be maintained as periodic oscillation. Is dynamic cooperation observed only in direct reciprocity? Results of this study show that indirectly reciprocal cooperation in n-person prisoner's dilemma games can be maintained dynamically as periodic or chaotic oscillation. This is, to our knowledge, the first demonstration of chaos in indirect reciprocity. Furthermore, the results show that oscillatory dynamics are observed in common in the evolution of reciprocal cooperation whether for direct or indirect.     

Modulation of Mucor miehei lipase properties via directed immobilization on different hetero-functional epoxy resins: Hydrolytic resolution of (R,S)-2-butyroyl-2-phenylacetic acid

Purified lipase from Mucor miehei (MML) has been covalently immobilized on different epoxy resins (standard hydrophobic epoxy resins, epoxy-ethylenediamine, epoxy-iminodiacetic acid, epoxy-copper chelates) and adsorbed via interfacial activation on octadecyl-Sepabeads support (fully coated with very hydrophobic octadecyl groups). These immobilized enzyme preparations were used under slightly different conditions (temperature ranging from 4 to 25 °C and pH values from 5 to 7) in the hydrolytic resolution of (R,S)-2-butyroyl-2-phenylacetic acid.

Different catalytic properties (activity, specificity, enantioselectivity) were found depending on the particular support used. For example, the epoxy-iminodiacetic acid-Sepabeads gave the most active preparation at pH 7 while, at pH 5, the ethylenediamine-Sepabeads was superior.

More interestingly, the enantiomeric ratio (E) also depends strongly on the immobilized preparation and the conditions employed. Thus, the octadecyl-MML preparation was the only immobilized enzyme derivative which exhibited enantioselectivity towards R isomer (with E values ranging from 5 at 4 °C and pH 7 to 1.2 at pH 5 and 25 °C).

The other immobilized preparations, in contrast, were S selective. Immobilization on iminodiacetic acid-Sepabeads afforded the catalyst with the highest enantioselectivity (E=59 under optimum conditions).     

Reputation-based partner choice is an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity in solving social dilemmas

When group interests clash with individual ones, maintaining cooperation poses a problem. However, cooperation can be facilitated by introducing reputational incentives. Through indirect reciprocity, people who cooperate in a social dilemma are more likely to receive cooperative acts from others. Another mechanism that enhances group cooperation is reputation-based partner choice, or competitive altruism. According to this framework, cooperators benefit via increased access to cooperative partners. Our study compared the effectiveness of indirect reciprocity and competitive altruism in re-establishing cooperation after the typical decline found during repeated public goods games. Twenty groups of four participants first played a series of public goods games, which confirmed the expected decline. Subsequently, public goods games were alternated with either indirect reciprocity games (in which participants had an opportunity to give to another individual from whom they would never receive a direct return) or competitive altruism games (in which they could choose partners for directly reciprocal interactions). We found that public goods game contributions increased when interspersed with competitive altruism games; they were also higher than in public goods games interspersed with indirect reciprocity games. Investing in reputation by increasing contributions to public goods was a profitable strategy in that it increased returns in subsequent competitive altruism and indirect reciprocity games. There was also some evidence that these returns were greater under competitive altruism than indirect reciprocity. Our findings indicate that strategic reputation building through competitive altruism provides an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity as a means for restoring cooperation in social dilemmas.     

Lipase-catalyzed production of optically active (S)-flurbiprofen in aqueous phase reaction system containing chiral succinyl β-cyclodextrin

The lipase-catalyzed production of optically active (S)-flurbiprofen was carried out in a dispersion reaction-system induced by chiral succinyl β-cyclodextrin (suβ-CD). The optimal reaction conditions were 500 mM (R,S)-flurbiprofen ethyl ester ((R,S)-FEE), 600 units of Candida rugosa lipase per 1 mmol of (R,S)-FEE, and 1000 mM suβ-CD at 37 °C for 72 h. An extremely high enantiomeric excess of 0.98 and conversion yield of 0.48 were achieved in the dispersed aqueous phase reaction system containing chiral suβ-CD added as a dispenser and chiral selector. The inclusion complex formability of the immiscible substrate (S)- and (R)-form of FEE with suβ-CD was compared using a phase-solubility diagram, DSC, and ¹H NMR. (S)-Isomer formed a more stable and selective inclusion complex with chiral suβ-CD. It was hydrolyzed much more selectively by lipase from C. rugosa, due to the selective structural modification through inclusion complexation with chiral suβ-CD.     

Induction of lacI mutations in Big Blue Rat-2 cells treated with 1-(2-hydroxyethyl)-1-nitrosourea: a model system for the analysis of mutagenic potential of the hydroxyethyl adducts produced by 1,3-bis (2-chloroethyl)-1-nitrosourea.

We have investigated the genotoxic effects of 1-(2-hydroxyethyl)-1-nitrosourea (HENU). We have chosen this agent because of its demonstrated ability to produce N7-(2-hydroxyethyl) guanine (N7-HOEtG) and O⁶-(2-hydroxyethyl) 2′-deoxyguanosine (O⁶-HOEtdG); two of the DNA alkylation products produced by 1,3-bis (2-chloroethyl)-1-nitrosourea (BCNU). For these studies, we have used the Big Blue Rat-2 cell line that contains a lambda/lacI shuttle vector. Treatment of these cells with HENU produced a dose dependent increase in the levels of N7-HOEtG and O⁶-HOEtdG as quantified by HPLC with electrochemical detection. Treatment of Big Blue Rat-2 cells with either 0, 1 or 5 mM HENU resulted in mutation frequencies of 7.2±2.2×10⁻⁵, 45.2±2.9×10⁻⁵ and 120.3±24.4×10⁻⁵, respectively. Comparison of the mutation frequencies demonstrates that 1 and 5 mM HENU treatments have increased the mutation frequency by 6- and 16-fold, respectively. This increase in mutation frequency was statistically significant (P<0.001). Sequence analysis of HENU-induced mutations have revealed primarily G:C→A:T transitions (52%) and a significant number of A:T→T:A transversions (16%). We propose that the observed G:C→A:T transitions are produced by the DNA alkylation product O⁶-HOEtdG. These results suggest that the formation of O⁶-HOEtdG by BCNU treatment contributes to its observed mutagenic properties.     

Coevolution of trustful buyers and cooperative sellers in the trust game

Many online marketplaces enjoy great success. Buyers and sellers in successful markets carry out cooperative transactions even if they do not know each other in advance and a moral hazard exists. An indispensable component that enables cooperation in such social dilemma situations is the reputation system. Under the reputation system, a buyer can avoid transacting with a seller with a bad reputation. A transaction in online marketplaces is better modeled by the trust game than other social dilemma games, including the donation game and the prisoner's dilemma. In addition, most individuals participate mostly as buyers or sellers; each individual does not play the two roles with equal probability. Although the reputation mechanism is known to be able to remove the moral hazard in games with asymmetric roles, competition between different strategies and population dynamics of such a game are not sufficiently understood. On the other hand, existing models of reputation-based cooperation, also known as indirect reciprocity, are based on the symmetric donation game. We analyze the trust game with two fixed roles, where trustees (i.e., sellers) but not investors (i.e., buyers) possess reputation scores. We study the equilibria and the replicator dynamics of the game. We show that the reputation mechanism enables cooperation between unacquainted buyers and sellers under fairly generous conditions, even when such a cooperative equilibrium coexists with an asocial equilibrium in which buyers do not buy and sellers cheat. In addition, we show that not many buyers may care about the seller's reputation under cooperative equilibrium. Buyers' trusting behavior and sellers' reputation-driven cooperative behavior coevolve to alleviate the social dilemma.     

Cognitive and Motivational Requirements for the Emergence of Cooperation in a Rat Social Game

Background

Game theory and the Prisoner''s Dilemma (PD) game in particular, which captures the paradox of cooperative interactions that lead to benefits but entail costs to the interacting individuals, have constituted a powerful tool in the study of the mechanisms of reciprocity. However, in non-human animals most tests of reciprocity in PD games have resulted in sustained defection strategies. As a consequence, it has been suggested that under such stringent conditions as the PD game humans alone have evolved the necessary cognitive abilities to engage in reciprocity, namely, numerical discrimination, memory and control of temporal discounting.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We use an iterated PD game to test rats (Rattus norvegicus) for the presence of such cognitive abilities by manipulating the strategy of the opponent, Tit-for-Tat and Pseudo-Random, or the relative size of the temptation to defect. We found that rats shape their behaviour according to the opponent''s strategy and the relative outcome resulting from cooperative or defective moves. Finally, we show that the behaviour of rats is contingent upon their motivational state (hungry versus sated).

Conclusions/Significance

Here we show that rats understand the payoff matrix of the PD game and the strategy of the opponent. Importantly, our findings reveal that rats possess the necessary cognitive capacities for reciprocity-based cooperation to emerge in the context of a prisoner''s dilemma. Finally, the validation of the rat as a model to study reciprocity-based cooperation during the PD game opens new avenues of research in experimental neuroscience.     

Beyond the prisoner's dilemma: Toward models to discriminate among mechanisms of cooperation in nature

The iterated prisoner's dilemma game, or IPD, has now established itself as the orthodox paradigm for theoretical investigations of the evolution of cooperation; but its scope is restricted to reciprocity, which is only one of three categories of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Even within that category, a cooperative encounter has in general three phases, and the IPD has nothing to say about two of them. To distinguish among mechanisms of cooperation in nature, future theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation must distance itself from economics and develop games as a refinement of ethology's comparative approach.     

Determination of the thermodynamics of carbonic anhydrase acid-unfolding by titration calorimetry

The enthalpy of unfolding (Δ_uH) of carbonic anhydrase II was determined by titrating the protein with acid and measuring the heat using isothermal titration calorimetry (ITC) in the temperature range of 5 to 59 °C. By combining the ITC results with our previous findings by differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) in the temperature range of 39 to 72 °C, the Δ_uH dependence over a wide temperature range was obtained. The temperature dependence of the enthalpy displays significant curvature indicating that the heat capacity of unfolding (Δ_uC_p) is dependent on temperature. The T-derivative of Δ_uC_p was equal to 100 ± 30 J/(mol × K²), with the result that the Δ_uC_p is equal to 15.8 kJ/(mol × K) at 5 °C, 19.0 kJ/(mol × K) at 37 °C and 21.8 kJ/(mol × K) at 64 °C. The enthalpy of unfolding is zero at 17 °C. At lower temperatures, the Δ_uH becomes exothermic.

This method of determining protein unfolding thermodynamics using acid-ITC, significantly widens the accessible T-range, provides direct estimate of the thermodynamic parameters at physiological temperature, and gives further insight into the third T-derivative of the Gibbs free energy of unfolding.     

Kinetics of laccase-catalysed TEMPO oxidation

The oxidation of TEMPO (2,2,6,6-tetramethyl-piperidine-1-oxyl radical) has been studied in the presence of recombinant laccases (benzenediol:oxygen oxidoreductase, EC 1.10.3.2) from Polyporus pinsitus (rPpL), Myceliophthora thermophila (rMtL), Coprinus cinereus (rCcL) and Rhizoctonia solani (rRsL) in buffer solution pH 4.5–7.3 and at 25 °C. At pH 5.5 the oxidation constant calculated from the initial rate of TEMPO oxidation was 1.7 × 10⁴, 1.4 × 10³, 7.8 × 10² and 5.2 × 10² M⁻¹ s⁻¹ for rPpL, rRsL, rCcL and rMtL, respectively. The maximal activity of rPpL-catalysed TEMPO oxidation was at pH 5.0. The pK_a obtained in neutral pH range was 6.2. The reactivity of laccases is in a good agreement with laccases copper type I redox potential.

TEMPO oxidation rate increased 541 times in the presence of 10-(3-propylsulfonate) phenoxazine (PSPX). The model of synergistic TEMPO and PSPX oxidation was proposed. Experimentally obtained rate constants for rPpL-catalysed PSPX oxidation were in a good agreement with those calculated from the synergistic model, therefore confirming the feasibility of the model. The acceleration of TEMPO oxidation with high reactive laccase substrates opens new possibilities for TEMPO application as a mediator.     

Fed-batch production of (S)-flurbiprofen in lipase-catalyzed dispersed aqueous phase reaction system induced by succinyl β-cyclodextrin and its extractive purification

Optically active (S)-flurbiprofen was produced fed-batch-wisely in a lipase-catalyzed dispersed aqueous phase reaction system induced by succinyl β-cyclodextrin (suβ-CD). A highly concentrated 480 mM (S)-flurbiprofen, corresponding to 117.0 g/l, with an enantiomeric excess of 0.98 and conversion yield of 0.48 was obtained. (S)-Flurbiprofen produced in an inclusion complex form with suβ-CD was extractively purified using three-step procedures: decomplexation of (S)-flurbiprofen and residual (R)-flurbiprofen ethyl ester ((R)-FEE) using the ethyl acetate, dissolution of (S)-flurbiprofen from (R)-FEE using a sodium bicarbonate solution, and selective precipitation of (S)-flurbiprofen using 2-propanol. Consequently, an extremely high concentration of 420 mM (S)-flurbiprofen with an optical purity higher than 98% was recovered after purification.     

Emergence of Super Cooperation of Prisoner’s Dilemma Games on Scale-Free Networks

Recently, the authors proposed a quantum prisoner’s dilemma game based on the spatial game of Nowak and May, and showed that the game can be played classically. By using this idea, we proposed three generalized prisoner’s dilemma (GPD, for short) games based on the weak Prisoner’s dilemma game, the full prisoner’s dilemma game and the normalized Prisoner’s dilemma game, written by GPD_W, GPD_F and GPD_N respectively. Our games consist of two players, each of which has three strategies: cooperator (C), defector (D) and super cooperator (denoted by Q), and have a parameter γ to measure the entangled relationship between the two players. We found that our generalised prisoner’s dilemma games have new Nash equilibrium principles, that entanglement is the principle of emergence and convergence (i.e., guaranteed emergence) of super cooperation in evolutions of our generalised prisoner’s dilemma games on scale-free networks, that entanglement provides a threshold for a phase transition of super cooperation in evolutions of our generalised prisoner’s dilemma games on scale-free networks, that the role of heterogeneity of the scale-free networks in cooperations and super cooperations is very limited, and that well-defined structures of scale-free networks allow coexistence of cooperators and super cooperators in the evolutions of the weak version of our generalised prisoner’s dilemma games.     

Catalytic performance of a highly enantioselective (R)-ester hydrolase from a new isolate Acinetobacter sp. CGMCC 0789

A highly enantioselective (R)-ester hydrolase was partially purified from a newly isolated bacterium, Acinetobacter sp. CGMCC 0789, whose resting cells exhibited a highly enantioselective activity toward the acetate of (4R)-hydroxy-3-methyl-2-(2-propynyl)- cyclopent-2-enone (R-HMPC). The optimum pH and temperature of the partially purified enzyme were 8.0 and 60 °C, respectively. The enantioselectivity of the crude enzyme was increased by 1.2-fold from 16 to 20 when the reaction temperature was raised from 30 to 60 °C. The activity of the crude enzyme was enhanced by 4.1-fold and the enantioselectivity (E-value) was markedly enhanced by 4.3-fold from 16 to 68 upon addition of a cationic detergent, benzethonium chloride [(diisobutyl phenoxyethoxyethyl) dimethyl benzylammoniom chloride]. The hydrolysis of 52 mM (R,S)-HMPC acetate to (R)-HMPC was completed within 8 h, with optical purity of 91.4% ee_p and conversion of 49%.     

Does a tag system effectively support emerging cooperation?

This paper investigates whether the so-called Tag Systems support emerging cooperation with respect to 2x2 games. The Tag System, initially proposed by Riolo et al. [2001. Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity. Nature 414, 441-443], gives each agent both a Tag and Tol defined by [0,1] real numbers. Tol is a tolerance for recognizing an opponent as a company. Both Tag and Tol are assumed to be evolving. Results show that the tag's effectiveness depends on whether the AllD strategy is allowed in the system. Allowing AllD implies that green beard effect does not work in the system. Thus, (1) the tag's effectiveness is more meager than that reported by Riolo et al., (2) the Tag System can use alternating reciprocity more effectively than the analytic solution in a Hero game; (3) a system using a 2D tag space supports cooperation more effectively than the usual Tag System.     

Bioreduction of 2-azido-1-arylethanones mediated by Geotrichum candidum and Rhodotorula glutinis

Enantioselective reductions of p-X-C₆H₄C(O)CH₂N₃ (X = H, Cl, Br, CH₃, OCH₃) mediated by Rhodotorula glutinis and Geotrichum candidum afforded the corresponding alcohols with complementary R and S configurations, respectively, in excellent yield and enantiomeric excesses. The obtained (R)-azidoalcohols are important starting materials for preparation of natural products and valuable pharmaceutical compounds such as (R)-Tembamide and (R)-Aegeline.