A critique for phytosociology

Abstract. Phytosociology is a subdiscipline of plant ecology that describes the co‐occurrence of plant species in communities. Gradient analysis and classification are its complementary tools. Various peculiarities and anachronisms of Central European phytosociology conceal its similarity with Anglo‐American approaches. Phytosociology deserves to be updated as a part of modern vegetation science that can build on a vast heritage of high‐quality data and the tools to store and analyse them in ways that go beyond syntaxonomy. By providing a context to more specialized pure and applied research, it has a crucial role to play in understanding community structure, ecosystem functioning and biological evolution.     

A botanical critique of cladism

Clade versus grade is an old question in taxonomy, going back as far as Darwin himself. Taxonomists have long believed that both must be taken into account in the formation of a general-purpose system. Recently clade has been elevated to a position of total dominance by a group of taxonomists who take their inspiration from Willi Hennig. Mayr has dubbed this approach cladism, and its exponents cladists. Cladistic theory is being vigorously developed and propounded by Hennig’s disputatious disciples, and much of the present-day theory would scarcely be recognized by the founder. I here address myself to what I consider the core features of present-day cladism. The essential distinctive feature of cladism, and its fatal flaw, is that a group is considered to be monophyletic, and thus taxonomically acceptable, only if it includesall the descendants from the most recent common ancestor. The traditional taxonomic view has been that a group can still be considered monophyletic (and thus taxonomically acceptable) after some of its more divergent branches have been trimmed off. This simple and seemingly innocuous difference has profound consequences to the taxonomic system. In Hennigian classification, organisms are ranked entirely on the basis of recency of common descent, that is, on the basis of the sequence of dichotomies in the inferred phylogeny. Theamount of divergence scarcely enters into the picture. This procedure represents an effort to capture taxonomy for a narrowly limited special purpose, at the expense of the important and necessary function of providing a general-purpose system that can be used by all who are concerned with similarities and differences among organisms. The first corollary of the Hennigian concept of phylogenetic taxonomy is that no existing taxon can be ancestral to any other existing taxon. The descendant must be included in the same taxon as its ancestor. At the level of species this is palpably false. The ancestral species often continues to exist for an indefinite time after giving rise to one or more descendants. At the higher taxonomic levels adherence to the principle often requires excessive lumping or excessive splitting to avoid paraphyletic groups (i.e., groups that do not include all of their own descendants), and it forbids the taxonomic recognition of many conceptually useful groups. Neither the prokaryotes nor the dicotyledons form a cladistically acceptable taxon, since both are paraphyletic. The prokaryotes are putatively ancestral to the eukaryotes, and the dicotyledons are putatively ancestral to the monocotyledons. Many other traditional and readily recognizable taxa would have to be abandoned, without being replaced by conceptually useful groups. Fossils present a special problem, because the whole concept of cladistic classification depends on the absence of taxa at the branch points of the cladogram. Presumably all of these branch points were at some time in the past represented by actual taxa, which under cladistic theory can neither be assigned to one of their descendants nor treated as paraphyletic taxa. The difficulty is mitigated somewhat by the gaps in the known fossil record. Once it is admitted that paraphyletic as well as holophyletic groups are taxonomically acceptable, there is much value in cladistic methodology. Formal outgroup comparison for the establisment of polarity, and the emphasis on synapomorphies in the construction of a cladogram can both be usefully incorporated into taxonomic theory and practice. These require no revolution in taxonomic thought. There are unresolved problems, however, in how to gather and manipulate the data, and how to interpret the cladogram produced by computers. In any complex group, the computer may produce several or many cladograms of equal or nearly equal parsimony. This is particularly true in angiosperms, among which the extensive evolutionary parallelism casts doubt on the importance of parsimony and may lead to the production of hundreds of such cladograms for a single group. Despite the claims of objectivity and repeatability in cladistic taxonomy, the necessity for some subjective decisions remains. The Wagner groundplan-divergence method has most of the advantages of formal cladism without the most important disadvantages. Wagner accepts paraphyletic taxa in principle, and he casts a wider net for data bearing on the polarity of characters. In complex groups consisting of many taxa, however, both methods retain a strong subjective component in the computer manipulation and in the degree of reliance on absolute parsimony.     

A critique of Darwinian anthropology

Darwinian anthropology holds that human behavior is adaptive in the sense of being designed to maximize reproductive success and that measurement of reproductive differentials typically illuminates adaptation. I argue to the contrary, that adaptive design is usually manifested at the psychological rather than at the behavioral level, that measuring reproductive differentials is at best an inefficient and ambiguous way to illuminate adaptation, and that Darwin's theory of natural selection sheds light on human affairs only insofar as it promotes understanding of the psychology that underpins these affairs.     

Nietzsche's aesthetic critique of Darwin

Despite his position as one of the first philosophers to write in the "post-Darwinian" world, the critique of Darwin by Friedrich Nietzsche is often ignored for a host of unsatisfactory reasons. I argue that Nietzsche's critique of Darwin is important to the study of both Nietzsche's and Darwin's impact on philosophy. Further, I show that the central claims of Nietzsche's critique have been broadly misunderstood. I then present a new reading of Nietzsche's core criticism of Darwin. An important part of Nietzsche's response can best be understood as an aesthetic critique of Darwin, reacting to what he saw as Darwin having drained life of an essential component of objective aesthetic value. For Nietzsche, Darwin's theory is false because it is too intellectual, because it searches for rules, regulations, and uniformity in a realm where none of these are to be found - and, moreover, where they should not be found. Such a reading goes furthest toward making Nietzsche's criticism substantive and relevant. Finally, I attempt to relate this novel explanation of Nietzsche's critique to topics in contemporary philosophy of biology, particularly work on the evolutionary explanation of culture.     

A critique of directionality theory

Directionality theory suggests that demographic entropy, defined in a way analogous to thermodynamic entropy, is as important as the Malthusian parameter in determining life history evolution in an age-structured population. In particular, it suggests that entropy should increase in equilibrium species and decrease in opportunistic species. This theory has been applied to explain the evolution of body size and of senescence. It has been claimed recently that this theory has been validated by a simulation study, but it is argued here that this study reveals substantial flaws in directionality theory and that the Malthusian parameter rather than entropy is the appropriate tool in the study of life history evolution.     

Ruse's Darwinian meta-ethics: A critique

Michael Ruse, in Taking Darwin Seriously seeks to establish that taking Darwin seriously requires us to treat morality as subjective and naturalistic. I argue that, if morality is not objective, then we have no good reason for being moral if we can avoid detection and punishment. As a consequence, we will only continue to behave morally as long as we remain ignorant of Ruse's theory, that is, as long as the cat is not let out of the bag. Ruse offers a number of arguments to show that his theory can overcome such problems. I argue that they all fail. Ruse also argues that he can offer a naturalistic account of ethics which steps around the naturalistic fallacy and avoids the confusion of reasons with causes. His principal argument for this view is an analogy between spiritualism and morality. I argue that this analogy fails.     

An organismic critique of molecular darwinism

The molecular darwinian approach to the emergence of life treats the competition between RNA sequences for nucleotide resources as the primordial selective process in prebiotic evolution, which prescribes possible pathways for the subsequent elaboration of organizational relationships. Since success in this competition is determined by the "phenotypic" properties of RNA strands in the absence of organizational context, the genesis of biotic organization is dependent upon the establishment of co-operative, hypercyclic interactions between competing RNA sequences. The thesis of this paper is that hypercycle theory is based on unwarranted assumptions about the conditions of prebiotic evolution, and that the implications of these assumptions run counter to both empirical evidence and to the rational by which natural selection operates in evolution generally. An organismic alternative to hypercycle theory is suggested, based on the catalytic microsphere and the thermodynamics of selection.