Rethinking fakes,authenticating selves

People who engage with objects that are deemed inauthentic under intellectual property laws might dismiss this classification and might ascribe different meanings to these objects. However, they cannot always disregard it, as circumstances might at any time bring this classification to the fore. In such situations, they are not only accused of deceiving others, but also derided for the deception they presumably work upon themselves. Drawing upon an ethnography of people's engagement with fake branded garments in Turkey and Romania and using theoretical perspectives on materiality and authenticity, I argue that a reconceptualization of the fake is a dignifying resolution to this crisis of authenticity. The fake is seen as a copy that does not hide its true nature. This is further elaborated on, in light of individual agendas and approaches to the world. These objects are ‘similar enough’, ‘good enough’, and ‘famous enough’. The fake is, thus, ‘sort of something’, the approximation of the ideal. Moreover, the fake is truthful to how the world truly is, namely a place full of half‐truths and half‐measures. The fake is, therefore, ‘sort of something’, as opposed to being ‘absolutely something’, the objectification of the ideal.     

Vitalism and the Resistance to Experimentation on Life in the Eighteenth Century

There is a familiar opposition between a ‘Scientific Revolution’ ethos and practice of experimentation, including experimentation on life, and a ‘vitalist’ reaction to this outlook. The former is often allied with different forms of mechanism – if all of Nature obeys mechanical laws, including living bodies, ‘iatromechanism’ should encounter no obstructions in investigating the particularities of animal-machines – or with more chimiatric theories of life and matter, as in the ‘Oxford Physiologists’. The latter reaction also comes in different, perhaps irreducibly heterogeneous forms, ranging from metaphysical and ethical objections to the destruction of life, as in Margaret Cavendish, to more epistemological objections against the usage of instruments, the ‘anatomical’ outlook and experimentation, e.g. in Locke and Sydenham. But I will mainly focus on a third anti-interventionist argument, which I call ‘vitalist’ since it is often articulated in the writings of the so-called Montpellier Vitalists, including their medical articles for the Encyclopédie. The vitalist argument against experimentation on life is subtly different from the metaphysical, ethical and epistemological arguments, although at times it may borrow from any of them. It expresses a Hippocratic sensibility – understood as an artifact of early modernity, not as some atemporal trait of medical thought – in which Life resists the experimenter, or conversely, for the experimenter to grasp something about Life, it will have to be without torturing or radically intervening in it. I suggest that this view does not have to imply that Nature is something mysterious or sacred; nor does the vitalist have to attack experimentation on life in the name of some ‘vital force’ – which makes it less surprising to find a vivisectionist like Claude Bernard sounding so close to the vitalists.     

Recognising and Translating Knowledge: Navigating the Political,Epistemological, Legal and Ontological

What does it mean to call something ‘knowledge’ today? What does this recognition or translation require? And what does it entrain? This introduction makes a novel synthesis of contributions to the Special Issue and advances observations regarding the ‘mythic’ qualities of intellectual property law, the precipitation of ‘nature’, and the importance of attending to what is lost when things and practices are also called ‘knowledge’. The papers cohere around a timely set of observations and critiques: critiques of the way the knowledge economy makes demands and defines expectations about value; of how intellectual property law lies behind and shapes exclusions, inclusions, and inequalities; of the ‘mythic’ status of assumptions informing laws about ownership; and the implicit hierarchy contained within types of knowledge as understood through the categories of western epistemology. By taking up effect rather than veracity and certainty, contributors leave the definition of knowledge to ethnographic subjects. That is, they attend to where and how things come to be called knowledge, and for what reasons, noticing how equivalences across practices, made for the purpose of creating the possibility of exchange value (and thus of encouraging circulation) does its work at the expense of multiple aspects, values, and relations that are also discernable in social processes that produce ‘knowledge’.     

Genes,genomes and identity. Projections on matter

This paper aims to show that references to genes and genomes are counterproductive in legal and political understandings of what it is to be human and a unique individual. To support this claim, I will give a brief overview of the many incompatible meanings the term ‘identity’ has gathered in reference to genes or genome in the contexts of biology and family ancestry, personal identity, species identity. One finds various and incompatible understandings of these expressions. While genetics is usually considered to deliver definitive knowledge about history and the future, genomics seems to work with more complicated relations between DNA, inheritance and phenotype. In genomics, ‘identity’ is no longer about identification and status markers but about individualization. Regulatory and legal documents project from traits to genomes, implying that the individuality is at least represented, if not created, in a unique genome. Boundaries between humans and other animals, between different ‘kinds’ of humans, and between all individual humans are re‐established via reference to the chemical matter of DNA. My analysis will show how this trend is a reactionary response to modern understandings of identities as social products and that it ignores new biomedical understandings of human bodies.     

Leaving the Magic Out: Knowledge and Effect in Different Places

In 2010, Porer Nombo and I launched a book about indigenous Papua New Guinean plant knowledge to a large audience at a university near to his village on the north coast of that country. Members of the audience commented that the book made a record of important practices. But they asked if those practices were dependent on secret magic to be effective? What gave us the right to include such secrets? Or, if there was in fact something fundamental missing from the book (magical formulae to activate the processes described), then what was the use of publishing the book? Thinking through their questions suggested the need to analyse what ‘knowledge’ is in different places, and why plants might be effective in some, but not others. In this paper I attempt an explanation that does not rely on a ‘social’ explanation of magic but instead suggest that what we call ‘magic’ are mechanisms whereby a gardener (or healer, or hunter) positions an action, or a thing in relation to other things. I liken the way myth works in these systems to the way intellectual property law provides a comparable ‘mythic’ structure that locates effect in the places that have developed ‘knowledge economies’ and I conclude by asking; if places embody their history and politics, and generate different understandings of effect, then what are the implications of calling Porer's practices with regard to plants, ‘knowledge’?     

ONTOLOGY OR PHENOMENOLOGY? HOW THE LVAD CHALLENGES THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE

This article deals with the euthanasia debate in light of new life‐sustaining technologies such as the left ventricular assist device (LVAD). The question arises: does the switching off of a LVAD by a doctor upon the request of a patient amount to active or passive euthanasia, i.e. to ‘killing’ or to ‘letting die’? The answer hinges on whether the device is to be regarded as a proper part of the patient's body or as something external. We usually regard the switching off of an internal device as killing, whereas the deactivation of an external device is seen as ‘letting die’. The case is notoriously difficult to decide for hybrid devices such as LVADs, which are partly inside and partly outside the patient's body. Additionally, on a methodological level, I will argue that the ‘ontological’ arguments from analogy given for both sides are problematic. Given the impasse facing the ontological arguments, complementary phenomenological arguments deserve closer inspection. In particular, we should consider whether phenomenologically the LVAD is perceived as a body part or as an external device. I will support the thesis that the deactivation of a LVAD is to be regarded as passive euthanasia if the device is not perceived by the patient as a part of the body proper.     

Beyond Trust: Plagiarism and Truth

Academic misconduct distorts the relationship between scientific practice and the knowledge it produces. The relationship between science and the knowledge it produces is, however, not something universally agreed upon. In this paper I will critically discuss the moral status of an act of research misconduct, namely plagiarism, in the context of different epistemological positions. While from a positivist view of science, plagiarism only influences trust in science but not the content of the scientific corpus, from a constructivist point of view both are at stake. Consequently, I argue that discussions of research misconduct and responsible research ought to be explicitly informed by the authors’ views on the relationship between science and the knowledge it produces.     

Epistemic artefacts: on the uses of complexity in anthropology

Distinctions between the ‘simple’ and the ‘complex’ have enjoyed a long and varied career in anthropology. Simplicity was once part of a collective fantasy about what life was like elsewhere, tingeing studies of tribal life with human longing for simpler ways of being. With the reflexive turn and the rise of cultural critique, simplicity has been all but excommunicated in favour of widespread diagnoses of complexity. In this article, I tease out some transformations in the uses of complexity in anthropology, and weave in some critical responses to these uses, spanning many decades, from within the discipline. I pay special attention to recent critiques by anthropologists who are beginning to grow weary of complexity as both an end‐in‐itself for scholarship and an empirical diagnosis. For these critics, complexity is deeply entwined with anthropological methods and knowledge practices. Drawing on these critical views, I suggest that complexity may be an epistemological artefact, rather than something that can be diagnosed ‘out there’, and offer a way of reframing complexity as a ‘dominant problematic’ in anthropology and beyond.     

Going to ‘Pentecost’: how to study Pentecostalism – in Melanesia,for example

In this article, I question regional context as primary context in anthropological analyses. I argue that the idea of historical continuity in a geographical locality/region might prevent us from understanding not only radical change, but also more gradually emerging social patterns that connect the ethnography to very different kinds of histories and places. Concretely, I focus on the global Charismatic and Pentecostal movements, and as an experiment, I ask whether it is possible to go to ‘Pentecost’, instead of going to Melanesia. With ‘going to Pentecost’ as a heuristic device, I suggest it is possible to overcome methodological challenges in the study of global religious movements. In this article, I thus trace the practices and articulations of my interlocutors as part of a wider Pentecostal universe. I show how notions of seeing, borders, separations, and protection are crucial in ‘Pentecost’, and I connect this to key Christian ideas and values.     

Surrender to the Market: Thoughts on Anthropology,The Body Shop,and Intellectuals1

The direction of anthropology over the last century is tied to the shifts from colonialism to postcolonialism and from modernism to postmodernism. These shifts have seen the thoroughgoing incorporation of the world population into the economic, political and juridical domain established through the last throes of colonialism and the transmutations of capitalism and the State. Anthropology, a discipline whose history shows close and regular links with colonial government, also transforms in association with the world it describes and partly creates. Two dominant trends in contemporary anthropology—applied consultancy and historicist self‐reflexivity—are compared for the ways they represent the transmutation, which is characterised, following Fredric Jameson as ‘the surrender to the market’. In this way it is asserted that just as the discipline had hitherto revealed its links to colonialism, it now reveals its links to globalisation through a form of commodified self‐obsession. To illustrate this quality the paper considers the global chain of cosmetics stores, The Body Shop, as an example of ‘late capitalism’ and the moral juridical framework of globalisation. Finally, it treats these developments in anthropology as more generally affecting intellectuals and knowledge production through the promotion of intellectual ‘silence’.     

Is New Zealand vegetation really ‘problematic’? Dansereau's puzzles revisited

Over four decades ago, Pierre Dansereau, the noted North American ecologist, proposed six features of New Zealand vegetation as being problematic or unusual in a global context. We examine his propositions in the light of current ecological knowledge to determine whether or not these can still be considered unusual characteristics of New Zealand vegetation. (1) ‘Climatic change is still progressing’ resulting in disequilibrium between species' distributions and the present climate. New data and methods of analysis now available have removed the impression that Dansereau gained of imprecise zonation, unclear vegetation/climate relations and missing vegetation types. Communities cited as having regeneration failure can now be seen as even‐aged stands that developed after major disturbance, although there are other, also non‐climatic, explanations. However, the cause of the Westland ‘Nothofagus gap’ has become more, rather than less, controversial. (2) ‘Continuity of community composition defies classification’ and ‘Very few New Zealand associations have faithful species' are correct observations, but perhaps equally true of vegetation elsewhere. Dansereau's assertion of low species richness in New Zealand is not supported by the comparative data available. (3) ‘Lack of intolerant [i.e. mid‐seral] trees …’ is not evident with newer information. The order of species in succession, seen as unclear by Dansereau, has been determined by a range of approaches, largely confirming each other. (4) ‘Discrepancies of form and function …’ in divaricate shrubs and widespread heteroblasty are still controversial, with many more explanations. Several abiotic explanations have failed to stand up to investigation. Explanations in terms of herbivory have been well supported, although the extinction of the large avian herbivores makes certainty impossible. (5) ‘Incidence of hybridization …’ remains problematic. We do not know whether the incidence is unusually high, as Dansereau alleged, but the limited comparative data available suggest not. (6) The ‘overwhelming … competing power of exotics' is strongly context dependent. They are prominent in many non‐forest habitats. It seems that they are drivers of the vegetation change in some habitats, yet passengers after disturbance in others. Invasions can be slow, and may still be very incomplete in some ecosystem types. Whether exotics will eventually take over in most communities, or whether the native species will ‘laugh them to scorn’ as Cockayne suggested, only time will tell. In conclusion, some aspects of New Zealand's vegetation seem less unusual with increased knowledge, but others remain ‘problems’.     

A failing anthropology of colonial failure: following a driver's uniform found at Amani research station,Tanzania

The remains of Amani, a century-old scientific laboratory in Tanzania, are quintessential modern relics. When anthropologists turn to such infrastructures of, originally colonial, knowledge-making, their own implication with the object of their study – and with its epistemological and political-economic origins and order – becomes part of the ethnographic pursuit. This entanglement between researcher and research material should challenge familiar realist modes of ethnographic writing ‘about’ such places that elude the anthropologists’ own, compromised position within them. Matters are complicated further when the studied knowledge-making sites already are broken, having failed their purpose – as in the case of the vestiges of an abandoned colonial institution. In this essay, I wonder how such ruins of knowledge-making might transform the knowledge made by anthropologists working within them. Instead of just adding ‘reflexive’ confessions to realist accounts, could writing take part in the defeat that the scientific station's remains seem to embody – writing not ‘after/beyond’ but ‘going along with’ failure? Drawing on non-representational ethnography, and poet-anthropologist Hubert Fichte's embrace of epistemic defeat as anticolonial method, I trace my engagements with just one fragment of the scientific station – a driver's uniform. In doing so, I experiment with an object ethnography that ‘fails’ to detach author and object, or settle the question of failure, and instead foregrounds performativity, ambiguity, and mirth as starting points for an ethnography of, and in, our modern ruins.     

Rethinking Reductionism,or, the Transformative Work of Making the Same

Plant-based drug discovery has long served as an iconic instance of both the power and the folly of scientific reductionism: this is a project, after all, that seeks to turn complex indigenous therapeutic practices into isolated molecules, to be scaled-up, and set into mass circulation. This arena has, for good reason, served as an example of the economic and epistemological violences enacted in forms of ‘recognition’ or ‘translation’ that treat scientific idioms and industrial value as the arbiters of truth and value. But here, I ask whether we are giving too much away, in analytic terms, when we take reductionism for granted. In this essay, I draw on my ethnographic research in Mexico, as well as broader philosophical debates, to suggest critical resources that might allow us to do something other than restage the familiar, infelicitous encounter between ‘embedded’, relational indigenous knowledges and isolating, abstracting, reductionist science. Here, I consider pharmaceutical research and development as a process that works less by reducing than by proliferating materials: in particular, by producing and recontextualising chemical compounds as simultaneously the same, and not the same. This formula has a strong place in pharmaceutical chemistry, and it resonates somewhat surprisingly in domains ranging from transnational drug regulation, to marketing strategies for generic drugs in Mexico, to debates within the philosophy of chemistry about the nature of chemical entities themselves. These conversations offer conceptual resources for rethinking reduction(ism), itself one of the key operators in charged projects of recognising and translating knowledge.     

Aquarium und Museum für Fischzucht, 1906–1937 in Brüssel,Belgien

In the beginning of last century an aquarium opened in Brussels where besides fishes also a collection of amphibians and reptiles was shown to the public. A small museum was also included. This aquarium was started with the aim just to show freshwater fishes but shortly after the opening also marine species were part of the collection.Curious inhabitants of Brussels who wanted to get acquainted with the unknown animal world and people who were interested in the scientific aspects of fishes, pisciculture, marine life and freshwater world found what they were looking for in the small aquarium and museum. Shortly after the inauguration it was described as ‘…a useful aquarium not only for the scientist who looks for information about all facets of live in water but also for the average visitors who want to get new impressions and enjoys the silence but also want to learn something. Families and schools as well have the possibility to let children and students learn about animals in a total new way’. A few renowned specialists and hydro biologists gave support but the aquarium had to face different problems and the interest of the public dropped off. A short time before World War II the aquarium was closed.     

A moderate Buddhist animal research ethics

Though there is a burgeoning interest in applied Buddhist ethics, Buddhist animal research ethics remains an underdeveloped area. In this paper I will explore how some central Buddhist ethical considerations can usefully engage our use of other animals (henceforth, animals) in science. As the scientific use of animals is broad, I will narrow my focus to laboratory science. I will show that, though a Buddhist abolitionism would not be unmotivated, it is possible to reject it. While doing so, it will be important to resist emphasizing elements of Buddhist thought that merely provide reasons to adopt the dominant ethical framework governing laboratory animal research ethics, known as the 3Rs. Though I will suggest how a Buddhist animal research ethics can sometimes permit the use of animals in harmful research, it will also require ethical constraints that resonate with some of the more progressive elements in ‘Western’ bioethics.     

Flexible kinship: shaping transnational families among the Chinese in Tahiti

This article examines the practices of ‘flexible kinship’ used by Chinese migrants in colonial Tahiti. ‘Flexible kinship’ draws attention to the strategic uses that are made of kinship in the context of migration and diaspora: the adjustments to cultural, political, and legal borders that lead to changes in family forms and in the relations between kin. Using a multi‐generational perspective, I examine how families were shaped by successive changes and reversals in legal‐political and economic events and conjunctures over the long twentieth century. I argue for the importance of addressing transnational border‐crossing practices that involve not just a spatial extension of networks but also legal strategies within the host locality. I further show that if it is true that the Confucian hierarchical order has conditioned transnational practices of flexible kinship, then this hierarchy has not only bent to the circumstances, it has to a great extent been weakened. Finally, I argue that the history of familial adjustments has shaped a habitus that maximizes economic and legal security, especially among women.     

A flavour of Alzheimer's

This article describes how today in the United States neurologists diagnose forms of dementia, such as Alzheimer's disease and frontotemporal dementia. Taking as a starting‐point the pervasive context of uncertainty in the diagnosis of neurodegenerative diseases, it examines how uncertainty is not merely an epistemological obstacle to the making of knowledge. On the contrary, the article analyses how uncertainty positively incites the use of clinicians’ ‘feelings’ in diagnostic work. Drawing on observations of clinical consultations and team meetings, it studies how, alongside contemporary instruments of objectification, clinicians use, share, and discuss their ‘feelings’ to ultimately renew knowledge about brain diseases. In documenting the manner in which medical expertise is bound to a concrete experience of the world, this article further explores how experts’ ‘intuition’ can be grasped as a conscious and effortful process, rather than as something ineffable, resisting analysis, and confined to an unconscious background.     

The Science of Animal Suffering

Can suffering in non‐human animals be studied scientifically? Apart from verbal reports of subjective feelings, which are uniquely human, I argue that it is possible to study the negative emotions we refer to as suffering by the same methods we use in ourselves. In particular, by asking animals what they find positively and negatively reinforcing (what they want and do not want), we can define positive and negative emotional states. Such emotional states may or may not be accompanied by subjective feelings but fortunately it is not necessary to solve the problem of consciousness to construct a scientific study of suffering and welfare. Improvements in animal welfare can be based on the answers to two questions: Q1: Will it improve animal health? and Q2: Will it give the animals something they want? This apparently simple formulation has the advantage of capturing what most people mean by ‘improving welfare’ and so halting a potentially dangerous split between scientific and non‐scientific definitions of welfare. It can also be used to validate other controversial approaches to welfare such as naturalness, stereotypies, physiological and biochemical measures. Health and what animals want are thus not just two of many measures of welfare. They provide the definition of welfare against which others can be validated. They also tell us what research we have to do and how we can judge whether welfare of animals has been genuinely improved. What is important, however, is for this research to be done in situ so that it is directly applicable to the real world of farming, the sea or an animal’s wild habitat. It is here that ethology can make major contributions.     

The Effects of Seasonal Forcing on Invertebrate-Disease Interactions with Immune Priming

There is increasing experimental evidence that exposure to low doses of infection may ‘prime’ the immune response of invertebrate hosts, giving them greater protection against future infection. This form of immune memory is not compatible with the ‘acquired immunity’ modelled by the classic Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) epidemiological model, but instead requires the development of an alternative Susceptible-Primed-Infected (SPI) framework. Some initial theoretical work has explored the epidemiological and evolutionary dynamics of the SPI model, but these have assumed hosts exist in a constant environment. In reality, natural invertebrate-disease systems will be subject to significant environmental variation. Here, I use bifurcation analysis using numerical continuation software, complemented with numerical simulations, to investigate the effects of seasonal forcing on the already complex epidemiological dynamics of the SPI model. I show that multi-year cycles, quasi-periodicity, chaos, and multiple stability may all result, and highlight the importance not just of the forcing amplitude, but also the ecological and epidemiological background, for complex dynamics to emerge.