WHEN HAWKS GIVE RISE TO DOVES: THE EVOLUTION AND TRANSITION OF ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES

The question of how altruism can evolve despite its local disadvantage to selfishness has produced a wealth of theoretical and empirical research capturing the attention of scientists across disciplines for decades. One feature that has remained consistent through this outpouring of knowledge has been that researchers have looked to the altruists themselves for mechanisms by which altruism can curtail selfishness. An alternative perspective may be that just as altruists want to limit selfishness in the population, so may the selfish individuals themselves. These alternative perspectives have been most evident in the fairly recent development of enforcement strategies. Punishment can effectively limit selfishness in the population, but it is not free. Thus, when punishment evolves among altruists, the double costs of exploitation from cheaters and punishment make the evolution of punishment problematic. Here we show that punishment can more readily invade selfish populations when associated with selfishness, whereas altruistic punishers cannot. Thereafter, the establishment of altruism because of enforcement by selfish punishers provides the ideal invasion conditions for altruistic punishment, effectively creating a transition of punishment from selfishness to altruistic. Thus, from chaotic beginnings, a little hypocrisy may go a long way in the evolution and maintenance of altruism.     

Genetic relatedness in viscous populations

Summary Hamilton's inclusive fitness rule shows that the evolution of altruism is facilitated by high genetic relatedness of altruists to their beneficiaries. But the evolution of altruism is inhibited when the beneficiaries are also close competitors of the altruist, as will often be true in structured or viscous populations. However, Hamilton's rule still gives the correct condition for the evolution of altruism if relatedness is measured with respect to the local competitive neighbourhood.     

Altruists Proliferate Even at a Selective Disadvantage within Their Own Niche

The evolutionary origin of altruism is a long-standing puzzle. Numerous explanations have been proposed, most prominently based on inclusive fitness or group selection. One possibility that has not yet been considered is that new niches will be created disproportionately often when altruism appears, perhaps by chance, causing altruists to be over-represented in such new niches. This effect is a novel variant of group selection in which altruistic groups benefit by discovering unoccupied niches instead of by competing for the limited resources within a single niche. Both an analytical population genetics model and computational simulations support that altruism systematically arises due to this side effect of increased carrying capacity even when it is strongly selected against within any given niche. In fact, even when selection is very strongly negative and altruism does not develop in most populations, it can still be expected to be observed in a consistent fraction of species. The ecological structure provided by niches thereby may be sufficient for altruists to proliferate even if they are always at a disadvantage within each niche considered individually.     

Familial selection and the evolution of social behaviour re-examined

The equation for the fitness requirements for the evolution of altruism by diploid workers in haplodiploid species was derived from the model. of Scudo & Ghiselin (1975). When the benefit to a family is proportional to the number of altruists, the constraints on fitness were found to be the same as for haploid altruists in haplodiploid species and for workers of ether sex in diploid species, in contrast to the equation given by Scudo & Ghiselin (1975). With this correction, their results are now in agreement both with comparable allele frequency models and with kin selection games theory. The general condition for evolution of altruism under this model, when benefits are not necessarily proportional to the number of altruists, was also derived. The result appears to differ from games theory predictions, but this is solely because the basic assumptions are not comparable. Altruism is less likely to arise under these conditions, which are less favorable for altruism at gene frequencies above 0·33.     

Selective pressures for accurate altruism targeting: evidence from digital evolution for difficult-to-test aspects of inclusive fitness theory

Inclusive fitness theory predicts that natural selection will favour altruist genes that are more accurate in targeting altruism only to copies of themselves. In this paper, we provide evidence from digital evolution in support of this prediction by competing multiple altruist-targeting mechanisms that vary in their accuracy in determining whether a potential target for altruism carries a copy of the altruist gene. We compete altruism-targeting mechanisms based on (i) kinship (kin targeting), (ii) genetic similarity at a level greater than that expected of kin (similarity targeting), and (iii) perfect knowledge of the presence of an altruist gene (green beard targeting). Natural selection always favoured the most accurate targeting mechanism available. Our investigations also revealed that evolution did not increase the altruism level when all green beard altruists used the same phenotypic marker. The green beard altruism levels stably increased only when mutations that changed the altruism level also changed the marker (e.g. beard colour), such that beard colour reliably indicated the altruism level. For kin- and similarity-targeting mechanisms, we found that evolution was able to stably adjust altruism levels. Our results confirm that natural selection favours altruist genes that are increasingly accurate in targeting altruism to only their copies. Our work also emphasizes that the concept of targeting accuracy must include both the presence of an altruist gene and the level of altruism it produces.     

Spotting altruistic dictator game players and mingling with them: the elective assortation of classmates

Altruism can evolve through assortation if the selfish advantage of egoistic individuals is outcompeted by the benefits of mutual cooperation between altruists. This selection process is possible if (a) individuals can distinguish altruists from egoists and (b) altruists cooperate electively with other altruists, leaving egoists no chance but to mingle with each other. This study investigates whether these two conditions are fulfilled in a natural setting. One hundred twenty-two students of six secondary school classes (age 10 to 19 years) played an anonymous dictator game, which functioned as a measure of altruism. Afterwards and unannounced, the students had to estimate their classmates' decisions and did so better than chance. Sociometry revealed that the accuracy of predictions depended on social closeness. Friends and disliked classmates were judged more accurately than liked classmates or those met with indifference. Moreover, altruists were friends with more altruistic persons than were egoists. The results confirm the existence of the two prerequisites for the evolution of altruism through assortation: the predictability of altruistic behavior and the association of altruists.     

Population viscosity and the evolution of altruism

The term population viscosity refers to limited dispersal, which increases the genetic relatedness of neighbors. This effect both supports the evolution of altruism by focusing the altruists' gifts on relatives of the altruist, and also limits the extent to which altruism may emerge by exposing clusters of altruists to stiffer local competition. Previous analyses have emphasized the way in which these two effects can cancel, limiting the viability of altruism. These papers were based on models in which total population density was held fixed. We present here a class of models in which population density is permitted to fluctuate, so that patches of altruists are supported at a higher density than patches of non-altruists. Under these conditions, population viscosity can support the selection of both weak and strong altruism.     

Sex-biased dispersal, haplodiploidy and the evolution of helping in social insects

In his famous haplodiploidy hypothesis, W. D. Hamilton proposed that high sister-sister relatedness facilitates the evolution of kin-selected reproductive altruism among Hymenopteran females. Subsequent analyses, however, suggested that haplodiploidy cannot promote altruism unless altruists capitalize on relatedness asymmetries by helping to raise offspring whose sex ratio is more female-biased than the population at large. Here, we show that haplodiploidy is in fact more favourable than is diploidy to the evolution of reproductive altruism on the part of females, provided only that dispersal is male-biased (no sex-ratio bias or active kin discrimination is required). The effect is strong, and applies to the evolution both of sterile female helpers and of helping among breeding females. Moreover, a review of existing data suggests that female philopatry and non-local mating are widespread among nest-building Hymenoptera. We thus conclude that Hamilton was correct in his claim that 'family relationships in the Hymenoptera are potentially very favourable to the evolution of reproductive altruism'.     

Lower group productivity under kin-selected reproductive altruism

Abstract Hamilton's rule provides the foundation for understanding the genetic evolution of social behavior, showing that altruism is favored by increased relatedness and increased productivity of altruists. But how likely is it that a new altruistic mutation will satisfy Hamilton's rule by increasing the reproductive efficiency of the group? Altruism per se does not improve efficiency, and hence we would not expect a typical altruistic mutation to increase the mean productivity of the population. We examined the conditions under which a mutation causing reproductive altruism can spread when it does not increase productivity. We considered a population divided into temporary groups of genetically similar individuals (typically family groups). We show that the spread of altruism requires a pleiotropic link between altruism and enhanced productivity in diploid organisms, but not in haplodiploid organisms such as Hymenoptera. This result provides a novel biological understanding of the barrier to the spread of reproductive altruism in diploids. In haplodiploid organisms, altruism within families that lowers productivity may spread, provided daughters sacrifice their own reproduction to raise full‐sisters. We verified our results using three single‐locus genetic models that explore a range of the possible reproductive costs of helping. The advantage of female‐to‐female altruism in haplodiploids is a well‐known prediction of Hamilton's rule, but its importance in relaxing the linkage between altruism and efficiency has not been explored. We discuss the possible role of such unproductive altruism in the origins of sociality. We also note that each model predicts a large region of parameter space were polymorphism between altruism and selfishness is maintained, a pattern independent of dominance.     

Altruism Can Be Assessed Correctly Based on Impression

Detection of genuine altruists could be a solution to the problem of subtle cheating. Brown et al. (Evol Psychol 1:42–69, 2003) found that humans could detect altruists using nonverbal cues. However, their experiments can be improved upon in several ways, and further investigation is needed to determine whether altruist-detection abilities are human universals. In our experiment, we used video clips of natural conversations as the stimulus. We asked a sample of Japanese undergraduates to rate their own level of altruism and then to estimate the videotaped targets’ altruism using the same scale. The perceivers were able to estimate the targets’ altruism levels accurately. Perceivers’ altruism score did not affect their ability to discriminate between altruists and non-altruists. Perceivers’ impressions of the altruist and non-altruist targets were also found to be different. Coding of nonverbal behavior of the targets revealed that altruists exhibited more “felt smiles” than non-altruists, which also supports the results of the previous study.     

Selection for altruism through random drift in variable size populations

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: Altruistic behavior is defined as helping others at a cost to oneself and a lowered fitness. The lower fitness implies that altruists should be selected against, which is in contradiction with their widespread presence is nature. Present models of selection for altruism (kin or multilevel) show that altruistic behaviors can have 'hidden' advantages if the 'common good' produced by altruists is restricted to some related or unrelated groups. These models are mostly deterministic, or assume a frequency dependent fitness. RESULTS: Evolutionary dynamics is a competition between deterministic selection pressure and stochastic events due to random sampling from one generation to the next. We show here that an altruistic allele extending the carrying capacity of the habitat can win by increasing the random drift of "selfish" alleles. In other terms, the fixation probability of altruistic genes can be higher than those of a selfish ones, even though altruists have a smaller fitness. Moreover when populations are geographically structured, the altruists advantage can be highly amplified and the fixation probability of selfish genes can tend toward zero. The above results are obtained both by numerical and analytical calculations. Analytical results are obtained in the limit of large populations. CONCLUSIONS: The theory we present does not involve kin or multilevel selection, but is based on the existence of random drift in variable size populations. The model is a generalization of the original Fisher-Wright and Moran models where the carrying capacity depends on the number of altruists.     

The spatial spread of altruism versus the evolutionary response of egoists

Several recent models have shown that altruism can spread in viscous populations, i.e. in spatially structured populations within which individuals interact only with their immediate neighbours and disperse only over short distances. I first confirm this result with an individual-based model of a viscous population, where an individual can vary its level of investment into a behaviour that is beneficial to its neighbours but costly to itself. Two distinct classes of individuals emerge: egoists with no or very little investment into altruism, and altruists with a high level of investment; intermediate levels of altruism are not maintained. I then extend the model to investigate the consequences of letting interaction and dispersal distances evolve along with altruism. Altruists maintain short distances, while the egoists respond to the spread of altruism by increasing their interaction and dispersal distances. This allows the egoistic individuals to be maintained in the population at a high frequency. Furthermore, the coevolution of investment into altruism and interaction distance can lead to a stable spatial pattern, where stripes of altruists (with local interactions) alternate with stripes of egoists (with far-reaching interactions). Perhaps most importantly, this approach shows that the ease with which altruism spreads in viscous populations is maintained despite countermeasures evolved by egoists.     

Nepotism vs Tit-For-Tat,or, why should you be nice to your rotten brother?

Summary It is well known that interactions among relatives facilitate the evolution of altruistic behaviours. Game theoretic models show, however, that guarded altruism (such as Tit-For-Tat) can evolve among non-relatives when individuals interact many times and cheating behaviours can be punished. Strangely, no one has yet asked whether the guarded altruism that evolves among non-relatives might also evolve among close relatives, supplanting unconditional altriusm. We present a series of one-locus sexual haploid models in which Tit-For-Tat, unconditional altruists and selfish individuals interact in groups of full siblings. Tit-For-Tat frequently (but not always) replaced unguarded altruism, in which case the strategic rules for interacting with kin vs non-kin are identical. Even when Tit-For-Tat is selected at a single locus, however, by withholding altruism for non-reciprocating relatives it may qualify as an outlaw from the standpoint of modifier genes at other loci.     

Altruism, cheating, and anticheater adaptations in cellular slime molds

Cellular slime molds (CSMs) possess a remarkable life cycle that encompasses an extreme act of altruism. CSM cells live as individual amoebae until starved, then aggregate and ultimately transform themselves into a multicellular fruiting body. This fruiting body consists of stalk cells (altruists that eventually die) and spores (the beneficiaries of this sacrifice). Altruistic systems such as this are vulnerable to cheaters, which are individuals unrelated to the altruists that obtain the benefits provided by them without reciprocating. Here, we investigate two forces that can maintain CSM altruism despite cheating: kin selection and anticheater adaptations. First, we present new kinship-based models based on CSM developmental biology to evaluate the efficacy of kin selection. These models show that stalk-making genotypes can still be maintained when aggregations are initiated by multiple "founder" spores, provided that spores of stalkless fruiting bodies have low rates of dispersal and dispersal success is a concave function of stalk height. Second, we review proposals that several features of CSM development, such as the chemical suppression of the redifferentiation of prestalk cells into prespores, act as anticheater adaptations.     

Evolution,altruism and cognitive architecture: a critique of Sober and Wilson’s argument for psychological altruism

Sober and Wilson have propose a cluster of arguments for the conclusion that “natural selection is unlikely to have given us purely egoistic motives” and thus that psychological altruism is true. I maintain that none of these arguments is convincing. However, the most powerful of their arguments raises deep issues about what egoists and altruists are claiming and about the assumptions they make concerning the cognitive architecture underlying human motivation.     

Pro-community altruism and social status in a Shuar village

Reciprocity theory (RT) and costly signaling theory (CST) provide different explanations for the high status of pro-community altruists: RT proposes that altruists are positively and negatively sanctioned by others, whereas CST proposes that altruists are attractive to others. Only RT, however, is beset by first- and higher-order free rider problems, which must be solved in order for RT to explain status allocations. In this paper, several solutions to RT’s free rider problems are proposed, and data about status allocations to Ecuadorian Shuar pro-community altruists are analyzed in light of RT and CST. These data confirm that perceived pro-community altruists are indeed high status and suggest that (1) community residents skillfully monitor the altruism of coresidents, (2) residents who engage in opportunities to broadcast desirable qualities are high status only to the extent that they are considered altruistic, and (3) individuals who sanction coresidents based on coresidents’ contributions to the community are themselves relatively high status. To a greater extent than CST, RT straightforwardly predicts all of these results.     

Unifying the theories of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism

Inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism are widely thought to be distinct explanations for how altruism evolves. Here we show that they rely on the same underlying mechanism. We demonstrate this commonality by applying Hamilton's rule, normally associated with inclusive fitness, to two simple models of reciprocal altruism: one, an iterated prisoner's dilemma model with conditional behavior; the other, a mutualistic symbiosis model where two interacting species differ in conditional behaviors, fitness benefits, and costs. We employ Queller's generalization of Hamilton's rule because the traditional version of this rule does not apply when genotype and phenotype frequencies differ or when fitness effects are nonadditive, both of which are true in classic models of reciprocal altruism. Queller's equation is more general in that it applies to all situations covered by earlier versions of Hamilton's rule but also handles nonadditivity, conditional behavior, and lack of genetic similarity between altruists and recipients. Our results suggest changes to standard interpretations of Hamilton's rule that focus on kinship and indirect fitness. Despite being more than 20 years old, Queller's generalization of Hamilton's rule is not sufficiently appreciated, especially its implications for the unification of the theories of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism.     

Competitive altruism: from reciprocity to the handicap principle

Current work on cooperation is focused on the theory of reciprocal altruism. However, reciprocity is just one way of getting a return on an investment in altruism and is difficult to apply to many examples. Reciprocity theory addresses how animals respond dynamically to others so as to cooperate without being exploited. I discuss how introducing differences in individual generosity together with partner choice into models of reciprocity can lead to an escalation in altruistic behaviour. Individuals may compete for the most altruistic partners and non-altruists may become ostracized. I refer to this phenomenon as competitive altruism and propose that it can represent a move away from the dynamic responsiveness of reciprocity. Altruism may be rewarded in kind, but rewards may be indirectly accrued or may not involve the return of altruism at all, for example if altruists tend to be chosen as mates. This variety makes the idea of competitive altruism relevant to behaviours which cannot be explained by reciprocity. I consider whether altruism might act as a signal of quality, as proposed by the handicap principle. I suggest that altruistic acts could make particularly effective signals because of the inherent benefits to receivers. I consider how reciprocity and competitive altruism are related and how they may be distinguished.     

Evolution of eusociality by kin selection: the effect of inbreeding between siblings

The effect of sib-sib inbreeding on the evolution of eusocial altruism in Hymenoptera by kin selection is examined by computer simulations. Inbreeding has minor effects on the ratio of relatedness to siblings: relatedness to offspring, but this ratio remains approximately one no matter what the degree of inbreeding. This implies that although inbreeding increases relatedness to siblings, relatedness to offspring increases to the same degree. Hence, inbreeding does not make the evolution of altruism more likely. If all the brothers of (non-mating) altruists outbreed, thereby increasing the frequency of altruism alleles in the outbred fraction of the population especially at low gene frequency, then altruism can be promoted by inbreeding. However, this is an indirect advantage, not attributable to inbreeding per se.     

Sex ratio changes and the evolution of eusociality in the hymenoptera: Simulation and games theory studies

Computer simulations of the evolution of altruistic (worker) behaviour with concomitant sex ratio biasing by female Hymenoptera were used to calculate K_min, the minimum K preventing selection against altruism. K is the ratio of the number of siblings raised by a worker, to the number of offspring she would have raised otherwise. The results were compared to a games theory analysis of the same system.The simulation results agreed exactly with games theory predictions under Hardy-Weinberg conditions, but deviated from them somewhat during selection. K_min varied with P (the proportion of altruists). If altruists made the sex ratio more female-biased, K_min < 1 at low P, but with reasonable brood sizes K_min > 1 at high P. If queens raised a second brood, simultaneously with brood raised by altruists, the value of K_min at high P was reduced with decreasing brood size. Decreasing the degree of female-bias generally caused a decrease in K_min with increasing P; altruism with sex ratio biasing toward males was always selected against. Simulations confirmed that selection is positive when K > K_min and negative when K < K_min. Thus altruism can be favoured by sex ratio biasing while P is low, but as P increases it becomes increasingly disadvantaged relative to altruism without sex ratio biasing (when K ? 1 at all P). It is concluded that sex ratio biasing is not particularly favourable for the evolution of social behaviour in Hymenoptera.