Canadian outpatients and advance directives: poor knowledge and little experience but positive attitudes.

OBJECTIVE: To examine the knowledge of, previous experience with, attitudes toward and perceived barriers to completing advance directives among outpatients at two general medicine clinics. DESIGN: Cross-sectional questionnaire administered in face-to-face structured interviews. SETTING: General internal-medicine outpatient clinics at a university teaching hospital. PATIENTS: One hundred and five adult outpatients who could communicate in spoken English and who consented to be interviewed. RESULTS: Of 167 patients approached, 58 were excluded because they could not communicate in spoken English, and 4 refused to participate. Of the remaining 105 patients, 17 (16%) knew about living wills, 12 (11%) about durable powers of attorney for health care and 4 (4%) about advance directives. Twenty-three (22%) had thought about their preferences for life-sustaining treatment, 20 (19%) had discussed them, none had written them down, and 45 (43%) had thought about choosing a proxy. Sixty-one (58%) wanted to think about their preferences for treatment, 65 (62%) wanted to discuss them, 32 (30%) wanted to write them down, and 80 (76%) wanted to choose a proxy. The perceived barriers to completing an advance directive were inability to write, the belief that an advance directive was unnecessary, a fatalistic attitude, previous discussion of preferences, a desire to leave the decision to doctors, uncertainty about preferences, a desire to discuss preferences rather than document them, a desire to wait until the situation arose, a desire to write down preferences in the future and a desire to avoid thinking about preferences or advance directives. Respondents with more knowledge of life-sustaining treatments were more likely to want to complete an advance directive. CONCLUSIONS: Outpatients have positive attitudes toward advance directives, but their knowledge and experience are limited. These data underscore the need for patient education and for policies to eliminate the barriers to completing advance directives that patients face.     

Advance directives, autonomy and unintended death

This Paper argues that Living wills are typically nebulous and confused documents that do not effectively enable you to determine your future treatment. Worse, signing a living will can end your life in ways you never intended, long before you are either incompetent or terminally ill. This danger is compounded by the fact that those who implement living wills are often themselves dangerously confused, so that, for example, they cannot be relied upon to distinguish living wills from DNR orders. In addition, the Paper argues that advance directives concerning resuscitation are often so confused that they end the lives of healthy, alert people who have not suffered cardiac or pulmonary arrest. Finally, the paper argues that advance directives establishing durable power of attorney for health care often preserve the chief dangers of living wills. Suggestions are offered as to how you can most effectively direct your future treatment without endangering your life.     

Family physicians' attitudes toward advance directives.

OBJECTIVE: To examine the attitudes toward, the experience with and the knowledge of advance directives of family physicians in Ontario. DESIGN: Cross-sectional survey. PARTICIPANTS: A questionnaire was mailed to 1000 family physicians, representing a random sample of one-third of the active members of the Ontario College of Family Physicians; 643 (64%) responded. RESULTS: In all, 86% of the physicians favoured the use of advance directives, but only 19% had ever discussed them with more than 10 patients. Most of the physicians agreed with statements supporting the use of advance directives and disagreed with statements opposing their use. Of the respondents 80% reported that they had never used a directive in managing an incompetent patient. Of the physicians who responded that they had such experience, over half said that they had not always followed the directions contained in the directive. The proportions of physicians who responded that certain patient groups should be offered the opportunity to complete an advance directive were 96% for terminally ill patients, 95% for chronically ill patients, 85% for people with human immunodeficiency virus infection, 77% for people over 65 years of age, 43% for all adults, 40% for people admitted to hospital on an elective basis and 33% for people admitted on an emergency basis. The proportions of physicians who felt that the following strategies would encourage them to offer advance directives to their patients were 92% for public education, 90% for professional education, 89% for legislation protecting physicians against liability when following a directive, 80% for legislation supporting the use of directives, 79% for hospital policy supporting the use of directives, 73% for reimbursement for time spent discussing directives with patients and 64% for hospital policy requiring that all patients be routinely offered the opportunity to complete a directive at the time of admission. CONCLUSIONS: Family physicians favour advance directives but use them infrequently. Most physicians support offering them to terminally or chronically ill patients but not to all patients at the time of admission to hospital. Although governments emphasize legislation, most physicians believe that public and professional education programs would be at least as likely as legislation to encourage them to offer advance directives to their patients.     

Choosing between life and death: patient and family perceptions of the decision not to resuscitate the terminally ill cancer patient

In keeping with the pre-eminent status accorded autonomy within Australia, Europe, and the United States, medical practice requires that patients authorize do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders, intended to countermand the default practice in hospitals of instituting cardiopulmonary-resuscitation (CPR) on all patients experiencing cardio-pulmonary arrest. As patients typically do not make these decisions proactively, however, family members are often asked to act as surrogate decision-makers and decide on the patient's behalf. Although the appropriateness of patients or their families having to decide about the provision of CPR has been challenged, there has been little examination of how patients and their families talk about and negotiate such decisions, particularly in the context of the patient's imminent death. In this article, part of a larger study analysing interviews with 28 patients (13 female) with cancer within weeks of their death, and 20 others (predominantly family) attending, we argue that a common assumption underpinning participants' talk about the DNR decision (i.e. forgoing CPR) is that it requires a choice between life and death. Using illustrative examples, we demonstrate that in making decisions about CPR, patients and their families are implicitly required to make moral judgements about the value of the patient's life, including their relationships with significant others. We identify some implications of these empirical observations for the development of ethically appropriate policies and practices regarding patient autonomy and surrogacy at the end of life.     

END‐OF‐LIFE CARE IN THE 21st CENTURY: ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN UNIVERSAL RIGHTS DISCOURSE

This article explores universal normative bases that could help to shape a workable legal construct that would facilitate a global use of advance directives. Although I believe that advance directives are of universal character, my primary aim in approaching this issue is to remain realistic. I will make three claims. First, I will argue that the principles of autonomy, dignity and informed consent, embodied in the Oviedo Convention and the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, could arguably be regarded as universal bases for the global use of advance directives. Second, I will demonstrate that, despite the apparent consensus of ethical authorities in support of their global use, it is unlikely, for the time being, that such consensus could lead to unqualified legal recognition of advance directives, because of different understandings of the nature of the international rules, meanings of autonomy and dignity which are context‐specific and culture‐specific, and existing imperfections that make advance directives either unworkable or hardly applicable in practice. The third claim suggests that the fact that the concept of the advance directive is not universally shared does not mean that it should not become so, but never as the only option in managing incompetent patients. A way to proceed is to prioritize work on developing higher standards in managing incompetent patients and on progressing towards the realization of universal human rights in the sphere of bioethics, by advocating a universal, legally binding international convention that would outlaw human rights violations in end‐of‐life decision‐making.     

DOES PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY PROTECT MEDICAL FUTILITY JUDGMENTS?

Despite substantial controversy, the use of futility judgments in medicine is quite common, and has been backed by the implementation of hospital policies and professional guidelines on medical futility. The controversy arises when health care professionals (HCPs) consider a treatment futile which patients or families believe to be worthwhile: should HCPs be free to refuse treatments in such a case, or be required to provide them? Most physicians seem convinced that professional autonomy protects them from being forced to provide treatments they judge medically futile, given the lack of patient benefit as well as the waste of medical resources involved. The argument from professional autonomy has been presented in a number of articles, but it has not been subjected to much critical scrutiny. In this paper I distinguish three versions of the argument: 1) that each physician should be free to exercise his or her own medical judgment; 2) that the medical profession as a whole may provide futility standards to govern the practice of its members; and 3) that the moral integrity of each physician serves as a limit to treatment demands. I maintain that none of these versions succeeds in overcoming the standard objection that futility determinations involve value judgments best left to the patients, their designated surrogates, or their families. Nor do resource considerations change this fact, since they should not influence the properly patient‐centered judgment about futility.     

A proposal for the use of advance directives in the treatment of incompetent mentally ill persons

[M]y question is how these patients while competent might be able to give their own informed consent to treatment, despite being both unwilling and incompetent to do so when treatment is to be begun, thereby reducing the need to relax the dangerousness criteria for involuntary commitment. It is uncontroversial that the dangerousness requirement would be too restrictive for all treatment of mental illness. When competent patients voluntarily seek and/or accept treatment for their mental illness, neither public policy nor medical practice restricts treatment to those patients judged to be dangerous. Instead, criteria should be and generally are comparable to those for the treatment of physical illness -- whether the patient is ill, in this case mentally ill, and likely to benefit from treatment. Through use of advance directives, it would be possible for mentally ill persons who are currently refusing treatment to give prior consent, while competent and with their disease in remission, to treatment at a later time when they are incompetent, have become noncompliant, and are refusing treatment. My proposal is certainly not entirely novel, since others have made similar proposals under the heading of Ulysses contracts and voluntary commitment contracts. Addressing briefly some of the criticisms of these earlier proposals will bring out one fundamental difference between them and my proposal here for a new use of advance directives -- whether the patient must then be incompetent when the contract or directive made earlier is later invoked -- a difference I shall argue strongly favors my proposal.     

Making an advance directive.

The introduction in Britain of advance directives--which allow a person to state in advance of becoming incompetent that they wish to take part in treatment decisions when no longer mentally competent--has now been advocated by the medical and legal establishments. The practical application of directives relating to health care would be simplified by the adoption of a standard model document together with guidelines summarising the background clinical conditions and any subsequent acute events that may make it appropriate to trigger the use of a directive. As no specific legislation exists, good communication is needed at the various stages between the drafting and implementation of directives if the system of directives is to be successful.     

Acculturation and end-of-life decision making: comparison of Japanese and Japanese-American focus groups

Variation in decision-making about end-of-life care among ethnic groups creates clinical conflicts. In order to understand changes in preferences for end-of-life care among Japanese who immigrate to the United States, we conducted 18 focus groups with 122 participants: 65 English-speaking Japanese Americans, 29 Japanese-speaking Japanese Americans and 28 Japanese living in Japan. Negative feelings toward living in adverse health states and receiving life-sustaining treatment in such states permeated all three groups. Fear of being meiwaku, a physical, psychological or financial caregiving burden on loved ones, was a prominent concern. They preferred to die pokkuri (popping off) before they become end stage or physically frail. All groups preferred group-oriented decision-making with family. Although advance directives were generally accepted, Japanese participants saw written directives as intrusive whereas Japanese Americans viewed them mainly as tools to reduce conflict created by dying person's wishes and a family's kazoku no jo--responsibility to sustain the dying patient. These findings suggest that in the United States Japanese cultural values concerning end-of-life care and decision-making process are largely preserved.     

Advance directives: the views of health care professionals.

OBJECTIVES: This study examined the views and experiences of 20 physicians and 20 nurses at a major Canadian teaching hospital regarding the use of advance directives in clinical care. DESIGN: The participants were purposively drawn from four clinical specialties: family and community medicine, oncology, intensive care and geriatrics. Detailed interviews were conducted in person. Content analysis was used to code the data, which were further analysed with both quantitative and qualitative techniques. MAIN RESULTS: Thirty-nine of the 40 participants favoured the use of advance directives in clinical care; physicians had somewhat less positive attitudes than nurses toward such directives. Advance directives were thought by participants to be helpful in resolving disagreements between patients and their families about treatment options; in making patients more comfortable, both physically and psychologically, during the process of dying; and in opening up communication and trust among patients, their families and health care professionals. Concerns about the use of advance directives focused on the lack of clarity in some patients'' instructions, the absence of legal status for directives, the possible interference with a practitioner''s clinical judgement, the adequacy and appropriateness of patients'' information about their circumstances, and the type of intervention (passive or active) requested by patients. CONCLUSIONS: New regulations and legislation are making the use of advance directives more widespread. Health care professionals should participate in the development and implementation of these directives. Continuing professional education is essential in this regard.     

A direct advance on advance directives

Advance directives (ADs), which are also sometimes referred to as 'living wills', are statements made by a person that indicate what treatment she should not be given in the event that she is not competent to consent or refuse at the future moment in question. As such, ADs provide a way for patients to make decisions in advance about what treatments they do not want to receive, without doctors having to find proxy decision-makers or having recourse to the doctrine of necessity. While patients can request particular treatments in an AD, only refusals are binding. This paper will examine whether ADs safeguard the autonomy and best interests of the incompetent patient, and whether legislating for the use of ADs is justified, using the specific context of the legal situation in the United Kingdom to illustrate the debate. The issue of whether the law should permit ADs is itself dependent on the issue of whether ADs are ethically justified; thus we must answer a normative question in order to answer the legislative one. It emerges that ADs suffer from two major problems, one related to autonomy and one to consent. First, ADs' emphasis on precedent autonomy effectively sentences some people who want to live to death. Second, many ADs might not meet the standard criteria for informed refusal of treatment, because they fail on the crucial criterion of sufficient information. Ultimately, it transpires that ADs are typically only appropriate for patients who temporarily lose physical or mental capacity.     

Ethics guidelines for research with the recently dead

The objective of the multidisciplinary expert Consensus Panel on Research with the Recently Dead (CPRRD) was to craft ethics guidelines for research with the recently dead. The CPRRD recommends that research with the recently dead: (i) receive scientific and ethical review and oversight; (ii) involve the community of potential research subjects; (iii) be coordinated with organ procurement organizations; (iv) not conflict with organ donation or required autopsy; (v) use procedures respectful of the dead; (vi) be restricted to one procedure per day; (vii) preferably be authorized by first-person consent, though both general advance research directives and surrogate consent are acceptable; (viii) protect confidentiality; (ix) not impose costs on subjects' estates or next of kin and not involve payment; (x) clearly explain ultimate disposition of the body.     

Durable power of attorney for health care. Are we ready for it?

Health care professionals need to be well informed about advance directives for medical care in the event a patient becomes incapacitated. The Patient Self-Determination Act requires that all patients be advised of their options at the time of hospital admission. Hospitals and health care professionals will need to work together to plan for implementing this law. We surveyed 215 physicians, nurses, and social workers at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center about the California advance directive, the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care. Attitudes were generally positive. All of the social workers had heard of the durable power of attorney directive, but 36% of physicians and nurses had never heard of it and an additional 20% had no experience with one. For respondents who had heard of the directive, the mean knowledge score was 6.35 of a possible 10 (5 predicted by chance). Respondents brought up the issue of durable power of attorney with patients before a crisis only 19% of the time and determined whether one had been signed for only 16% of older patients in hospital. The most commonly cited reasons for failure to discuss this with patients were lack of proper forms, pamphlets, or a place to refer a patient. Of those who had ever seen such a document in use, 42% were aware of a problem with it at some time. Whereas attitudes toward advance directives are positive, many physicians and nurses had little knowledge of the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care and were poorly equipped to discuss it with patients. We encourage educating hospital staff to prepare for the enactment of the Patient Self-Determination Act. We also recommend that the concerns raised by professionals about the use of a durable power of attorney be addressed.     

Futility and the obligations of physicians

It is becoming increasingly common (at least in the United States) for doctors to appeal to futility judgments as the basis for certain types of clinical decisions, such as the decision to withhold CPR. The clinical use of futility judgments raises two basic questions regarding futility. First, how is the concept of futility to be understood? Secondly, once we have a clearer understanding of futility, what role should determinations of futility play in clinical decision-making? Much of the discussion about the concept of futility has centered on the value-ladenness of futility judgments. I argue that futility determinations need to be distinguished from two other types of value-based judgments, namely, identification of the goals of treatment and treatment decisions based on an assessment of the benefits and burdens of treatment. If this distinction is sound, it suggests a very limited role for futility determinations in clinical decisionmaking, a role which should serve to promote communication between doctor and patient.     

Patients' Receipt and Understanding of Written Information about a Resucitation Policy

Aims: To assess patient receipt of written information. To ensure patients understand the written information about a resuscitation policy and to determine whether they disapproved of or had concerns about the policy.
Methods: All admissions to four wards of the hospital were approached for an interview. A set questionnaire was asked by one of 2 interviewers.
Results: 72% of 572 admissions were interviewed. Refusal accounted for only 2 of the people not interviewed. 11% were unable to advocate for themselves by reason of mental incompetence, inability to communicate or impairment secondary to their illness.
Of the 401 interviewed only 49% recalled receiving the patient information booklet. Few patients (17%) recalled reading the information in the patient information booklet. They were all then given the paragraph about the hospital's resuscitation policy. 352 were asked their understanding and only 61% demonstrated that they understood the paragraph. 91% of all 401 patients approved of the hospital having the option of DNR orders. 31% of people however had concerns related to DNR orders. These are discussed.
Conclusions: Many acutely unwell patients are unable to advocate for themselves. Written information is a poor method of communicating with patients. There was limited receipt of the information and many misunderstood the paragraph about the hospitals resuscitation policy. There was a wide range of patient thoughts and concerns expressed.     

Advance directives, dementia, and 'the someone else problem'

Advance directives permit competent adult patients to provide guidance regarding their care in the event that they lose the capacity to make medical decisions. One concern about the use of advance directives is the possibility that, in certain cases in which a patient undergoes massive psychological change, the individual who exists after such change is literally a (numerically) distinct individual from the person who completed the directive. If this is true, there is good reason to question the authority of the directive ‐ which is supposed to apply to the individual who completed it, not to someone else. This is 'the someone else problem'.
After briefly introducing advance directives as a basis for medical decision-making, this paper elaborates 'the someone else problem' in the context of severe dementia. The paper then reconstructs the reasoning that leads to this putative problem and exposes the important underlying assumption that we are essentially persons. An alternative view of what we are, one that regards personhood as inessential, is then considered, before several arguments are advanced in favor of that alternative view. The paper next explores implications for advance directives: 'The someone else problem' is effectively dissolved, while it is noted that a related problem (one beyond the paper's scope) may persist. A few implications beyond advance directives are also identified.     

Medicolegal considerations in the initiation and termination of resuscitation in Canada.

Medicolegal issues in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and emergency cardiac care were considered in the United States by the National Conference on Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in 1985. This paper discusses these issues in the Canadian context. Although there is little legislation or case precedent in Canada to guide providers of CPR in decision-making, there appears to be little risk of liability or prosecution for competently rendered care. Providers should be cautious in withholding or withdrawing resuscitative measures from incompetent patients when brain death has not occurred and cardiovascular unresponsiveness has not been demonstrated. However, resuscitation may be withheld when a competent patient refuses it or if there is another medically and legally valid reason to do so.     

In Memoriam

The Patient Self-Determination Act was implemented in December 1991. Before and after its implementation, we used a structured interview of 302 randomly selected patients to determine their awareness, understanding, and use of advance directives. Implementation of the Act did not have a major effect on these. Although more than 90% of patients were aware of the living will, only about a third selected the correct definition or the correct circumstances in which it applied, and less than 20% of patients had completed one. About a third of patients were aware of a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care and chose the correct definition, and about half identified the correct circumstances in which it applies; less than 10% had completed such a document. Surprisingly, patients who said they had completed advance directives did not demonstrate better understanding of these documents. Our results indicate that many patients, including some who have completed advance directives, do not fully understand them. It may be unwise to regard these documents as carefully considered, compelling statements of patients'' preferences. Appropriate responses to our findings include increased public education, revising state statutes to bring them into congruence with public perception, and expanding the dialogue between physicians and patients.     

Rational desires and the limitation of life-sustaining treatment

It is accepted that treatment of previously competent, now incompetent patients can be limited if that is what the patient would desire, if she were now competent. Expressed past preferences or an advance directive are often taken to constitute sufficient evidence of what a patient would now desire. I distinguish between desires and rational desires. I argue that for a desire to be an expression of a person's autonomy, it must be or satisfy that person's rational desires. A person rationally desires a course of action if that person desires it while being in possession of all available relevant facts, without committing relevant error of logic, and "vividly imagining" what its consequences would be like for her. I argue that some competent, expressed desires obstruct autonomy. I show that several psychological mechanisms operate to prevent a person rationally evaluating what future life in a disabled state would be like. Rational evaluation is difficult. However, treatment limitation, if it is to respect autonomy, must be in accord with a patient's rational desires, and not merely her expressed desires. I illustrate the implications of these arguments for the use of advance directives and for the treatment of competent patients.     

Implementatie van niet-reanimeerbeleid op afdelingen acute geriatrie van Vlaamse ziekenhuizen in 2002 nog niet voltooid

Do-Not-Resuscitate Policy on Acute Geriatric Wards in Flanders, Belgium. This study describes the historical development and status of a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) policy on acute geriatric wards in Flanders, Belgium. In 2002 (the year Belgium voted a law on euthanasia), a structured mail questionnaire was sent to all head geriatricians of acute geriatric wards in Flanders (N=94). Respondents were asked about the existence, development, and implementation of the DNR policy (guidelines and order forms). The response was 76.6%. Development of DNR policy began in 1985, with a step-up in 1997 and 2001. In 2002, a DNR policy was available in 86.1% of geriatric wards, predominantly with institutional DNR guidelines and individual, patient-specific DNR order forms. The policy was initiated and developed predominantly from an institutional perspective by the hospital. The forms were not standardized and generally lacked room to document patient involvement in the decision making process. Implementation of institutional DNR guidelines and individual DNR order forms on geriatric wards in Flanders lagged behind that of other countries and was still incomplete in 2002. DNR policies varied in content and scope and were predominantly an expression of institutional defensive attitudes rather than a tool to promote patient involvement in DNR and other end-of-life decisions. Tijdschr Gerontol Geriatr 2007; 38: 246-254